ELECTRICITY CONSERVATION: CONSUMER RATIONALITY VERSUS PROSPECT THEORY

Research supports the efficacy of prospect theory over utility maximization for consumer investment in electricity saving equipment. The findings have implications for designing electric utility programs to promote electricity conservation. Prospect theory describes, explains and organizes consumer behavior that is contrary to consumers maximizing a stable utility function. The results are similar across three ethnic groups.     

The impact of socio-economic background on satisfaction: evidence for policy-makers

Consumer satisfaction with utility services has received increased attention from firms, consumer associations, regulators and governments since the 1990s. Evidence is mounting that consumers in specific socio-economic groups express lower satisfaction levels than their peers, at least, in some utility markets. Seeing this as part of their remit to protect consumer welfare, governments and international organizations are exploring possible demand-side policy responses with the intention of ameliorating lower satisfaction levels of these groups of consumers. However, more information on the precise relationships between satisfaction and consumers’ socio-economic background is required if policy is to be proportional and effective. This paper provides new empirical knowledge on this topic by contrasting consumers’ stated and revealed preferences for five utility services (electricity, gas, fixed and cellular telephony and Internet) across twelve European countries. We find strong evidence that consumers’ socio-economic characteristics matter: consumers with lower levels of education, the elderly and those not employed exhibit particular expenditure patterns on, and lower satisfaction levels with, some utility services. However, this relationship is uneven and depends on the socio-economic category and service in question. We conclude by highlighting five findings which may be of use to policy-makers when considering whether demand-side regulatory policies are required     

A case for water utilities as cooperatives and the UK experience

This article explores the creation of consumer cooperatives as a means of privatizing water utilities. The first section examines the structure of ownership and sets out Hansmann's theoretical basis for determining which category of persons is most efficiently assigned ownership. The section extends the discussion of market contracting costs by considering the externalities and social costs associated with a water utility. The heart of the paper is the second section which applies the theory of efficiently assigned ownership to the case of water utilities. The third section briefly reviews the literature on the relative efficiency of private and public utilities and also succinctly applies the theory of the firm to the question of vertical integration in the case of water utilities. The fourth section discusses the UK's experience with water utilities. The final section draws together the paper's conclusions.   The application of Hansmann's general theoretical scheme for assigning ownership leads to the conclusion that water utilities should be consumer cooperatives. Consumer-owned utilities would confront lower market contracting and ownership costs, than would investor-owned utilities. Additionally, the social costs and externalities that are particular to water are better left to consumers who are more prone to take them into account in their decisions.     

Conservation Incentives for Consumers

This paper investigates profit-maximizing conservation incentives of a utility, where the interest in conservation results from prices regulated below the marginal costs of supply and where consumers differ with respect to their subjective time preference. Conventional least-cost planning implies that a program should focus on inefficient consumers (those who apply high discount rates). However, this scheme provokes strategic reactions of the consumers. Hence, incentive-compatible conservation schemes-one tied to efficiency, the other tied to electricity consumption-are derived that differ starkly from the above finding and from actual programs.     

Import prices and the distribution of personal income

An indirect translog utility function is estimated for U.S. expenditure on domestically produced non-durables, durables, services and consumer imports. Empirical tests lead to the rejection of homogeneity and linear logarithmic utility as valid functional forms. Estimates of expenditure elasticities indicate that imported varieties of consumer goods are luxuries. An exogenous decrease in the price of these goods, which would occur when tariff barriers are relaxed, would be especially beneficial to upper income consumers. Finally, a redistribution of expenditure from upper income consumers to lower income consumers will increase expenditure on domestically produced goods and reduce expenditure on consumer imports.     

Helping "light green" consumers walk the talk: Results of a behavioural intervention survey in the Swiss electricity market

While many consumer surveys show very positive attitudes towards renewable energy, the share of consumers actually purchasing green electricity is still in the single-digit percent range in most countries. What can be done to help consumers with positive attitudes towards green electricity to “walk the talk”, i.e. to behave consistently with their preferences? We developed a psychological model based on the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) to design a large-scale behavioural intervention survey with 1163 Swiss electricity consumers. Our results show that by providing information targeted at the key factors influencing the intention to purchase green electricity, namely attitudes towards purchase, social norms and perceived behavioural control, a significant increase in green electricity market share can be achieved. Our results show that price is not the only barrier to purchasing green electricity, and that information to increase the perceived benefit of buying green electricity as well as targeted communication to overcome inertia among retail electricity consumers are equally important factors.     

