Equilibrium unemployment and wage formation with matching frictions and worker moral hazard

This paper combines the shirking and the matching approaches of equilibrium unemployment in order to endogenize the wage formation process as a function of labour market conditions. The steady-state equilibrium can take two forms depending on whether the no-shirking condition is binding or not. It is demonstrated that the efficiency wage approach is relevant when the unemployment rate is above a certain threshold. Furthermore, an efficiency wage is more likely when the disutility of effort is high, recruiting costs and workers' bargaining power are low, inspections are unlikely and the workers' productivity is weak.     

Quit behavior and the role of job protection

Job protection reduces job turnover by changing firms' hiring and firing decisions. Yet the effect of job protection on workers' quit decisions and post-quit outcomes is still unknown. We present the first evidence using individual panel data from 12 European countries, which differ both in worker turnover rates and in the level of job protection. We find that workers are less likely to quit their job in countries with more job protection, and those workers who quit receive higher wages compared to stayers. This evidence can be explained by increased mobility costs associated with higher expected risk of post-quit layoff and job mismatch.     

Labour Demand Adjustment: Does Foreign Ownership Matter?

This paper examines whether multinationals differ in their employment adjustment from domestic companies, using a panel of 5,544 Belgian firms observed between 1998 and 2005. More precisely, we estimate labour adjustment costs by worker and firm types. We propose a new flexible specification that takes into account the role of firm size in adjustment costs. Our results indicate that adjusting white‐collar employment is around half as costly for multinational firms (MNFs) as for domestic firms of the same size. The remaining differential in adjustment costs between MNFs and domestic firms might result, among other things, from multinationals' stronger bargaining power.     

Holdup in oligopsonistic labour markets - a new role for the minimum wage

We consider a labour market model of oligopsonistic wage competition and show that there is a holdup problem although workers do not have any bargaining power. When a firm invests more, it pays a higher wage in order to attract workers from competitors. Because workers participate in the returns on investment while only firms bear the costs, investment is inefficiently low. A binding minimum wage can achieve the first-best level of investment, both in the short run for a given number of firms and in the long run when the number of firms is endogenous.     

Informality in developing economies: Regulation and fiscal policies

This paper proposes a unified theoretical framework where formal and informal firms coexist and face the same type of product and labor market imperfections: they have monopoly power in the goods market, they are subject to matching frictions in the labor market, and wages are determined by bargaining between large firms and their workers, through either individual or collective bargaining. Our model matches the main stylized facts on informality for developing countries and appears to be a good candidate for policy analysis. In this framework, we study the impact on informality, wages and unemployment of policies that may be used to reduce informality. We consider changes in product market regulation (PMR) and in two types of fiscal policies, labor taxes and formality enforcement. We find that lessening PMR decreases informality and unemployment simultaneously, indicating that there is not necessarily a tradeoff between informality and unemployment. The tradeoff appears when fiscal policies are used, though. Moreover, the impacts of PMR on unemployment and on wages are larger under collective than individual bargaining. With respect to wage inequality, lessening PMR reduces it, while lower taxes tend to increase the formal sector wage premium.     

Labor's liquidity service and firing costs

This paper studies the specific effect that firing costs can have on firms facing liquidity constraints. When firing costs are zero and a time gap exists between production and its associated revenues, firing allows firms to hold on to their liquid assets by saving on wages, and thus, allows firms to cope better with liquidity shocks when external financing is too costly or unavailable. I refer to this feature as labor's liquidity service. Higher firing costs reduces the value of labor's liquidity service, and thus, increases firms' incentive for hoarding liquidity and reduces firms' demand for production inputs. In addition to this negative effect at the creation margin of production, firing costs have a relatively higher positive effect on the destruction margin of production of financially restricted firms. This paper presents a model that develops these ideas and shows that the presence of firing costs has a stronger negative effect on the output of firms facing liquidity constraints. Regression analysis, based on country-industry panel data sets, provides empirical evidence consistent with the liquidity service effect of firing costs. I find a relatively stronger negative effect of firing costs on the output of industries with higher liquidity requirements and a relatively stronger negative effect of firing costs on the output of small, and more likely financially constrained, firms.     

The efficiency of training and hiring with intrafirm bargaining

This paper demonstrates that firms hire and train workers efficiently in a matching and intrafirm bargaining economy when the Hosios condition holds and returns to scale are constant. This conclusion stands in contrast to the prevailing view that training costs are a source of inefficiency in imperfect labor markets. The efficiency of the competitive economy relies on the ability of large firms to take into account the negative impact of the training rate on the wages negotiated inside the firm through intrafirm bargaining: untrained workers accept a wage reduction in compensation for potential training that is accessible only following employment. This intrafirm bargaining process solves efficiency problems associated with training costs that would otherwise lead to inefficient hiring and training decisions. This conclusion holds true for both specific and general human capital.     

