GSEs,Mortgage Rates,and Secondary Market Activities

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that securitize mortgages and issue mortgage-backed securities (MBS). In addition, the GSEs are active participants in the secondary mortgage market on behalf of their own investment portfolios. Because these portfolios have grown quite large, portfolio purchases (in addition to MBS issuance) are often thought to be an important force in the mortgage market. Using monthly data from 1993 to 2005 we estimate a VAR model of the relationship between GSE secondary market activities and mortgage interest rate spreads. We find that GSE portfolio purchases have no significant effects on either primary or secondary mortgage rate spreads. Further, we examine GSE activities and mortgage rate spreads in the wake of the 1998 debt crisis, and find that GSE portfolio purchases did little to affect mortgage rates. This empirical finding is robust to alternative identification assumptions and to alternative model and variable specifications.      

GSEs,Mortgage Rates,and the Long-Run Effects of Mortgage Securitization

Our paper compares mortgage securitization undertaken by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) with that undertaken by private firms, with an emphasis on how each type of mortgage securitization affects mortgage rates. We build a model illustrating that market structure, government sponsorship, and the characteristics of the mortgages securitized are all important determinants of mortgage rates. We find that GSEs generally—but not always—lower mortgage rates, particularly when the GSEs behave competitively, because the GSEs implicit government backing allows them to sell securities without the credit enhancements needed in the private sector. Using our simulation model, we demonstrate that when mortgages eligible for purchase by the GSEs have characteristics similar to other mortgages, the GSEs implicit government-backing generates differences in mortgage rates similar to those currently observed in the mortgage market (which range between zero and fifty basis points). However, if the mortgages purchased by GSEs are less costly to originate and securitize, and if the GSEs behave competitively, then the simulated spread in mortgage rates can be much larger than that observed in the data.     

A Reconsideration of the Jumbo/Non-Jumbo Mortgage Rate Differential

Consistent with a series of recent papers, the interest-rate differential between mortgages eligible for purchase based on loan size by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and larger loans is estimated to be 22 basis points over the 1986–2000 period. This differential averaged 19 basis points for the 1996–2000 period. Other significant effects include: loans slightly above the conforming loan limit and originated late in a calendar year often have a lower rate that nearly fully anticipates their likely characterization as a non-jumbo loan after the conforming loan limit is indexed effective each January; loan-to-value ratios affect jumbo loan rates much more than they affect non-jumbo loan rates; loans located in non-metropolitan areas have a 3 basis point differential versus loans in metropolitan areas that is surprisingly small given the likely higher cost to service non-metropolitan loans and the higher degree of uncertainty about non-metropolitan collateral values; and estimated regional mortgage rate differentials have narrowed through time.     

The Real Effects of FAS 166/167 on Banks’ Mortgage Approval and Sale Decisions

We examine the real effects of FAS 166 and FAS 167 on banks’ loan‐level mortgage approval and sale decisions. Effective in 2010, these standards tightened the accounting for securitizations and consolidation of securitization entities, respectively, causing banks to recognize an estimated $811 billion of securitized assets on balance sheet. We find that banks that recognize more securitized assets exhibit larger decreases in mortgage approval rates and larger increases in mortgage sale rates. These effects significantly exceed those of banks’ off–balance sheet securitized assets, consistent with our results being driven by the consolidation of securitization entities rather than by securitization per se. We conduct tests that help rule out the financial crisis as an alternative explanation for our results. Further analyses suggest that mechanisms underlying the results include consolidating banks’ reduced regulatory capital adequacy, increased market discipline, and consequent desire not to recognize high‐risk mortgages on balance sheet.     

Mortgage Loan Securitization and Relative Loan Performance

We compare the ex ante observable risk characteristics, the default performance, and the pricing of securitized mortgage loans to mortgage loans retained by the original lender. In our sample of loans originated between 2000 and 2007, we find that privately securitized fixed and adjustable-rate mortgages were riskier ex ante than lender-retained loans or loans securitized through the government sponsored agencies. We do not find any evidence of differential loan performance for privately securitized fixed-rate mortgages. We find evidence that privately securitized adjustable-rate mortgages performed worse than retained mortgages, although other observable factors appear to be more economically important determinants of mortgage default. We do not find any evidence of a compensating premium in the loan rates for privately securitized adjustable-rate mortgages.     

