股权全流通对大股东行为的影响

该文对大股东日常关联交易行为、资金占用行为在股权分置改革前后的变化进行检验,研究股份全流通对大股东行为的影响。实证结果表明,在股权全流通时期,大股东减少了对上市公司利益的侵占,增加了对上市公司的支持,但仍存在机会主义行为。在股份全流通时期,应进一步优化上市公司股权结构,强化股权制衡;引入外部利益相关者,构建多元治理结构;完善信息披露制度,降低信息不对称,保护中小投资者。     

股权分置改革能抑制控股股东过度投资行为吗?

文章基于上市公司投资行为的视角研究了控股股东侵占与公司治理问题,特别考察了股权分置改革是否有助于缓解控股股东过度投资。基于Richardson(2006)预期投资模型,文章的研究结果显示控制权与现金流权分离度对过度投资有显著的正向影响,而股权分置改革能够显著弱化这种分离度与过度投资之间的正向关系。政府控股公司比私人控股公司的过度投资更为严重,而改善外部治理环境在一定程度上可以抑制过度投资。文章为控股股东侵占行为提供了证据,同时表明股权分置改革有效缓解了过度投资。     

国有风险投资的投资行为和投资成效

本文分析风险投资的产权性质对其投资行为和投资成效的影响。研究发现:国有风险投资在投资行为上并没有体现出其政策初衷,并且在扶持创新上也没有表现出显著的价值增加作用;从投资成效来看,股权分置改革前,国有风险投资相对于非国有风险投资,虽然投资持有期限更长,但是取得成本更高而投资收益更低;股权分置改革后国有风险投资的投资期变得更短、回报更高而成本更低。同时,国有风险投资在企业发展晚期进入时能享有更低的投资成本和更高的投资收益,相关结果在控制内生性之后也仍然存在。这些发现说明国有风险投资的表现总体上符合私人利益假说的预期,而不是社会价值假说的预期。     

试析管理层过度投资行为动因及其治理

投资行为是企业资金积累的重要基础和企业成长的主要动因,但是由于委托代理、信息不对称、管理层薪酬、管理者背景特征等方面的原因导致了企业的管理层进行过度投资,"羊群行为"、自我保护动机是管理层过度投资的主要表现,企业可以通过优化管理层的激励机制、完善股权结构等方面治理管理层过度自信引发的过度投资行为.     

金融发展、两类股权代理成本与过度投资

针对上市公司产能过剩和过度投资等非效率投资的问题,本文在金融发展的制度背景下,以我国2007—2011年的A股股权分置改革后的上市公司为样本,实证分析两类股权代理成本与公司过度投资的关系。研究发现,两类股权代理成本与公司过度投资呈正相关关系,金融发展能减弱第一类股权代理成本与公司过度投资的正相关关系。本文丰富了金融发展与公司非效率投资的文献,有助于理解金融发展与实体经济的互动关系。     

基于公司治理视角的企业投资行为研究

随着公司契约中不同利益主体代理冲突的演化,企业投资行为的治理机制不断被赋予新的研究内涵。本文在简要评述企业投资行为的公司治理理论背景基础上,基于股权分散和集中两种典型公司治理模式,首先从股东-管理者代理、信息非对称-自由现金流代理和股东-债权人代理三个方面,对传统公司治理下的企业投资行为特征和相应的治理机制进行了阐释。然后沿着公司治理研究的发展动态,对大小股东代理冲突下的企业投资行为进行了成因分析与治理探讨。最后在我国股权分置改革与资本市场演进的背景下,提出了探索企业投资行为的规律。     

管理层过度投资行为动因及其治理

投资行为是企业资金积累的重要基础和企业成长的主要动因,但是由于委托代理、信息不对称、管理层薪酬、管理者背景特征等方面的原因导致了企业的管理层进行过度投资,“羊群行为”、自我保护动机是管理层过度投资的主要表现,企业可以通过优化管理层的激励机制、完善股权结构等方面治理管理层过度自信引发的过度投资行为。     

债务融资对企业过度投资约束的分析

企业融资方式的不同会对企业进行投资的决策和效果产生较大的作用.当前我国企业中存在较大的问题就是上市企业更多的利用股权进行融资,而对债务融资的利用率不高.文章主要研究在信息不对称的情况下,股权融资以及债务融资对企业投资的作用,同时还包括债务融资发挥职能的前提.     

自由现金流量、股权结构与我国上市公司过度投资问题研究

按照自由现金流量假说,当公司存在大量自由现金流量时,管理人员的机会主义行为容易引发过 度投资.本文以2005-2007年上市公司数据考察我国企业是否存在过度投资以及股权结构能否抑制过度投资.分析表明我国企业普遍存在过度投资行为,国有企业相比非国有企业过度投资更严重,现金流与投资行为显著正相关,第一大股东持股比例与股权集中度在某种程度上能够制约过度投资,但是举债在我国并不能对过度投资发挥有效的抑制作用.     

