排污权初始分配方式简述

实行排污权交易制度首要面对的其中一个问题就是排污权初始分配问题,选取何种分配方式仍是现实中的一个难点问题.目前理论界对排污权初始分配方式的研究,大多是对拍卖和祖父制的研究,本文将对这两种方式进行简要的述评.     

初始排污权拍卖效率的影响因素分析——以市场势力为例

在具体实施排污权拍卖问题时,会受到各方条件如市场势力、企业规模、创新程度、资产配置能力、产权结构及稳定性等等因素的影响,其中以市场势力尤为突出。从市场势力角度入手,运用市场势力相关理论,通过分析现有市场势力是否对初始排污权拍卖效率有所影响,得出市场势力会影响排污权排放效率的结论,通过这类问题的研究不但在理论上对影响初始排污权拍卖效率的因素有更为具体的理解和认识,而且在实践中有助于人们自觉而理性地对待排污权交易。     

嘉兴市排污权交易机制分析

工业化和城市化进程造成了众多环境污染问题,排污权交易作为以市场为基础的环境经济手段正日益受到重视。首先对嘉兴市的排污权交易实践和成果进行分析,然后对一级市场和二级市场分别进行考察,寻找最适合嘉兴市的排污权交易形式。对免费分配、政府定价出售和拍卖等三种排污权初始配置方式进行了优劣势分析,并从不同维度比较了排污权二次交易的不同拍卖形式,最后对实践中存在的问题进行剖析,给出了可行的建议。     

IPO定价机制在排污权初始分配中应用的研究

排污权初始分配是排污权交易和排污总量控制的基础,一种合理的排污权初始分配及科学的排污权定价机制,是影响排污权市场表现的重要因素.针对现有分配方式的不足,应用IPO定价机制,在排污权初始分配中采用累计投标询价+固定价格+免费分配混合分配模式,可提高排污权初始分配效率、实现初始分配公平.     

一种流域排污权初始分配方式的探讨——以淮河流域江苏段为例

流域排污权初始分配是排污权交易制度顺利实施的关键所在。目前,关于淮河流域的排污权初始分配的研究较少。这篇文章以淮河流域江苏段为例,探讨了流域排污权的初始分配方案并计算出淮河流域江苏段内各市排污权的初始分配比例。     

初始排污权分配中的公平问题

初始排污权的分配问题是排污权交易中的关键问题,在初始排污权的分配过程中要强调公平性原则。以公平性与经济性为基本原则,建立排污权的分配模型,利用熵值法赋权的原理确定各指标的权重,减小公平评价过程中主观因素的影响,运用群体决策方法,赋予决策成员相应权重,通过非线性规划方法得到最优方案,使得决策群体的不满意程度最小,实现初始排污权的公平分配。     

排污权定价的影子价格模型分析

本文利用影子价格模型对排污权交易市场中排污权的初始定价及交易中的市场出清价格的形成机制进行了分析,指出通过影子价格可以为政府在初次分配排污权时寻求定价依据,从而达到企业的目标和社会目标相一致;交易时利用影子价格可以为二级市场提供定价依据,促使市场运行更有效率。     

广西二氧化硫(SO2)排污权初始分配模式及价格形成机制研究

广西二氧化硫排污权初始分配模式及价格形成机制是广西二氧化硫排污权交易顺利开展的核心。文章深入分析了排污权初始分配的三种模式,指出固定价格配售模式是广西未来开展二氧化硫排污权交易的方向。最后文章在建立二氧化硫排污权初始价格形成机制模型的基础上,以广西火电厂为例测算了广西火电行业二氧化硫排污权的初始配售价格的范围。     

我国排污权初始分配问题探析

排污权的初始分配是一项复杂、细致和严谨的工作.目前我国在排污权交易的初始分配理论研究方面已有较大的进展,但排污权交易实践方面产生的效果并不理想.这主要是因为我国相应的法律法规不够健全、污染物测算的技术不够成熟以及监管体系的不够完善等原因所造成的.针对此,本文提出应及时加强对排污权的立法工作、建立健全总量控制体系及排污收费制度、制定排污权分配有偿化标准等措施,以此来平衡经济发展与环境保护之间的关系.     

