In search for yield? Survey-based evidence on bank risk taking

Monetary policy can have an impact on economic and financial stability through the risk taking of banks. Falling interest rates might induce investment into risky activities. This paper provides evidence on the link between monetary policy and bank risk taking. We use a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) for the US for the period 1997–2008. Besides standard macroeconomic indicators, we include factors summarizing information provided in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL). These data provide information on banks׳ new loans as well as interest rates for different loan risk categories and different banking groups. We identify a risk-taking channel of monetary policy by distinguishing responses to monetary policy shocks across different types of banks and different loan risk categories. Following an expansionary monetary policy shock, small domestic banks increase their exposure to risk. Large domestic banks do not change their risk exposure. Foreign banks take on more risk only in the mid-2000s, when interest rates were ‘too low for too long’.     

The role of banks in the monetary policy transmission in the new EU member states

This paper aims to enrich the knowledge on the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the new European Union member states with empirical evidence on the impact of monetary policy on bank lending. This work is based on individual bank balance sheet data and covers a sample of commercial banks from 10 Central and Eastern European countries over the period 1998–2006. We follow the approach suggested by Kashyap and Stein (1995) and control for cross-section heterogeneities among banks. The results indicate the existence of asymmetric adjustment of loan quantities with respect to specific bank characteristics. Our findings indicate the existence of a functioning bank-lending channel through small banks. This applies in the short-run to several, but not all, of the analysed banks.     

内部控制质量、资本结构与银行风险承担——货币政策与股权集中度的调节作用

本文选取2009—2018年中国24家上市银行年度数据,采用面板模型对内部控制质量对银行风险承担的影响及其作用机制进行实证分析。研究结果表明：（1）内控质量对银行风险承担具有抑制作用。内控质量提高有助于提升银行部门间贷款信息传递及风险协同控制效率,由此降低银行风险承担。相对于非国有、低联结度与高权力度银行,内控质量对国有、高联结度与低权力度银行风险承担的影响力度更大。（2）资本结构在内控质量与银行风险承担的关系中承担着中介作用,内控质量通过影响资本结构来影响银行风险承担,“内控质量—资本结构—银行风险承担”的传导渠道有效。（3）货币政策对内控质量与银行风险承担关系具有非对称性调节作用。高利率货币政策会减弱内控质量对银行风险承担的抑制作用,宽松货币政策会加剧内控质量对银行风险承担的抑制作用。（4）股权集中度提高会减弱内控质量对银行风险承担的抑制作用,这归于控制权过度引发的关联贷款风险集聚效应对冲了内控质量对银行风险承担的抑制效应。本文研究结论可为防控中国银行部门单体风险及金融系统性风险提供重要的理论指导与决策参考。     

Role of credit and monetary policy in determining asset prices: Evidence from emerging market economies

We examine the relative dominance of credit and monetary policy shocks in influencing asset prices in emerging markets. Estimates from panel VAR models for 22 EMEs provide evidence of a significant impact of bank credit on house prices in contrast to trivial impact on stock prices, possibly due to prudential regulations on banks’ exposure to stock markets. Contractionary monetary policy triggers sizeable and persistent decline in stock than housing prices as higher interest rates may render the funding of leverage costlier. Global shocks play an important role in explaining fluctuations in domestic stock prices rather than house prices since the latter class of asset is largely non-tradable across countries.     

How does the money market development impact the bank lending channel of emerging Countries? A case from China

Transforming from quantitative-based instruments to price-based instruments is the primary goal of the monetary policy transformation in emerging economies. In essence, this process is gradually replacing the interest rate channel with the credit channel from the perspective of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, which is mainly achieved by promoting financial development to reduce the financial friction. However, there are opposite effects of financial development on the bank lending channel; thus, the topic is controversial. Using banks’ data from 2010 to 2018, this paper studies whether and how the money market development weakens the effect of the bank lending channel in China. The result shows that the mechanism through which the money market development influences the bank lending channel is realized by affecting the substitution elasticity of the asset and liability structure of banks’ balance sheets. Different from the theoretical expectation, the effect of the money market development on the bank lending channel is nonsignificant in China but appears to be weakened when the interest rate market-oriented reform is considered. However, further research based on structural analysis demonstrates that the money market development exerts heterogeneous effects on the bank lending channel under different types of sub-markets and different characteristics of the banks considered.     

