Seasonality,price discrimination,and welfare

We discuss a potential limitation to a widely accepted result, namely that an output increase is a necessary condition for welfare to increase with price discrimination. We use a theoretical model to show that the existence of seasonal demand fluctuations may allow for a simultaneous reduction in average output and increase in average welfare. We also discuss a number of extensions of our basic model.     

THE OUTPUT EFFECT UNDER OLIGOPOLISTIC THIRD DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION*

This paper analyses the output effect of price discrimination in a Cournot oligopoly where firms have different costs. Criteria which are based on the demand curves but not on the industry cost structure are developed to determine the direction of output change. Such criteria may provide an analytical basis for assessing regulatory cases and developing empirical propositions in testing the social impact of oligopolistic price discrimination.     

价格歧视战略与福利效应分析

在完全竞争市场条件下 ,竞争均衡可实现帕累托最优效率。垄断市场一般很难提供价格等于边际成本的产量水平 ,其产量与价格选择对社会来说不是最优的。垄断厂商以内生范畴和外生范畴为基础对消费者进行分类 ,使得价格歧视成为一种可行战略。由于定价策略存在差异 ,不同类型的价格歧视便具有不同的福利效应。     

Open access policies, regulated charges and non-price discrimination in telecommunications

Open access policies in telecommunications, including interconnection and unbundling, are implemented by regulators in an effort to increase competition in the sector. Lack of cooperation from incumbents is pervasive, given their incentives to engage in non-price discrimination and the moral hazard resulting from the inability of regulators to monitor the contract. We build a relationship between the access price and non-price discrimination, neither assuming a pre-determined market strategic interdependence or a specific demand function format. When the access charge is liberalized, the incentive for non-price discrimination disappears. It may be optimal for the regulator to set a second-best regulated access price to avoid non-price discrimination.     

Upstream and downstream pollution taxations in vertically related markets with imperfect competition

When two markets are vertically related, the government can control pollution at the upstream as well as the downstream market levels. This paper employs the stylized model of input price discrimination and compares the effectiveness of upstream and downstream pollution taxations. We consider the situation in which downstream firms have heterogeneous abatement technologies and an upstream monopolist performs input price discrimination against them. In order to mitigate pollution, the government imposes input tax on the intermediate inputs and emission tax on the pollutant. We show that the degree of input price discrimination decreases with a rise in the input tax and increases with a rise in the emission tax. We further examine the effect of a green tax reform in which the government changes the source of taxation from input tax to emission tax. We argue that although this green tax reform may reduce the tax revenue of the government, it will certainly increase social welfare.      

Third‐degree price discrimination in the presence of congestion externality

This paper analyzes third‐degree price discrimination of a monopoly airline in the presence of congestion externality when all markets are served. The model features the business‐passenger and leisure‐passenger markets where business passengers exhibit a higher time valuation, and a less price‐elastic demand, than leisure passengers. Our main result is the identification of the time‐valuation effect of price discrimination, which can work in the opposite direction as the well‐known output effect on welfare. This time‐valuation effect clearly explains why discriminating prices can improve welfare even when this is associated with a reduction in aggregate output.     

History-based price discrimination and entry in markets with switching costs: A welfare analysis

We analyze history-based price discrimination in an asymmetric industry, where an incumbent, protected by switching costs, faces an entrant who does not have access to information about consumers’ purchase histories. We demonstrate that consumer surplus is higher with uniform pricing than with history-based price discrimination. We find that the entry decision is invariant to whether the incumbent implements history-based pricing or uniform pricing. This implies that the potential abuse of market dominance imposed by history-based price discrimination is exploitation, not exclusion. Finally, we establish that the profit gain to the incumbent from history-based pricing exceeds the associated loss to consumers.     

Third-degree price discrimination,quality choice,and welfare

Employing an endogenous quality choice model, we reconsider the effect on welfare of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination. We prove that price discrimination always enhances welfare, mainly because the quality improvement owing to price discrimination increases consumer surplus. Moreover, we show that third-degree price discrimination benefits all parties, including consumers in the higher priced market if the preference differences between markets are sufficiently large.     

REAL BALANCES, RELATIVE PRICES AND AN OPEN MODEL TEMPORARY EQUILIBRIUM WITH RATIONING THE MARSHALL-LERNER CONDITIONS IN

The model is of an open economy producing a single output, the demand for which depends on its price, the price of foreign output, real incomes and government spending. We thereby extend the rationed equilibrium model of Malinvaud to the simplest open economy. Residents hold foreign assets as well as domestic assets, hence exchange rate movements have real balance effects as well as relative price effects. The Marshall Lerner conditions are sufficient, but not necessary, for either an exchange rate depreciation or a fall in the domestic price level, to increase demand for domestic output. They are necessary, but not sufficient, for a depreciation or fall in the domestic price level, to improve the trade balance under Keynesian Unemployment.     

Monopoly and the choice of product characteristics

Monopoly firms producing large, indivisible goods may be able to effect perfect price discrimination by charging an all-or-none implicit price for each product characteristic. In that case, a monopolist will provide the same vector of product characteristics (i.e., the same product ‘quality’) as will a competitive industry; and, perhaps more surprisingly, produce the same quantity of the good. With all-or-none pricing, monopoly power leads to a higher product price, but no change in product quality or output.     

Can child allowances improve fertility in a gender discrimination economy?