中国股市价值投资研究

对价值投资的全面理解,需要在价值投资的经济学基础、稳健的市场表现、与其他投资理念的竞争关系等方面展开.目前中国的价值投资理念遭遇到基础薄弱、变现困难、异化炒作等困境.深化价值投资理念,要求加强以解决股权分置、加快蓝筹股上市、推进金融创新、稳步发展QFII制度、吸引更多投资性资金、完善监管等为代表的制度建设.     

控股股东股权质押、控制权转移风险与广告投入

股权质押使控股股东面临控制权转移风险,其有动机进行市值管理。本文以2011-2019年中国A股上市公司为样本,考察股权质押情境下控股股东是否存在调整广告投入的行为。研究结果发现,控股股东进行股权质押后,公司广告投入水平显著提高,说明股权质押情境下控股股东会通过策略性地增加广告投入进行信息管理,而非通过削减广告投入进行向上盈余管理,证实广告具有短期股票回报效应;控制权转移风险较大时,控股股东股权质押对广告投入的正向影响更明显,说明股权质押情境下控股股东增加广告投入是出于缓解控制权转移风险的动机。进一步研究发现,在散户规模较大和产品直接与消费者接触的企业,广告更容易吸引投资者注意力,此时控股股东增加广告投入的动机更强,该行为短期内可以提振股价,但没有起到改善经营业绩的作用且加剧了股价波动。本文为资本市场和产品市场的联系提供了证据,且对相关部门加强上市公司广告费用监管具有一定的政策参考价值。     

监督与纾困！ 机构投资者持股与企业投资效率的关系研究

本文采用上海和深圳证券交易所2008-2019年全部A股上市公司为实证样本,探索机构投资者持股与投资效率之间的关系。结论表明,机构投资者能够同时发挥监督治理效应与纾困治理效应,通过抑制企业过度投资,缓解企业投资不足,进而改善企业投资效率。在控制潜在内生性影响以及一系列稳健性之后结论依然成立。探讨影响路径发现,机构投资者主要通过降低代理成本来抑制企业过度投资。同样,机构投资者主要通过缓解内源融资缓解企业投资不足。进一步考虑外部信息环境的作用,发现良好的信息环境更有利于机构投资者缓解企业内部融资,降低代理成本,最终优化企业投资水平。异质性分析表明,机构投资者在非国有企业中对企业投资效率的影响更加显著。本文在一定程度上拓展了机构投资者治理效力的研究,为更好的探寻机构投资者参与上市公司治理的路径与机理提供了参考。     

Fiscal decentralization and corporate investment: empirical evidence from China

This paper examines the effect of fiscal decentralization on levels and efficiency of corporate investment. The results indicate that as the extent of local government fiscal decentralization increases, the level of new investment by firms under their jurisdiction rises. Furthermore, fiscal decentralization has an impact on corporate investment by aggravating over-investment rather than alleviating under-investment, leading to a situation whereby fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with investment efficiency at the level of the firm. Finally, the impact of fiscal decentralization on over-investment, under-investment and investment efficiency is not different between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, suggesting that economic leverages are the dominant government intervention measures. The findings imply that fiscal decentralization is another determinant of firm-level investment and corporate investment efficiency, which broadens the existing literature on the economic consequence of fiscal decentralization, resulting in important implications for policy-making.     

The relation between asset growth and the cross-section of stock returns: Evidence from the Chinese stock market

This study examines the effect of firm investment on stock returns by using data on the Chinese stock market. We find that stocks with higher investment experience lower future returns and there is an obvious investment effect in the Chinese stock market. The investment effect is stronger for firms that have higher cash flows, lower debt or for state-owned firms. We further explore the relation between investment and returns over the 3 years around portfolio formation. The results show that the high investment firms earn higher returns than low investment firms before portfolio formation; however the high investment firms earn lower returns than low investment firms after portfolio formation, such evidence is supportive of investor's overreaction explanation. Additionally, the stock returns don't necessarily decrease after investment, and the stock returns don't significantly positively correlate with firm profitability or book-to-market, so the result don't support risk-based explanation. Overall, both our portfolio sort and two-stage cross-sectional regression analysis show that behavioral finance theories are better than risk-based theories in explaining the investment anomaly. Evidence from the Chinese stock market provides a useful perspective to understand the debate on the investment anomaly.     

