The disruptive potential of PWLAN at the country-level: The cases of Germany,the UK,and the USA

This paper analyzes the impact of WLAN technologies for incumbent MNOs based on an empirical cross-country study of the players in the public WLAN-hotspot market using the theory of disruptive innovation and theoretical extensions for the industry- and country-level. The main research question to be analyzed is whether and why PWLAN has shown a disruptive or sustaining impact trend for incumbent MNOs in the hotspot markets of Germany, the UK, and the USA in recent years. The results imply that incumbent MNOs and new entrants have taken advantage of the opportunity provided by PWLAN, but the market success of both types of players varies between the countries analyzed. Incumbent MNOs dominate in Germany but not in the UK and the USA. The reasons for these country-specific differences were further investigated, and the results suggest that the analysis of disruptive potential in telecommunications needs to include country- and firm-specific factors, which are, again, largely influenced by the local regulation.     

The competitive effects of resale versus facility-based entry: evidence from the long-distance market

This paper examines the ability of entry by either resellers or facilities-based carriers to discipline the pricing behavior of a vertically integrated incumbent supplier. Theoretical considerations suggest that, once a sufficient amount of entry has occurred at both vertical stages—transmission and retail functions—additional entry at either stage can push final output toward the competitive level. Under these conditions, entry at either stage may serve as a gross complement or substitute for entry at the other stage. Data from the interLATA telecommunications market are used to test the relevant hypotheses. Our findings are not expected to be directly applicable to the local exchange and electricity markets as those markets are currently constituted. When these industries begin to exhibit structural characteristics that resemble the long-distance market, however, our findings should become relevant there as well.     

Structural separation versus vertical integration: Lessons for telecommunications from electricity reforms

Structural separation between network and retail functions is increasingly being mandated in the telecommunications sector to countervail the market power of incumbent operators. Experience of separation in the electricity sector offers insights for policy-makers considering telecommunications reforms. Despite apparent competitive benefits, the costs of contracting increase markedly when short-term focused electricity retail operations are separated from longer-term generation infrastructure investments (which require large up-front fixed and sunk cost components). The combination of mismatches in investment horizons, entry barriers, and risk preference and information asymmetries between generators and retailers leads to thin contract markets, increased hold-up risk, perverse wholesale risk management incentives, and bankruptcies. Direct parallels in the telecommunications sector indicate exposure to similar complications, intensifying many of the contractual risks arising from regulated access arrangements. Thus, as in electricity, competition between vertically integrated telecommunications providers would likely induce more efficient and sustainable investment and competition than would separation.     

Wireline deregulation: The Canadian experience

Changes in the state of telephony markets paved the way for significant regulatory and legislative reforms in the telecommunications sector in the 1990s. In Canada, the 1993 Telecommunications Act was enacted to promote the emergence of competitors in a market that had until then been dominated by regional monopolies. This paper examines the Canadian telecommunications regulatory framework and analyzes the regulatory privileges given to new entrants at the expense of former telecommunications monopolies. Such regulations, which were meant to induce competition, ended up hurting consumers and distorting the market process. This paper also shows how the Canadian government recently eliminated many of those regulations by seizing control of the policy agenda from the telecommunications regulator.     

Infrastructure investment and optimal access regulation in the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization

In this paper, we compare the optimal access regulation under three different market configurations that approximate the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization. We show that in the first stage of market liberalization the regulator has to balance between static efficiency and investment and that the optimal access price may be above marginal cost. In the second stage, two different outcomes are possible. If entrants tend to underinvest, the regulator balances between static efficiency and investment. If entrants tend to overinvest, the regulator sets the access price as low as possible in order to prevent or limit infrastructure duplication. Interestingly, we find that in the third stage of market liberalization the regulator may decide to promote infrastructure duplication and to set the access price above the price in the first stage of market liberalization, even if telecommunications network operators tend to overinvest in infrastructure duplication.     

