Does Greater Firm‐Specific Return Variation Mean More or Less Informed Stock Pricing?

Roll [1988] observes low R² statistics for common asset pricing models due to vigorous firm‐specific return variation not associated with public information. He concludes that this implies “either private information or else occasional frenzy unrelated to concrete information”[p. 56]. We show that firms and industries with lower market model R² statistics exhibit higher association between current returns and future earnings, indicating more information about future earnings in current stock returns. This supports Roll's first interpretation: higher firm‐specific return variation as a fraction of total variation signals more information‐laden stock prices and, therefore, more efficient stock markets.     

On the Stewardship and Valuation Implications of Accrual Accounting Systems

In this paper we explore the role of accruals in determining “earnings quality” from both a stewardship and a valuation perspective. We show that the valuation and stewardship qualities of accrual accounting are maximized by either an “aggressive” or a “conservative” accrual strategy. Furthermore, accrual strategy choices can be delegated to management as it does not benefit by implementing a strategy that is not in the best interests of the shareholders. We also investigate the implications of accrual strategies for standard empirical measures of “earnings quality”: regression coefficients and R²s from price‐earnings and market‐to‐book regressions. We show that such measures respond differently, and in some cases adversely, to the kind of strategies that make accounting constructs more correlated with the underlying economic activities of firms.     

From Stock Selection to Portfolio Alpha Generation: The Role of Fundamental Analysis

In this roundtable sponsored by Columbia Business School's Center for Excellence in Accounting Research and Security Analysis, a group of successful investors discuss their approaches and methods. A common saying among financial economists is that stock prices are set not by the average investor, but “at the margin” by the most sophisticated and influential investors. The intent of this roundtable is to furnish a portrait of such “marginal” investors, one that turns out to be quite different from the quarterly earnings‐driven, momentum traders often depicted by the media and deplored by corporate executives. In response to the common charge of short termism leveled by corporate managers, most of the investors at the table claimed to take large, multi‐year positions in companies they believed to be well‐managed, but temporarily undervalued. Instead of being attracted to earnings momentum, and rather than simply capitalizing current earnings at industry‐wide multiples to arrive at price targets, the analysis of these investors begins with a “deep dive” into a company's financials, which is often reinforced by primary research—visits with management, customers, suppliers. The aim of such research is to identify, well before the broad market does, companies that promise to earn consistently high and sustainable returns on invested capital.     

The Extreme Future Stock Returns Following I/B/E/S Earnings Surprises

We investigate the stock returns subsequent to quarterly earnings surprises, where the benchmark for an earnings surprise is the consensus analyst forecast. By defining the surprise relative to an analyst forecast rather than a time‐series model of expected earnings, we document returns subsequent to earnings announcements that are much larger, persist for much longer, and are more heavily concentrated in the long portion of the hedge portfolio than shown in previous studies. We show that our results hold after controlling for risk and previously documented anomalies, and are positive for every quarter between 1988 and 2000. Finally, we explore the financial results and information environment of firms with extreme earnings surprises and find that they tend to be “neglected” stocks with relatively high book‐to‐market ratios, low analyst coverage, and high analyst forecast dispersion. In the three subsequent years, firms with extreme positive earnings surprises tend to have persistent earnings surprises in the same direction, strong growth in cash flows and earnings, and large increases in analyst coverage, relative to firms with extreme negative earnings surprises. We also show that the returns to the earnings surprise strategy are highest in the quartile of firms where transaction costs are highest and institutional investor interest is lowest, consistent with the idea that market inefficiencies are more prevalent when frictions make it difficult for large, sophisticated investors to exploit the inefficiencies.     

Expectations and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns

Previous research has shown that stocks with low prices relative to book value, cash flow, earnings, or dividends (that is, value stocks) earn high returns. Value stocks may earn high returns because they are more risky. Alternatively, systematic errors in expectations may explain the high returns earned by value stocks. I test for the existence of systematic errors using survey data on forecasts by stock market analysts. I show that investment strategies that seek to exploit errors in analysts' forecasts earn superior returns because expectations about future growth in earnings are too extreme.     

Accounting information,disclosure, and expected utility: Do investors really abhor uncertainty?

