A framework for estimating willingness-to-pay to avoid endogenous environmental risks

This paper proposes a general empirical strategy to estimate willingness-to-pay (WTP) for exogenous risk mitigation when environmental risks are endogenous in protective actions and consumers are imperfectly informed about the ambient risk levels. The strategy consists of a set of survey techniques and the dummy endogenous variable model (Heckman, 1978) to control for correlation in unobserved errors that enter the WTP equation and the protection-decision equation. The method is applied to the non-market valuation survey data on arsenic contamination in drinking water. Our results indicate that the estimated WTPs are significantly higher for households without self-protective action. Our approach thus offers not only the correct welfare estimate for exogenous reduction of environmental risks, but also yields policy implications qualitatively much different from the conventional approach. We also estimate the welfare value of the policy to inform and educate the public about the arsenic risk simultaneously with public risk mitigation. The estimated welfare value is similar to, though slightly higher than, that of risk mitigation without information component. This occurs due to the competing effects of information dissemination and risk mitigation efforts.     

Information Exchange and Transnational Environmental Problems

This paper analyzes information exchange in a model of transnational pollution control in which countries use private information in independently determining their domestic environmental policies. We show that countries may not always have an incentive to exchange their private information. However, for a sufficiently high degree of predictability of domestic environmental policy processes, the expected welfare from sharing information is greater than the expected welfare from keeping it private. The minimum degree of policy predictability for which information sharing occurs increases with the level of environmental risk. Intuitively, information exchange can help mitigate the perception of global uncertainty (both political and scientific) that surrounds transnational environmental problems and potentially improve welfare if policymaking processes are sufficiently aligned with evidence-based approaches (predictable).     

Private information and its origins in an electronic foreign exchange market

We study the risk of informed trading in an electronic foreign exchange market and test whether informed trading is driven by marketwide private information. Our framework is based on a structural microstructure trade model that measures the market makers' beliefs directly. Evidence of high concentration of informed trades is found to be inversely related to the overall 24-hour trading activity, i.e., early morning and late afternoon GMT rounds of trading involve the highest risk of informed trading. We structurally identify that the trades due to region-specific private information are dominant and explain between 5 and 25% of the variation in currency returns. In contrast, marketwide private information explains only about 1–5% of the variation in returns.     

Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition

We study the impact of competition on banks’ risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of information. While financial opening increases banks’ riskiness, a risk-based deposit insurance or, alternatively, the public disclosure of financial information, are likely to mitigate this effect. Moreover, the limiting cases of uninsured but fully informed depositors, and risk-based full deposit insurance, yield the same equilibrium risk level. Although the welfare consequences of increased competition depend on its impact on risk, financial opening unambiguously improves welfare as we approach the limiting cases.     

ADVERSE SELECTION WITH HETEROGENEOUSLY INFORMED AGENTS

A model of over-the-counter markets is proposed. Some asset buyers are informed in that they can identify high-quality assets. Sellers with private information choose what type of buyers they want to trade with. When the measure of informed buyers is low, a unique equilibrium exists, and interestingly, price, trading volume and welfare typically decrease with more informed buyers. When the measure of informed buyers is intermediate, multiple equilibria arise. A switch from one equilibrium to another can lead to large drops in liquidity, price, trading volume, and welfare, like a financial crisis. Implications of an endogenous measure of informed buyers are also studied.     

Information acquisition and welfare effect in a model of competitive financial markets

We analyze welfare effect of information acquisition for a model of competitive financial markets with diverse information and rational expectations. We show that in the fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium, each agent’s gain from trade in ex ante utility decreases as more agents become informed. An implication of the result is that market efficiency and ex ante Pareto optimality are not compatible in competitive financial markets with diverse information and rational expectations. Our result can be viewed as complementary to the Grossman paradox, which shows that market efficiency and individuals’ incentives to acquire information are not compatible. This paper is the first step in a projected exploration of welfare effect of information acquisition in models with diverse information.     

Proportionality of Willingness to Pay to Small Changes in Risk: The Impact of Attitudinal Factors in Scope Tests

Sensitivity (proportionality) of willingness to pay (WTP) to (small) risk changes is often used as a criterion to test for valid measures of economic preferences. In a contingent valuation (CV) study conducted in Austria, 1,005 respondents were asked their WTP for preventing an increase in the risk of being killed in an avalanche of 1/42,500 and 3/42,500 respectively. WTP for the higher variation in risk is significantly greater than WTP for the lower risk change. We find evidence that those respondents who have had personal experience of avalanches in recent years combine the information about future risk increase—as provided in the survey—with the observed number of fatal avalanche accidents in the past. Proportionality of WTP holds if such prior experience is taken into account and if attitudinal factors in scope tests are controlled for. This research was funded by alpS GmbH—Center for Natural Hazard Management, Innsbruck, Austria.     

Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias

A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation (CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid.      

Asking for Individual or Household Willingness to Pay for Environmental Goods?

