The effects of remittances,foreign direct investment,and foreign aid on economic growth: An empirical analysis

The Sustainable Development Goals have refocused attention on ways of providing external finance to support development. Because they have different motivations and work through different modalities, remittances, foreign direct investment (FDI), and official development assistance may be expected to have different consequences for economic growth. Existing empirical evidence suggests that both positive and negative effects are associated with each source of finance. We use both a dynamic panel model and a fixed effects model to calculate the overall effects of each source of finance in isolation and taken together over the period 1976–2015. We include a range of control variables to allow for other potential influences on economic growth. We disaggregate the effects across geographical regions and income levels to test for heterogeneity. We also undertake a series of robustness checks. Our results suggest that FDI has a significant positive effect on economic growth, whereas remittances have a significant and negative effect. The effect of foreign aid is more ambiguous but is usually insignificant. The article offers an interpretation of the results drawing on ideas from the relevant theory.     

珠三角工业化模式对刘易斯模型的扩展

刘易斯模型面临着挑战并具有扩展、创新的内在要求,把刘易斯模型应用于珠三角地区二元经济演化和工业化路径分析时,该地区表现出刘易斯模型未能覆盖和未曾分析的特殊模式,而其特殊性主要是在一个开放条件下的演化增长,从而拓展了传统刘易斯模型的封闭系统分析框架,构建了由资本、剩余劳动力转移、出口贸易、技术转移等这四个要素组成的开放型二元经济演化路径。     

An Evolutionary Interpretation of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria

A convincing interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria describes them as steady states in a large population in which players use pure strategies but the population as a whole mimics a mixed strategy. I study the conditions under which an evolutionary, stochastic learning process converges to the appropriate distribution over pure strategies in the population. I find that not all mixed equilibria can be justified as the result of an evolutionary process even if the equilibrium is unique. For symmetric 2 × 2 and 3 × 3 games I give necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence, which are related to the concept of an ESS, and forn × ngames I give a sufficient condition.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C73, D83.     

Schumpeter's theory of economic evolution: a Darwinian interpretation

A general Darwinian framework is employed to arrive at an interpretation of Schumpeter's work that brings out clearly its specific evolutionary aspects. Schumpeter's theory of economic evolution is seen to be still highly relevant to evolutionary economics, because it sheds light on some fundamental issues: the relationship between evolutionary theory and equilibrium analysis, the usefulness of Darwinian theory for economics, and the precise nature of the evolutionary forces at work in economic systems.     

Evolutionary economics and the counterfactual threat: on the nature and role of counterfactual history as an empirical tool in economics

Counterfactual conditional statements are ubiquitous in any scientific endeavour. This paper contains an analysis of the nature of counterfactual conditionals and the conditions under which they are considered assertable by scientists. The paper then applies this analysis to the use of counterfactuals in evolutionary economics, arguing that because evolutionary economics is inherently concerned with historical processes it cannot avoid the use of counterfactual history as one of its tools of empirical analysis. We discuss the strengths and pitfalls of counterfactual history. We argue that because evolutionary economics starts from the foundation that randomness may be inherent in any economic system, the very aspects of evolutionary economics that make counterfactual history a desirable empirical tool also make that tool difficult to employ. RID="*" ID="*" We thank the participants of the International Seminar on Evolutionary Economics as a Research Programme in Stockholm, May 1997, for many helpful comments. We also thank Lorri Baier for many helpful substantive and textual comments. Correspondence to: R. Cowan     

Viewpoint: Estimating the causal effects of policies and programs

Estimation, inference and interpretation of the causal effects of programs and policies have all advanced dramatically over the past 25 years. We highlight three particularly important intellectual trends: an improved appreciation of the substantive importance of heterogeneous responses and of their methodological implications, a stronger focus on internal validity brought about by the “credibility revolution,” and the scientific value that follows from grounding estimation and interpretation in economic theory. We discuss a menu of commonly employed partial equilibrium approaches to the identification of causal effects, emphasizing that the researcher's central intellectual contribution always consists of making an explicit case for a specific causal interpretation given the relevant economic theory, the data, the institutional context and the economic question of interest. We also touch on the importance of general equilibrium effects and full cost–benefit analyses.     

Coevolution of economic and ecological systems

This paper analyzes a model of economy–environment coevolution in which economic activities induce the genetic evolution of a biological species. This model is applied to the problem of pesticide resistance management. Just as in Munro (Environ Resour Econ, 9:429–449, 1997), we consider three main types of interactions: (1) a large pest population reduces economic revenues, (2) economic activities select for resistant genes and (3) the spread of resistant genes affects the size of the pest population. The model differs from Munro in that it includes evolutionary modeling of economic strategies. Economic agents are assumed to be boundedly rational, i.e they cannot compute the optimal level of pesticide use that minimizes resistance among pests. Economic evolution represents the change in the distribution of pesticide strategies in the population of economic agents and is modeled by a replicator dynamics equation. The interactions between economic evolution of pesticide strategies, pest population dynamics and genetic evolution of resistance of pests are studied in a system of three differential equations. We explore the dynamics and stability properties of the system using numerical simulations.     