Price-Quality Tradeoffs and Welfare Effects in Cable Television Markets

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 reduced restrictions on the cable TV industry, providing completely deregulated rates in March 1999. Prior to that time the cable industry was generally allowed to increase rates so long as additional channels were supplied. In this paper we develop a simple tradeoff between price and quality in order to calculate the welfare tradeoff to consumers of the provision of one additional satellite channel. Gauging the impact of this quality change on consumers alone, we conclude that the increase in consumer gains due to an extra channel provision are almost exactly counterbalanced by reductions due to price increases. This ceteris paribus calculation does not mean, of course, that dynamic supply effects from the provision and availability of more channels will not increase future competition and potential consumer benefits.     

Electricity Prices as Signals for the Evaluation of Reforms: An Empirical Analysis of Four European Countries

This paper looks at price trends as signals for the evaluation of utility reforms. A specific example is considered: electricity prices in four countries, namely France, Germany, Italy and UK. These countries offer a natural experiment in different patterns of public/private ownership and liberalisation of electricity industry. Electricity prices are mainly influenced by the mix of energy inputs, their costs, and by consumption per capita. Under different institutional settings, prices for business users are often more cost‐reflective than prices for residential users. Beyond these common features, the evidence does not support the view that there is clear dominance of one industry pattern in terms of welfare change for the representative consumer. This conclusion tends to question the widely held idea that one specific ‘orthodox’ reform should be preferred: privatisation with liberalisation and vertical disintegration. Utility reforms should be flexible and country‐specific.     

Interruption insurance for generation and distribution of electric power

We describe a simple insurance scheme for use in an environment in which consumers of electricity are differentiated by their value of uninterrupted service as well as their location. Location plays a determining role in the model, in that reliability of distribution is allowed to vary throughout the network. Consumers choose a level of compensation for service interruption and pay a premium that depends on this compensation, as well as the distribution reliability at their location. In the event of power shortages, the utility will interrupt consumers according to their selected compensation so as to minimize compensation payments. The premium schedule is designed to induce consumer self-selection which results in efficient rationing, i.e., consumers are interrupted in increasing order of their interruption losses. The tariff has the added feature of inducing consumers to purchase full insurance and thus transfers all of the risk to the utility. It is shown that with proper tuning the proposed insurance scheme is Pareto superior to a uniform service charge with random rationing.     

Product recall with symmetric uncertainty and multiunit purchases

A common view in retail electricity markets is that retailers discriminate based on consumers’ loyalty: loyal consumers pay more and switchers can (and do) select the cheapest offers) when they switch. The premium is colloquially known as a “loyalty tax” or “loyalty premium”. Reflecting this understanding Australia’s governments, regulators and consumer advocates have encouraged consumers to switch electricity retailers. Using a sample of 47,114 household electricity bills we test whether consumers that had switched in the previous 12 months (“switchers”) pay less than consumers who remained with their retailers (“remainers”) in the previous 12 months. We find that the annual bills of switchers are expected to be AU$48 (4%) lower than remainers and that the median switcher could reduce their bills by 21% by selecting the cheapest offer. Classifying retailers into tiers however provides some nuance to the main conclusion: the third tier of retailers (the new entrants with market shares of less than 3%) impose higher loyalty taxes than the other two tiers (incumbents and mid-sized retailers). The middle tier of retailers impose the lowest loyalty tax, and in fact for many consumers they may reward loyalty. These findings suggest that the loyalty tax is (typically) smaller than widely considered, it varies across tiers of retailers and even engaged consumers typically do not select the lowest priced offer. This raises the question of whether switchers are motivated by lower bills as well as other factors or whether the main challenge is search difficulties.

     

Do Incentive Rates Provide Consumer Value? An Empirical Assessment from Ontario’s Electricity Distribution Sector

Abstract:

This article discusses empirical evidence regarding the theoretical claims that Incentive Rate regulation for electricity distribution creates greater consumer value than Cost of Service in terms of consumer rates. Institutional economists have identified a problem with IR in that it gives an incentive not to reduce consumer costs but to reduce adequate spending on asset maintenance. The Ontario electricity distribution sector combines both forms of regulation which creates an unusual opportunity to test the claims of increased consumer value by comparing the unit average revenues in years in which rates were set by CoS with those in which they were set by IR. The application of a t-test to data from 2011 to 2015 results in the acceptance of the null hypothesis at a 95% confidence level. The analysis concludes that there is no support for the claim that IR results in lower revenues collected from consumers.     

IN SEARCH OF THE BEST BUNDLE: HILL-CLIMBING CONSUMERS AND THE MICRODYNAMICS OF CONSUMER CHOICE

Abstract. The paper considers the consequences of hill-climbing consumer behavior in the presence of nonconvex utility, and considers the optimal reactions of nonmyopic firms and governments to such behavior. Both firms and governments have an incentive to induce consumers to start consuming goods subject to nonconvexities by offering introductory price discounts. Monopolists appear to offer smaller introductory discounts than is optimal; competitive markets may never be able to supply such goods at all.     