Employers' hiring practices,employment protection,and costly search: A vacancy-level analysis

An employer with a vacancy may respond to high search costs by lowering hiring requirements. While such an adjustment increases the employer's chances of filling the vacancy, it also more likely results in a match that terminates when the match is hit by match-specific productivity shocks. Drawing on a novel Slovenian vacancy dataset, we find that employers who are searching to fill temporary positions are more likely to hire underqualified workers when search costs are high. We find that search costs are taken into consideration when employers are searching to fill permanent positions in some specifications but not all. These findings suggest that for employers who are searching to fill a permanent position, the benefits of lowering hiring requirements when search costs are high are likely outweighed by: a) high firing costs if an under-qualified worker is hired on a permanent contract or b) the costs of undertaking a new search later if an under-qualified worker is hired on a temporary contract. These are novel findings about the employers' hiring practices in the presence of employment protection laws and costly search.     

The difference a manager can make: organizational justice and knowledge worker commitment

The quality of the employment relationship is argued to be central to knowledge workers' commitment, which in turn supports knowledge creation. Given the high levels of discretion enjoyed by knowledge workers, managers' decisions over work distribution, content and resources become more critical for commitment and knowledge creation. However, little research has explored how justice perceptions shape the quality of the employment relationship and the consequences for commitment. Using a sample of 429 R&D workers from across six science and technology-based firms this paper explores the three-way interaction of procedural and interactional justice with the psychological contract to predict knowledge worker commitment. We found that when employees simultaneously perceived high levels of procedural and interactional justice this moderated the relationship between psychological contract breach and knowledge worker commitment. Furthermore, where there was contract breach, positive perceptions of procedural justice moderated the relationship with commitment. However, in the context of contract fulfilment, low perceived levels of interactional justice predicted lower comparative levels of commitment, regardless of the level of procedural justice.

The results suggest that the perceived quality of the relationship between knowledge workers and their manager can make a positive difference in the context of breach of the psychological contract and this in turn can help maintain levels of commitment important for knowledge creation.     

Firms' investments in general training and the skilled labour market

An adverse selection model is analysed, where firms can train or hire a skilled worker. In equilibrium, the market wage is determined by supply and demand. The quality of the supplied skilled labour is negatively biased, because workers stem from firms that shut down and from firms that observed their trainee's bad quality during the training. If fewer firms were to shut down, then the supplied average quality deteriorates and the incentive to train increases. The incentive is inefficient, because firms must share the informational rent and they free-ride. Ex ante workers may wish to increase the firms' bargaining power.     

The two sides of proximity in industrial clusters: The trade-off between process and product innovation

According to the literature on industrial districts, the proximity of small firms operating in a similar sector can lead to several positive externalities, which enhance collective efficiency. We investigate this assumption by building a microeconomic model in which a set of small firms trades off two opposite effects. First, the closer they are to each other, the more they can share fixed costs or pool risks, and the more they can innovate on more efficient processes. Second, the closer they are, the less diverse is their cognitive environment, and the less they innovate on products. We find that there is a “bell-shaped relationship” between proximity and the firms' performance. Moreover, equilibrium configurations tend to produce too much proximity from the consumers' and the workers' point of view, but too few proximity from the firms' point of view.     

Firms' price and wage adjustment in Europe: Survey evidence on nominal stickiness

This paper presents new evidence on the patterns of price and wage adjustment in European firms and on the extent of nominal rigidities. It uses a unique dataset collected through a firm-level survey conducted in 17 European countries and covering various sectors. Several conclusions are drawn from this evidence. Firms adjust wages less frequently than prices, on average every 15 and 10 months, respectively. Price and, especially, wage adjustment exhibit a substantial degree of time-dependence. In particular, wage changes tend to cluster at a specific time of the year, mostly January in the majority of countries. The results of a multivariate analysis indicate that prices are more flexible when competitive pressures in product markets are strong and when labor costs account for a lower fraction of firms' total costs, whereas wages are more flexible when bargaining is decentralized and when the coverage of collective bargaining and the stringency of employment protection legislation are low. Price rigidities are higher in firms with a larger share of high-skilled/white-collar workers.     

On the effectiveness of firing costs

This paper evaluates the determinants of the effectiveness of firing costs in reducing layoffs. We define effectiveness as either the level of productivity at which firms start firing workers for a given level of firing costs, or the change in this level caused by a given change in the level of firing costs. We find that both are very sensitive to the rate of interest, the persistence of productivity shocks, and the level of uncertainty. An increase in the persistence of shocks makes firing costs less effective, independent of which definition is used. A rise in the real interest rates initially makes firms start firing earlier, but then later if interest rates rise above a certain threshold. A rise in firing costs affects the firing threshold most at high interest rates. Finally, a rise in the degree of uncertainty makes firms wait longer before firing workers, but the effectiveness of changes in firing costs is not much affected by the degree of uncertainty.     

