The Central Government-Private Sector Wage Differential

Since Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986) there has been a plethora of articles investigating the relationship between public and private sector wages. This article examines part of this post 1986 literature by reviewing articles that examine central government-private sector wage differentials. In sum, most articles find that there is a premium paid to central government workers, although the premium has declined in recent years. In developing countries, however, the differential is usually negative. Women and minorities tend to do better in the public sector relative to their private sector counterparts. The evidence on union premiums between sectors is mixed, although the premium tends to be higher in the private sector. However public sector union workers do not do much better than private sector union members. The magnitude of all of the wage differentials discussed are sensitive to the estimation technique and data source used. The most common explanation for the public sector wage premium is economic rent accruing to government workers, although the public sector wage determination literature suggests that the differential is due to returns to political and 'vote producing' activities not relevant in the private sector.     

Public–private wage gap in Latin America (1992–2007): A matching approach

Using matching methods, we estimate the public–private wage gap for urban workers in eleven Latin American countries for the 1992–2007 period. These methods do not require any estimation of earnings equations and hence no validity-out-of-the-support assumptions; furthermore, this approach allows us to estimate not only the average wage gap but also its distribution. Our main findings indicate that the average public sector worker earns more than his/her private counterpart, and that this differential increased over the 1992–2007 period. Important differences along the wage distribution are also shown in the results; in fact, public servants in the highest percentiles of the wage distribution generally earn less than their private sector equivalents. Nonetheless, the percentile at which a positive wage gap becomes a wage penalty shifted over the period as the average wage gap experienced by most countries widened. Still, the most qualified public sector workers do face a wage penalty. Furthermore, indicators of government effectiveness show no relationship with the country ranking according to the public–private wage gap.     

Public–private sector wage differentials and the business cycle

This paper uses microeconomic data for the period from 1990 to 2004 to examine the relationship between public–private sector wage differentials and labour market conditions in Finland. The results show that the public sector wage premium is strongly counter-cyclical. On average, a 10 percent increase in the local unemployment rate increases the public–private sector wage gap by one percent. Separate analyses by government sector and quantiles of the distribution of wages reveal that it is local government workers and those working at lower skill levels who benefit more from increasing unemployment rate. The paper also exploits the longitudinal structure of the data to examine whether the results are constant over time. These results indicate that the cyclical pattern primarily emerges in years with deteriorated labour markets.     

Men's wage inequality in Serbia's transition

Wage inequality is considered to have been quite compressed in socialist economies. In this paper I analyse how men's wage inequality has changed during the period of transition to a market economy in Serbia, a country which has experienced a particularly dramatic transition. Changes in the distribution of earnings are examined using the Lemieux (2002) decomposition methodology and five annual Labour Force Surveys (2001–2005). I find that the change in wage inequality is mostly driven by changes in wage premiums, while the effect of changes in the composition of the labour force is very small. Isolating the effect of the emerging private sector reveals that changes in the private sector size and wage premium account for an average 25 per cent of the changes in inequality during this period. Moreover, the minimum wage is found to exert a dampening effect on wage inequality.     

Towards a theory of the labor market with a public sector

The object is to specify and analyze equilibrium in a labor market with frictions when there is a significant public sector. In the vast majority of equilibrium studies on labor markets, a public sector has been ruled out by assumption. This seems a strange oversight as about 17% of workers in the US are public sector workers, whereas in western Europe, approximately 22% of workers work in the public sector. The goal in this study is to provide answers to such questions as: what happens to private sector wages if the public sector is increased? If the Government increases the number of public sector jobs, does this crowd out private sector jobs? When will private sector wages be greater (less) than the public sector wage? Reasonably complete answers to these questions (and others) are provided within the context of the model developed.     