Investors are said to “abhor uncertainty,” but if there were no uncertainty they could earn only the risk‐free rate. A fundamental result in the analytical accounting literature shows that investors buying into a CARA‐normal CAPM market pay lower asset prices, gain higher ex‐ante expected returns, and obtain higher expected utility, when the market payoff has higher variance. New investors obtain similar “welfare” gains from risk under a log/power utility CAPM. These results do not imply that investors “abhor information.” To realize investors' ex‐ante expectations, the subjective probability distributions representing market expectations must be accurate. Greater payoff risk can add to investors' expected utility, but higher ex‐post(realized) utility comes from better information and more accurate ex‐ante expectations. An important implication for accounting is that greater disclosure can have the simultaneous effects of (i) exposing more fully or perceptibly firms' payoff uncertainty, thereby increasing new investors' expected utility, and (ii) improving market estimates of firms' payoff parameters (means, variances, covariances), thereby giving investors a better chance of realizing their expectations. Paradoxically, better information can be valuable to new investors by exposing more fully and more accurately the risk in firms' business operations and results–new investors maximizing expected utility want both more risk and better information.     

Analyst Forecasts and the Cross Section of European Stock Returns

We examine revisions to earnings forecasts by equity analysts and their role in predicting stock returns. We provide evidence that European stocks with net upward revised forecasts earn higher future returns than otherwise similar stocks. This effect is not concentrated in small stocks, stocks with low analyst coverage, or stocks with low book‐to‐market ratios. We find differences in the return continuation patterns of stocks with upward versus downward revisions, namely, bad news travels quickly, but good news travels slowly. This result is consistent with investors' attaching greater significance to poor earnings forecasts, but adopting a wait‐and‐see approach to good news.     

Earnings Announcements and Systematic Risk

Firms scheduled to report earnings earn an annualized abnormal return of 9.9%. We propose a risk‐based explanation for this phenomenon, whereby investors use announcements to revise their expectations for nonannouncing firms, but can only do so imperfectly. Consequently, the covariance between firm‐specific and market cash flow news spikes around announcements, making announcers especially risky. Consistent with our hypothesis, announcer returns forecast aggregate earnings. The announcement premium is persistent across stocks, and early (late) announcers earn higher (lower) returns. Nonannouncers' response to announcements is consistent with our model, both over time and across firms. Finally, exposure to announcement risk is priced.     

Value versus growth: Australian evidence

The value‐growth effect is one of the most pervasive patterns in stock prices. In this study, the ability of four proxies for value‐growth, book‐to‐market, sales‐to‐price, earnings‐to‐price and cash‐flow‐to‐price to explain equity returns is analysed. The findings show that in aggregate, book‐to‐market best explains cross‐sectional variation in Australian equity returns, which in isolation suggests that it is the superior proxy for value‐growth. The analysis is taken further and the value‐growth effect is examined separately in positive and negative earnings firms. After segregating firms, it is found that in the negative earnings sample, book‐to‐market is the best value‐growth proxy and in the positive earnings sample, cash‐flow‐to‐price has the highest level of significance and is thus the superior value‐growth proxy. The economic significance of this result is telling, as the firms that report positive earnings are much larger than those that report negative earnings.     

Earnings expectations,investor trade size,and anomalous returns around earnings announcements

We provide evidence that identifiable subsets of investors use significantly different information sets. Investors initiating large trades respond to analysts’ earnings forecast errors, while investors initiating small trades respond to a less-sophisticated signal that underestimates the implications of current earnings innovations for future earnings levels. This suggests small investors exhibit the behavior that Bernard and Thomas [Journal of Accounting and Economics 13, 305–340] theorize causes post-earnings announcement drift. We also use analysts’ forecasts to significantly improve the predictability of returns around earnings announcements previously documented by Bernard and Thomas. Finally, results attempting to link return predictability to the prevalence of small-investor trading are mixed.     

Financial Management Association Roundtable on Stock Market Pricing and Value‐Based Management

A group of academics and practitioners addresses a number of questions about the workings of the stock market and its implications for corporate decision‐making. The discussion begins by asking what the market wants from companies: Is it mainly just steady increases in earnings per share, which are then “capitalized” by the market at the current industry P/E multiple to produce a higher stock price? Or does the market pay attention to the “quality,” or sustainability, of earnings? And are there more revealing measures of annual corporate performance than GAAP earnings—measures that would provide investors with a better sense of companies' future cash‐generating capacity and returns on capital? The consensus was that although many investors respond uncritically to earnings numbers, the most sophisticated and influential investors consider far more than current earnings when pricing stocks. And although the stock market is far from omniscient, the heightened scrutiny of companies resulting from the growth of hedge funds, private equity, and investor activism of all kinds appears to be making the market “more efficient” in building information into stock prices. The second part of the discussion explored the implications of this view of the market pricing process for corporate strategy and the evaluation of major investment opportunities. For example, do acquisitions have to be “EPS‐accretive” to be value‐adding, or is there a more reliable means of assessing an investment's value added than pro forma EPS effects? Does the DCF valuation method always offer a better guide to value than the method of comparables used by many Wall Street dealmakers? And under what circumstances are the relatively new real options valuation approaches likely to provide a significant advantage over conventional methods? The main message offered to corporate practitioners is to avoid letting cosmetic accounting effects get in the way of value‐adding investment and operating decisions. As the corporate record on acquisitions makes painfully clear, there is no guarantee that an accretive deal will turn out to be value‐increasing (in fact, the odds are that it will not). As for choosing a valuation method, there appears to be a time and place for each of the major methods—comparables, DCF, and real options—and the key to success is understanding which method is best suited to the circumstances.     