论我国排污权交易存在的问题及破解思路

排污权交易是在政府部门的监督下,发挥市场机制对生态环境容量资源的优化配置作用,以更好地保护生态环境。本文对我国排污权交易存在的缺乏法律依据、排污总量确定难、排污初始分配难以做到公正公平以及排污监测难等主要问题进行分析。由此可见,我国并没有形成有效地以市场为机制的排污权交易二级市场。借鉴美国排污权交易制度的先进经验,提出建立我国完善的排污权交易制度的对策建议。     

Call Auction Transparency and Market Liquidity: Evidence from China

This paper uses the natural experiment offered by the Shanghai Stock Exchange to investigate the impact of opening call auction transparency on market liquidity. We find that the dissemination of indicative trade information during the pre‐open call auction session leads to an overall improvement in stock liquidity in the continuous trading session. Bid‐ask spreads narrow in the first trading hour because adverse selection risk fell significantly and there is less price volatility in the continuous market. This effect is greater for actively traded securities than illiquid securities. Our findings are robust for different lengths of sample period, different lengths of trading hours after market open, and stocks that had (and had not) reformed the share split structure during our research period.     

Trading Mechanisms and Market Quality: Call Markets versus Continuous Auction Markets

On July 29, 2002, the trading mechanism in the Taiwan Futures Exchange (TAIFEX) was switched from an exclusive call market to a continuous auction market. Based upon several proxies of market quality, in the present study, we set out to empirically examine whether this switch has resulted in any significant improvement in market quality within the TAIFEX. We find that while the quoted spreads, effective spreads, and price volatility are all smaller in the continuous auction market, the call auction market exhibits greater market depth and smaller pricing errors; the latter is also found to be more effective in resolving the problem of information asymmetry. Overall, the results of the present study suggest that the choice between call and continuous auction trading mechanisms essentially involves trade‐offs between the bid‐ask spread, market depth, price volatility, information asymmetry costs, and price efficiency.     

国际碳交易发展及我国碳市场构建

我国的碳排放交易市场,必须满足经济社会发展必要的碳排放基本需求,既在发展经济、消除贫困、改善民生的同时保护环境,又不能以牺牲经济增长为代价来减少温室气体的排放。第一,建立健全包括总量控制制度、配额分配与管理制度、市场交易管理制度和监督与评估制度在内的碳排放权交易制度的基本框架;第二,确定碳排放配额分配方式,短期内以免费分配为主,远期采取拍卖分配方式,过渡期采取混合的分配方式;第三,实施碳排放权分级管理,由中央负责排放总量控制,同时增加地方政府在排放配额管理方面的权利。     

Market microstructure effects on volatility at the TAIFEX

This study examines whether changes in the frequency of market clearing or changes in trading hours on competing exchanges that use different auction systems affect the volatility of futures prices. In particular, this study exploits a natural experiment in the frequency of market clearing of stock index futures contracts traded on the Taiwan Futures Exchange (TAIFEX) to assess whether successive increases in the frequency of market clearing are associated with changes in the volatility of futures prices. The impact of changes in the trading hours on the TAIFEX and on the competing Singapore Exchange (SGX) where a similar Taiwanese stock index futures contract trades under a continuous auction market regime is also examined. The evidence for the impact of an increase in the frequency of market clearing on volatility is mixed. However, the introduction of simultaneous opening times for the TAIFEX (which batches orders at the open) and the SGX (which does not) is associated with a significant reduction in the volatility in SGX Taiwanese stock index futures prices. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 27:1219–1243, 2007     

Error Reduction in Distributed DSS Through Coordination of Modeling Activities: Simulation Study

It is well known that the “lemon” problem can cause market failure. Because difficulties in quality discovery of nonstandardized and complex products will increase transaction costs, it was predicted that the “electronic market” would prevail only with less complex and more standardized goods. However, it has been observed that there are many successful electronic (auction) markets for seemingly typical “lemon” goods such as used cars, raw minerals, and agricultural products. It is argued that in such markets, the equilibrium price of electronic trading appeared higher than in the nonelectronic market. Many speculative explanations have been offered for this, but to the best of our knowledge, no analytical studies have been presented. This study is an attempt to fill this gap. In this paper, we look at the problem of quality discovery in the electronic trading of physical goods especially when the goods are not standardized. The information asymmetry between buyer and seller creates the possibility of a “lemon” in the nonstandardized market. To mitigate this problem, several auction markets have devised third party quality grading systems and limited auctions to only relatively higher quality products. Through analytical modeling, we rationalize these mechanisms; that is, the intervention of an impartial third party for quality inspection, market segmentation by quality measure, and the sellers' willingness to pay the cost of quality inspection.     