While it is believed that child allowances can improve fertility in principle, this paper shows that the effects of child allowances with gender discrimination should be reconsidered. It points out that gender wage discrimination can inhibit the positive effects of child allowances on fertility. With high gender wage discrimination, assuming that both parental time and market childcare goods are indispensable for childrearing, child allowances significantly increase maternal childcare time. On the other hand, child allowances also reduce childcare expenditure due to the decline in female labor time and increase in the relative price of market childcare goods, which eventually decreases fertility. We show that when the gender discrimination factor is greater than a certain cutoff, the effects of child allowances on fertility become negative. Moreover, male childcare time also plays an essential role in increasing fertility rates. Therefore, gender equality is a prerequisite for increased child allowances to be effective.     

Complementarity of willingness to pay and cost heterogeneity under vertical product differentiation: A welfare analysis

Due to the fact that a consumer’s willingness to pay differs between segments, many unregulated industries are price constrained, although the specific costs of market segments also differ. If the product quality is endogenously chosen, we find that third-degree price discrimination increases welfare if a sufficiently pronounced complementarity between the willingness to pay and variable cost heterogeneity is given. This is due to the fact that the monopolist’s incentive for employing a pronounced price dispersion strategy is directly influenced by the consumers’ willingness to pay for the quality of a product. With endogenous product quality, the paper shows that the standard welfare result of third-degree price discrimination compared to uniform monopoly pricing (e.g. that total welfare and consumer surplus both fall if total output does not rise) can be only reversed given the complementarity is sufficiently pronounced.     

Price discrimination via information provision

We study price discrimination where different prices are offered as a bundle with different levels of information about a product. The seller’s price discrimination induces high valuation buyers to purchase a good without information and low valuation buyers to purchase with information. Our analysis highlights several interesting results about price discrimination: (i) the seller’s choice of information provision is the combination of full information and no information, (ii) products can be cheaper without information provision than with information provision, (iii) as a result of price discrimination, prices can be more dispersed as buyers’ valuations become largely similar, and (iv) the high valuation buyers purchase a damaged good and may earn negative surplus. Furthermore, we investigate under which circumstances price discrimination is more profitable than uniform pricing. We show that a decline in transportation costs which facilitate price discrimination can be welfare reducing.     

双边市场、不完全信息与二级价格歧视

本文研究了双边市场二级价格歧视问题。本文构建了包括广告商、消费者、垄断平台在内的两阶段博弈模型，研究了在最优与次优情况下平台的定价机制，分析了二级价格歧视对平台利润、社会福利等的影响。研究表明：（1）“顶部无扭曲”或“底部无扭曲”并不严格成立；（2）平台对观众提供的节目质量、广告插播量均可能出现类型逆转的情况；（3）二级价格歧视会增加社会总福利；（4）“会员制”是平台可能的占优定价机制之一。     

Commodity prices and fiscal policy in a commodity exporting economy

This paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of commodity price shocks on a commodity exporting country. In doing so, we use a DSGE model developed to describe the business cycle in Chile, a copper exporting country. We compare the effects of commodity-price shocks under different fiscal rules. The results show that if the fiscal policy is conducted in a way such that the government saves most of the extra revenues from the higher commodity price, then the macroeconomic effects of a commodity price increase of 10% are an expansion of output below 0.2% and a real exchange appreciation of 0.5%. In contrast, when fiscal policy is highly expansive, the same commodity price increase implies an output expansion above 0.5% and a real exchange rate appreciation of 0.8%. With our model, we also analyze the effects of persistent reduction in the commodity price, the relevance of exchange rate flexibility and the role of imperfect credibility of the fiscal rule.     

Do minimum quality standards bite in polluting industries?

We investigate the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated duopoly where production is polluting. We examine the alternative frameworks with quality-dependent fixed or variable costs, under both price and quantity competition. Under Bertrand behaviour, the introduction of a binding MQS regulation reduces product differentiation, which causes an increase in the output and pollution. Hence its adoption must rely on the increase in consumer surplus generated by the increase in output and average quality. Conversely, in the Cournot setting, a binding MQS decreases output and pollution, and its adoption is driven by the fact that the balance between these effects and the associated increase in average quality yields a welfare improvement.     

Forward Markets and the Behaviour of the Competitive Firm with Production Flexibility

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty when a forward market for its output is available. The firm possesses production flexibility in that it makes its production decision after the resolution of the output price uncertainty, albeit subject to a capacity constraint on production. We show that the firm optimally acquires a higher level of capacity investment than an otherwise identical firm with no production flexibility. We further show that production flexibility allows the firm to implicitly hedge against its output price risk exposure by the ex post production decision. The firm as such under‐hedges its output price risk exposure in the forward market wherein the forward price contains a non‐positive risk premium.     

成本冲击与价格粘性的非对称性——来自中国微观制造业企业的证据

本文在状态依存模型框架内,估计了中国制造业企业价格粘性的非对称性和异质性。结果显示制造业产品的价格粘性具有非对称的特征,同时企业的"异质性"也影响了产品的价格粘性。根据价格粘性理论,存在价格粘性时,货币是"非中性"的,通过调整货币数量能够影响短期内的产出。然而,由于价格粘性的非对称性,在通货膨胀时期,央行为了抑制通胀而采取的紧缩性货币政策将更多地表现为产出减少,而非价格水平下降;相反,为提高产出而实行的扩张性货币政策将更多地表现为价格水平上升,而非产出水平提高。只有通货紧缩时期,价格粘性的非对称性出现反转,扩张性货币政策在短期内才更有效。     

Imperfect price discrimination, market structure, and efficiency

Abstract.  We introduce a flexible third‐degree price discrimination framework by modeling the information firms possess about consumers' locations (preferences) on the Salop circle as a partition. Higher information quality is translated into a partition refinement. In the limit, we obtain the perfect price discrimination paradigm. We show that the free‐entry equilibrium number of firms exhibits a U‐shape as a function of the quality of information. This implies that imperfect price discrimination generates the most efficient free‐entry outcome. JEL classification: D43, L11, L43