Order Flows and Stock Returns: Compensation for Market Makers with Inventory Concerns

We investigate whether market makers with inventory concerns are compensated with subsequent monthly returns in the cross‐section. We find a significant negative relation between order flows and monthly returns, “the order flow effect,” suggesting that market makers lower prices for stocks with sell order flows and demand a reward in the form of higher expected returns. Further, the order flow effect is stronger for high‐volatility or high‐volume stocks for which market makers have serious inventory concerns. Funding liquidity of market makers also affects the order flow effect. Finally, our finding is independent of existing regularities and robust to the decimalization.     

Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect the Implications of Special Items for Future Earnings?

Previous research (Rendleman, Jones, and Latane [1987]; Freeman and Tse [1989]; Bernard and Thomas [1990]; and Ball and Bartov [1996]) indicates that security prices do not fully reflect predictable elements of the relation between current and future quarterly earnings. We investigate whether this finding also holds for the special items component of earnings. Given that special items are prominent in financial analysis and are assumed to have relatively straightforward implications for future earnings (special items are assumed to be largely transitory), one might expect that prices would fully impound the implications of special items for future earnings. Based on the "two-equation" approach used in Ball and Bartov [1996] and other studies (e.g., Abarbanell and Bernard [1992]; Sloan [1996]; Rangan and Sloan [1998]; and Soffer and Lys [1999]), we find that while prices reflect relatively more of the effects of special items compared to other earnings components, we still reject the null hypothesis that prices fully impound the implications of special items for future earnings. The "two-equation" approach assesses the consistency of coefficients in a pair of prediction and pricing equations, and thus depends on an assumed functional form. However, a less structured abnormal returns methodology like that used in Bernard and Thomas [1990] also supports the conclusion that the implications of special items are not fully impounded in prices. Specifically, a trading strategy based only on the sign of special items earns small but statistically significant abnormal returns during a 3-day window four quarters subsequent to the original announcement of special items.     

Returns to buying earnings and book value: accounting for growth and risk

Historical cost accounting deals with uncertainty by deferring the recognition of earnings until the uncertainty has largely been resolved. Such accounting affects both earnings and book value and produces expected earnings growth deemed to be at risk. This paper shows that the earnings-to-price and book-to-price ratios that are the product of this accounting forecast both earnings growth and the risk to that growth. The paper also shows that the market pricing of earnings and book values in these ratios aligns with the risk imbedded in the accounting: the returns to buying stocks on the basis of their earnings yield and book-to-price are explained as a rational pricing of the risk of expected earnings growth not being realized. Accordingly, the paper provides a rationalization of the well-documented book-to-price effect in stock returns: book-to-price indicates the risk in buying earnings growth. However, growth identified by a high book-to-price as yielding a higher return in this paper is quite different from “growth” typically attributed to a low book-to-price as yielding a lower return. Accordingly, the notion of “growth” versus “value” requires modification.     

How Much New Information Is There in Earnings?

We quantify the relative importance of earnings announcements in providing new information to the share market, using the R² in a regression of securities' calendar‐year returns on their four quarterly earnings‐announcement “window” returns. The R², which averages approximately 5% to 9%, measures the proportion of total information incorporated in share prices annually that is associated with earnings announcements. We conclude that the average quarterly announcement is associated with approximately 1% to 2% of total annual information, thus providing a modest but not overwhelming amount of incremental information to the market. The results are consistent with the view that the primary economic role of reported earnings is not to provide timely new information to the share market. By inference, that role lies elsewhere, for example, in settling debt and compensation contracts and in disciplining prior information, including more timely managerial disclosures of information originating in the firm's accounting system. The relative informativeness of earnings announcements is a concave function of size. Increased information during earnings‐announcement windows in recent years is due only in part to increased concurrent releases of management forecasts. There is no evidence of abnormal information arrival in the weeks surrounding earnings announcements. Substantial information is released in management forecasts and in analyst forecast revisions prior (but not subsequent) to earnings announcements.     