The aggregate welfare measure for a change in the provision of a public good derived from a contingent valuation (CV) survey will be higher if the same elicited mean willingness to pay (WTP) is added up over individuals rather than households. A trivial fact, however, once respondents are part of multi-person households, it becomes almost impossible to elicit an “uncontaminated” WTP measure that with some degree of confidence can be aggregated over one or the other response unit. The literature is mostly silent about which response unit to use in WTP questions, and in some CV studies it is even unclear which type has actually been applied. We test for differences between individual and household WTP in a novel, web-administered, split-sample CV survey asking WTP for preserving biodiversity in old-growth forests in Norway. Two samples are asked both types of questions, but in reverse order, followed by a question with an item battery trying to reveal why WTP may differ. We find in a test between samples that the WTP respondents state on behalf of their households is not significantly different from their individual WTP. However, within the same sample, household WTP is significantly higher than individual WTP; in particular if respondents are asked to state individual before household WTP. Our results suggest that using individual WTP as the response unit may overestimate aggregate WTP. Thus, the choice of response format needs to be explicitly and carefully addressed in CV questionnaire design and further research in order to avoid the risk of unprofitable projects passing the benefit-cost test.

---

     

Use of Contingent Valuation to Elicit Willingness-to-Pay for the Benefits of Developmental Health Risk Reductions

We report the results of several contingent valuation (CV) surveys to elicit willingness-to-pay values from the general public for risk reductions associated with decreases in exposure to a chemical, PCBs, in the environment. We also develop Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) from the survey using both standard gamble and time-tradeoff elicitation methods to explore the relationship between QALYs and willingness-to-pay (WTP), and to develop QALY weights for subtle developmental effects. The results of the CV surveys are designed for incorporation into a case study of an integrated risk model to monetize the benefits of predicted risk reductions. Respondents showed a nearly proportional, positive relationship between decreasing the risk of a 6-point reduction in IQ (a standard measure of “intelligence”) and WTP, but showed a negative relationship between risk reduction and WTP for reading comprehension as an outcome. The range of mortality risks that respondents would accept on behalf of their (hypothetical) 10-year-old child is 2 in 10,000 to 9 in 1,000 per IQ point, and WTP per IQ point is $466 ($380, $520). QALY weights elicited via time tradeoff (reduction in life expectancy) were significantly different from QALY weights elicited via a standard gamble (p = 0.001). Respondents who answered questions about ecological endpoints first were willing to pay a small additional amount when asked about human health effects, but those respondents who answered questions about human health endpoints first were not willing to pay any additional amount when subsequently asked about ecological effects. This paper has not been submitted elsewhere in identical or similar form, nor will it be during the first three months after its submission to the Publisher.     

Asymmetric Information in Simple Bargaining Games: An Experimental Study

Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at stake: in some cases, the proposer is better informed, in others, it is the responder. We analyze the effects of both types of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto power: the ultimatum and the dictator game. We find that the extent to which proposers demand less in the ultimatum as compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we find informed proposers to exploit their informational advantage by offering an amount that does not reveal the true size of the pie, with proposers in the ultimatum game exhibiting this behavioral pattern to a larger extent than those in the dictator game. Uninformed proposers risk imposed rejection when they ask for more than potentially is at stake, and ask for a risk premium in dictator games. We concentrate on proposers, but also explore responder behavior: We find uninformed responders to enable proposers’ hiding behavior, and we find proposer intentionality not to play an important role for informed responders when they decide whether to accept or reject an offer by an (uninformed) proposer.     

The Timing and Strategic Role of Self-Protection

Self-protection has private goods characteristics as it reduces own exposure to pollution given a certain level of pollution. We study the effect of timing self-protection before, after or simultaneously with abatement. We find that self-protection when timed before abatements has strategic effects. In this case self-protection, shifts the second stage subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of abatements such that own contributions of abatement are decreased and those of the other country are increased. Thereby shifting future abatement costs to the other country. When countries cooperate only on abatement, the incentives to shift future abatement costs are greater. Contrary to, intention, cooperation on abatement may in fact worsen environmental quality if it does not include self-protection.     

Evaluation of Welfare Change in Quantity-Constrained Regimes*

There are many circumstances where individuals are subject to constraints other than income and prices. Evaluation of welfare change from a price-taking position to a quantity-constrained position presents special problems. While remaining firmly in the partial-equilibrium tradition, indifference curves in the price-quantity space are applied to the identification of an equivalent variation. a modified Marshallian measure and a compensating variation in quantity-constrained situations. These measures satisfy the condition of CV < MS < EV for a normal good. A Marshallian measure that has been used—the ‘simple Marshallian measure’—is shown to have a considerable drawback.     

Mandating behavioral conformity in social groups with conformist members

Social interaction among individuals with a preference for conformity gives rise to coordination externalities which are not internalized in a non-cooperative setting. Mandating behavioral conformity, by centrally imposing a common, group-wide action, internalizes these coordination externalities, but also comes at a cost of restraining individuals’ self-regarding goals. We explore a framework of social interaction among privately informed individuals with conformist preferences to examine when mandating behavioral conformity improves group welfare. Our analysis elucidates how the desirability of mandating behavioral conformity is shaped by the group's socio-economic structure. We find that mandating behavioral conformity is not desirable in social groups that are ex ante homogeneous—either with respect to members’ contribution to group welfare or their innate conformist tendency. In contrast, mandating behavioral conformity can be beneficial in those ex ante heterogeneous social groups where the individuals who contribute most to group welfare also exhibit the strongest preference for conformity.     

