The effect of unemployment benefits on re-employment rates: Evidence from the Finnish unemployment insurance reform

In January 2003, the unemployment benefits in Finland were increased for workers with long employment histories. The average benefit increase was 15% for the first 150 days of the unemployment spell. At the same time severance pay system was abolished. In this paper we evaluate the effect of the change in the benefit structure on the duration of unemployment by comparing the changes in the re-employment hazard profiles among the unemployed who were affected by the reform to the changes in a comparison group whose benefit structure remained unchanged. We find that the change in the benefit structure reduced the re-employment hazards by on average 17%. The effect is largest at the beginning of the unemployment spell and disappears after the eligibility period for the increased benefits expires.     

Replacement rates and labour market behaviour

This paper studies how the replacement rate, defined as the ratio of disposable income when unemployed to expected disposable income if beginning to work, affects individuals’ transition rate from unemployment. Linked register data, representing a local Finnish labour market in 1996, are analysed with piece-wise constant exponential hazard models. Results suggest that the effect of the replacement rate and, thus, of “unemployment traps”, is fairly modest. It does not seem to change with time spent unemployed. The impact on the transition rate into employment is lower than on the transition rate out of the labour force. Unemployment insurance recipients are found to be less sensitive to changes in the replacement rate than are unemployment assistance recipients.     

Unemployment Experiences of Young Men: on the Road to Stable Employment?*

This study examines the unemployment experiences of young men in the United Kingdom over the period 1982.IV–1998.I. The empirical results show that repeated unemployment is a dominant feature of the UK labour market and that individual heterogeneity affects mainly the incidence of unemployment and only to a much lesser extent the duration of unemployment. We estimate that about 73% of the young unemployed find stable employment before the age of 35. The remaining 27%, concentrated among the lower‐skilled, keep returning into unemployment, suggesting structural employment instability. These findings imply that a labour market programme targeted at increasing the employability of the young unemployed would yield long‐term benefits by not only getting them out of unemployment but also keeping them out of unemployment.     

On-the-job search equilibrium with endogenous unemployment benefits

This paper develops an on-the-job search model with wage posting where unemployment benefits are proportional to past wages. We emphasize that this contributes to increasing the reservation wages of unemployed workers and introduces a feedback effect of the distribution of wages on the distribution of unemployment benefits. We show that the model predictions are consistent with some stylized French facts and quantify the impact of inefficient rejections of low-wage offers by the unemployed. We find that, by reducing the indexing of unemployment benefits to previous earnings and increasing lump-sum transfers, it is possible to increase both employment and welfare.     

Boon or bane? Others' unemployment,well-being and job insecurity

The social norm of unemployment suggests that aggregate unemployment reduces the well-being of the employed, but has a far smaller effect on the unemployed. We use German panel data to reproduce this standard result, but then suggest that the appropriate distinction may not be between employment and unemployment, but rather between higher and lower levels of labour-market security, at least for men. Men with good job prospects, both employed and unemployed, are strongly negatively affected by regional unemployment. However, insecure employed men and poor-prospect unemployed men are less negatively, or even positively, affected. There is however no clear relationship for women. We analyse labour-market inequality and unemployment hysteresis in the light of our results.     

Exits from unemployment: Recall or new job

This paper studies transitions out of unemployment in Spain distinguishing between recall to the same employer and reemployment in a new job. We use a large sample of newly unemployed workers obtained from Social Security records for Spain. These data contain information about each individual's employer identity before and after the unemployment spell. A discrete-time duration model with competing risks of exits serves us to investigate the factors that influence the probabilities of leaving unemployment to return to the same employer or to find a new job with a different employer. We find that taking into account the route to exit unemployment helps us to understand the influence of individual and job characteristics on the hazard rate. Moreover, the recall hazard rate exhibits no duration dependence, whereas the new-job hazard rate presents positive duration dependence.     

