信息不对称、信号传递方式与供应商甄选博弈

论文从供应商传递信息方式的角度来研究信息不对称情形下供应商的甄选问题。研究首先将对称信息与非对称信息情况下供应商甄选结果及供需双方的收益进行比较．得出信息不对称导致供应链上供应商的逆向选择问题。然后运用信号传递成本无差异与信号传递成本有差异这两种类型信号博弈模型来解决不对称信息下的供应商选择问题，并得出结论只有信号传递成本在不同类型的供应商之间存在差异，信号才能起到类型显示的作用，从而解决信息不对称情形下供应商的甄选问题。     

Evidence of Adverse Selection from Thoroughbred Wagering

Previous research has shown the thoroughbred sales market to be affected by adverse selection. In the market, sellers who race as well as breed thoroughbreds will choose to keep thoroughbreds when their estimated private values exceed expected sales prices. The presence of asymmetric information leads these sellers to sell their low-quality horses and keep their best for racing. We extend the analysis by examining how bettors use similar information when wagering on thoroughbred races. We show, using a sample of two-year-old maiden races, that homebreds (those horses kept by their breeders for racing) are favored over otherwise similar nonhomebreds.     

Adverse Selection and the Demand for Supplementary Dental Insurance

In 1995 dental services were excluded from the compulsory health insurance package that covers the families of all Dutch employees in the market sector with incomes below a certain threshold. People had to choose between no insurance and supplementary insurance. The exclusion of dental services was unexpected and was accompanied by a generous acceptance policy and almost uniform premiums. Due to these features the exclusion constitutes a natural experiment to investigate whether customers with poorer teeth conditions are more likely to buy insurance. This is a key condition for adverse selection to matter. The empirical results show that adverse selection indeed occurs; individuals with poor teeth condition are more likely to choose insurance. The same holds for customers with more frequent visits in the past. Differences in prices play some role, whereas differences in income do not.     

健康保险中的四方博弈

保险合同中健康保险由于其信息不对称的严重性导致了保险关系建立的从始到末出现当多的问题。本文通过建立对保险人、被保险人、保险代理人以及医疗机构四方在保险关系建立过程中的博弈模型分析,指出了现有博弈产生的均衡造成的对各方的不利影响。并提出了解决这些博弈困境应当采取的措施。     

网络环境下集群企业知识创造伙伴选择博弈

协同知识创造已成为网络环境下集群企业知识创造的主要模式。文章通过对比不同网络联结状态下知识创造协同伙伴选择结果及博弈双方收益,发现存在不同程度的信息不对称,导致了知识创造协同伙伴选择中的逆向选择问题,提出需要使用信号传递博弈模型来解决上述逆向选择问题。通过构造两种类型的信号传递博弈模型,发现信号成本在不同类型的潜在协同伙伴之间存在差异、不诚信网络节点的收益分配较少且根据网络联结状态提供信誉收益时,信号才能正确显示其类型,并进一步探讨了分离均衡的影响因素,提出了促进分离均衡的政策建议。     

Costly Buyer Search in a Differentiated Products Model: An Experimental Study

This study examines whether the content of buyer information and the timing of its dissemination affects seller market power. We construct laboratory markets with differentiated goods and costly buyer search in which sellers simultaneously post prices. The experiment varies the information on price or product characteristics that buyers learn under different timing assumptions (pre‐ and postsearch), generating four information treatments. Theory predicts that price information lowers the equilibrium price, but information about product characteristics increases the equilibrium price. That is, contrary to intuition, the presence of informed buyers may impart a negative externality on other uninformed buyers. Data support the model's negative externality result when sellers face a large number of robot buyers that are programmed to search optimally. Observed prices conform to the model's comparative statics and are broadly consistent with predicted levels. With human buyers, however, excessive search instigates increased price competition, and sellers post prices that are significantly lower than predicted.     

