Mortgage Loan Securitization and Relative Loan Performance

We compare the ex ante observable risk characteristics, the default performance, and the pricing of securitized mortgage loans to mortgage loans retained by the original lender. In our sample of loans originated between 2000 and 2007, we find that privately securitized fixed and adjustable-rate mortgages were riskier ex ante than lender-retained loans or loans securitized through the government sponsored agencies. We do not find any evidence of differential loan performance for privately securitized fixed-rate mortgages. We find evidence that privately securitized adjustable-rate mortgages performed worse than retained mortgages, although other observable factors appear to be more economically important determinants of mortgage default. We do not find any evidence of a compensating premium in the loan rates for privately securitized adjustable-rate mortgages.     

Reverse Mortgage Loans: A Quantitative Analysis

Reverse mortgage loans (RMLs) allow older homeowners to borrow against housing wealth without moving. Despite rapid growth in this market, only 1.9% of eligible homeowners had RMLs in 2013. In this paper, we analyze reverse mortgages in a calibrated life‐cycle model of retirement. The average welfare gain from RMLs is $252 per homeowner, and $1,770 per RML borrower. Bequest motives, uncertainty about health and expenses, and loan costs account for low demand. According to the model, the Great Recession's impact differs across age, income, and wealth distributions, with a threefold increase in RML demand for lowest income and oldest households.     

FHA vs. Subprime Mortgage Originations: Is FHA the Answer to Subprime Lending?

We analyze originations of mortgages guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and of subprime mortgages—loans that dominate the non-prime mortgage market for riskier borrowers. Using home purchase and refinance loans data for 2005, we estimate that a sizeable number of borrowers who got subprime loans would have qualified for FHA loans, implying a potential net flow of borrowers from subprime to FHA, especially for refinance loans at a rate of about 30%. Also, consistent with the FHA’s modernization proposal to increase its loan limits, we find that increasing the limits on FHA loans could help to attract borrowers, mostly of home purchase loans, who are likely to be constrained by the lower-priced house limits. Our findings are generally in line with the recent increased flow of mortgages to FHA, and suggest that FHA loans could be the answer to the current subprime lending crisis.     

An empirical analysis of home equity loan and line performance

Given the growth in home equity lending during the 1990s, it is imperative that lenders and regulators understand the risks associated with this segment of the residential mortgage market. Using a unique panel data set of over 135,000 homeowners with second mortgages, our analysis indicates that significant differences exist in the prepayment and default probabilities of home equity loans and lines, providing insights into bank minimum capital requirements. We find that households with equity loans are relatively more sensitive to changes in interest rates. By contrast, households with equity lines are more sensitive to appreciation in property value.     

Characteristics of Mortgage Terminations: an Analysis of a Loan-Level Dataset

Understanding mortgage termination behavior is crucial for valuating mortgage-backed securities. Analyzing a unique loan-level dataset, this study examines the characteristics of mortgage prepayment and default behaviors in the Korean housing and housing finance markets. We also analyze mortgage termination behaviors across regions, loan purposes, and periods. The results suggest that the prepayment rate of fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) and the ratio of adjustable-rate mortgages to FRMs can provide meaningful signals for the Korean household economy. Although the macro-prudential policies pertaining to the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and debt-to-income ratio (DTI) are very effective, their effects can vary depending on the region or loan purpose. Furthermore, the DTI and credit score cannot always identify the default risks of mortgages not intended for housing purchases even though such mortgages are more vulnerable to macroeconomic changes. The observed changes in default behavior indicate that the government’s policies to promote fixed-rate loans have achieved a certain degree of success.     

Phasing out the GSEs

We develop a new model of the mortgage market that emphasizes the role of the financial sector and the government. Risk tolerant savers act as intermediaries between risk averse depositors and impatient borrowers. Both borrowers and intermediaries can default. The government provides both mortgage guarantees and deposit insurance. Underpriced government mortgage guarantees lead to more and riskier mortgage originations and higher financial sector leverage. Mortgage crises occasionally turn into financial crises and government bailouts due to the fragility of the intermediaries’ balance sheets. Foreclosure crises beget fiscal uncertainty, further disrupting the optimal allocation of risk in the economy. Increasing the price of the mortgage guarantee “crowds in” the private sector, reduces financial fragility, leads to fewer but safer mortgages, lowers house prices, and raises mortgage and risk-free interest rates. Due to a more robust financial sector and less fiscal uncertainty, consumption smoothing improves and foreclosure rates fall. While borrowers are nearly indifferent to a world with or without mortgage guarantees, savers are substantially better off. While aggregate welfare increases, so does wealth inequality.     