Interconnection regulation in India: Lessons for developing countries

Interconnection is not only a major competition issue per se, it is also a critical element of the basic telecommunications agreement of the WTO. An important issue in interconnection regulation is interconnection charging especially in the context of a dominant incumbent. Most regulators in developing countries face challenges in setting interconnection prices in the absence of market information on the incumbent's or entrant's costs, competition or demand and models suited for developing countries that also adhere to the WTO guidelines. There are few papers that illustrate the challenges faced by regulators in such a context. This paper attempts to bridge the gap by highlighting the nature of interaction between the regulator, incumbent, judiciary and the political environment, the role of formal models in setting interconnection charges and the implications of rapid technological changes in a developing country context through a case study of India.The case study highlights the point that besides independence, it is important to vest enforcement powers in the regulatory agency for it to be credible. Incorporating the WTO interconnection guidelines within a developing country context has implications for network growth and poses challenges to the regulatory processes.Although Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) started with a distortionary, inefficiently priced network providing low coverage and quality, it has meandered its way to a more reasonable network access pricing regime. The decreasing cost of technology and increasing incomes in India and political interventions in regulation have put pressure on TRAI to provide lower interconnection charges and faster telecom growth. Thus, it is pragmatic for regulators to start with a “quick and dirty” estimate, provided that they can signal the downward trend in interconnection pricing, rather than wait for the “correct” estimates.Adoption of future looking strategies (interconnection exchanges), use of a variety of formal models, and strengthening of regulatory capacity are all necessary steps in fostering a competitive environment. Interconnection regimes set up early in the reform process require a review. For successful competition, effective dispute resolution mechanisms and institutions are also important.     

Spectrum Licensing,Policy Instruments and Market Entry

Competition policy attempts to address the potential for market failure by encouraging competition in service markets. Often, in wireless communication service markets, national regulatory authorities seek to encourage entry via the spectrum assignment process. Instruments used include the assignment mode (auction or beauty contest), setting aside licenses and providing bidding (price and quantity) credits for potential entrants, and making more licenses (spectrum blocks) available than there are incumbent firms (excess licenses). The empirical analysis assesses the effectiveness of these policy instruments on encouraging entry. The econometric results show that the probability of entry is enhanced by using auction assignments and excess licenses. Furthermore, quantity, but not price, concessions encourage entry.     

The public incumbent's defeat in mobile competition: Implications for the sequencing of telecommunications reform

Within a mere 5 years of market competition, the mobile communications sector in Taiwan has exceeded a 100% penetration rate, currently ranking near the top of the world. In an even more stunning development, the public incumbent, Chunghwa Telecom, has handed the leadership status to a market entrant, Taiwan Cellular Corp., despite phenomenal mobile communications growth. This paper explores the factors that hamstrung Chunghwa Telecom in competition against its rival entrants. Our econometric analysis substantiates the fact that handset subsidies are the most effective instrument for mobile firms to gain market share. Chunghwa Telecom, due to its public ownership status, was nevertheless prohibited at first from adopting such a marketing strategy.The empirical results provided in this paper indeed pinpoint the importance of the sequencing of reform mandates in developing telecommunications: a prolonged privatization could help to promote competition in the industry. Public ownership makes Chunghwa Telecom vulnerable to political intervention and operational inefficiency, which is a barricade to performance and competitiveness for the not-yet-privatized company in a liberalized market. Taiwan's case presents an interesting deviation from conventional development theories, while it deserves scrutiny as it paves a shortcut to successful implementation of telecommunication reform in a timely fashion.     

Incumbency and market share within European mobile telecommunication networks

The structure of mobile telecommunication markets varies considerably across Europe, ranging from monopolies with a handful of subscribers to markets with five operators and many millions of subscribers. Where competitive markets occur, there is also an incumbent operator possessing substantial first mover advantages. This paper explores these advantages, asking whether the incumbent has remained the largest operator as the market has developed. This question is investigated using data from 49 European countries. The analysis finds that in most countries the incumbent continues to be the largest operator measured by market share. In some countries, later entrants into the market have struggled to gain market share, contributing to the highly concentrated nature of many mobile markets. The extent to which the geographical footprint of an operator influences its market share is also examined.     

The future role of international telecommunications institutions

The telecommunications world is being swept by technological and national regulatory changes. The international telecommunication institutions — the ITU, INTELSAT and CEPT — were founded in times when technological trends were more stable and national regulation was more homogeneous. How will they cope with these new changes? In an era of growing heterogeneity, the ITU may need to look increasingly beynd itself to maintain its centrality. Meanwhile, INTELSAT faces challenges from new market entrants and a more flexible approach to new technological and commercial imperatives in satellite and cable services. The EEC is awakening to the need for institutional change within Europe and this is already having an impact on CEPT. It is concluded that to survive and to maintain relevance the existing international institutions will need to initiate changes or face a loss of authority to other institutions such as OECD and EEC.     