Does subsidised temporary employment get the unemployed back to work? Aneconometric analysis of two different schemes

Subsidised employment is an important tool of active labour market policies to improve the reemployment chances of the unemployed. Using unusually informative individual data from administrative records, we investigate the effects of two different schemes of subsidised temporary employment implemented in Switzerland: non-profit employment programmes (EP) and a subsidy for temporary jobs (TEMP) in private and public firms. Econometric matching methods show that TEMP is more successful than EP in getting the unemployed back to work. Compared to not participating in any programme, EP and TEMP are ineffective for unemployed who find jobs easily anyway or have a short unemployment spell. For potential and actual long-term unemployed, both programmes may have positive effects, but the effect of TEMP is larger.     

The Relationship between Unemployment Benefits and Re‐employment Probabilities: Evidence from Spain*

We provide the first Spanish evidence about the effects on re‐employment probabilities of variations in benefit levels and time‐to‐exhaustion. Increases in unemployment insurance (UI) benefit levels had a small disincentive effect on the re‐employment hazard on average. Around this average, there were larger disincentive effects for men with elapsed durations between 4 and 18 months, whereas for men unemployed longer than 18 months, or for men resident in the south, the effect was negligible. Re‐employment hazards increased when UI exhaustion was imminent, but the change was small. Extensions to unemployment assistance eligibility in 1989 for men aged 45+ years lowered re‐employment probabilities.     

The ‘recession-push’ hypothesis reconsidered

The relationship between unemployment and self-employment has been studied extensively. Due to its complex, multifaceted nature, various scholars have found a large array of different results, so that the exact nature of the relation is still not clear. An important element of the relation is captured by the recession-push hypothesis which states that in times of high unemployment individuals are pushed into self-employment for lack of alternative sources of income such as paid employment. We make two contributions to this literature. First, we argue that official unemployment rates may not capture the ??true?? rate of unemployment as it does not include ??hidden?? unemployed who are out of the labour force. Therefore, we propose a new method where the ??recession-push?? effect relates not only to the (official) unemployed but also to the inactive population. Second, we argue that the magnitude of the recession-push effect is non-linear in the business cycle, i.e. the effect is disproportionally stronger when economic circumstances are worse. We provide empirical support for our hypotheses by estimating an econometric model on Spanish data.     

THE THREAT EFFECT OF ACTIVE LABOR MARKET PROGRAMS: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

This paper is a systematic review of the threat effect of active labor market programs for unemployed individuals. The threat effect is the induced change in the hazard rate of leaving unemployment prior to program participation. Studies included in the review all estimated a threat effect, with the participants in all cases being unemployed individuals in receipt of benefit of some kind during their tenure of unemployment. Eight of these studies have been included in a meta-analysis: The meta-analysis, which has been carried out using a random effects model to account for heterogeneity, indicated a hazard ratio of 1.25 for the pooled estimate. We conclude that active labor market programs constitute a statistically significant threat effect, although it is modest.     

The Unintended Consequences of Italy's Labour Laws: How Extensive Labour Regulation Distorts the Italian Economy

Simple solutions to complex problems often have unintended and undesirable consequences. An example is Italy's approach to combating unemployment. Rigid laws designed to protect the employed perversely discourage businesses from hiring and people from working. They also encourage precarious temporary employment among young people, informal work, and under‐the‐table deals that compromise worker benefits. The numbers of Italy's unemployed and of those outside the workforce are much higher than official estimates suggest. Italy's employment protection legislation – arguably the most restrictive in Europe – creates that which it seeks to prevent: the insecurity of unemployment.     

The impact of territorially concentrated FDI on local labor markets: Evidence from the Czech Republic

This paper investigates the impact of a large and territorially concentrated foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow on local labor market outcomes in the Czech Republic. A conditional difference-in-differences technique is employed for an estimation of the impact and block bootstrapping is used for computing consistent standard errors. The results indicate a positive and statistically as well as economically significant effect of a large investment project on the local unemployment outflow rate, which is driven mainly by increases in the aggregate unemployment exit hazard rates for unemployment durations smaller than nine months. Subsequent to the investment, the unemployment rate decreased by 1.7 percentage points and the employment rate increased by 3.7 percentage points in the host district. However, the impact on long-term unemployed was negligible as the exit hazard rates for durations longer than nine months remain unchanged. Moreover, a simple cost–benefit analysis suggests that investment incentives paid from a state budget would pay off only in a horizon of twelve years.     