Arbitrage,cointegration, and the joint dynamics of prices across discrete commodity futures auctions

Underlying the search for arbitrage opportunities across commodity futures markets that differ in market structure is the idea that the futures prices for similar commodities that are traded on different exchanges adjusted for differences in currency, delivery time (if any), location, and market structure are equal. This article examines price linkages in competing discrete commodity futures auction markets. We find no evidence of cointegration of futures prices of similar commodities traded on two contemporaneous discrete auction futures exchanges in Asia. We also find no evidence of arbitrage activities across these two Asian exchanges, though this does not preclude arbitrage activities with North American continuous auction markets. This lack of cointegration may be due to nonstationarities in the trading cost component. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 19: 799–815, 1999     

Electronic Call Market for Commodity Transactions: Design of Computer-Mediated Order Matching System

Commodity exchanges provide potential market structures for electronic trading because commodity products have relatively simple and well-standardized product attributes. Most existing electronic trading systems are introduced for financial exchanges, where qualities of traded products (such as stocks and bonds) are homogeneous, thus taking into account only bid and offer prices for computer-mediated order matching. However, a single commodity market, such as the cotton or grain market, is made up of many heterogeneous goods that are similar to each other but have different product qualities and contract terms. In addition to the price, commodity traders have other pertinent preference ranges over product attributes and delivery conditions. We delineate an electronic call market system for commodity trading, which optimizes the realization of traders' utilities over extended product attributes beyond the price. The electronic call market not only maximizes the total surplus of market participants based on bid and ask prices but also satisfies their qualitative preferences over other attributes, which are difficult to include in the quantitative prices. The trading mechanism of the electronic call market integrates an economic auction model with a social choice model to produce a Pareto-improved transaction. Market simulations are conducted to validate the performance of the proposed electronic call market. The order matching system of the electronic call market is implemented using constraint logic programming.     

国际碳排放权交易价格决定与最优出口规模研究

本文分析了总量控制和交易、基准排放和信用两种碳排放权交易体系中的价格决定原理,并以边际减排成本等于市场均衡价格为基础,分析《京都议定书》框架下国际碳排放权交易规模和利益分配不公等情况;然后构建两阶段模型,讨论“非附件B国家”碳排放权出口规模的决定因素及其影响效应,并通过估测中国碳排放权出口规模决定因素的函数值或参数值,计算中国第1承诺期的最优出口量;最后提出中国参与国际碳排放权交易的政策建议。     

拍卖交易模式在农产品流通中的应用

大力发展农产品批发市场的拍卖交易,逐步缩减散、小、乱的传统对手交易市场,是今后我国农产品交易的发展方向和目标.在农产品流通体系上,要在政府的引导和规范下构建农产品批发市场多层次交易体系,既有农村基层市场的小额批发和城市社区市场的末梢批发,又有区域流通性质的大型集散型批发;在拍卖主体建设上,在大型农产品集散基地推行拍卖交易,特别是在大规模区域种植的产地批发市场加大投入,完善批发市场配套设施与服务功能;在农产品拍卖上下游建设上,一方面要培育、扶持现有农产品运销大户和农业经营企业,促进批发商、代理商和经纪人的组织化发展,另一方面要促进农民合作组织的发展,从资金、政策上给予必要的扶持,鼓励农民加入各类专业合作组织,提高农民进入市场的组织化程度.     

多属性逆向拍卖采购机制设计

全球市场环境不断向买方市场的转变,为企业利用逆向拍卖机制进行采购创造了条件。多属性逆向拍卖机制是采购拍卖中具有广泛应用价值的机制之一,在供应商成本和采购商效用具有可加属性特征的条件下,设计了一个基于模糊评价的多属性逆向拍卖机制,将各属性等级权重值设为供应行业提供此属性等级的平均边际成本,发现该机制是激励相容的较好机制。