Fragility of information cascades: an experimental study using elicited beliefs

This paper examines the occurrence and fragility of information cascades in two laboratory experiments. One group of low informed participants sequentially guess which of two states has been randomly chosen. In a matched pairs design, another group of high informed participants make similar guesses after having observed the guesses of the low informed participants. In the second experiment, participants’ beliefs about the chosen state are elicited. In equilibrium, low informed players who observe an established pattern of identical guesses herd without regard to their private information whereas high informed players always guess according to their private information. Equilibrium behavior implies that information cascades emerge in the group of low informed participants, the belief based solely on cascade guesses is stationary, and information cascades are systematically broken by high informed participants endowed with private information contradicting the cascade guesses. Experimental results show that the behavior of low informed participants is qualitatively in line with the equilibrium prediction. Information cascades often emerge in our experiments. The tendency of low informed participants to engage in cascade behavior increases with the number of identical guesses. Our main finding is that information cascades are not fragile. The behavior of high informed participants differs markedly from the equilibrium prediction. Only one-third of laboratory cascades are broken by high informed participants endowed with private information contradicting the cascade guesses. The relative frequency of cascade breaks is 15% for the situations where five or more identical guesses are observed. Participants’ elicited beliefs are strongly consistent with their own behavior and show that, unlike in equilibrium, the more cascade guesses participants observe the more they believe in the state favored by those guesses.     

Combining performance-based and action-based payments to provide environmental goods under uncertainty

Payments for environmental services (PES) are widely adopted to support the conservation of biodiversity and other environmental goods. Challenges that PES schemes have to tackle are (i) environmental uncertainty and (ii) information asymmetry between the provider of the service (typically a farmer) and the regulator. Environmental uncertainty calls for action-based payment schemes, because of the more favorable risk allocation if the farmer is risk-averse. Information asymmetry, on the other hand, calls for a performance-based payment, because of the more direct incentives for the farmer. Based on a principal-agent model, we study the optimal combination of both, performance-based and action-based payments under conditions of environmental uncertainty and asymmetric information. We find that for a risk-neutral regulator a combination is optimal in the majority of cases and that the welfare gain of the combined scheme over a pure action-based (performance-based) payment increases with information asymmetry (environmental uncertainty). We further show that for a regulator who is risk-averse against fluctuations in environmental goods provision the optimal performance-based payment is lower than for a risk-neutral regulator. We quantitatively illustrate our findings in a case study on the enhancement of the butterfly Scarce Large Blue (Maculinea teleius) in Landau/Germany.     

Real estate investment: Market volatility and optimal holding period under risk aversion

This paper deals with real estate portfolio optimization when investors are risk averse. In this framework, we examine an important decision making problem, namely the determination of the optimal time to sell a diversified real estate portfolio. The optimization problem corresponds to the maximization of a concave utility function defined on both the free cash flows and the terminal value of the portfolio. We determine several types of optimal times to sell and analyze their properties. We extend previous results, established for the quasi linear utility case, where investors are risk neutral. We consider four cases. In the first one, the investor knows the probability distribution of the real estate index. In the second one, the investor is perfectly informed about the real estate market dynamics. In the third case, the investor uses an intertemporal optimization approach which looks like an American option problem. Finally, the buy-and-hold strategy is considered. For these four cases, we analyze in particular how the solutions depend on the market volatility and we compare them with those of the quasi linear case. We show that the introduction of risk aversion allows to better account for the real estate market volatility. We also introduce the notion of compensating variation to better measure the impacts of both the risk aversion and the volatility.     

INFORMATION AND PRICE DISPERSION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

Limited information is the key element generating price dispersion in models of homogeneous-goods markets. We show that the global relationship between information and price dispersion is an inverse-U shape. We test this mechanism for the retail gasoline market using a new measure of information based on commuter data from Austria. Commuters sample gasoline prices on their commuting route, providing us with spatial variation in the share of informed consumers. Our empirical estimates are in line with the theoretical predictions. We also quantify how information affects average prices paid and the distribution of surplus in the gasoline market.     

Self-protection against crime: what do schools do?

Most economic research about self-protection against crime concentrates on self-protection by individuals, households, and stores – private economic agents. We know much less about self-protection in public economic settings, such as by schools; this article takes a step towards learning more. An economic agent who self-protects benefits by reducing vulnerability to crime but incurs self-protection costs whether a victimization occurs or not; should a crime occur, the agent further bears the cost of the victimization itself. The agent, a school administrator in this application, must determine the optimal level of self-protection within this environment. Empirical results obtained using data from the 2004 and 2006 School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) show that schools self-protect (use professional security personnel) much in line with theoretical predictions. Among other findings, schools located in larger cities and that have a larger and older student body self-protect more prevalently than other schools, while schools with more academically able students self-protect less than schools with less productive student inputs.