Credit risk of subsidiaries of foreign banks in CEE countries: Impacts of the parent bank and home country economic environment

In this study, using dynamic panel data, we investigated the influences of the home country economic environment and parent bank condition on the credit risk of foreign banks in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. We concentrated on the international transmission of credit risk through the internal capital market of multinational banks. Our theoretical assumptions follow studies that document how the parent bank condition and home country macroeconomic environment affect lending in subsidiaries in CEE countries. However, our results go one step further. We provide evidence that these relationships are reflected in subsidiaries’ credit risk in CEE countries. Our results suggest that the size and profitability of the parent bank have negative influences, while the liquidity and credit risk of the parent bank have positive influences on the subsidiaries’ credit risk. Moreover, the GDP growth in the parent bank’s country has a negative effect on the credit risk of the subsidiary, while the lending rate and liquidity in the parent bank country cause growth in the credit risk. These results indicate a new channel of international risk transfer from parent bank countries to host countries through foreign-owned banks.     

Monetary policy and bank performance: The role of business models

This paper examines the relationship between monetary policy and bank performance in a multiple-instrument environment, particularly highlighting the conditioning role of bank business models. Employing a unique dataset of Vietnamese commercial banks from 2007 to 2019, we display that banks react to monetary policy changes, either when the central bank increases policy rates or injects money into the economy through open market operations, by decreasing overall returns and increasing financial instability. Additionally, we document that the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves benefits bank outcomes, contrasting to open market operations, albeit the central bank uses both of these policy instruments to alter money supply in the economy. Our key analysis of interest reveals that business models considerably matter in the effects of monetary policy on bank performance. Collectively, our findings demonstrate that banks’ business models that yield more non-interest income or diversify more into different income sources may mitigate the pass-through of monetary policy to bank performance. This finding holds across all interest- and quantitative-based monetary policy indicators and across all the functions of risk-taking behavior, earning-profit capacity, and financial stability. Furthermore, while plotting the marginal effects of monetary policy, we realize that they are insignificant for banks whose business models heavily rely on non-traditional segments.     

Does monetary policy influence banks’ risk weights under the internal ratings-based approach?

This paper studies the extent to which monetary policy may affect banks’ perception of credit risk and the way banks measure risk under the internal ratings-based approach. Specifically, we empirically analyze the effect of different monetary policy variables on banks’ risk weights for credit risk. We present robust evidence of a strong, statistically significant relationship between monetary policy easing and lower implicit risk weights of banks using the internal ratings-based approach. Further, we show that the recent prolonged period of accommodative monetary policy has been instrumental in establishing this relationship. The presented findings have important implications for the prudential authority, which should be aware of the possible side effects of monetary policy on how banks measure risk.     

Factors influencing bank risk in Europe: Evidence from the financial crisis

We use a dynamic panel data model to analyze bank-specific and macroeconomic determinants of bank risk for a large sample of commercial banks operating in the euro area. The selected time span, from 2001 to 2012, considers the impact of the on-going financial and economic crisis on the Eurozone banking system. Our results indicate that capitalization, profitability, efficiency and liquidity are inversely and significantly related to bank risk. However, the recourse to wholesale funding by banks seems to increase their risk. We also find that less-concentrated markets, lower interest rates, higher inflation rates and a context of economic crisis (with a falling GDP) increase bank risk.     

Bank forbearance: A market-based explanation

Why does forbearance for insolvent banks occur? We offer an explanation based on stockholders’ ability to appeal to the courts for reversal and monetary damages after the regulator has initiated a receivership action. Although this has always been theoretically possible, precedents and common law standards now exist. We calculate the market’s perceived postponement of receiverships for banks thought to be insolvent. We explain the receivership delays with the regulator’s reluctance to proceed when investors’ pricing of the bank’s stock and accountants’ assessment of the bank’s solvency do not support a receivership action. Our clinical evidence is consistent with this notion.Jel Classification: G180; G200; G210; G280     

Do stock markets discipline US Bank Holding Companies: Just monitoring,or also influencing?