Value Creation through Securitization: Evidence from the CMBS Market

Despite recent volatility and constraints in secondary market funding, analysts have ascribed substantial value creation to the securitization of commercial mortgages. Such value creation likely emanates from liquidity enhancements, regulatory arbitrage, price discrimination and risk diversification by pooling and tranching, gains from specialization in origination, servicing, and holding of mortgages, and the like. Indeed, such value creation would be consistent with past accelerated growth in the mortgage- and asset-based securities markets and the sizable profits earned by secondary market intermediaries. In this paper, we estimate the pricing effects of commercial mortgage securitization. We do so by applying loan level data from 1992–2003 to compare the pricing of conduit and portfolio loans held in CMBS structures. In contrast to portfolio loans, which are held for investment by originating institutions, conduit loans are originated for the sole purpose of sale and securitization in the secondary market. If securitization creates value, it should be evidenced in the relative pricing of conduit loans sold into CMBS pools and in a lower cost of capital to loan originators. We estimate a reduced-form model, in which the interest rate spread between commercial mortgages and comparable-maturity treasury securities varies with loan characteristics, capital market conditions, and conduit loan status. Estimation results indicate that securitization of conduit loans leads to an 11 basis points reduction in commercial mortgage interest rates. We assess robustness of results via hazard model tests for omitted variables and originator-specific effects. We further estimate a simultaneous equations model that accounts for the potential endogeneity of mortgage loan terms to the mortgage-treasury rate spread. Results of that analysis suggest a larger 20 basis points reduction in loan pricing among conduit loans sold into CMBS structures.     

An Early Assessment of Residential Mortgage Performance in China

The residential mortgage market becomes a financial engine for the booming residential housing development and sustained economic growth in China. Our study provides the first rigorous empirical analysis on the earlier performance of residential mortgage market in China based on a unique micro dataset of mortgage loan history collected from a major residential mortgage lender in China. We found that while the option theory fails to explain prepayment and default behavior in the residential mortgage market in China, other non-option theory related financial economic factors play major roles in determining the prepayment and default risks in China. We also found that borrower’s characteristics are significant in determining prepayment behavior, hence may be used as an effective tool for screening potential high risk borrowers in the loan origination process. Adopting a risk-based pricing in residential mortgage lending in China can improve the efficiency of the market, and enhance the credit availability to the most needed households, i.e., the younger households, blue-collar workers, lower income households, and help them become homeowners.     

Evidence on the Benefits of Alternative Mortgage Products

Alternative mortgage products have been identified by many as culprits in the financial crisis. However, because of their lower initial mortgage payments relative to loan amount, they may be a valuable tool for households that expect higher and more certain future labor income, and that wish to smooth consumption over the life‐cycle. Using U.K. household‐level panel data, this paper provides evidence in support of this hypothesis and highlights other important benefits of alternative mortgages, including portfolio diversification, tax benefits, and a reduction in the transaction costs incurred in housing transactions.     

Valuing mortgage loan servicing

We develop an intertemporal model for valuing mortgage loan servicing contracts. The model includes a stochastic short-term interest rate and realized inflation rate which jointly determine the current mortgage coupon rate, the mortgagor's prepayment decision, the servicer's future net cash flows, and the rate at which to discount these future cash flows. Several potential uses of the model for institutions that service mortgages and trade servicing portfolios are illustrated by the application of the model to servicing fixed-rate mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages. The model also is applicable to regulatory issues and to the servicing of other types of loans.The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Washington, D.C., the Purdue Research Foundation, West Lafayette, Indiana, and the Richard D. Irwin Foundation, Homewood, Illinois.     

