Cost Uncertainty and Unilateral Abatement

Unilateral abatement is sometimes advocated in order to set a good example that will make other countries follow. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether existence of correlated cost uncertainty provides an incentive for a country to undertake unilateral abatement. The theoretical model is driven by two main mechanisms; first, a learning effect, as the follower country might reduce its risk premium as it can observe the cost level in the leader country. Second, there is the public good effect, i.e., the marginal benefit of abatement declines when abatement is a public good and other countries contribute to pollution reductions. Results shows that unilateral abatement would be efficient in reducing uncertainty about the unit costs of abatement if a country with low cost uncertainty would undertake abatement first, while a country with initially high cost uncertainty would follow. However, countries may prefer to act simultaneously because of the larger uncertainties that are inherent in a sequential game.      

Rethinking the optimal level of environmental quality: justifications for strict environmental policy

Traditional environmental theory suggests that the optimal level of a pollution emission occurs when the marginal damage created by the emissions is equal to the marginal cost of reducing the emissions. We argue that the benefits from reducing pollution should be much more broadly defined to include at least three other sources of benefits. First, we develop a game-theoretic model in which firms may under-invest in cost-saving ‘green technologies’. Second, we demonstrate that consideration of future damages and abatement costs leads to a lower current optimal pollution level than that obtained in traditional models. Finally, we show that ecological complexity creates indirect pathways by which greater pollution increases the likelihood of generating irreversible environmental damage. This broader definition of the benefits of pollution abatement yields an optimal level of pollution that may actually be less than the level at which conventionally-measured marginal damages are equal to marginal abatement costs. Thus, environmental policy should be stricter.     

Intertemporal Emission Permits Trading Under Uncertainty and Irreversibility

This paper analyzes the effect of emission permit banking on clean technology investment and abatement under conditions where the stringency of the future cap is uncertain. We examine the problem of heterogeneous firms minimizing the cost of intertemporal emission control in the presence of stochastic future pollution standards and emission permits that are tradable across firms and through time. A firm can invest in clean capital (an improved pollution abatement technology) to reduce its abatement cost. We consider two possibilities: that investment is reversible or irreversible. Uncertainty is captured within a two period model: only the current period cap is known. We show that if banking is positive and marginal abatement costs are sufficiently convex, there will be more abatement and investment in clean technology under uncertainty than there would be under certainty and no banking. These results are at odds with the common belief that uncertainty on future environmental policy is a barrier to investment in clean capital. Moreover, under uncertainty and irreversibility, we find that there are cases where banking enables firms to invest more in clean capital.     

Games of Climate Change with International Trade

We analyse games of greenhouse gas emission reduction in which the emissions and the emission reduction costs of one country depend on other countries' emission abatement. In an analytically tractable model, we show that international trade effects on costs and emissions can either increase or decrease incentives to reduce emissions and to cooperate on emission abatement; in some specifications, optimal emission reduction is unaffected by trade. We therefore specify the model further, calibrating it to larger models that estimate the costs of emission reduction, trade effects, and impacts of climate change. If trade effects are driven by total emission reduction costs of other countries cooperation is slightly more difficult than in the case without trade effects. If trade effects are determined by relative emission reduction efforts in other countries, cooperation becomes easier. Carbon leakage does not affect our qualitative insights, although it does change the numbers.     

How Large are the Welfare Gains from Technological Innovation Induced by Environmental Policies?

This paper examines whether the welfare gains from technological innovation that reduces future abatement costs are larger or smaller than the Pigouvian welfare gains from optimal pollution control. The relative welfare gains from innovation depend on three key factors—the initially optimal level of abatement, the speed at which innovation reduces future abatement costs, and the discount rate. We calculate the welfare gains from innovation under a variety of different scenarios. Mostly they are less than the Pigouvian welfare gains. To be greater, innovation must reduce abatement costs substantially and quickly and the initially optimal abatement level must be fairly modest.     

Allocation of pollution abatement under learning by doing

This paper examines how learning by doing affects the allocation of pollution abatement between heterogeneous technologies over time. The optimal policy balances current abatement costs against reductions in future costs and infant technologies may be preferred to mature technologies despite greater initial costs. We characterize when a technological winner might emerge and we identify conditions under which optimal abatement is shared across all technologies. Pigouvian taxes can implement the first-best, but may need to be differentiated across technologies. When technical change is induced, an important role of environmental policies is to put abatement on the right technological trajectories.     

Moving to greener pastures? Multinationals and the pollution haven hypothesis

This paper presents evidence on whether multinationals are flocking to developing country “pollution havens”. Although we find some evidence that foreign investors locate in sectors with high levels of air pollution, the evidence is weak at best. We then examine whether foreign firms pollute less than their peers. We find that foreign plants are significantly more energy efficient and use cleaner types of energy. We conclude with an analysis of U.S. outbound investment. Although the pattern of U.S. foreign investment is skewed towards industries with high costs of pollution abatement, the results are not robust across specifications.     