Technological and geographic heterogeneity in broadband markets: The challenge for regulation

When the telecommunications industry was liberalised in Europe and North America in the 1980s and 1990s, it inherited a legacy of monopoly providers whose footprint was national or multi-regional in its character. The regulatory framework, particularly that adopted in EU member states, reflected this pattern of relatively homogeneous deployment achieved, in part, by decades of cross-subsidised pricing and universal service goals. Perhaps because of this legacy, telecommunications regulators have often adopted the presumption that relevant markets are national in character, unless proven otherwise Although geographically-variegated regulatory remedies have been permitted (even in the face of allegedly national relevant markets) and adopted in many member states, many regulators have never done so, and overly cautious thresholds for permitting geographically based forbearance suggest a continued bias towards presuming national markets and remedies. We find that this presumption of uniformity and the tendency to aggregate geographic markets together is not supported by first principles of antitrust analysis, although there may have been strong practical reasons to apply this presumption in the past circumstances of the telecommunications and broadband industries.On the ground, however, there has arguably never been as much heterogeneity across geographies and across technological solutions that provide effective ultra-fast broadband speeds. Both technological (i.e., product market) and geographic heterogeneity are likely to increase with the advent of mobile 5G networks. With their deployment, a cautious regulatory stance towards geographic variation and a cautious regulatory stance towards inter-technology or inter-modal competition may result in regulation that could exceed what is required to ensure effective competition and could instead distort the incentives to enter of facilities-based actors. This may also result in higher-cost and inefficient investment. A more geographically varied and technologically agnostic regulatory framework may satisfy the principle of proportionate and focused regulation—with the possibility that the locus of regulation shifts from the access network to bottleneck facilities such as fibre, ducts and poles.This discussion is especially germane when one considers the highly speculative nature of forecasts and projections about future demand, and the competing claims of proponents of 5G and fibre. While there is some scepticism about the performance of mobile networks, we note that pure mobile and fixed 5G services may have synergies in deployment, and that the idea of competing with residential broadband services is a core strategy of very influential large-scale industry actors. In terms of a future research agenda, regulatory decisions could benefit from much more research into the relationship between domestic and global bandwidth constraints and their influence on development of software and application, as well as much more quantitative research by academics on the drivers of bandwidth demand. The risks associated with promoting investment that results in large-scale wasted resources should also be central to the regulatory agenda.     

Paradoxical impact of asymmetric regulation in Taiwan's telecommunications industry: Restriction and rent seeking

The mobile penetration rate in Taiwan has climbed from 6.86 to 112.15. Mobile phone accounts per 100 capita in the first 6 years of market competition, during this time the state-owned incumbent Chunghua Telecom has been dethroned by a new entrant, Taiwan Cellular Corp. This paper addresses the cause of Taiwan's unprecedented mobile growth, and provides policy solutions for countries that strive to improve their telecommunications sectors in a short time scale. The authors highlight the fundamental role of asymmetric regulation, rather than pure liberalization, in the creation of the deregulated telecommunications industry in Taiwan. The asymmetric regulation in Taiwan is manifested in a twofold framework: the dominant carrier vs. competitors, and the fixed-line carrier vs. mobile companies. Econometric analysis concludes that dualistic asymmetric regulation leads to higher growth for mobile competitors and raises the total mobile penetration rate. However, the authors warn against the paradoxical consequences of dualistic asymmetric regulation. The regulatory benefits which mobile entrants received evolved into rents when they successfully lobbied to end the follow-me call service, the pricing scheme of which contradicts the asymmetric revenue-sharing constraint. The paper calls for a sunset clause for dualistic asymmetric regulation in order to take full advantage of its strengths, while at the same time preventing rent seeking by the firms, which benefit.     

How will telecommunications bundles impact competition and regulatory analysis?

In this article, one makes two points about the impact of bundles on competition and regulatory policy. First, one argues that the growing importance of bundles requires an adjustment in the current framework of relevant product markets for individual services, and that the traditional tools of competition policy, namely the SSNIP test, can be adjusted to deal with these new circumstances. Second, one argues that the technological and behavioral changes, underlying the emergence of bundles, call for a shift of emphasis in regulatory policy from ensuring access to the incumbent’s fixed telecommunications network services to ensuring access to television content.     

Pricing Network Interconnection: Advantages Held by Integrated Telecom Carriers

A recurring telecommunications policy debate centers on whether incumbent, vertically integrated local exchange carriers have an incentive to discriminate in price against down-stage service rivals who interconnect to their network (a price squeeze). The concern is typically voiced in one of two claims: (1) there is an incentive for an incumbent to use a price squeeze when access prices are set above long-run incremental cost; or (2) prices set at that cost are preferred for interconnection because they eliminate incentives for a price squeeze. In principle, form (1) is generally true (Proposition 1), but form (2) is generally not (Proposition 2), The proof of these Propositions reveals why pricing access at long-run incremental cost coupled with appropriate price floors in the down-stage market does eliminate the incentive to squeeze.     