Self/paid-employment, public/private sector selection, and wage differentials

We use Probit models to account for the double selection problem of choice between, on the one hand, self- and paid-employment and, on the other, employment in the public and private sector. These models provide corrections for sample selection in wage equations for paid employees in the public and private sectors. Using a modified version of the Oaxaca and Ransom [J. Econom. 61 (1994) 5] procedure, we decompose the wage gap between the public and private sectors into a portion attributable to differences in characteristics, the public sector advantage, the private sector disadvantage and unobserved selection effects. Rich data for the Republic of Cyprus, a thriving economy with institutional features reminiscent of a developing economy, help determine the choice of type (self/paid) and sector (public/private) of employment. The human capital model describes the wage determination process satisfactorily. The size and distribution of public sector rents between men and women are similar to those in North America and are bracketed by results for developing countries.     

The returns to formality and informality in urban Africa

This paper addresses the questions as to the size and causes of earnings differentials in two urban African labor markets, those of Ghana and Tanzania. We have panel data so we can ask how far time invariant unobservables, market ability for short, matters in the determination of earnings. We also have information on whether the individual is own self-employed, self-employed with employees, a private or public sector wage employee and the size of the enterprise in which wage employees work or which the self-employed owns. We find, mirroring work on developed economies, that unobserved individual market ability is by far the most important factor explaining the variance of earnings. With controls for such ability the gap between private wage employment and civil servants is about 50%. With controls for enterprise size we find that wage employees earn the same as the self-employed in both Ghana and Tanzania. Enterprise size matters. At most half of the OLS effect of size on earnings can be explained by unobservable ability. Workers in the largest firms are the high earners with wage rates which exceed those of civil servants. These results all assume exogenous movement. We find evidence that endogeneity bias may be serious and may be understating the extent of both the size effect and the private sector wage (negative) premium. The implications of our results for understanding the nature of formal and informal employment in Africa are discussed.     

Union effects on pay levels in Britain

The contraction of union representation in Britain raises the question of whether or not unions still achieve a wage premium. Analysis of matched employer–employee data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey shows that there is now no demonstrable premium for private sector workers in general. However, unions do achieve a wage premium of around 9% for about half of employees covered by collective bargaining arrangements. The effect of union bargaining spills over to other employees in the same workplaces. The paper identifies circumstances where union effects are strongest—employer endorsement of union membership, high collective bargaining coverage and multi-unionism.     

WHAT HAS 20 YEARS OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PAY GAP LITERATURE TOLD US? EASTERN EUROPEAN TRANSITIONING vs. DEVELOPED ECONOMIES

This paper surveys the literature on public–private sector pay differentials based on 20 years of research in transitioning countries of Eastern Europe (EE) and compares the results with estimates obtained from developed market economies. The majority of empirical studies from EE economies found evidence of public sector pay penalties during the period of economic transition from a communist to market‐based economy. In developed economies, however, the average differential is usually around zero or positive. The public sector pay inequality reducing effect relative to the private sector is greater in transitioning economies than in developed economies. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the sign of the public sector pay gap as well as the relative public sector pay distribution change with the progress of economic transition towards those usually observed in developed economies. Different pay‐setting arrangements between private and public sectors and competition for workers seem to be major arguments for the existence of systematic pay differences between the two sectors.     

On Kin Groups and Wages in the Ghanaian Labour Market

A common feature of African societies is that individuals belong to kin groups which impose reciprocal obligations upon their members. In the modern economy, where large scale production is required, forms must employ multiple kin groups. In such cases kin groups will try to favour their own members in the assignment of good jobs. We analyze the effects of kin group patronage in the modern sector. We set out a model in which kin group favouritism is shown to give rise to a wage premium for the largest kin group. We then use an unusually rich data set from Ghana to test for kin group favouritism, empirically distinguishing it from 'taste for discrimination'. We find that in the private sector there is no evidence for kin group patronage and earning functions (corrected for selection into the various sectors) reveal that workers are paid according to their human capital attributes. By contrast, public sector workers are rewarded for their credentials and membership of the right kin group, not for their productive characteristics. The kin group premium is about 25 percent and is statistically robust to alternative specifications.     

Public and private sector jobs,unreported income and consumption gap in India: Evidence from micro-data

This paper documents the wage and consumption gap between private and public sector employees in India. We empirically investigate the wage gap as well as difference in consumption expenditure using household survey from the 2004-05 National Sample Survey of India. Our results show that despite a lower level of public sector income in some of the income quantiles, the consumption of durable goods is not different between these two groups, statistically. After checking for competing explanations, we conclude that the absence of statistically significant consumption gap could be an outcome of ‘unreported’ income earned by public sector workers in India.     