This paper presents evidence that bank managers adjust key strategic variables following a risk and/or valuation signal from the stock market. Banks receive a risk signal when they exhibit substantially higher (semi-)volatility compared to the best performing bank(s) with similar characteristics, and a valuation signal when they are undervalued relative to the average bank with similar characteristics. We document, using a partial adjustment model, that bank managers adjust the long-term target value of key strategic variables and the speed of adjustment towards those targets following a risk and/or negative valuation signal. We interpret this as evidence of stock market influencing. We show that our results are unlikely to be driven by indirect influencing by regulators, subordinated debtholders, retail or wholesale depositors. Finally, we show that the likelihood that banks receive a risk and/or valuation signal increases with opaqueness, managerial discretion and specialization.     

Systemic risk governance in a dynamical model of a banking system with stochastic assets and liabilities

We consider the problem of governing systemic risk in an assets–liabilities dynamical model of a banking system. In the model considered, each bank is represented by its assets and liabilities. The net worth of a bank is the difference between its assets and liabilities and bank is solvent when its net worth is greater than or equal to zero; otherwise, the bank has failed. The banking system dynamics is defined by an initial value problem for a system of stochastic differential equations whose independent variable is time and whose dependent variables are the assets and liabilities of the banks. The banking system model presented generalizes those discussed in Fouque and Sun (in: Fouque, Langsam (eds) Handbook of systemic risk, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 444–452, 2013) and Fatone and Mariani (J Glob Optim 75(3):851–883, 2019) and describes a homogeneous population of banks. The main features of the model are a cooperation mechanism among banks and the possibility of the (direct) intervention of the monetary authority in the banking system dynamics. By “systemic risk” or “systemic event” in a bounded time interval, we mean that in that time interval at least a given fraction of banks have failed. The probability of systemic risk in a bounded time interval is evaluated via statistical simulation. Systemic risk governance aims to maintain the probability of systemic risk in a bounded time interval between two given thresholds. The monetary authority is responsible for systemic risk governance. The governance consists in the choice of assets and liabilities of a kind of “ideal bank” as functions of time and in the choice of the rules for the cooperation mechanism among banks. These rules are obtained by solving an optimal control problem for the pseudo mean field approximation of the banking system model. Governance induces banks in the system to behave like the “ideal bank”. Shocks acting on the banks’ assets or liabilities are simulated. Numerical examples of systemic risk governance in the presence and absence of shocks acting on the banking system are studied.

     

利率期限结构、商业银行投资组合与宏观经济波动——基于DSGE的分析框架

将包含同业业务的商业银行投资组合、利润和利率期限结构的局部均衡模型嵌入以家庭、资本投资者、商业银行、中间厂商和最终厂商为经济主体的DSGE模型中,分析商业银行风险错配、货币政策工具和经济增长对利率期限结构的影响。结果表明:经济增长冲击和商业银行的风险错配冲击对我国利率期限结构的影响最大,其次是数量型货币政策和价格型货币政策冲击。     

Risk pricing of wholesale funds and the behavior of retail deposit rates

We explore the relationship between bank risk and retail deposits. Predicted risk premiums on wholesale funds explain retail rate heterogeneity through two channels. First, increased bank risk premiums encourage the bank to substitute from wholesale funds to small certificates of deposits (CD) by increasing small CD rates. Second, increased rival risk premiums in a local market require the bank to increase small CD rates even more. Our results are consistent with risk encouraging the use of small CDs as a marginal source of funds and promoting local market competition for small CDs. As risk premiums rise, banks also reduce rates on other retail deposits. Our approach has implications for regulatory and monetary policies and financial stability.     

Do contractionary monetary policy shocks expand shadow banking?