基于不完全信息动态博弈下的投资者决策分析

投资者对融资公司进行投资时,因信息的不对称,往往导致投资失败。不同的公司为了有效融资,并让投资者相信企业的高质量特征,都会想方设法发出一些可置信的信号。作为投资者未必完全相信企业发出的信息,原因在于赢利能力相同的不同企业可能有不同的资本结构,进而影响其投资策略。在博弈中,公司先发出信息。作为投资者,关键在于如何正确分析这些信息。因此,需要对影响企业的信息质量因素进深入分析,才能得到有效的投资决策。     

Numerosity: Forward and Reverse Stock Splits

Abstract

Individuals have a tendency to fixate on large numbers and ignore other relevant information in their decision making process. The numerosity heuristic, a cognitive bias, is the first behavioral hypothesis to explain why investors prefer to receive more shares (rather than less shares) in a stock split even though the aggregate economic value is the same. For forward splits, after controlling for the positive signaling of improved earnings growth and liquidity from the split announcement, the stock price reacts positively to the larger number of shares issued. More importantly, the use of a dual class numerosity model can explain why most conventional hypotheses fail to explain the negative stock price reaction to reverse splits. Given a typical bearish outlook associated with a reverse stock split, investors’ cognitive resources have already been conditioned to derive a systematic conclusion to sell the stock at the higher price. Focusing only on large stock price numerosity, investors are incorrectly inferring a higher investment value. As the high numerosity encourages bearish investors to sell at the higher perceived investment value, the stock returns react more negatively to the higher post-reverse split price level. In both forward and reverse split cases, investors react to high numerosity.     

Drivers of price reaction to rights issue announcements in the Kuwait Stock Exchange

This study examines the drivers behind stock price reactions to announcements of rights issues by firms listed on the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange for the period 2003–2013. We find higher cumulative abnormal returns for firms that undertake larger issues, with the issue size reflecting the availability of favourable investment opportunities and their potential positive impact on firms’ earnings. We also document a positive price reaction in firms that are affiliated with a family group. We interpret this as evidence that the proceeds of the rights offering would be employed effectively when the firm is controlled by a family firm. No evidence was found for the price pressure and pricing effects.     

Contractual restrictions on insider trading: a welfare analysis

Summary. This paper analyzes the welfare effects of permitting firms to negotiate contractually the right to allow corporate insiders to trade shares in the firm on private information. A computational framework is employed to (i) analyze formally the effects of insider trading on managerial investment choice, the informational efficiency of stock prices, and the welfare of all investor types; and (ii) examine the effectiveness of various compensation schemes (such as stock and insider trading rights) to mitigate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. I show that shareholders will typically choose not to grant insider trading rights to managers. This decision is socially optimal. Received: September 23, 2000; revised version: December 12, 2000     

国有机构投资者持股能提升企业投资效率吗?

具有国资背景的机构投资者,对于资本市场平稳发展具有重要意义。本文基于我国2015—2019年A股上市公司样本,考察持股对企业投资效率的影响。研究发现,持股显著提升了企业投资效率,并且该影响在代理冲突更严重和所处信息环境更不透明的公司中更加显著。机制检验表明,降低企业内外部信息不对称和代理成本是持股提升企业投资效率的重要渠道。进一步研究发现,国有机构投资者持股时间越长,对企业非效率投资的治理效果越好;细分国有机构投资者类型后发现,致力于长期维护资本市场稳定和上市公司长期健康发展的证金公司和汇金公司对企业投资效率的提升作用显著,但没有发现“救市”基金和外管局旗下的投资平台对企业投资效率有提升作用。研究结论从企业投资效率视角为国有机构投资者持股在微观企业日常经营中发挥的治理作用提供了新颖的经验证据,对进一步提高我国上市公司质量具有启示意义。     

Capital markets and capital allocation: Implications for economies in transition*

Recent work showing that a sounder financial system is associated with faster economic growth has important implications for transition economies. Stock prices in developed economies move in highly firm‐specific ways that convey information about changes in firms’ marginal value of investment. This information facilitates the rapid flow of capital to its highest value uses. In contrast, stock prices in low‐income countries tend to move up and down en masse, and thus are of scant use for microeconomic capital allocation. Some transition economy markets are coming to resemble those of developed economies, others those of low‐income countries. Stock return asynchronicity is highly correlated with the strength of private property rights in general and public shareholders’ rights in particular. Other recent work suggests that small entrenched elites in low‐income countries preserve their sweeping control over the corporate sectors of their economies by using political influence to undermine the financial system and deprive entrants of capital. The lack of cross‐sectional independence in some transition economies’ stock returns may be a warning of such economic entrenchment. Sound property rights, solid shareholder rights, stock market transparency, and capital account openness appear to check this, and thus contribute to efficient capital allocation and economic growth.