论明大诰中的惩贪法制

明大诰是明太祖朱元璋亲自指导编纂的一部严刑惩治吏民的特别刑法,体现了朱元璋重典治国的思想和主张。朱元璋颁行大诰的目的,是警诫臣民,永以为训,想通过颁行大诰峻令,使臣民知畏而不敢轻犯,但实际上并未收到应有的效果。由于大诰倡导的是对人极度蔑视的封建强权主义和无节制的滥杀政策,就理所当然地受到人民的反对;朱元璋死后不久,就被其继承者所抛弃。这说明仅仅严刑峻法并不能遏制贪污的问题,腐败的形成有很多原因,多杀贪官不能从根本上解决腐败的问题。     

关于推进国有企业惩防体系建设的思考

文章从惩防体系建设要科学谋划,惩防体系建设要整体推进,惩防体系建设要突出重点等三个方面总结介绍了永济新时速电机电器有限责任公司党委推进国有企业惩防体系建设的体会、经验、做法和成效。     

浅谈如何把国有企业惩防体系建设融入经营管理之中

国有企业惩防体系建设要全面推行"过程监察"管理模式,把惩防体系融入国有企业内部控制和风险管理制度之内、融入国有企业经营管理体系之中;要发挥党风廉政建设责任制的优势,求真务实,注重实效,抓好落实:要坚持改革创新,健全完善制度,在领导机制上,有效预防和治理腐败.     

以效能监察为抓手 将惩防体系建设融入企业经营管理

对如何将惩防体系建设融入企业经营管理是目前企业纪检监察工作的重要议题。笔者就该问题提出以效能监察为抓手,是将惩防体系建设融入企业经营管理的一个有效途径。     

发挥制度建设在惩防体系中的核心作用

针对十七大报告中明确提出了"反腐倡廉建设"这一新概念,根据中共中央颁布的《建立健全教育、制度、监督并重的惩治和预防腐败体系实施纲要》,要求把制度建设作为构建惩防体系的核心和根本途径,这对于公司进一步认识反腐败形势,建立健全惩防体系,全面推进公司反腐倡廉建设,强化党员干部的廉洁自律和作风建设具有十分重要的意义。为响应党十七大"防腐倡廉"这一新概念新要求,贯彻南网方略,遵循海南电网公司的发展战略,开展"防腐倡廉"一系列宣传教育活动,逐步制定并不断完善相关的管理监督制度,惩防体系。     

关于国有企业惩防机制建设的探讨

国有企业反腐倡廉建设不但关系到企业自身的健康发展,也同样关系到和谐社会的建设,必须给予高度重视。要从企业内部管理做起,从完善管理机制着手,注重细节管理,抓大不放小,将教育、制度、监督、惩处相结合,推进一体化惩防体系建设。     

巡视制度全覆盖才能让“老虎”“苍蝇”无处遁形

《中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定》明确提出，“改进中央和省区市巡视制度，做到对地方、部门、企事业单位全覆盖。”党的十八大以来，中央已经启动两轮中央巡视组巡视工作。一大批手握重权、身居要职的官员落马，显示了中央高层惩贪反腐、澄清吏治的决心，而不少高官频频落马与中央巡视组巡视反腐有着直接关联，巡视制度在惩贪反腐上的确功不可没，真正做到了既打“老虎”，又打“苍蝇”。     

浅谈治理会计信息失真的惩防性措施

会计信息失真是当前严重影响社会经济正常秩序的一个突出问题,文章针对当前市场经济不断发展,会计造假之风盛行对社会造成的危害,提出了治理会计信息失真的惩防性措施。     

浅谈治理会计信息失真的惩防性措施

会计信息失真是当前严重影响社会经济正常秩序的一个突出问题,文章针对当前市场经济不断发展,会计造假之风盛行对社会造成的危害,提出了治理会计信息失真的惩防性措施.     

关于构建国有企业惩防腐败体系的几点看法

本文针对国有企业在构建惩防腐败体系中遇到的问题,从教育、制度、监督的角度提出了有效的解决途径,并得到了一些启示.     

Corruption,foreign aid and welfare to the poor

This paper investigates the impact of foreign aid and corruption on the welfare of different classes in an economy that receives aid and uses it to finance a public good. We use a general equilibrium model that consists of three goods and three income classes to derive our results. The most important result we obtain is to show that under certain conditions, aid and corruption immiserize the poor.     

