Participating Insurance Contracts and the Rothschild-Stiglitz Equilibrium Puzzle

We extend the Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) insurance market model with adverse selection by allowing insurers to offer either non-participating or participating policies, that is, insurance contracts with policy dividends or supplementary calls for premium. It is shown that an equilibrium always exists in such a setting. Participating policies act as an implicit threat that dissuades deviant insurers who aim to attract low-risk individuals only. The model predicts that the mutual corporate form should be prevalent in insurance markets where second-best Pareto efficiency requires cross-subsidisation between risk types.     

基于利益相关者理论的投保人与保险人的博弈分析

目前我国不少保险公司把企业的短期边际利润作为唯一经营目标,保险人与投保人的利益冲突问题不容忽视。由博弈结果分析可知,投保人作为保险企业的利益相关者,其利益的保护和保险企业的长期发展息息相关。如果投保人利益长期得不到有效的保障,投保人会选择退出保险市场,这将影响到保险业的市场占有率、信誉和形象等等,给保险业的长期健康发展带来威胁。     

Vertragsrechtliche Anforderungen an die Gestaltung von „Self-Tracking“-Tarifen in der Privatversicherung

The phenomenon of digitalization is reaching into our everyday lives, and “self-tracking” practices gain new adherents. Yet “self-tracking”, the practice of systematically recording information about one’s health and lifestyle by digital means, is not only an opportunity for the self-tracker to enhance his self-knowledge, but also for insurers to detail and personalize their risk assessment. The following article deals with “self-tracking”-insurance contracts, i.?e. insurance contracts that adapt to the personal risk data of the insured person and offer discounts for risk-aware policyholders. In these contracts, self-tracking data will either be used as a basis for premium calculation or as an element to calculate the bonuses payable as profit participation on with-profit policies. The article focuses on the control of standard terms of “self-tracking”-insurance contracts, but also covers the legal prerequisites under which the insurance contract may be combined with a separate self-tracking-contract between the self-tracker and a third party.     

Insurance Markets With Differential Information

This article attempts to understand the outcomes when each party of an insurance contract simultaneously has superior information. I assume that policyholders have superior information about specific risks while insurers have superior information about general risks. I find that low-general-risk policyholders purchase insurance, while high-general-risk policyholders are self-insured. Among the low-general-risk policyholders, high-specific-risk policyholders purchase full insurance, while low-specific-risk policyholders purchase partial insurance. When insurers can strategically publicize their information, efficiency is improved because high-general-risk policyholders purchase actuarially fair insurance. The market segmentation is also found based on the general-risk type and the publicizing of information.     

Understanding Basis Risk in Insurance Contracts

There is a tremendous amount of resources being tied up in litigation between insurance companies and policyholders over things like the extent of coverage for various loss scenarios or allegedly bad faith delays in settlement payments. The fact that policyholders formally dispute insurer coverage positions or claims payment strategies gives credibility to the idea that mismatches exist between what policyholders expect insurance policies to cover and what the insurance contracts actually provide as loss indemnification. This mismatch essentially represents insurance basis risk, the analysis of which can more accurately reflect the value and overall efficiency of insurance contracts and suggest factors that may influence policyholder dissatisfaction and consequently insurance contract disputes. This article takes a detailed look at insurance basis risk and finds that subjectivity plays a prominent role in its definition. Using Bayesian inference, it is shown how factors can affect the magnitude of insurance basis risk depending on the individual situation in which the mismatch between losses and coverage exists.     

Optimal asset allocation for participating contracts under the VaR and PI constraint

ABSTRACT

Participating contracts provide a maturity guarantee for the policyholder. However, the terminal payoff to the policyholder should be related to financial risks of participating insurance contracts. We investigate an optimal investment problem under a joint value-at-risk and portfolio insurance constraint faced by the insurer who offers participating contracts. The insurer aims to maximize the expected utility of the terminal payoff to the insurer. We adopt a concavification technique and a Lagrange dual method to solve the problem and derive the representations of the optimal wealth process and trading strategies. We also carry out some numerical analysis to show how the joint value-at-risk and the portfolio insurance constraint impacts the optimal terminal wealth.     

Fair valuation of cliquet-style return guarantees in (homogeneous and) heterogeneous life insurance portfolios

Participating life insurance contracts allow the policyholder to participate in the annual return of a reference portfolio. Additionally, they are often equipped with an annual (cliquet-style) return guarantee. The current low interest rate environment has again refreshed the discussion on risk management and fair valuation of such embedded options. While this problem is typically discussed from the viewpoint of a single contract or a homogeneous* insurance portfolio, contracts are, in practice, managed within a heterogeneous insurance portfolio. Their valuation must then – unlike the case of asset portfolios – take account of portfolio effects: Their premiums are invested in the same reference portfolio; the contracts interact by a joint reserve, individual surrender options and joint default risk of the policy sponsor. Here, we discuss the impact of portfolio effects on the fair valuation of insurance contracts jointly managed in (homogeneous and) heterogeneous life insurance portfolios. First, in a rather general setting, including stochastic interest rates, we consider the case that otherwise homogeneous contracts interact due to the default risk of the policy sponsor. Second, and more importantly, we then also consider the case when policies are allowed to differ in further aspects like the guaranteed rate or time to maturity. We also provide an extensive numerical example for further analysis.     