Pollution Abatement Investment When Environmental Regulation Is Uncertain

In a dynamic model of a risk-neutral competitive firm that can lower its pollution emissions per unit of output by building up abatement capital stock, we examine the effect of a higher pollution tax rate on abatement investment both under full certainty and when the timing or the size of the tax increase is uncertain. We show that a higher pollution tax encourages abatement investment if it does not exceed a certain threshold rate. However, akin to the Diamond-Mirrlees tax anomaly, it is possible that a higher pollution tax rate results in more pollution. The magnitude uncertainty discourages abatement investment, but at the time of the actual tax increase the abatement investment path may shift either upward or downward. On the other hand, when the timing is uncertain, the abatement investment path always jumps upward, thus suggesting that the effect of magnitude uncertainty on the optimal investment path may be more pronounced than that of timing uncertainty. Further, we show that the ad hoc practice of raising the discount rate to account for the uncertainty leads to underinvestment in abatement capital. We show how the size of this underinvestment bias varies with the future tax increase. Finally, we show that a credible threat to accelerate the tax increase can induce more abatement investment.     

Investment and emission control under technology and pollution externalities

This paper studies incentives to develop advanced pollution abatement technology when technology may spillover across agents and pollution abatement is a public good. We are motivated by a variety of pollution control issues where solutions require the development and implementation of new pollution abatement technologies. We show that at the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game with R&D investment and emission abatement, whether the free rider effect prevails and under-investment and excess emissions occur depends on the degree of technology spillovers and the effect of R&D on the marginal abatement costs. There are cases in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, Nash equilibrium investments in emissions reductions exceed the first-best case.     

Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy

We study the optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy when (i) the regulator does not know the firms’ abatement costs, (ii) penalties for tax evasion are limited, and (iii) monitoring of pollution is costly. We show that the threat of being audited alter the usual firms’ incentives to over-estimate their abatement costs. In particular, depending on the firms’ abatement costs, the optimal policy may involve over or under-deterrence compared to the full information outcome. We then investigate the properties of a pollution standard. We show that this policy comes close to an environmental tax once the economic incentives of the accompanying enforcement policy are considered.     

The relationship between pollution abatement costs and environmental regulation: Evidence from the Chinese industrial sector

Since the 2000s, China has been trying to strengthen emission controls in response to increasing pollution problems. However, strict implementation of emission controls generates pollution abatement costs. Using regional data for 29 provinces in the Chinese industrial sector from 1995 to 2010, this study estimated the pollution abatement costs for each province through the measurement of environmental efficiency, by applying a directional distance function approach. Moreover, using panel data analysis, this study clarified whether there is a nonlinear relationship between pollution abatement costs and environmental regulations. The empirical results are as follows. The study confirmed that the burden of abatement costs tended not only to occur in the central and western regions but also to increase in the eastern region. Moreover, the nonlinear relationship is inverted U‐shaped; thus, pollution abatement costs increase, as a negative effect of environmental regulations, until a certain inflection point, after which they decrease.     

Optimal incentives to reduce transboundary emissions: Theory and empirical illustration to sulphur emissions in Austria and (former) Czechoslovakia

The observation that only one out of 14 tons of sulphur compounds immissions in Austria originates from Austrian sources highlights the contribution of transboundary pollution (predominantly from Eastern Europe). Therefore, further abatement in Austria has only a marginal impact but is very costly given the already high Austrian abatement standards. Thus, scientists and politicians conclude that it is in the rich countries' (e.g., Austria, Germany and the Scandinavian countries) own interest to support environmental protection in the former centrally planned economies that are apparently less concerned about environmental harms and risks. However, the proposed policies lead to a crowding out of the recipient country's own abatement investments. In order to mitigate such strategic behaviour, which is possible due to asymmetric information, we apply the principal-agent theory to derive optimal incentives. These incentives are in stark contrast to actual policy proposals, in particular, no subsidy should be paid if the neighbouring and polluting country does not care sufficiently about environment. Indeed, the empirical application shows that only sufficient environmental concern in Czechoslovakia warrants subsidies from Austria.We acknowledge discussions with Markus Amann and Gary Brennand and in particular, the very constructive comments from three anonymous referees.     

Endogenous technology and tradable emission quotas

We study an international climate agreement that assigns emission quotas to each participating country. Unlike the simplest models in the literature, we assume that abatement costs are affected by R&D activities undertaken in all firms in all countries, i.e. abatement technologies are endogenous. In line with the Kyoto agreement we assume that the international climate agreement does not include R&D policies. We show that for a second-best agreement with heterogeneous countries, marginal costs of abatement differ across countries. In other words, the second-best outcome cannot be achieved if emission quotas are tradable.     

How does the design of international environmental agreements affect investment in environmentally-friendly technology?