GSE Activity and Mortgage Supply in Lower-Income and Minority Neighborhoods: The Effect of the Affordable Housing Goals

I estimate the credit supply effect of the Underserved Areas Goal (UAG), which establishes GSE purchase goals for mortgages to lower-income and minority neighborhoods. Taking advantage of discontinuous census tract eligibility rules and abrupt changes in tract eligibility, I find some evidence of a small UAG effect on GSE purchases and mortgage originations, without crowding-out of FHA and subprime lending. The results also suggest that the GSEs exploit the law??s lack of precision-targeting, yielding effects that might diverge from the law??s intent.     

The risk-relevance of securitizations during the recent financial crisis

We investigate changes in the risk-relevance of securitized subprime, other nonconforming, and commercial mortgages for sponsor-originators during the recent financial crisis. Using the volatility of realized stock returns, option-implied volatility, and credit spreads, we observe a pronounced increase in the risk-relevance of subprime securitizations as early as 2006. Furthermore, reflecting the evolution of the financial crisis in waves, we find that investors recognized the increased credit risk of other nonconforming and commercial mortgage securitizations as the financial crisis progressed. Additional analyses show that risk-relevance varies cross-sectionally with structural characteristics such as monoline credit-enhancement and the presence of special servicers for commercial mortgage securitizations. Our results inform the current debates on the opacity of securitization structures and highlight the need to take into account cross-sectional and inter-temporal heterogeneity in risk-relevance across securitized asset classes and securitization characteristics (e.g., quality and type of collateral and transaction structure).     

The 2015 Maastricht-NUS-MIT International Real Estate Finance &; Economics Symposium: Editors’ Introduction to the Special Issue

We use an empirical model of commercial mortgage spreads to examine how tenant diversification impacts credit spreads for mortgages on retail properties. We find that mortgages on properties with a highly diversified tenant base have spreads that are up to 7.1 basis points higher than spreads on mortgages for single-tenant properties, but that mortgages on properties with moderate levels of tenant diversification have spreads that are up to 5.2 basis points lower than mortgages on single-tenant properties. The spread discount for mortgages on properties with moderate levels of tenant diversification disappears when the lease of the property’s largest tenant expires before the loan matures. Despite the spread discount that is given to properties with moderate levels of tenant diversification, we find that the likelihood with which a mortgage goes into default increases as tenant diversification increases.     

Value Creation through Securitization: Evidence from the CMBS Market

Despite recent volatility and constraints in secondary market funding, analysts have ascribed substantial value creation to the securitization of commercial mortgages. Such value creation likely emanates from liquidity enhancements, regulatory arbitrage, price discrimination and risk diversification by pooling and tranching, gains from specialization in origination, servicing, and holding of mortgages, and the like. Indeed, such value creation would be consistent with past accelerated growth in the mortgage- and asset-based securities markets and the sizable profits earned by secondary market intermediaries. In this paper, we estimate the pricing effects of commercial mortgage securitization. We do so by applying loan level data from 1992–2003 to compare the pricing of conduit and portfolio loans held in CMBS structures. In contrast to portfolio loans, which are held for investment by originating institutions, conduit loans are originated for the sole purpose of sale and securitization in the secondary market. If securitization creates value, it should be evidenced in the relative pricing of conduit loans sold into CMBS pools and in a lower cost of capital to loan originators. We estimate a reduced-form model, in which the interest rate spread between commercial mortgages and comparable-maturity treasury securities varies with loan characteristics, capital market conditions, and conduit loan status. Estimation results indicate that securitization of conduit loans leads to an 11 basis points reduction in commercial mortgage interest rates. We assess robustness of results via hazard model tests for omitted variables and originator-specific effects. We further estimate a simultaneous equations model that accounts for the potential endogeneity of mortgage loan terms to the mortgage-treasury rate spread. Results of that analysis suggest a larger 20 basis points reduction in loan pricing among conduit loans sold into CMBS structures.     

The impact of the agencies on conventional fixed-rate mortgage yields

Between the early 1980s and 1986, the share of new conforming (under $153,000 in 1986) conventional fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) that went into Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage pools increased from under 5% to over 50%. The impact of these agencies moving from negligible participants to dominant players in this market is investigated in this study by an analysis of yields on 4,900 loans closed in California during May–June 1978 and 1,800 closed in May–June 1986.Our analysis indicates that the loan rate depends on the loan-to-value ratio, the loan size, and, in 1986, whether the loan is far above, just above, or below the conforming loan limit. Rates on loans far above the conforming loan limit exceed those on otherwise comparable loans below the limit by 30 basis points and those on loans destined to exceed the limit within a year by 15 basis points. That is, the expanded agency securitization of conforming FRMs has significantly lowered the rates on both conforming loans and loans somewhat above the conforming limit (27% of nonconforming loans in 1986) relative to what they would otherwise have been.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at an OSU Finance Seminar and the Midyear Meetings of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association. We acknowledge the financial support of the Garn Institute.     