A performance analysis of participating life insurance contracts

Traditional life insurance products, in particular participating life insurance contracts, are often criticized. Their performance is often said to be poor compared to other investment alternatives. Interestingly, this perception appears to persist although very little research has been conducted into the performance of participating life insurance contracts. But are participating life insurance contracts actually bad for policyholders? We conduct a performance analysis based on contracts offered in the German market, in order to provide evidence to support decision making by policyholders.     

Creating Customer Value in Participating Life Insurance

The value of a life insurance contract may differ depending on whether it is looked at from the customer's point of view or that of the insurance company. We assume that the insurer is able to replicate the life insurance contract's cash flows via assets traded on the capital market and can hence apply risk‐neutral valuation techniques. The policyholder, on the other hand, will take risk preferences and diversification opportunities into account when placing a value on that same contract. Customer value is represented by policyholder willingness to pay and depends on the contract parameters, that is, the guaranteed interest rate and the annual and terminal surplus participation rate. The aim of this article is to analyze and compare these two perspectives. In particular, we identify contract parameter combinations that—while keeping the contract value fixed for the insurer—maximize customer value. In addition, we derive explicit expressions for a selection of specific cases. Our results suggest that a customer segmentation in this sense, that is, based on the different ways customers evaluate life insurance contracts and embedded investment guarantees while ensuring fair values, is worthwhile for insurance companies as doing so can result in substantial increases in policyholder willingness to pay.     

Consumer risk perceptions and information in insurance markets with adverse selection

Standard models of adverse selection in insurance markets assume policyholders know their loss distributions. This study examines the nature of equilibrium and the equilibrium value of information in competitive insurance markets where consumers lack complete information regarding their loss probabilities. We show that additional private information is privately and socially valuable. When the equilibrium policies separate types, policyholders can deduce the underlying probabilities from the contracts, so it is information on risk type, rather than loss probability per se, that is valuable. We show that the equilibrium is “as if” policyholders were endowed with complete knowledge if, and only if, information is noiseless and costless. If information is noisy, the equilibrium depends on policyholders' prior beliefs and the amount of noise in the information they acquire.     

Risk Taking and Performance of Public Insurers: An International Comparison

We investigate how investor protection, government quality, and contract enforcement affect risk taking and performance of insurance companies from around the world. We find that better investor protection results in less risk taking, as do higher quality government and greater contract enforceability. However, we find only limited evidence that these factors influence firm performance. We conclude that better overall operating environments result in less risk taking by insurers without the concomitant decline in performance. These results imply that better investor protection environments benefit policyholders and outside stockholders by preventing corporate insiders from expropriating wealth from policyholders and outside stockholders.     

Mortality-Indexed Annuities Managing Longevity Risk Via Product Design

Abstract

Longevity risk has become a major challenge for governments, individuals, and annuity providers in most countries. In its aggregate form, the systematic risk of changes to general mortality patterns, it has the potential for causing large cumulative losses for insurers. Since obvious risk management tools, such as (re)insurance or hedging, are less suited for managing an annuity provider’s exposure to this risk, we propose a type of life annuity with benefits contingent on actual mortality experience.

Similar adaptations to conventional product design exist with investment-linked annuities, and a role model for long-term contracts contingent on actual cost experience can be found in German private health insurance. By effectively sharing systematic longevity risk with policyholders, insurers may avoid cumulative losses.

Policyholders also gain in comparison with a comparable conventional annuity product: Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we identify a significant upside potential for policyholders while downside risk is limited.     

中国分红保险的机理与制度框架

分红政策在分红保险的经营和监管中始终发挥着核心作用。不论分红保险采用何种模式,分红政策都应当遵循一定的原则:既重视保单持有人的合理预期,贯彻诚信经营和红利分配的公平原则,又要充分考虑红利分配对公司未来红利水平、投资策略以及偿付能力的影响。为了实现分红保险的这些原则,必须辅以有效的工具,其中分红特别储备是实现这些目的的本质、核心和关键。本文以此为基础,阐述了分红保险的管理机制和报告制度。     

Weighted utility optimization of the participating endowment contract

ABSTRACT

In a participating endowment contract, the special loss compensation and profit sharing mechanism leads to heterogeneous benchmarks to distinguish the gain and loss for the policyholder's and the insurance company's S-shaped utilities. Because of the intense competition among the insurance companies and the requirement of the regulators, the benefits of the policyholders should be considered. As such, choosing the weighted utility of the two counterparts as the optimization objective is a rational setting. This setting induces a non-HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) and non-concave objective utility whose exact concavity and convexity are unknown. The difficulties not only come from this highly non-concave optimization problem, but also exist in the implicit integration of the optimum when solving the expected utilities of the two counterparts. We originally design an identification method to establish two categories of concave envelopes to solve the optimization problem, and propose an innovative numerical integration by substitution technique to deal with the implicit integration problem. The numerical simulation results recognize the existence of Pareto improvement of the two counterparts, which shows that the utilities of the policyholder and the insurance company can be simultaneously improved by switching into the weighted objective and appropriately amending the contract.     