Beyond accounting and back: An empirical examination of the relative relevance of earnings and “other” information

Ohlson (1995) models firm value as a function of book value, earnings, and analysts' earnings forecasts which capture “other” information not yet reflected in the financial statements. Within this framework, stock returns reflect information from earnings and forecasts, each of which is different in terms of reliability and timeliness. For the period 1984–2012, this paper examines time trends and the influence of aggregate market conditions on the relative relevance of earnings and forecasts. In this context, relative relevance is defined as the incremental explanatory power of earnings or forecasts, relative to their combined explanatory power with respect to the cross-section of stock returns. This inquiry is motivated by anecdotal evidence and recent research, which suggests that aggregate market conditions influence the usefulness of accounting information for investors. The findings show that while the relative relevance of earnings has remained stable, the relative relevance of forecasts has increased over time. I also find that the relative relevance of earnings is higher in bad years, i.e. years with low market returns or elevated market uncertainty. Overall, the results reported in this study suggest that despite the increase in the relevance of timely “other” information, investors tend to rely more on reliable accounting information during bad years.     

What Drives the Cross‐Section of Credit Spreads?: A Variance Decomposition Approach

I decompose the variation of credit spreads for corporate bonds into changing expected returns and changing expectation of credit losses. Using a log‐linearized pricing identity and a vector autoregression applied to microlevel data from 1973 to 2011, I find that expected returns contribute to the cross‐sectional variance of credit spreads nearly as much as expected credit loss does. However, most of the time‐series variation in credit spreads for the market portfolio corresponds to risk premiums.     

Stock Liquidity Risk and the Cross‐sectional Earnings‐Returns Relationship

We argue that a higher sensitivity to aggregate market‐wide liquidity shocks (i.e., a higher liquidity risk) implies a tendency for a stock's price to converge to fundamentals. We test this intuition within the framework of the earnings‐returns relationship. We find a positive liquidity risk effect on the relationship between return and expected change in earnings. This effect on the earnings‐returns relationship is distinct from the negative effect observed for stock illiquidity level. Notably, the liquidity risk effect is evident (absent) during periods of neutral/low (high) aggregate market liquidity. We also show that the liquidity risk effect is dominant in firms that: (a) are of intermediate size; (b) are of intermediate book‐to‐market; and (c) are profit making.     

Econometrics of the Basu Asymmetric Timeliness Coefficient and Accounting Conservatism

A substantial literature investigates conditional conservatism, defined as asymmetric accounting recognition of economic shocks (“news”), and how it depends on various market, political, and institutional variables. Studies typically assume the Basu [1997] asymmetric timeliness coefficient (the incremental slope on negative returns in a piecewise‐linear regression of accounting income on stock returns) is a valid conditional conservatism measure. We analyze the measure's validity, in the context of a model with accounting income incorporating different types of information with different lags, and with noise. We demonstrate that the asymmetric timeliness coefficient varies with firm characteristics affecting their information environments, such as the length of the firm's operating and investment cycles, and its degree of diversification. We particularly examine one characteristic, the extent to which “unbooked” information (such as revised expectations about rents and growth options) is independent of other information, and discuss the conditions under which a proxy for this characteristic is the market‐to‐book ratio. We also conclude that much criticism of the Basu regression misconstrues researchers’ objectives.     

Drivers of Shareholder Returns in Tech Industries (or How to Make Sense of Amazon's Market Value)

Earnings according to GAAP do a notoriously poor job of explaining the current values of the most successful high‐tech companies, which in recent years have experienced remarkable growth in revenues and market capitalizations. But if GAAP earnings fail to account for the values of such companies, are there other measures that do better? The authors address this question in two main ways. They begin by summarizing the findings of their recent study of both the operating and the stock‐market performance of 169 publicly traded tech companies (with market caps of at least $1 billion). The aim of the study was to identify which of the many indicators of corporate operating performance—including growth in revenues, EBITDA margins, and returns on equity—have had the strongest correlation with shareholder returns over a relatively long period of time. The study's main conclusion is that investors appear to be looking for signs of neither growth nor efficiency in using capital alone, but for an optimal mix or balancing of those goals. And that mix, as the study also suggests, is captured in a cash‐flow‐based variant of “residual income” the authors call “residual cash earnings,” or RCE. In the second part of their article, the authors show how and why RCE does a much better job than reported net income or EPS of explaining the current market value of Amazon.com , one of the best‐performing tech companies in the world. Mainly by treating R&D spending as an investment of capital rather than an expense, RCE reveals the value of a company that is distinguished by both the amount and the productivity of its ongoing investment—both of which have been obscured by GAAP.