Residential Mortgage Lending and Borrower Risk: The Relationship Between Mortgage Spreads and Individual Characteristics

The mortgage banking environment in Hong Kong is quite different from that in the United States. For example, the secondary mortgage market and mortgage insurance only started after 1997. Using a large data set on mortgages, we examine empirically how mortgage rates in this market vary with various individual borrower, property, and loan characteristics. We find that mortgage rates in Hong Kong do vary with individual characteristics, which suggests credit sorting according to both prepayment risk and default risk, as a higher mortgage rate is found to be related to either higher collateral (a lower loan-to-value ratio) or slower prepayment. The empirical results suggest that lenders in Hong Kong can observe the risk type of individual borrowers to a certain extent and charge a corresponding mortgage spread. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the sorting-by-observed-risk paradigm as in Berger and Udell (1990).     

A New Spin on the Jumbo/Conforming Loan Rate Differential

This article uses house-price transaction data to estimate volatility in house prices. The volatility parameter is an input into a mortgage-pricing model that is used to simulate the contract interest rate that balances the mortgage contract. By segmenting the house-price transaction into high- and low-valued homes, we are able to estimate a theoretical jumbo/conforming loan rate differential. Simulation results demonstrate that the differences in volatility between high- and low-priced homes can produce a contract loan rate differential, holding all else constant. The article also presents a discussion of the problems inherent to estimating volatilities form assets with infrequent trades and long holding periods.     

Anatomy of an ARM: The Interest-Rate Risk of Adjustable-Rate Mortgages

This article analyzes the dynamics of the commonly used indices for adjustable rate mortgages and systematically compares the effects of their time-series properties on the interest-rate sensitivity of adjustable-rate mortgages. Our ARM valuation methodology allows us simultaneously to capture the effects of index dynamics, discrete coupon adjustment, mortgage prepayment, and both lifetime and periodic caps and floors. We can, moreover, either calculate an optimal prepayment strategy for mortgage holders or use an empirical prepayment function. We find that the different dynamics of the major ARM indices lead to significant variation in the interest-rate sensitivities of loans based on different indices. We also find that changing assumptions about contract features, such as loan caps and coupon reset frequency, has a significant, and in some cases unexpected, impact on our results.     

Loss Recoveries,Realized Excess Returns,and Credit Rationing in the Commercial Mortgage Market

In this paper we exploit loan level data combining foreclosure histories with information about the revenues and expenses associated with the ongoing management and eventual sale of financially distressed loans to estimate the magnitude of realized excess returns on commercial mortgages. Our findings are striking. We find that average realized excess returns on commercial mortgages are the lowest at the best times á la Stiglitz and Weiss (Am. Econ. Rev., 71:393–409, 1981). We also find that excess realized returns on commercial mortgages are low when lenders are swamped with funds (which we measure by the volume of commercial mortgage commitments) and when promised spreads are low.      

Mortgage Choice in the Euro Area: Macroeconomic Determinants and the Effect of Monetary Policy on Debt Burdens

This paper provides novel evidence on the role of the macroeconomic environment for households’ choice between fixed‐interest‐rate and adjustable‐interest‐rate mortgages (ARMs) in the euro area. We find that relatively more ARMs are taken out when economic growth is strong, the interest rate spread is high, or unemployment shows low volatility. A simulation exercise shows that a reduction in mortgage rates as witnessed during the monetary easing in the course of the global financial crisis produces a substantial decline in debt burdens among mortgage‐holding households, especially in countries where households have higher debt burdens and a larger share of ARMs.     