Evolvability and progress in evolutionary economics

This paper develops an account of evolutionary progress for use in the field of evolutionary economics. Previous work is surveyed and a new account set out, based on the idea of evolvability as it has been used recently in evolutionary developmental biology. The biological underpinnings of this idea are explained using examples of a series of phenomena that influence the evolvability of biological systems. It is further argued that biological and economic selection pressures and developmental processes are sufficiently similar to make this biological concept useful in economics. The new account is defended against a number of common objections to the notion of progress in evolving systems, including the claim that all stipulated measures of evolutionary progress are essentially arbitrary and the idea that economic evolutionary progress might not accord with the preferences of economic actors. It is argued that progress, understood as an increase in evolvability over time, is both philosophically well-justified and provides useful predictive and explanatory resources to those seeking to understand and manipulate evolving economic systems.     

Imitation and evolutionary stability of poverty traps

This paper develops a bioeconomic model applying evolutionary game theory to the notion of poverty traps. We study the evolution of the social norm of being either a high-type or low-type in a dynamic environment where agents are driven by an imitative behavior. History matters because given initial conditions, agents imitate according to their current success in payoffs and the current profile of economic agents in the economy. We define a poverty trap as an evolutionarily stable strategic profile and steady state of the replicator dynamics. We show that in poor economies with a large fraction of low-type agents imitative strategies do not support a take-off into sustained growth. To achieve that take-off, society should subsidize critical parameters of the expected payoffs such that economic agents may change the initial conditions and the economy gets a critical mass of high-type economic agents, and so to overcome the poverty trap.     

Bioeconomics as economics from a Darwinian perspective

Bioeconomics—the merging of views from biology and economics—on the one hand invites the 'export' of situational logic and sophisticated optimization developed in economics into biology. On the other hand, human economic activity and its evolution, not least over the past few centuries, may be considered an instance for fruitfully applying ideas from evolutionary biology and Darwinian theory. The latter perspective is taken in the present paper. Three different aspects are discussed in detail. First, the Darwinian revolution provides an example of a paradigm shift which contrasts most significantly with the 'subjectivist revolution' that took place at about the same time in economics. Since many of the features of the paradigmatic change that were introduced into the sciences by Darwinism may be desirable for economics as well, the question is explored whether the Darwinian revolution can be a model for introducing a new paradigm in economic theory. Second, the success of Darwinism and its view of evolution have induced economists who are interested in an evolutionary approach in economics to borrow, more or less extensively, concepts and tools from Darwinian theory. Particularly prominent are constructions based on analogies to the theory of natural selection. Because several objections to such analogy constructions can be raised, generalization rather than analogy is advocated here as a research strategy. This means to search for abstract features which all evolutionary theories have in common. Third, the question of what a Darwinian world view might mean for assessing long term economic evolution is discussed. Such a view, it is argued, can provide a point of departure for reinterpreting the hedonistic approach to economic change and development. On the basis of such an interpretation bioeconomics may not only go beyond the optimization-cum-equilibrium paradigm currently prevailing in economics. It may also mean adding substantial qualifications to the subjectivism the neoclassical economists, at the turn of the century, were proud to establish in the course of their scientific revolution.     

Policy instruments for evolution of bounded rationality: Application to climate-energy problems

We demonstrate how an evolutionary agent-based model can be used to evaluate climate policies that take the heterogeneity of strategies of individual agents into account. An essential feature of the model is that the fitness of an economic strategy is determined by the relative welfare of the associated agent as compared to its immediate neighbors in a social network. This enables the study of policies that affect relative positions of individuals. We formulate two innovative climate policies, namely a prize, altering directly relative welfare, and advertisement, which influences the social network of interactions. The policies are illustrated using a simple model of global warming where a resource with a negative environmental impact—fossil energy—can be replaced by an environmentally neutral yet less cost-effective alternative, namely renewable energy. It is shown that the general approach enlarges the scope of economic policy analysis.     

Management and the representative firm revisited: the modern significance of Marshall's evolutionary economics

In an essay written in honour of Peter Swann, it is second nature to discuss some aspects of the economics of innovation, as that is the very challenging area of economic life where he has added so much to our understanding. I will attempt to do this by posing the problem of how innovation fits into the theory of value. Innovation research continues apace, but its broader systemic implications for how we understand the dynamics of capitalism are in danger of being overlooked. But two important economists, Schumpeter and Marshall, have seen the problem differently and built innovation into their theoretical schemes from the start. Marshall's theory of evolutionary change provides a natural focus for our discussion, and this is reflected in his treatment of management, in his use of the representative firm and in the variation-cum-selection dynamics of his open competitive process. We treat each of these topics and show how his evolutionary dynamics can be expressed in the Fisher/Price dynamics of evolutionary change. More generally, the key to economic development is the uneven nature of innovation and it is the uneven nature that gives economic transformation its evolutionary character. This, I suggest, is the proper legacy of Marshalls economics.     