The market of dynamic hybrid products in Germany: concept, risk-return profiles, and market overview

This article analyzes dynamic hybrid products along with their diverse characteristics and contract variations that are currently available in the German market. Dynamic hybrid products are innovative life insurance contracts combining features of traditional participating life insurance with those of unit-linked policies. This approach is thereby implemented by a mathematical algorithm based on a constant proportion portfolio insurance strategy that periodically reallocates funds (e.g. once per month or day) between the policy reserve stock (with an interest rate guarantee), a guarantee fund and/or equity fund. In this paper, we contribute to the literature by examining the concepts and key features of available dynamic hybrid products with particular focus on the embedded options, which allows the identification of key contract characteristics associated with them. In addition, risk-return profiles are studied and compared, which is of high relevance for regulators and policyholders. Our results show that these strongly vary, depending on the individual rebalancing mechanism and the type and amount of embedded options.     

Analysis of Participating Life Insurance Contracts: A Unification Approach

Fair pricing of embedded options in life insurance contracts is usually conducted by using risk‐neutral valuation. This pricing framework assumes a perfect hedging strategy, which insurance companies can hardly pursue in practice. In this article, we extend the risk‐neutral valuation concept with a risk measurement approach. We accomplish this by first calibrating contract parameters that lead to the same market value using risk‐neutral valuation. We then measure the resulting risk assuming that insurers do not follow perfect hedging strategies. As the relevant risk measure, we use lower partial moments, comparing shortfall probability, expected shortfall, and downside variance. We show that even when contracts have the same market value, the insurance company's risk can vary widely, a finding that allows us to identify key risk drivers for participating life insurance contracts.     

The Pricing of Insurer Demutualization Initial Public Offerings

This article examines the pricing of the initial public offerings (IPOs) that follow insurance company demutualizations. Insurers that convert from mutual to stock form typically cite the need for capital as a key motivation. Given that capital adequacy is a primary regulatory objective for insurers, one would expect that for a given number of shares to be sold, these firms would price their offerings to maximize proceeds. However, the vast literature on IPO pricing suggests various theories as to why it may be in the issuing firm's best interest to underprice its offering. By examining the initial and long‐run stock returns for these conversion IPOs, the existence and degree of underpricing, as characterized by large initial returns, can be determined. It is observed that on average demutualization insurer IPOs post significantly higher first‐day returns than nondemutualization insurer IPOs. These gains would accrue to the initial investors and to those policyholders who receive compensation in the form of shares in the newly created stock insurer. Attractive returns are sustained for both groups of insurers during the first few years after IPO.     

Insurance guaranty fund—what good is it?

In this paper, we analyze under which conditions a self-supporting insurance guaranty fund can be beneficial for the policyholders in an incomplete market. Within the analyzed setting, we find out that in general, if existent, the potential advantages from its introduction cannot be fairly divided among the participating insurers. Thereby, we have to expect systematic wealth transfers between the policyholders of different insurance companies. We introduce a framework for utility-based fund charges as a solution to this problem.     

Implicit Options in Life Insurance: Valuation and Risk Management

Participating life insurance contracts typically contain various types of implicit options. These implicit options can be very valuable and can thus represent a significant risk to insurance companies if they practice insufficient risk management. Options become especially risky through interaction with other options included in the contracts, which makes their evaluation even more complex. This article provides a comprehensive overview and classification of implicit options in participating life insurance contracts and discusses the relevant literature. It points out the potential problems particularly associated with the valuation of rights to early exercise due to policyholder exercise behavior. The risk potential of the interaction of implicit options is illustrated with numerical examples by means of a life insurance contract that includes common implicit options, i.e., a guaranteed interest rate, stochastic annual surplus participation, and paid-up and resumption options. Valuation is conducted using risk-neutral valuation, a concept that implicitly assumes the implementation of risk management measures such as hedging strategies.     

Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection and Yaari's Dual Theory of Risk

Under Yaari's dual theory of risk, we determine the equilibrium separating contracts for high and low risks in a competitive insurance market, in which risks are defined only by their expected losses, that is, a high risk is a risk that has a greater expected loss than a low risk. Also, we determine the pooling equilibrium contract when insurers are assumed non-myopic. Expected utility theory generally predicts that optimal insurance indemnity payments are nonlinear functions of the underlying loss due to the nonlinearity of agents' utility functions. Under Yaari's dual theory, we show that under mild technical conditions the indemnity payment is a piecewise linear function of the loss, a common property of insurance coverages.