The impact of minimum wages on wages,work and poverty in Nicaragua

In this paper we use an individual- and household-level panel data set to study the impact of changes in legal minimum wages on a host of labor market outcomes including: a) wages and employment, b) transitions of workers across jobs (in the covered and uncovered sectors) and employment status (unemployment and out of the labor force), and c) transitions into and out of poverty. We find that changes in the legal minimum wage affect only those workers whose initial wage (before the change in minimum wages) is close to the minimum. For example, increases in the legal minimum wage lead to significant increases in the wages and decreases in employment of private covered sector workers who have wages within 20% of the minimum wage before the change, but have no significant impact on wages in other parts of the distribution. The estimates from the employment transition equations suggest that the decrease in covered private sector employment is due to a combination of layoffs and reductions in hiring. Most workers who lose their jobs in the covered private sector as a result of higher legal minimum wages leave the labor force or go into unpaid family work; a smaller proportion find work in the public sector. We find no evidence that these workers become unemployed.Our analysis of the relationship between the minimum wage and household income finds: a) increases in legal minimum wages increase the probability that a poor worker's family will move out of poverty, and b) increases in legal minimum wages are more likely to reduce the incidence of poverty and improve the transition from poor to non-poor if they impact the head of the household rather than the non-head; this is because the head of the household is less likely than a non-head to lose his/her covered sector employment due to a minimum wage increase and because those heads that do lose covered sector employment are more likely to go to another paying job than are non-heads (who are more likely to go into unpaid family work or leave the labor force).     

Identification issues in the public/private wage gap,with an application to Italy

This paper reviews some of the standard assumptions that are imposed in order to estimate the average public/private wage gap and that are mainly related to the possible selection of the sector. There are two contributions to the existing public/private wage gap literature. One is a better understanding of the identified parameters: standard estimators identify a local effect (LATE), which in general cannot be generalized to the entire population, as instead is almost always done. The other is the partial identification of the population average treatment effect, with an instrumental variable. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper in this literature that employs bounds. The technique is applied to male workers in Italy. For compliers, LATE estimates a wage advantage from working in the public sector greater than 30%. This return is within the narrowest bounds on the population average treatment effect that are consistent even with a much smaller gap (about 15% or more).     

Firm heterogeneity and wages in unionised labour markets: Theory and evidence

In many countries wages are set in two stages, where industry-level collective bargaining is followed by firm-specific arrangements determining actual paid wages as a mark-up on the industry wage floor. What explains the wage set in each of these stages? In this paper we show that both the industry wage floor and the average wage cushion are systematically associated with the degree of firm heterogeneity in the industry: The former (latter) is negatively (positively) associated with the productivity spread. Furthermore, since the response of the wage floor dominates that of the wage cushion, workers in more heterogeneous industries tend to get lower actual paid wages. These conclusions are reached in a model of Cournot oligopoly with firm productivity heterogeneity and a two-tiered wage setting system. They are then confirmed by administrative data covering virtually all workers, firms and collective bargaining agreements of the Portuguese private sector for the period 1991–2000.     

The effect of the public sector on private jobs: Evidence from the West Bank

This paper estimates the short run effect of creating more public jobs on private employment in the occupied West Bank. Unlike most cited research, the results provide evidence that favors crowd-in effect both at the aggregate employment level and across sectors. A main contribution of the paper is to empirically explore the underlying mechanisms that drive the results. They include positive public employment effect on local demand, lack of public wage premium, as well as no effect on private wages. It turns out that an increase in the local labor force participation is a driving factor for the latter channel. Interestingly, the increase in labor force participation exceeds that of public and private employment, leading to an increase in the number of job seekers.     