机制设计视角的O2O模式科学性分析

O2O模式的升级与转型是目前电商行业的热点问题。运用机制设计理论,分析O2O不同经营类型的科学性,验证不同O2O类型与盈利模式间的关系。理论分析发现:相对于独立型与复合型团购,平台型团购能够较好地处理传统营销中买卖双方的信用关系,具有机制设计上的优势性。实证分析显示:平台型团购的盈利模式侧重于新型的增值业务收入,独立型与复合型团购侧重于商品的进销差价等传统盈利模式,消费者投诉绝大部分集中在独立型与复合型团购。     

信息不对称与债券担保——基于中国债券市场的检验

担保是解决债券市场上信息不对称的有效机制。逆向选择理论强调担保能够缓解事前信息不对称;道德风险理论则强调担保有助于解决事后信息不对称。两种理论对于债务人风险程度与采取担保的可能性、担保与债务利率之间的关系给出不同的预测。文章以2008-2015年间中国债券市场的实际数据为样本对以上两类理论进行实证检验。在解决可能存在的内生性问题后,研究发现,债券发行人风险越高,越有可能采取担保;在控制其它因素的情况下,相较于同一债券信用评级的无担保债券,担保债券具有较高的发行利差。研究结果表明道德风险理论能够很好地解释我国债券发行人的担保行为。     

Early evidence of an adverse selection death spiral? The case of Blue Cross and Blue Shield

This paper uses a unique data set from 1957 to examine whether or not Blue Cross and Blue Shield suffered from an adverse selection death spiral after for-profit commercial insurance companies entered the market for health insurance. Results suggest that moving to experience rating may have helped the Blues counteract adverse selection in the group health insurance market. Adverse selection posed a greater problem for the Blues in the market for individual health insurance, possibly because of differences in the way the Blues screened potential enrollees relative to commercial insurance companies.     

二手房交易中中介机构的信息屏障及其破解对策

目前房地产中介公司已成为二手房交易的主要渠道,许多中介公司利用买卖主体的信息不对称,有意制造信息屏障,获取额外收益。了解中介公司设置信息屏障的方式方法十分必要,它可以帮助买卖主体有效规避交易风险,减少不必要的经济损失。     

An experimental investigation of bilateral oligopoly in emissions trading markets

Market power in emissions trading has been extensively investigated because emerging markets for tradable emissions permits, such as the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), can be dominated by relatively few large sellers or buyers. Previous studies on market power in emissions trading have assumed the existence of a subset of competitive players. However, a key feature of emissions trading markets is that emissions permits are often traded by a small number of large sellers and buyers. Using a laboratory experiment, our objective in this paper is to test the performance of an emissions trading market utilizing a double auction in a bilateral oligopoly. Our results suggest that the theoretical bilateral oligopoly models can better describe market outcomes of emissions trading. The effects of the slope of the marginal abatement cost function on market power in laboratory experiments are found to be consistent with those predicted by the theoretical bilateral oligopoly model. How market power is exercised depends on the curvature of the abatement cost function. If the marginal abatement cost function of buyers (sellers) is less steep than that of sellers (buyers), the price of permits is lower (higher) than that under perfect competition. This is because the market power of buyers (sellers) exceeds that of sellers (buyers). The price of permits is close to the perfect competitive price when all traders have the sameslope of the marginal abatement cost function.     

WHY IS THE TAKE-UP OF MICROINSURANCE SO LOW? EVIDENCE FROM A HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME IN INDIA

Insurance for the poor, called microinsurance, has recently drawn the attention of practitioners in developing countries. There are common problems among the various schemes: (1) low take-up rates, (2) high claim rates, and (3) low renewal rates. In the present paper, we investigate take-up decisions using household data collected in Karnataka, India, focusing on prospect theory, hyperbolic preference, and adverse selection. Prospect theory presumes that people behave in a risk-averse way when evaluating gains but in a risk-loving way when evaluating losses. Because insurance covers losses, the risk-loving attitude toward losses might explain the low take-up rates, and we find weak empirical support for this. Households with hyperbolic preference were more likely to purchase insurance, consistent with our theoretical prediction of demand for commitment. We also find some evidence on the existence of adverse selection: households with a higher ratio of sick members were more likely to purchase insurance.     

新农合道德风险与逆选择及其规避研究

道德风险和逆选择并不是医疗保险中特有的现象,它们在任何商业保险和社会保险中都存在,但在医疗保险中更为严重。在新农合中,由于农民有自愿投保的选择权而保险机构却没有拒保权,面对的又是处于艰难生存环境的农村卫生机构,其道德风险和逆选择现象要严重得多,如果不能处理好新农合中道德风险和逆选择问题,将可能导致新农合的市场萎缩与效率的下降。本文就是在研究新农合中逆选择与道德风险生成机理的基础上,提出一些规避措施,为新农合的长期可持续发展奠定微观制度基础。     

Perceived need and actual demand for health insurance among rural Chinese residents

One would expect that an individual perceives a need for health insurance before making a purchase. However, simply perceiving a need for insurance is not sufficient for making a purchase. When insurance is “lumpy” individuals perceiving a need may not make a purchase if financial resources are lacking. In this paper we develop a theoretical model which differentiates need from demand for health insurance. We then empirically investigate rural health insurance demand in China. We find that factors like children, education and wealth affect perceived need differently from the way they affect demand.     