Urban search models under high-relocation costs. Theory and application to spatial mismatch

We develop a search-matching model in which mobility costs are so high that it is too costly for workers to relocate when a change in their employment status occurs. We show that, in equilibrium, wages increase with distance to jobs and commuting costs because firms need to compensate the transportation cost difference between the employed and unemployed workers at each location in the city. We also show that the equilibrium land rent is negatively affected by the unemployment benefit because an increase in the latter induce firms to create less jobs, which, in turn, reduces the competition in the land market. We then use this model to provide a mechanism for the observed spatial mismatch between where black workers live and where jobs are. We finally show that a transportation policy consisting in subsidizing the commuting costs of black workers can increase job creation and reduce unemployment if the level of the subsidy is set at a sufficiently high level.     

Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms

We study a labor market described by a many-to-one matching market with externalities among firms in which each firm’s preferences depend not only on workers whom it hires, but also on workers whom its rival firms hire. We define a new stability concept called weak stability and investigate its existence problem. We show that when the preferences of firms satisfy an extension of substitutability and two new conditions called increasing choice and no external effect by an unchosen worker, then a weakly stable matching exists. We also show that a weakly stable matching may fail to exist without these restrictions.     

Teaching an old dog a new trick: Reserve price and unverifiable quality in repeated procurement

This paper shows that, in a repeated competitive procurement, a buyer can use the reserve price in a low-price auction as a “public”—hence nondiscriminatory—incentive device to elicit unverifiable quality. We study a model with many firms and one buyer, who is imperfectly informed on the firms' costs. When firms are ex ante identical, the provision of quality is sustained by a sufficiently high reserve price to reward firms for the quality provision and by the threat of setting a low reserve price forever, if quality is not delivered. The buyer can elicit the desired level of unverifiable quality provided her baseline valuation of the project is not too high and the net benefit from unverifiable quality is not too low. These results are robust to firms' heterogeneity in their time preferences when the punishment for a deviation is finite but sufficiently long.     

The Use of Attendance Incentive Differentials for Managing Worker Shortages: A Study of Export Manufacturers in Global Supply Chains

Amidst frequent and consequential worker shortages, export manufacturers in developing economies use incentives to reward workers for perfect attendance each month. However, it is unclear to what extent the attendance incentive differentials observed between export manufacturers are shaped by both employers' and workers' interests. By applying prior pay setting theory in the context of evidence of when consequential worker shortages occur due to workers' pursuit of personal or professional interests during workdays, I develop a framework that explains export manufacturers' policy decisions on the incentive level to reward workers' perfect attendance. Hypotheses are tested using data on 104 export apparel manufacturing establishments in Sri Lanka. The findings imply that attendance incentive pay setting is shaped not only by export manufacturers' strategic interest in minimizing vulnerability to worker shortages but also by their understanding of workers' willingness to forgo personal/professional interests (e.g., time-off, alternative careers/jobs) to attend on every workday.     

Labour market oligopsonistic competition: The effect of worker immobility on wages

We suggest that firms in a local labour market may be able to exploit worker mobility costs and offer immobile workers wages that are lower than their marginal product. If so, the ability of employers to exploit worker immobility in setting wages would decline in the competitiveness of the local labour market. We test this intuition using a measure of individual mobility costs and measures of local labour market competition. Our findings suggest that worker immobility causes substantial wage variation across workers in small, weakly competitive markets, and in occupations where wages are individually bargained.     

Peer pressure and social comparisons with heterogeneous ability

When workers' efforts are not contractible, we investigate whether the display of workers' efforts to coworkers influences wage and effort decisions. We find that employers mainly increase the wages offered to the more valuable workers when they are observed that increases the difference in wages in such setting. We find evidence of peer pressure and strategic complementarity in efforts. Additionally, low‐ability workers are more sensitive to peer pressure than their more productive coworkers, and these workers exert less effort with increases in the reciprocity of their coworkers. Finally, the display of workers' efforts to coworkers is detrimental to the employer's payoff but enhances efficiency.     

The commuting time paradox

We examine the conditions for the ‘commuting time paradox’ which states that the average commuting time does not vary between different periods. We develop therefore an equilibrium job search model with endogenously chosen commuting costs. Presuming wage bargaining between workers and firms, the optimally chosen maximum commuting costs jointly maximise the worker's and firm's payoffs. We demonstrate that when productivity levels increase over time, average commuting costs and average wages both increase, which affects the optimally chosen commuting time. We establish the conditions under which the paradox holds.