Finance Sector Wage Growth and the Role of Human Capital

We reveal the pervasiveness of the finance sector pay premium, across all OECD countries, as well as all sub‐sectors and occupations within the UK financial sector. Moreover, the UK premium has continued to rise despite the financial crisis. We show that earnings increase faster with value added in certain sub‐sectors of finance, compared to the general economy, providing evidence of profit‐sharing in these sub‐sectors. Other possible explanations, such as workers with higher qualifications or better cognitive skills, or technological change and differing job characteristics, can explain some of the finance sector pay premium, but are not sufficient on their own.     

Union wage premiums in Great Britain: Coverage or membership?

This paper presents estimates of union wage premiums for Great Britain and distinguishes between union membership and union coverage effects on wages. For this purpose a panel data system estimator is applied to data from the British Household Panel Survey.For female workers a coverage premium of 6.1% is estimated whilst no evidence of a union membership premium is found. This result lends support to the by-product theory of Olson (1965) [Olson Jr., M., 1965. The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.)]: if female covered members receive other private benefits than a higher wage from the union the coverage premium could be viewed as a by-product. For male workers no evidence is found of a membership premium nor a coverage premium. To investigate potential bias in the estimated union effects particular attention is paid to measurement error in union membership and the inclusion of job-changes in the sample.     

Returns to Skills and the Distribution of Wages: Spain 1995–2010

In contrast to the pattern observed in other developed countries, the Spanish wage distribution compressed between 1995 and 2006 and became more disperse afterwards, so that in 2010 wage inequality was roughly similar to 1995. In this paper, we analyze the role of supply and demand factors when accounting for these facts. We start by decomposing observed wage changes into changes in the composition of the labour force and changes in the returns of workers' and jobs' characteristics. The results indicate that the compression of the wage distribution between 1995 and 2006 is largely explained by changes in returns, and particularly, by a decrease in the returns to education. We show that both the increase in the supply of high‐skilled workers and the increasing weight of low‐skilled occupations are related to the decreasing trend in the skill premium over this period. In contrast, the widening of the wage distribution after 2006 is largely explained by an increase in the relative demand for high‐skilled workers generating an increase in the school premium.     

Minimum wages,wages and employment in various sectors in Honduras

This paper contributes to our understanding of the impact of minimum wages on labor markets of developing countries, where there are often multiple minimum wages and compliance is weak. We examine how changes in more than 22 minimum wages over 1990–2004 affect employment, unemployment and average wages of workers in different sectors, defined by coverage under the legislation. The evidence suggests that minimum wages are effectively enforced only in medium and large-scale firms, where a 1% increase in the minimum wage leads to an increase of 0.29% in the average wage and a relatively large reduction in employment of ? 0.46%. We find that public sector wages emulate minimum wage trends but the higher cost of labor does not reduce employment there. There are no discernable effects of minimum wages on the wages of workers in small-firms or the self-employed; yet, higher minimum wages may create more unemployment. We conclude that (even under our upper bound estimate of the effect on the wages of workers) the total earnings of workers in the large-firm covered sector fall with higher minimum wages in Honduras, which warrants a policy dialogue on the structure and level of minimum wages.     

An update on EMU sovereign yield spread drivers in times of crisis: A panel data analysis

We empirically investigate the determinants of EMU sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund. Using panel data techniques, we examine the role of a wide set of potential drivers. To our knowledge, this paper presents one of the most exhaustive compilations of the variables used in the literature to study the behaviour of sovereign yield spreads and, in particular, to gauge the effect on these spreads of changes in market sentiment and risk aversion. We use a sample of both central and peripheral countries from January 1999 to December 2012 and assess whether there were significant changes after the outbreak of the euro area debt crisis. Our results suggest that the rise in sovereign risk in central countries can only be partially explained by the evolution of local macroeconomic variables in those countries. Besides, without exception, the marginal effects of sovereign spread drivers (specifically, the variables that measure global market sentiment) increased during the crisis compared to the pre-crisis period, especially in peripheral countries. Moreover, the increase in the significance of the banking level of indebtedness and foreign bank's claims in the public sector (mainly in peripheral countries) along with the crisis unfolding seems to highlight the interconnection between private and public debt and thus, between banking and sovereign crises.