The agency costs of tranching: Evidence from RMBS

This paper documents the agency costs resulting from the deeper tranching of subprime residential mortgage pools. Mortgage servicers are less likely to renegotiate delinquent loans collateralizing a greater number and variety of tranches. We find that an interquartile increase in tranching reduces mortgage servicers’ probability of loan renegotiation by 14% relative to the mean. This effect is concentrated in mortgages with greater ambiguity surrounding the loan value maximizing action. Overall, our results support the notion that tranching worsens agency frictions by increasing coordination costs among investors and impeding their monitoring of the agent.     

Credit History and the Performance of Prime and Nonprime Mortgages

Although nonprime lending has experienced steady or even explosive growth over the last decade very little is known about the performance characteristics of these mortgages. Using data from national secondary market institutions, this paper estimates a competing risks proportional hazard model, which includes unobserved heterogeneity. The analysis examines the performance of 30-year fixed rate owner occupied home purchase mortgages from February 1995 to the end of 1999 and compares nonprime and prime loan default and prepayment behavior. Nonprime loans are identified by mortgage interest rates that are substantially higher than the prevailing prime rate. Results indicate that nonprime mortgages differ significantly from prime mortgages: they have different risk characteristics at origination; they default at elevated levels; and they respond differently to the incentives to prepay and default. For instance, nonprime mortgages are less responsive to how much the option to call the mortgage or refinance is in the money and this effect is magnified for mortgages with low credit scores. Tests also reveal that default rates are less responsive to homeowner equity when credit scores are included in the specification.     

The effect of foreclosure laws on securitization: Evidence from U.S. states

A mortgage that defaults is more likely to enter foreclosure rather than renegotiation if it has been securitized in the private non-agency market, according to previous research. We study whether this foreclosure-propensity affects lenders’ securitization decision ex-ante. Due to the higher foreclosure probability, the value of a mortgage should be more sensitive to foreclosure costs if it is securitized. Comparing loans made in the same metropolitan area but under different foreclosure laws, we find that lenders are less likely to securitize mortgages in states with higher foreclosure costs, as measured by laws requiring judicial foreclosure. Two additional results are consistent with the proposed channel. First, the effect increases for loans with higher expected default rates and disappears for mortgage-like loans not subject to these laws. Second, the effect of judicial requirements increases for loans with higher expected default rates, consistent with differences in loss given default driving the results. Borrowers in states without judicial requirements also get riskier loans.     

The role of securitization in mortgage renegotiation

We study the effects of securitization on renegotiation of distressed residential mortgages over the current financial crisis. Unlike prior studies, we employ unique data that directly observe lender renegotiation actions and cover more than 60% of the U.S. mortgage market. Exploiting within-servicer variation in these data, we find that bank-held loans are 26–36% more likely to be renegotiated than comparable securitized mortgages (4.2–5.7% in absolute terms). Also, modifications of bank-held loans are more efficient: conditional on a modification, bank-held loans have 9% lower post-modification default rates (3.5% in absolute terms). Our findings support the view that frictions introduced by securitization create a significant challenge to effective renegotiation of residential loans. We also provide evidence supporting the affordability focus of recent policy actions, such as the Home Affordability Modification Program.     

Determinants of Mortgage Default and Consumer Credit Use: The Effects of Foreclosure Laws and Foreclosure Delays

The mortgage default decision is part of a complex household credit management problem. We examine how factors affecting mortgage default spill over to other credit markets. As home equity turns negative, homeowners default on mortgages and home equity lines of credit at higher rates, whereas they prioritize repaying credit cards and auto loans. Larger unused credit card limits intensify the preservation of credit cards over housing debt. Although mortgage nonrecourse statutes increase default on all types of housing debt, they reduce credit card defaults. Foreclosure delays increase default rates for housing and nonhousing debts. Our analysis highlights the interconnectedness of debt repayment decisions.     

Securitization and the Declining Impact of Bank Finance on Loan Supply: Evidence from Mortgage Originations

Low-cost deposits and increased balance sheet liquidity raise banks' supply of illiquid loans more than loans easily sold or securitized. We exploit the inability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase jumbo mortgages to identify an exogenous change in liquidity. The volume of jumbo mortgage originations relative to nonjumbo originations increases with bank holdings of liquid assets and decreases with bank deposit costs. This result suggests that the increasing depth of the mortgage secondary market fostered by securitization has reduced the effect of lender's financial condition on credit supply.     

