Demand for Money in Transition: Evidence from China’s Disinflation

We examine money demand in the Chinese economy during a period characterized by significant disinflation and outright deflation, coupled with strong output growth. Our study establishes a stable money demand system for broad money M2. Inflation affects the adjustment of the system towards equilibrium, and shocks to broad money are found to lead to higher inflation in the context of an impulse response analysis. No evidence of non-linearity in money demand is found for the disinflationary period. The results provide support for the People’s Bank of China’s policy of specifying intermediate targets for money growth. Importantly, our results suggest that movements in the nominal effective exchange rate should be taken into account in a successful implementation of such a policy.

The dynamics of the growth of firms: evidence from the services sector

Using a dynamic panel data model with serial correlation in the error term, the purpose of this paper is to examine if Gibrat’s Law can be rejected for the services sector as it has been for manufacturing. The aim of this paper is also to improve the understanding of the empirical determinants of firm growth by extending the literature to include a new variable related to foreign participation. In addition, and based on recent developments in the growth of firms, our analysis also includes the role of the financial structure. The sample used is an unbalanced panel data set that includes all size classes, including the smallest surviving firms, from the Portuguese service sector over the period from 1995 to 2001. Applying the GMM-system estimator our findings suggest that Gibrat’s Law is rejected for the services firms. In addition, the results also indicate that firm growth is mainly explained by firm size and age. These results have significant policy implications.

The concept of choice: why and how innovative behaviour is not just stochastic

The goal of this paper is to highlight the importance of the concept of choice. To do so, a synopsis of the most important contributions to this topic—featuring an eclectic set of scholars across disciplines—is provided. As central to the argument, John von Neumann’s contributions, game theory and simulation techniques on von Neumann machines, are identified. Innovation (economic and theoretic) as the driving force behind human evolution seems to head for a new scientific paradigm based on von Neumann’s ideas.

On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device

In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology—of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks—which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors, a scenario is postulated under which ‘programmed’ migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation.

Quantifying corruption by a human capital earnings equation

This paper uses a human capital earnings equation to quantify administrative corruption in the public sector. Regression analyses are conducted based on information from surveys administered to public officials in Albania. After accounting for officials’ characteristics, e.g., schooling, experience, gender, type of agency, and public and private sectors’ features, we deduce that the administrative corruption was on average 2.6× the officials’ current salary in Albania, which is equivalent to 16.7% of the country’s GDP.

Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences?

In constitutional political economy, the citizens’ constitutional interests determine the social contract that is binding for the post-constitutional market game. However, following traditional preference subjectivism, it is left open what the constitutional interests are. Using the example of risk attitudes, we argue that this approach is too parsimonious with regard to the behavioral foundations to support a calculus of consent. In face of innovative activities with pecuniary and technological externalities in the post-constitutional phase, the citizens’ constitutional interests vary with their risk preferences. To determine what kind of social contract is generally agreeable, specific assumptions about risk preferences are needed.

The interaction of firing costs and firm training

By allowing firms to invest in their workers’ human capital, this paper extends the traditional analysis of firing costs with respect to two points, both of them positive in terms of welfare. On the one hand, firing restrictions reduce turnover, thereby enhancing incentives to provide training. On the other hand, training gives firms the opportunity to lower the costs of firing restrictions since well-trained workers are less likely to be fired. In this way the negative effects of firing costs on firm profitability and workers’ job-finding rates are reduced.

Reciprocity in evolving social networks

We study the viability of conditional cooperation in a dynamically evolving social network. The network possesses the small world property, with high clustering coefficient but low characteristic path length. The interaction among linked individuals takes the form of a multiperson prisoners’ dilemma, and actions can be conditioned on the past behavior of one’s neighbors. Individuals adjust their strategies based on performance within their neighborhood, and both strategies and the network itself are subject to random perturbation. We find that the long-run frequency of cooperation is higher under the following conditions: (i) the interaction radius is neither too small nor too large, (ii) clustering is high and characteristic path length low, (iii) the mutation rate of strategies is small, and (iv) the rate of adjustment in strategies is neither too fast nor too slow.

Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members

This note studies the volatility of the policy chosen by a committee whose members’ preferences are volatile, due to common and individual preferences shocks. It is shown that majority voting mitigates the latter but not the former. The volatility of the policy is smaller the smaller the volatility of members’ preferences, smaller the larger the size of the committee, and smaller than if it was chosen by a single member. The results hold in a context of uncertainty and with multidimensional issues.

Transaction tax and stock market behavior: evidence from an emerging market

This study examines the impact of a stamp tax rate increase on market behavior, using data from two stock exchanges in China. We find that when the tax rate increases from 0.3 to 0.5% (which implies that the transaction cost increases by about 1/3) trading volume decreases by 1/3. This implies an elasticity of turnover with respect to a stamp tax of −50% and an elasticity of turnover with respect to transaction cost of −100%. The markets’ volatility significantly increases after the increase in the tax rate. Furthermore, the change in the volatility structure indicates that the markets become less efficient in the sense that shocks are less quickly assimilated in the markets.