Access regulation,entry and investments in telecommunications

This paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent and an entrant firm in telecommunications. The entrant has the option to enter the market with or without having preliminary invested in its own infrastructure; in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to invest in the provision of enhanced services. In the case of resale based entry the entrant needs access to the incumbent network. Unlike the rival, the incumbent has always the option to upgrade the existing network to provide advanced services. We study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry and on firms’ investments. We find that without regulation the incumbent sets the access charge to prevent resale based entry and this generates a social inefficient level of facility based entry. Access regulation may discourage welfare enhancing investments, thus also inducing a socially inefficient outcome. We extend the model to account for negotiated interconnection in the case of facilities based entry.     

Is exclusionary pricing anticompetitive in two-sided markets?

This paper studies the competitive effects of exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets. While formally showing that below-cost pricing on one market side can allow an incumbent firm to exclude a potential rival which does not have a customer base yet, the proposed model does not necessarily imply that below-cost pricing in such markets should be taken as anti-competitive conduct. Instead, I find that in sufficiently asymmetric two-sided markets, exclusion is always beneficial and if anything, there is too little of it in the sense that there are cases in which there is inefficient entry. Further, prohibiting below marginal cost pricing may destroy some socially efficient exclusion and worsen the problem of excessive (or inefficient) entry.     

Platform envelopment

Due to network effects and switching costs in platform markets, entrants generally must offer revolutionary functionality to win substantial market share. We explore a second entry path that does not rely upon Schumpeterian innovation: platform envelopment. Through envelopment, a provider in one platform market can enter another platform market, and combine its own functionality with that of the target in a multi‐platform bundle that leverages shared user relationships. Envelopers capture market share by foreclosing an incumbent's access to users; in doing so, they harness the network effects that previously had protected the incumbent. We present a typology of envelopment attacks based on whether platform pairs are complements, weak substitutes, or functionally unrelated and we analyze conditions under which these attack types are likely to succeed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic focus of incumbents in the European telecommunications industry: The cases of BT,Deutsche Telekom and KPN

This study investigates the internal and external strategic choices that telecommunications firms, operating in a dynamic network environment, make to adapt to changes and to respond quickly in order to create or to sustain their competitive advantage. In particular, in the European telecommunications industry incumbent firms have faced important challenges from new technologies, liberalization and the convergence of markets. The leading European telecommunications companies initially focused on new markets and new businesses, emphasizing their plans to become major players in relevant markets. However, after the telecommunications euphoria companies were more restrained due to their huge burden of debt and their market value. Through refocusing or restructuring, these companies have tried to streamline their businesses in order to restore their value and to improve their competitiveness. Insight into the specific strategic actions of traditional telecommunications companies in Europe to the recent developments in the industry is provided from the analysis of three leading traditional telecommunications companies: BT, Deutsche Telekom and KPN.     

Telemedicine competition,pricing, and technology adoption: Evidence from talk therapists

This paper examines how new telemedicine competitors affected incumbent health care providers during the first waves of COVID-19. Using data from the largest mental health provider search platform in Canada, I show that increased telemedicine competition in a market caused incumbent providers in that market to stop offering income-based discounts to patients. I isolate the causal effect of competition in a difference-in-differences framework, comparing providers before and after a supply shock on the platform that exogenously assigned some markets new telemedicine search results. I find that higher-quality providers are more likely to stop income-based discounts when facing new telemedicine entrants, while lower-quality providers are more likely to exit the platform, which is consistent with telemedicine providers competing for more price-sensitive patients. The results suggest that expanding telemedicine options had a heterogeneous effect on the affordability of care.     

Ex ante margin squeeze tests in the telecommunications industry: What is a reasonably efficient operator?

This paper studies the implementation of Reasonably Efficient Operator margin squeeze tests by National Regulatory Authorities in European telecommunications markets. It provides a theoretical framework which shows how regulatory authorities deal with the asymmetries between entrants and incumbents by adjusting the Equally Efficient Operator margin squeeze test used in competition policy. Using this framework, this paper presents a benchmark of implementation choices by inspecting authorities' guidelines, market analyses, and decisions. Whereas some implementation choices are very similar across authorities' decisions, some others display a strong heterogeneity.