COMPETITION BETWEEN INTERMEDIATED AND DIRECT TRADE AND THE TIMING OF DISINTERMEDIATION

This paper analyses how intermediation by a middleman who buysfrom sellers and sells to buyers is affected if direct tradebetween buyers and sellers becomes possible. Without coordinationamong sellers and buyers, disintermediation may not occur whenit would be welfare-improving. With such coordination, disintermediationmay occur too early. If direct trade is active, the supply anddemand for intermediation become interdependent: an increasein the bid price thus increases both supply and demand. Thisprocess of interdependence by which the two trade mechanismscompete for trade is a feature of competing markets generally.     

住院医疗费用保险的保险事故研究

住院医疗费用保险是商业健康保险的主要险种之一。住院医疗费用保险的保险事故具有多元性、主客观双重性、信息不对称性、旁源性和频发性，这些特性使住院医疗费用保险的经营管理和风险控制具有自身的规律和要求。研究住院医疗费用保险的这些特性和经营规律要求，能够帮助商业保险公司树立正确的经营理念，建立适合的经营管理模式，与医疗服务机构建立医疗事务的协调和合作关系，促进住院医疗费用保险的长期健康持续经营。     

并购交易中的信息传递机制研究——基于业绩承诺的视角

由于并购具有金额大与标的资产质量难以辨别等特点，如何在并购交易中降低交易风险一直是学术界持续关注的话题。文章以中小板和创业板公司2015年至2016年审核通过的并购事件为样本，从业绩承诺视角探讨市场对于并购重组交易契约中信息传递机制的看法。研究表明，市场会对业绩承诺这一信息传递机制予以积极反应，业绩承诺越乐观，并购方在公告期间的超额收益越大。进一步研究发现，在非关联并购、投资者专业化程度较低或财务信息更稳健的情况下，业绩承诺所带来的财富效应更明显。文章以业绩承诺为切入点，为学术界了解如何降低并购交易中的信息风险提供了重要的视角与经验证据。     

Adverse Selection in Private Annuity Markets and the Role of Mandatory Social Annuitization

We study the effects on the macroeconomic equilibrium, the wealth distribution, and welfare of adverse selection in private annuity markets in a closed economy inhabited by overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents who are distinguished by their health status. If an agent’s health type is private information there will be a pooling equilibrium in the private annuity market. We also study the implications for the macro-economy and welfare of a social security system with mandatory contributions that are constant across health types. These social annuities are immune to adverse selection and therefore offer a higher rate of return than private annuities do. However, they have a negative effect on the steady-state capital intensity and welfare. The positive effect of a fair pooled rate of return on a fixed part of savings and a higher return on capital in equilibrium is outweighed by the negative consequences of increased adverse selection in the private annuity market and a lower wage rate.     

The Impact of a Public Health Emergency on the Demand for Life Insurance – An Empirical Analysis Based on Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

We examined changes in personal life insurance purchase decisions after a public health event by incorporating perceived health risk and regret into the expected utility function. The model predicts that the epidemic will create incremental insurance demand. Based on the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome outbreak in China, we used a panel dataset of 30 provinces from 2000 to 2007 and applied the difference-in-differences method to confirm the prediction empirically. The results showed that the epidemic did not significantly impact the demand for life insurance in the short term but played a role in the long term. People increased their health-care expenditure and premiums for new policies after the severe acute respiratory syndrome event, suggesting that the epidemic changed people's perceived risk and triggered anticipated regret, which increased life insurance demand. Some robustness checks also supported our findings.     

小规模分散经营情况下的农产品质量信号问题

农产品市场由于信息的不对称,引发了逆向选择和机会主义行为,这是导致食品安全问题的主要原因,在小规模分散经营情况下,这一问题更加严重。本文通过简单的数理模型分析,认为组织的建立能够提高农产品质量,促使质量信号更好的传递,在一定程度上避免了农产品市场上的逆向选择问题。而不同形式的经济组织对于农产品质量信号传递亦产生不同的影响。