In this paper, we investigate how the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs) affects the incentives for the private sector to invest in environmentally-friendly technology. The givens are a transboundary pollution problem involving two asymmetric countries in terms of benefits arising from global abatement. There is a single polluting firm in each country. We account for two types of IEAs: an agreement based on a uniform standard with transfers and an agreement based on differentiated standards without transfers. To carry out this study, we use a two-stage game where the private sector anticipates its irreversible investment given the expected level of abatement standards resulting from future negotiations. Our findings indicate that the implementation of the agreement based on a uniform standard with transfers may be preferable for the two countries, as it creates greater incentives for firms to invest in costly abatement technology. This result arises when this technology’s level of the sunk cost of investment is low. If this level is sufficiently high, the implementation of the same agreement is not beneficial to countries, because it takes away the incentive of each firm to invest in new abatement technology. Moreover, this agreement is not able to generate any positive gains for either country through cooperation, thus no country is motivated to cooperate.     

Water pollution abatement by Chinese industry: cost estimates and policy implications

Factory-level data are used to estimate water pollution abatement costs for Chinese industry. Joint abatement cost functions are utilized which relate total costs to treatment volume and the simultaneous effect of reductions in suspended solids, chemical oxygen demand, biological oxygen demand and other pollutants. Tests of alternative functional forms suggest that a very simple (constant elasticity) model fits the data as well as a complex (translog) model, permitting sophisticated policy experiments with relatively simple calculations. From the results, the cost-effectiveness of current pollution control policy in China is analysed. Basic conclusions are (1) The benefits of stricter discharge standards should be weighed carefully against the costs. For the sample of 260 factories, a shift across the existing range of standards entails a present-value difference of US$330 million in abatement costs. (2) Emissions charges as low as US$1.00/ton would be sufficient to induce 80% abatement of suspended solids for cost-minimizing factories. Charges of US$3, US$15 and US$30 per ton would be sufficient to induce 90% abatement of TSS, COD and BOD. (3) The current regulatory system provides an economic incentive to abate by charging a levy on pollution in excess of the standard. However, the results suggest that changing to a full emissions charge system would greatly reduce overall abatement costs. For the 260 factories in the sample, the current overall abatement rate could be attained under a charge system at a reduced annual cost whose present value is US$344 million.     

Unilateral actions, the case of international environmental problems

When abatement costs are uncertain but correlated, and a country becomes privately informed that costs are low, then unilateral actions can serve as a signalling device to reveal low costs and this can have the potential to trigger positive responses abroad. However, the country engaging in unilateral actions is the one with the highest expectation about the other countries’ reactions, and it might suffer from an effect similar to the winner’s curse.     

Environmental Abatement Costs and Establishment Size

The impact of environmental abatement costs on the size distribution of manufacturing establishments in pollution-intensive industries is analyzed. Utilizing both state- and industry-specific measures of environmental regulation, a new and important interaction is discovered: Establishment size increases with state environmental abatement costs, but only in industries during periods of relatively high (national) pollution abatement intensity. Increased state environmental stringency during times when similar industries located in other states are not undertaking sufficient abatement expenditures leads to a decrease in establishment size. (JEL L11 , L51 , R38 )     

Supplementing Domestic Mitigation and Adaptation with Emissions Reduction Abroad to Face Climate Change

In this paper we focus on a long-term dynamic analysis of the optimal adaptation/mitigation mix in the presence of a pollution threshold above which adaptation is no longer efficient. We account for accumulation in abatement capital, greenhouse gases, and adaptation capital in order to better capture the arbitrage between abatement and adaptation investments. Pollution damages arise from the emissions due to the country consumption but also from the emissions of the rest of the world (ROW). A pollution threshold is then introduced, above which adaptation is no longer efficient. We obtain that if this threshold is lower than the steady-state level of pollution, there is no way for the modelled economy to avoid it. In particular, such a situation will appear if the ROW’s emissions are high. We then show that CDM may be a means to avoid a pollution threshold above which adaptation becomes of no use.     

Transboundary Pollution and the Welfare Effects of Technology Transfer

We examine the welfare effects of a transfer of pollution abatement technology in a two-country model. In each country, one industry discharges pollution as a byproduct of output, and the sum of domestic and cross-border pollution decreases the productivity of the other industry. We show the effects of technology transfer on the terms of trade, pollution levels, and welfare. Technology transfer decreases the pollution affecting each country under certain conditions. We derive and interpret the conditions under which technology transfer enriches the donor and the recipient. The results essentially depend on the trade pattern and the fraction of cross-border pollution.     

Does Technological Innovation Really Reduce Marginal Abatement Costs? Some Theory,Algebraic Evidence,and Policy Implications

The existing literature models innovation in pollution control as a reduction in marginal abatement costs. We show that this assumption is inappropriate for production process innovations such as fuel switching. Algebraically, we examine the effects of different innovation types on marginal abatement cost curves, showing that some desirable innovations increase marginal abatement costs. Empirically, we estimate marginal abatement costs for sulfur dioxide by measuring the output distance function for electric power in Korea. Regression results confirm that production process innovations did raise marginal abatement costs in this case. One policy implication: economic instruments do not always provide stronger innovation incentives than command-and-control policies.