技术创新合作机制的演化博弈分析及对策研究——基于军民结合视角

军民结合技术创新是国家创新体系的重要组成部分,也是统筹国防建设和经济建设的重要途径。以军工企业和民用企业为研究对象,以有限理性为基本假设,构建了军民结合技术创新合作机制的演化博弈模型,分析了军民结合技术创新的演化稳定策略。研究结果表明,预期收益率和双方的技术投入对合作创新有正向影响,信息沟通成本、创新风险和技术转化成本对合作创新有反向影响。并在此基础上,提出了促进军民结合技术创新的政策建议。     

A survey of evolutionary policy: normative and positive dimensions

We explore public policy from the perspective of evolutionary analysis. Potential entry points for developing a normative evolutionary policy theory are examined, which involves a critical examination of the related idea of “evolutionary progress”. The meaning of evolutionary policy is next studied from two different, normative and positive angles: namely, policy design informed by evolutionary thinking; and policy-making and politics as an evolutionary process. Several examples are provided to discuss the value of evolutionary thinking for policy, including in the context of the current economic crisis. Next, evolutionary policy is compared with policy advice coming from two dominant schools of policy analysis, namely neoclassical economics and public choice theory. We conclude that evolutionary thinking offers a distinct and useful perspective on public policy change and design. Nevertheless, there is a need for more synthesis and coherence among different studies as well as for policy experiments and in-depth empirical studies.     

Determinants of voting behaviour on the Keystone XL Pipeline

After lengthy debate, the Keystone XL Pipeline bill passed in January 2015. We use this event to better understand the determinants of Senator voting behaviour. Specifically, this article attempts to examine the relative impacts of political and economic influences. This is accomplished through the use of a binary logit regression model with legislator vote as the dependent variable. Results indicate that while legislators do appear to be representing their political constituency, the role of campaign funding plays an important role as well. The economic effect of such funding, controlling for other factors, is quantitatively small.     

Competitive selection, self-organisation and Joseph A. Schumpeter

Post-Schumpeterians have tended to use biological analogies to understand economic evolution, in contrast to Schumpeter himself. In this paper it is argued that the biological analogies used tend to be outdated and that Schumpeter espoused an intuitive understanding of the evolutionary economic process that is closely related to modern conceptions of self-organisation, suitably adapted for application in socioeconomic systems. Using a self-organisation approach, competition can be understood without recourse to biological analogy, in terms of general systemic principles that operate in the presence of variety. Viewing economic evolution in terms of complex adaptation in self-organising systems yields nonequilibrium and nonlinear perspectives that parallel Schumpeter's own intuitions, reinvigorating them as the basis of evolutionary economic thinking in the new Millennium.     

Economic emergence: An evolutionary economic perspective

The standard neoclassical approach to economic theorising excludes, by definition, economic emergence and the related phenomenon of entrepreneurship. We explore how the most economic of human behaviours, entrepreneurship, came to be largely excluded from mainstream economic theory. In contrast, we report that evolutionary economists have acknowledged the importance of understanding emergence and we explore the advances that have been made in this regard. We go on to argue that evolutionary economics can make further progress by taking a more ‘naturalistic’ approach to economic evolution. This requires that economic analysis be fully embedded in complex economic system theory and that associated understandings as to how humans react to states of uncertainty be explicitly dealt with. We argue that ‘knowledge,’ because of the existence of uncertainty is, to a large degree ‘conjectural’ and, thus, is closely linked to our emotional states. Our economic behaviour is also influenced by the reality that we, and the systems that we create, are dissipative structures. Thus, we introduce the notions of ‘energy gradients’ and ‘knowledge gradients’ as essential concepts in understanding economic emergence and resultant economic growth.     

HEDGING,SPECULATION, AND INVESTMENT IN BALANCE‐SHEET TRIGGERED CURRENCY CRISES*

This paper explores the linkage between corporate risk management strategies, investment, and economic stability in an open economy with a flexible exchange rate regime. Firms use currency futures contracts to manage their exchange rate exposure – caused by balance sheet effects as in Krugman (2000) – and therefore their investments’ sensitivity to currency risk. We find that, depending on whether futures contracts are used for risk reduction (i.e. hedging) or risk taking (i.e. speculation), the implied magnitudes of recessions and booms are decreased or increased. Corporate risk management can therefore substantially affect economic stability on the macrolevel.     

Models in evolutionary economics and environmental policy: Towards an evolutionary environmental economics

In this paper we review evolutionary economic modelling in relation to environmental policy. We discuss three areas in which evolutionary economic models have a particularly high added value for environmental policy-making: the double externality problem, technological transitions and consumer demand. We explore the possibilities to apply evolutionary economic models in environmental policy assessment, including the opportunities for making policy-making endogenous to environmental innovation. We end with a critical discussion of the challenges that remain.