个人住房抵押贷款借款人产品选择行为

1998年至今,中国个人住房抵押贷款市场迅速成长,并呈现出持续增长趋势。从完善个贷服务、降低金融风险的角度出发,深入研究借款人个贷产品选择行为具有现实意义。本文以2001年北京个贷市场实际交易数据为基础,采用二元Logit选择模型,定量分析经济因素、借款人个体属性和个贷产品属性对借款人个贷期限和贷款价值比选择行为的影响。实证研究发现,借款人性别对其个贷产品选择的影响并不显著;高收入借款人相对于中低收入借款人更倾向高比例中短期贷款;购置高价住宅的借款人相对于购置中低价格住宅的借款人更倾向选择中低比例长期贷款;未婚借款人更倾向高比例贷款;年轻借款人和高等教育程度借款人更倾向长期贷款。此外,本文结合对特定人群房价收入比的分析,探讨造成借款人选择行为差异的可能原因。本文基本结论为,借款人个贷期限和贷款价值比选择行为相对合理,不存在绝对高风险人群。     

Subprime Loan Default Resolutions: Do They Vary Across Mortgage Products and Borrower Demographic Groups?

This paper examines default outcomes for subprime first lien loans during the recent subprime mortgage boom. It conducts this investigation in two phases. The paper first examines factors associated with pre-foreclosure outcomes for subprime mortgages in default. It then examines factors associated with different outcomes for loans that enter foreclosure. These factors include less understood elements such as mortgage product features and borrower demographics. The analysis is based on detailed loan-level data and employs multinomial logit models in a hazard framework. Results show that default resolutions vary with product features and borrower demographics. Adjustable rate and interest-only mortgages, and loans with low- or no-documentation are more likely to enter foreclosure proceedings, and, once in foreclosure, are more likely to become REO. The existence of junior liens increases the probability of the loan remaining in default. Owner-occupancy is associated with lower likelihood of foreclosure initiation and REO, and greater likelihood of curing default. Additionally, default outcomes are impacted by local legal, economic and housing market conditions, and the equity in the home.     

The impact of the agencies on conventional fixed-rate mortgage yields

Between the early 1980s and 1986, the share of new conforming (under $153,000 in 1986) conventional fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) that went into Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage pools increased from under 5% to over 50%. The impact of these agencies moving from negligible participants to dominant players in this market is investigated in this study by an analysis of yields on 4,900 loans closed in California during May–June 1978 and 1,800 closed in May–June 1986.Our analysis indicates that the loan rate depends on the loan-to-value ratio, the loan size, and, in 1986, whether the loan is far above, just above, or below the conforming loan limit. Rates on loans far above the conforming loan limit exceed those on otherwise comparable loans below the limit by 30 basis points and those on loans destined to exceed the limit within a year by 15 basis points. That is, the expanded agency securitization of conforming FRMs has significantly lowered the rates on both conforming loans and loans somewhat above the conforming limit (27% of nonconforming loans in 1986) relative to what they would otherwise have been.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at an OSU Finance Seminar and the Midyear Meetings of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association. We acknowledge the financial support of the Garn Institute.     

A Reconsideration of the Jumbo/Non-Jumbo Mortgage Rate Differential

Consistent with a series of recent papers, the interest-rate differential between mortgages eligible for purchase based on loan size by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and larger loans is estimated to be 22 basis points over the 1986–2000 period. This differential averaged 19 basis points for the 1996–2000 period. Other significant effects include: loans slightly above the conforming loan limit and originated late in a calendar year often have a lower rate that nearly fully anticipates their likely characterization as a non-jumbo loan after the conforming loan limit is indexed effective each January; loan-to-value ratios affect jumbo loan rates much more than they affect non-jumbo loan rates; loans located in non-metropolitan areas have a 3 basis point differential versus loans in metropolitan areas that is surprisingly small given the likely higher cost to service non-metropolitan loans and the higher degree of uncertainty about non-metropolitan collateral values; and estimated regional mortgage rate differentials have narrowed through time.