Consumers' Surplus As an Exact and Superlative Cardinal Welfare Indicator

This article shows that the Bennet-Bowley consumer surplus measure is an exact measure of Allais' disposable surplus if the consumer's utility function is of the translation-homothetic generalized quadratic form. The Bennet-Bowley consumer surplus measure, therefore, is a superlative cardinal welfare measure for the entire class of translation homothetic preferences. Because the exactness results in this article apply for cardinal welfare measures, they can be meaningfully aggregated across consumers to make aggregate welfare comparisons.     

Modeling the rebound effect in two manufacturing industries

The rebound effect refers to the phenomenon that energy savings from improvements in energy efficiency are lower than expected due to unintended second-order effects. Grasping specific mechanisms related to the rebound effect requires a good understanding of interactions between heterogonous agents on multiple markets. Otherwise, policies aimed at reducing energy use may render counter-expected and unforeseen consequences. In this paper, we propose a formal model, where technological change results from interactions on two markets: between consumers and producers in the market for final goods, and heterogeneous power plants in the electricity market. The analysis provides insights to the role of technological change, supply–demand coevolution, and status-driven consumption in explaining the rebound effect. The model is employed to compare effectiveness of economic policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions associated with production of consumer goods, namely: a tax on electricity and ‘nuclear obligations’ to produce ten percent of electricity from nuclear energy.     

Rethinking real-time electricity pricing

Most US consumers are charged a near-constant retail price for electricity, despite substantial hourly variation in the wholesale market price. This paper evaluates the first program to expose residential consumers to hourly real-time pricing (RTP). I find that enrolled households are statistically significantly price elastic and that consumers responded by conserving energy during peak hours, but remarkably did not increase average consumption during off-peak times. The program increased consumer surplus by $10 per household per year. While this is only one to two percent of electricity costs, it illustrates a potential additional benefit from investment in retail Smart Grid applications, including the advanced electricity meters required to observe a household’s hourly consumption.     

Saving and retirement behavior under quasi-hyperbolic discounting

This paper investigates saving and retirement behavior using a quasi-hyperbolic discounting model with endogenous labor supply. The behavior of quasi-hyperbolic-discounting consumers is compared with optimal behavior, which is obtained under exponential discounting. The quasi-hyperbolic discounters, whether naïve or sophisticated, under-save and retire early compared with an exponential discounter, if and only if the present-biased marginal utility of future consumption decreases with stronger present bias. Logarithmic utility functions and constant-absolute-risk-aversion utility functions can both exhibit this property. In other words, quasi-hyperbolic discounting explains why, consistent with previous empirical studies, under-savers might also be early retirers. Under logarithmic utility, a wage tax and an interest subsidy can counteract the under-saving and early retirement and improve consumer welfare.     

Revisiting electricity liberalization and quality of service: empirical evidence from New Zealand

What effect does the firm structure have on the quality of service delivered by networks and infrastructure industries? We answer this question by empirically assessing the impacts of complete vertical separation, such as ownership unbundling, on the quality of service delivered by a liberalized network industry. Electricity distribution utilities in New Zealand are considered for this purpose and are analysed using panel-data econometrics. The results show robust evidence that ownership unbundling contributed to a fall in the duration and frequency of supply interruptions in electricity distribution. However, the results also show that unbundling has no effect on reducing distribution network losses. These results, overall, highlight the nonsimple impacts of ownership unbundling on the quality of electricity distribution. We suggest that the quality of service may largely improve when considered in the economic regulation of electricity networks than completely relying on specific reform measures such as ownership unbundling.     

Producer and Consumer Interests, the State-Owned Pipeline, and Public Authority Pricing of Natural Gas*

This paper considers producer and consumer interests when state ownership of a pipeline provides a public authority with monopoly and monopsony power. In contrast with the producer/consumer conflict in the regulatory setting where self-interested authorities choose the price at which producers and consumers directly transact with one another, in the pipeline case producers and consumers have a commonality of interest which is sustained even if the authorities take the view that it is politically inexpedient to take advantage of monopoly power with respect to consumers.     

消费者选择生鲜农产品零售终端的行为分析——基于消费者效用的理论解释

已有的实证研究显示,消费者选择超市和农贸市场这两个生鲜农产品零售终端的频率存在差异。许多学者分析了造成这一差异的影响因素。但消费者选择不同零售终端的频率安排决策是如何做出的,这种频率安排又说明了什么等问题仍需深入探讨。从消费者效用角度出发,对这一频率安排差异进行理论解释,得出消费者效用最大化的层次还有待提升的结论,并提出提升这一层次的措施。