Using VAR models for the USA, we find that a contractionary monetary policy shock has a persistent negative impact on the level of commercial bank assets, but increases the assets of shadow banks and securitization activity. To explain this “waterbed” effect, we propose a standard New Keynesian model featuring both commercial and shadow banks, and we show that the model comes close to explaining the empirical results. Our findings cast doubt on the idea that monetary policy can usefully “get in all the cracks” of the financial sector in a uniform way.     

Non-interest income,profitability, and risk in banking industry: A cross-country analysis

Using bank accounting data for 22 countries in Asia over the period 1995–2009, this article applies the dynamic panel generalized method of moments technique to investigate the impacts of non-interest income on profitability and risk for 967 individual banks. We find that non-interest activities of Asian banks reduce risk, but do not increase profitability on a broad sample basis. Specifically, when considering bank specialization and a country's income level, the results become complicated. Non-interest activities decrease profitability as well as increases risk for savings banks. The impact is also different for commercial, cooperative, and investment banks either by increasing profitability or reducing risk. On the other hand, non-interest activities raise risk for banks in high income countries, while increasing profitability or reducing risk for banks in middle and low income countries. Finally, our results reveal that the persistence of risk is greatly affected by bank specialization and a country's income level, as all risk variables present persistence from one year to the next. Our findings suggest that the type of bank specialization matters for the effect of diversifying revenue sources.     

Unconventional government debt purchases as a supplement to conventional monetary policy

In response to the Great Financial Crisis, the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and many other central banks have adopted unconventional monetary policy instruments. We investigate if one of these, purchases of long-term government debt, could be a valuable addition to conventional short-term interest rate policy even if the main policy rate is not constrained by the zero lower bound. To do so, we add a stylised financial sector and central bank asset purchases to an otherwise standard New Keynesian DSGE model. Asset quantities matter for interest rates through a preferred habitat channel. If conventional and unconventional monetary policy instruments are coordinated appropriately then the central bank is better able to stabilise both output and inflation.     

Central bank disclosure as a macroprudential tool for financial stability

The Basel Capital Accord (pillar 3) states that disclosure of information (transparency) is essential to financial stability. This study analyzes, through inflation reports, the disclosure of information from the Central Bank of Brazil concerning the credit market. We consider credit risk and capital buffers as measures of financial stability in this analysis. Furthermore, in order to measure the perception of the monetary authority on the credit market, we built two indices based on the central bank’s communication on credit development. We performed a panel data analysis based on a sample of 125 banks for the period from June 1999 to September 2014 (7000 observations). The findings suggest that central bank communication regarding expectations concerning the credit market contributes to financial stability. Therefore, this kind of communication of central banks (about credit development) may constitute an important macroprudential tool to improve financial stability.     

A survey on time-varying parameter Taylor rule: A model modified with interest rate pass-through

Today, the prime aim of central banking is to achieve price stability and, to a lesser extent, output stability. To this end, central banks use various monetary policy rules. This paper intends to provide a broad survey of the literature on Taylor-type monetary policy rules with a time-varying parameter (TVP) specification. To include the TVP feature, some modification is made in the monetary transmission mechanism of Taylor-type monetary policy models to account for the changing risk preference of individuals. In line with this approach, we introduce an interest rate pass-through specification of the monetary transmission process in a general equilibrium model to account for the varying perceptions of risk by individuals. We include an application for Turkey and estimate the time-variable parameters of the model by employing a structural extended Kalman filter (EKF). The results indicate that the EKF performs better than the standard Kalman filter in estimating the reaction function of the central bank.     

The Macroeconomic Effects of Shocks to Large Banks’ Capital

We propose a simple approach to quantifying the macroeconomic effects of shocks to large banks’ leverage. We first estimate a standard dynamic model of leverage targeting at the bank level and use it to derive an aggregate measure of the economic capital buffer of large US bank holding corporations. We then evaluate the response of key macro variables to a shock to this aggregate bank capital buffer using standard monetary VAR models. We find that shocks to the capital of large US banks explain a substantial share of the variance of credit to firms and real activity.