财政分权与官员腐败——基于1999-2007年中国省级面板数据的实证研究

利用1999-2007年的省级面板数据,分析了中国地区腐败水平的决定因素,并特别关注财政分权的反腐作用。研究发现:财政分权影响地区腐败机制的多元性,财政分权能够通过推动政府规模膨胀和支出结构扭曲而加重地区的腐败水平;而在控制政府规模和支出结构的前提下,财政分权则能对地区腐败水平产生抑制作用。同时,地区人均GDP、受教育年限和开放程度都是影响地区腐败的重要因素。最后,还尝试性地给出反腐倡廉的政策建议。     

论国家权限与政府腐败

马克思主义者认为,国家是超出其他一切以维持和维护阶级统治和剥削为职能的一种机构。国家征税是权力当做资本的结果。国家通过征税参与剩余价值的分配,但国家权力资本分配财富不是无限的。在市场经济中,政府对于维护国家经济安全负有重要的责任。制度的腐败导致官员生活的腐化,对官员权力寻租的批判不应当脱离人的本性。     

Exploring differences in corruption: the role of neighboring countries

The aim of this paper is to study whether corruption spreads across neighboring countries. Spatial econometric techniques are used to analyze corruption interactions, testing whether the perception of corruption in neighboring countries affect a country’s own corruption once other variables are controlled for. For a given country it is found that corruption varies neither with the behavior of its neighbors (there is no endogenous interaction) nor with their exogenous characteristics (there is no contextual interaction). Corruption is therefore not contagious, but neighboring countries tend to show similar levels of corruption because they face similar characteristics and similar institutional environments.     

民营经济发展与“腐败有效论”的检验

据"腐败有效论"的已有研究结合私营企业发展路径分析试图解释中国高腐败和民营经济高增长并存的"双高之谜"。通过1998～2006年的省级面板数据实证检验,我们发现腐败与民营经济发展呈现著正相关关系,对民营经济发展而言"腐败有效论"是成立的。并且我们证明,腐败有利于民营经济发展起作用的一个重要渠道就是可以减少政府的掠夺和干预。说明面对一个扭曲的制度安排,必然存在另一个扭曲的制度对其进行纠正。而要根除这种次优的扭曲的资源配置方式,只有根除其赖以生存的制度环境,即只有坚定不移地推动市场化改革。     

How does economic transition breed corruption?

Based on the existing literature, this paper discusses the relationship between economic transition and corruption, and argues that economic transition is one of the main roots of the spread of corruption in transitional China. It divides economic transition into four parts, and examines various channels by which economic transition breeds corruption opportunities. By applying the case statistical analysis method to analyze 594 major corruption cases, it finds the most corruption-prone areas, and provides some empirical evidence on the existence of such channels.     

国有经济腐败的委托代理因素分析

国有经济的结构特征可以用两大等级体系的委托代理链来描述 ,第一等级的委托人是全民 ,代理人是政府 ;第二等级的委托人是政府 ,代理人是国企经理。在经济中发挥实质性作用的是第二等级的委托代理关系。国有经济的腐败问题恰恰是第二等级的委托人和代理人的共谋租金的结果。我们认为 ,政府对企业行政上的超强控制是委托人与代理人共谋租金的纽带 ,而经济中监督激励的严重缺乏 ,则是腐败泛滥的重要原因。通过理论分析与模型分析 ,我们认为加强监督 ,减少政府干预企业经济 ,是解决腐败问题的关键。     

Corruption and corporate leverage in an emerging economy: The role of economic freedom

This study investigated the effects of corruption and economic freedom on corporate leverage. We also evaluated how economic freedom shapes the effect of corruption on corporate leverage. Using a sample of Vietnamese firms covering a nine-year period from 2010 to 2018, we find evidence that increased control of corruption has a significant positive impact on firm leverage, whereas the opposite is true for economic freedom. This effect is robust to alternative measures of control of corruption as well as advanced estimation methods, such as firm-fixed effects and quantile regressions. Our results also reveal that the positive impact of corruption controls on corporate leverage is more pronounced for firms with high economic freedom. Econometrically, our findings indicate that firms with better control over corruption prefer debt financing, as demonstrated by their higher leverage ratio.     

A panel data analysis of the effect of corruption on tourism

This study empirically tests the hypothesis that corruption has a negative effect on tourism. Having to pay bribes while on holiday or a business trip increases the costs of travelling to a country where corruption is prevalent. Tourists are thus more likely to travel to countries where these additional costs do not need to be incurred. This hypothesis is tested using a panel data set of over 100 countries and 16 years. The results indicate that a 1-point increase in the Corruption Perception Index (implying a decrease in corruption) results in a 2% to 7% increase in tourist inflows. In addition, tourist inflows rise with GDP per capita, openness and growth and are higher in countries with a temperate climate.     

Are electronic government innovations helpful to deter corruption? Evidence from across the world

Electronic government innovations have been a critical development in public administration in recent years. Many countries have implemented e-government policies to enhance efficiency and transparency and combat corruption. This paper examines the impact of e-government on corruption using longitudinal data for more than 170 countries from 2002 to 2020. The empirical results suggest that e-government serves as a deterrent to corrupt activities. We analyse which e-government domains affect corruption, which types of corruption are more affected by e-government and the circumstances under which e-government is more effective in reducing corruption. The empirical results suggest that online service completion and e-participation are important features of e-government as an anticorruption tool. Evidence suggests that e-participation reduces corrupt legislature activities, public sector theft, executive bribery, and corrupt exchanges. The potential of e-government to deter corruption is higher in countries where corruption is moderate or high and economic development is lower. Higher levels of GDP per capita, foreign direct investment, and political rights are also associated with lower levels of corruption.