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Firm behaviour under pollution ratio standards with non-compliance

This paper compares a firm’s short run optimal production and abatement rules under emission level standards and standards expressed in terms of emissions per unit of output (ratio standards). The models allow for non-compliance with standards, with expected penalties dependant on either level or relative violations of the standard in question. It is shown that ratio arguments make a difference to the optimal decision rules derived for a profit-maximising firm. For example, for a given level of emissions the firm both produces more, and abates more, under a ratio standard, so that ratio and level standards cannot be used interchangeably to achieve the same combination of emissions and output. The implications for the efficiency of pollution control are briefly discussed.

Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions: a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms

This paper proposes a discrete bidding model for both quantities and pricing. It has a two-unit demand environment where subjects bid for contracts with an unknown redemption value, common to all bidders. Prior to bidding, the bidders receive private signals of information on the (common) value. The relevant task is to compare the equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue of the three most common auction formats with two players. The result is that the Vickrey auction always gives the most revenue to the seller, the discriminatory auction follows closely and the uniform auction clearly is the worst due to demand reduction.

Entry and fiscal policy effectiveness in a small open economy within a Monetary Union

In this article I develop an imperfectly competitive dynamic general equilibrium model for a small open economy integrated in a monetary union. Here, the type of entry in the non-traded goods’ sector affects fiscal policy effectiveness. Fiscal policy effectiveness is enlarged when aggregate demand stimuli increase intra-industrial competition (case I). This is due to the counter-cyclical mark-up mechanism generated by entry. Such a mechanism is absent in the usual monopolistic competition where entry only has a sharing effect (case II).

The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy

This paper is organized as follows: first, we show that the reference to the notion of group selection is coherent with the other parts of Hayek’s thought. Second, we develop the idea that recent works in terms of the emergence and evolution of social norms corroborate in part Hayek’s theses in this domain. Finally, we put to the fore some drawbacks in Hayek’s approach and propose means to solve them.

Modeling Distribution Channel Dynamics of North American Cars in the Spanish Automobile Industry

Relations between manufacturers and distributors have been the center point of the distribution channel’s management. This study covers the effects of coercive, as well as non-coercive power on intermediary variables such as cooperation and conflict. It will also analyze the effects of cooperation and conflict on American car dealers’ satisfaction and performance in Spain. Due to the small sample size (46 dealers), the model based on causal modeling compelled us to use the optimization method based on the partial least squares (PLS) regression techniques coupled with a bootstrapping to enable some generalization of the results.

Buchanan on monetary constitutions

Buchanan’s reflections on monetary issues have been mostly neglected, despite their great interest both per se and for a deeper understanding of his general constitutional endeavour. We will thus propose a comprehensive assessment of Buchanan’s writings on this topic, focusing in particular on the different political models that have been developed to argue in favour of constitutional constraints on the governmental power to create money and on the implications that one can draw from our author’s monetary papers for the structure and the objectives of his constitutional discourse more generally.

Corporate social responsibility and the ‘game of catallaxy’: the perspective of constitutional economics

The paper examines the issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR) from the perspective of constitutional economics, focusing on the distinction between a political community’s constitutional choice of the rules of the “market game,” and the market players’ sub-constitutional choice of strategies within these rules. Three versions of CSR-demands are identified and discussed, a “soft,” a “hard”, and a “radical” version. The soft version is concerned with the issue of how “socially responsible” corporations ought to play the market game within existing rules. The hard version is about how the rules of the market ought to be changed in order to induce “socially responsible” corporate behavior. And the radical version questions the compatibility of CSR and the logic of the market game, calling in effect for adopting some alternative economic regime.

Rawls’ Paradox

Rawls’ theory of justice is paradoxical, for it requires a society to aim directly to maximize the basic goods received by the least advantaged even if directly aiming is self-defeating. Rawls’ reasons for rejecting capitalist systems commit him to holding that a society must not merely maximize the goods received by the least advantaged, but must do so via specific institutions. By Rawls’ own premises, in the long run directly aiming to satisfy the difference principle is contrary to the interests of the poor, though it is meant to aid them.

On the distribution of product price and quality

We investigate the structure of demand by focusing on the distribution of prices within narrowly-defined classes of goods. We observe considerable heterogeneity—products that are functionally similar but presumably of different ‘quality’ may sell at very different prices. We analyze distribution of prices for bottles of wine, used cars, houses in London and week-long holidays in Majorca, and observe in each case that the the resulting distribution is more skewed than the lognormal but less skewed than a Pareto distribution. We then present a theoretical model whereby products can distinguish themselves along multiple hedonic dimensions of ‘performance’, with these product attributes being random variables subject to multiplicative interactions. Variations of this model can reproduce a lognormal price distribution and a Pareto distribution as lower and upper bound benchmarks (respectively).

Liberty and national security in Adam Smith’s possible world

Thomas P. M. Barnett argues that globalization’s spread presents the United States and other liberal democracies with two unprecedented national-security problems, and proposes an ambitious military strategy for their solution. This work argues that a successful strategy to solve one of these problems must also include rational policy, public policy that makes Adam Smith’s simple system of natural liberty a reality. Thus, Barnett’s military strategy and rational policy become complementary elements of a more comprehensive strategy to solve this national-security problem. Knowledge that Smith’s simple system of natural liberty moves the world toward peace can create a need for rational policy among voters.