Corporate social responsibility,credit rating,and private debt contracting: new evidence from syndicated loan market

We examine the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities on loan spreads of syndicated bank loans, with a particular interest in how CSR and credit ratings are interrelated as a joint determinant of loan spreads. Focusing on private debt contracts, we show that both CSR strengths and concerns are related to their loan spreads. CSR strengths work to lower firm risk, hence reducing the loan spread, whereas CSR concerns increase firm risk, thus increasing the loan spread. Once we include detailed credit rating information in the models, however, CSR concerns lose significance, but CSR strengths remain significantly related to the loan spread. We also find that both CSR strengths and CSR concerns are related to loan spread for non-rated firms, but the CSR concern effect is stronger than the CSR strength effect for these firms. A further test shows that firm risk measured by stock return volatility plays as a direct channel through which a firm’s CSR activities affect loan spreads, whose result lends further support to our main results. Overall, our results provide strong evidence that CSR matters to the pricing of loan contracts beyond credit rating information and the results remain robust to the possible firm size effect and the endogeneity issues.     

Credit History and the Performance of Prime and Nonprime Mortgages

Although nonprime lending has experienced steady or even explosive growth over the last decade very little is known about the performance characteristics of these mortgages. Using data from national secondary market institutions, this paper estimates a competing risks proportional hazard model, which includes unobserved heterogeneity. The analysis examines the performance of 30-year fixed rate owner occupied home purchase mortgages from February 1995 to the end of 1999 and compares nonprime and prime loan default and prepayment behavior. Nonprime loans are identified by mortgage interest rates that are substantially higher than the prevailing prime rate. Results indicate that nonprime mortgages differ significantly from prime mortgages: they have different risk characteristics at origination; they default at elevated levels; and they respond differently to the incentives to prepay and default. For instance, nonprime mortgages are less responsive to how much the option to call the mortgage or refinance is in the money and this effect is magnified for mortgages with low credit scores. Tests also reveal that default rates are less responsive to homeowner equity when credit scores are included in the specification.     

Characteristics of Mortgage Terminations: an Analysis of a Loan-Level Dataset

Understanding mortgage termination behavior is crucial for valuating mortgage-backed securities. Analyzing a unique loan-level dataset, this study examines the characteristics of mortgage prepayment and default behaviors in the Korean housing and housing finance markets. We also analyze mortgage termination behaviors across regions, loan purposes, and periods. The results suggest that the prepayment rate of fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) and the ratio of adjustable-rate mortgages to FRMs can provide meaningful signals for the Korean household economy. Although the macro-prudential policies pertaining to the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and debt-to-income ratio (DTI) are very effective, their effects can vary depending on the region or loan purpose. Furthermore, the DTI and credit score cannot always identify the default risks of mortgages not intended for housing purchases even though such mortgages are more vulnerable to macroeconomic changes. The observed changes in default behavior indicate that the government’s policies to promote fixed-rate loans have achieved a certain degree of success.     

Mortgage risks,debt literacy and financial advice

A limited understanding of mortgage contracts and the risks involved may have contributed to the outbreak of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. We developed a special questionnaire relating mortgage loan decisions to financial knowledge and financial advice. Our results demonstrate that homeowners appear to be well aware of mortgage risks. Large loans relative to home value are perceived as riskier, as are loans with large mortgage payments relative to income and loans linked to investment vehicles. Homeowners with riskier mortgages indicated that they could encounter financial problems should house prices or their income decline. Homeowners with relatively low debt literacy are more likely to take out traditional mortgages with principal repayments over the maturity of the loan. Riskier mortgages are more prevalent among homeowners with a better understanding of loan contracts. Financially less sophisticated homeowners consulting mortgage brokers, too, hold riskier mortgages.     

Macroeconomic News and Mortgage Rates

The study analyzes the influence of macroeconomic news announcements on (a) interest rates for commercial mortgages, residential mortgages, 10-year Treasury notes, and Baa-rated corporate bonds; and (b) corresponding mortgage spreads. It is both interesting and highly relevant from a policy and portfolio management standpoint to examine the implications of the influence of macroeconomic news announcements on mortgage markets. Some important results are reported. First, consistent with the notion of market integration, mortgage rates are found to be co-integrated with other capital market instruments. Second, of the 22 types of periodic macroeconomic news releases considered, 13 of them have a significant influence on at least one of the interest rates, and notably changes in hourly earnings and housing starts significantly influence all debt-security yields. More generally, macroeconomic news that conveys higher inflation and/or economic growth has a positive influence on mortgage and other interest rates. Finally, this study finds several announcements including durable goods orders, new home sales, personal consumption, non-farm payroll, trade balance and Treasury budget to have a significant influence on mortgage spreads.