Bubbles, crises, and policy

In many recent cases financial liberalization has led to a bubblein asset prices. The bursting of the bubble results in a bankingcrisis and recession. It is suggested such bubbles are causedby an interaction of the risk-shifting problem arising fromagency relationships in intermediaries and uncertainty concerningthe expansion of credit. Two important policy objectives areidentified. The first is the prevention of bubbles in assetprices. The second is minimizing the impact of spillovers onto the real economy during post-bubble banking crises. The differentpolicy approaches taken in Norway and Japan are compared.     

Finance, governments, and trade

We study how financial transactions may respond to exogenous variation in trade opportunities not only directly, but also through policy channels. In more open economies, governments may find it more difficult to fund and enforce public policies that substitute private financial transactions, and more appealing to deregulate financial markets. We propose a simple theoretical model of such policy-mediated relationships between trade and financial development. Empirically, we document in a country panel dataset that, before the 2007–2008 crisis, financial market volumes were robustly and negatively related to the share of government consumption in GDP in regressions that also include indicators of financial regulation and trade openness, and we seek support for a causal interpretation of this result in instrumental variable specifications.     

Migration,FDI, and Welfare

We investigate migration and foreign direct investment (FDI) for a small trading economy. Historically, immigration in small countries has been accompanied by FDI inflows (complementary capital movements). Based on the skill composition of migrants, empirical evidence finds that skilled immigration is accompanied by FDI inflows but unskilled immigration is accompanied by FDI outflows (substitutable capital movements). We prove that the Heckscher-Ohlin model cannot reconcile these apparently contradictory observations. We introduce a theoretical model in which capital and unskilled labor are sector specific, and demonstrate that this model can reconcile the historical and empirical observations on migration and FDI.     

Offshoring,wages, and heterogeneity

Considering heterogeneous responses by skill group to material and service offshoring, we examine the relationship between offshoring and the individual wages of workers in the U.S. labor market. We find that offshoring has been beneficial for high-skill workers but detrimental for middle- and low-skill workers. In particular, service offshoring, which has been widespread since 2000, has severely affected the labor market, compared to material offshoring.     

Emotions,Sanctions, and Cooperation

We use skin conductance responses and self‐reported hedonic valence to study the emotional basis of cooperation and punishment in a social dilemma. We argue that the availability of sanctions sets in motion a “virtuous emotional circle” that accompanies cooperation. Emotional reaction to free riding leads cooperators to apply sanctions. In response, and in addition to the monetary consequences of receiving sanctions, the negative emotions experienced by the free‐riders when punished lead them to increase their subsequent level of cooperation. The outcome is an increased level of cooperation that becomes a new norm. Therefore, emotions sustain both the use of altruistic punishment and cooperation.     

Growth, equality, and history

Complex policy issues deserve frequent reassessment, and the relationship between economic growth and equality is undeniably complex. Policymakers who care about trade-offs between the two goals continue to press the scientific limits of empirical economics. It takes an enormous sample of long-term national experiences to approximate the data base necessary to move debate from allegation to evidence. Fortunately, the sample continues to expand. Since the 1950s dozens of countries have produced evidence on income distribution and growth, and the records of some currently developed countries have been extended back into the 17th century. This article assesses the empirical harvest. Most of our inferences, however, are based on American and British history.     

Trade, Institutions, and Credit

Within economics there has been a mounting interest in institutions. Virtually all the work to date on institutions has examined a single institution. The problem is that in many settings the performance of the institution under examination is affected by other, unexamined institutions. This paper examines the relationship between two types of private-order institutions that facilitated trade in a specific setting—Mexican California during the 1830s and 1840s. The surviving evidence suggests that a multilateral institution enabled merchants to extend credit to their retail customers, and a similar multilateral institution enabled the merchants to extend credit to one another. The relationship between these institutions makes them of particular interest. This relationship arose because local communities imposed costs on merchants that affected their trade with one another. The barriers to entry and exit posed by these costs, in turn, facilitated the operation and persistence of the institution that supported intermerchant trade. They also precluded other organizational forms such as the vertical integration of wholesalers.     

Institutions,Capital, and Growth

The international development community has encouraged investment in physical and human capital as a precursor to economic progress. Recent evidence shows, however, that increases in capital do not always lead to increases in output. We develop a growth model where the allocation and productivity of capital depends on a country's institutions. We find that increases in physical and human capital lead to output growth only in countries with good institutions. In countries with bad institutions, increases in capital lead to negative growth rates because additions to the capital stock tend to be employed in rent‐seeking and other socially unproductive activities.     

Investment financing, inflation, risks, and stabilization

This paper discusses financial problems of stepping up the investment process in Russia, approaches to intensifying financial redistribution, opportunities for using government savings to boost and upgrade economic growth, and suggests financial support measures for the modernization of the Russian economy.     

Sickness, absenteeism, presenteeism, and sick pay

The annual cost of absenteeism from the workplace in the UKhas been estimated to be over 1% of GDP. The traditional approachto a discussion of absence has been for the firm to passivelyaccept both wages and sick pay and allow workers to choose theirabsence behaviour. Most empirical research has been based onthis approach. However, if absence is costly why should firmspay extra-statutory sick pay? One reason may be the phenomenaof presenteeism (ill workers attending work). This may adverselyaffect productivity. This paper shows that allowing for presenteeismhas important implications for both the design of optimal wage-sickpay contracts and for the interpretation of empirical studies.Specifically, we show that firms will offer a level of sickpay greater than the statutory minimum.     

Prostitutes,Pimps, and Brothels: Intermediaries,Information, and Market Structure in Prostitution Markets

Prostitution is a multi‐billion dollar, globally distributed, low‐concentration service industry that is receiving increasing attention in the economics literature. This article focuses on a widespread, but little studied, feature of this environment—the role of intermediaries (pimps or brothel owners) on market outcomes. Prostitution laws and markets are perhaps unique in that transactions between principals (prostitutes and johns) are legal in many countries, while intermediary activity (pimping) is illegal. After surveying the varying cross‐country legality of agents we develop a simple theoretical model to analyze how the presence or absence of intermediaries shifts the distribution of market surplus. We show that eliminating pimps and brothels may shift surplus in non‐obvious ways, depending on the precise function they perform and on whether equilibrium is pooling or separating across “high quality” and “low quality” market segments. The implications of alternative policy regimes (intermediaries legal or illegal) are considered.     

House prices, money, credit, and the macroeconomy

This paper assesses the links between money, credit, house prices,and economic activity in industrialized countries over the lastthree decades. The analysis is based on a fixed-effects panelvector autoregression, estimated using quarterly data for 17industrialized countries spanning the period 1970–2006.The main results of the analysis are the following. (i) Thereis evidence of a significant multidirectional link between houseprices, monetary variables, and the macroeconomy. (ii) The linkbetween house prices and monetary variables is found to be strongerover a more recent sub-sample from 1985 to 2006. (iii) The effectsof shocks to money and credit are found to be stronger whenhouse prices are booming.