On the extent of re-entitlement effects in unemployment compensation

We analyze the implications of two-tier unemployment compensation systems with non-automatic eligibility in an equilibrium matching model with Nash bargaining. As eligibility for UI does not automatically follow from employment, the two types of unemployed workers have different threat points, which delivers equilibrium wage dispersion. The parameters of the model are estimated for France, and the model is also calibrated for Denmark and the U.S. Re-entitlement effects are shown to be sizeable for all three countries. For France, re-entitlement effects lower by 15% the rise in the wage and by 25% the rise in unemployment following a 10% increase in the benefit level. Finally, we show that in all three countries the optimal compensation system is characterized by time-decreasing unemployment benefits and non-automatic eligibility for UI, with higher levels of both UI and UA benefits, a smaller decrease in benefits over time, and a longer employment duration required for UI eligibility than in the current system.     

HOW EFFECTIVE ARE UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT SANCTIONS? LOOKING BEYOND UNEMPLOYMENT EXIT

This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of the effects of benefit sanctions on post‐unemployment outcomes such as post‐unemployment employment stability and earnings. We use rich register data which allow us to distinguish between a warning that a benefit reduction may take place in the near future and the actual withdrawal of unemployment benefits. Adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity, we find that warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post‐unemployment earnings. Actual benefit reductions lower the quality of post‐unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well as in terms of earnings. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How does the benefit effect vary as unemployment spells lengthen?

This paper investigates how the effect of income while unemployed on the probability of an individual leaving unemployment varies with the length of time that the individual has been unemployed. We examine this question in the context of a variety of alternative econometric models. We extend the Proportional Hazards model with unrestricted baseline hazard to one in which there are unrestricted effects of a subset of the explanatory variables and also consider models that can be estimated as series of binary response models. The proportional hazard restrictions are rejected for the sample of British unemployed men analysed and in the binary sequence framework Logit and Probit models based on symmetric distributions dominate (in likelihood terms) the Extreme Value form model implied by extension of the Proportional Hazards formulation. Logit models with a flexible form for the duration dependence which also incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in a flexible way are estimated. The results for all formulations indicate a rapidly declining effect of unemployment income as a spell lengthens, with no significant effect for the long-term unemployed. The preferred specifications which allow for omitted heterogeneity indicate no significant effect after about 5 months, and this result is robust to the inclusion or exclusion of previous labour-market experience variables and to the choice of mixing distribution.     

Decomposing the Ins and Outs of Cyclical Unemployment

This paper analyses the contribution of the composition of the pool of employed and unemployed individuals to labour market dynamics in different phases of the business cycle. Using individual‐level data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), we decompose differences in employment status transition rates between upswings and downturns into explained and unexplained parts. We find that the duration of unemployment contributes to explaining unemployment outflows to employment and observe that its initially positive contribution turns negative in deep recessions. Composition effects play an important role for unemployment outflows to non‐participation but dampen the cyclicality of unemployment inflows from employment.     

Sign reversal in LIVE treatment effect estimates: The effect of vocational training on unemployment duration

We use administrative records in Israel to identify the treatment effect of vocational training for the unemployed on the duration of unemployment. We randomize training using data on the availability of courses in and around the time of becoming unemployed. This assumes that the timing of entry into unemployment is random, and course availability around the time of entry is independent of current labor market conditions. According to naïve estimators, which ignore self-selectivity, training reduces unemployment durations. The same applies to linear (IV) estimators, which control for self-selectivity. However, the opposite is found when non-linear IV estimators are used, i.e. training prolongs unemployment durations. Sign reversal depends on how the first stage is specified. A non-nested test indicates that the nonlinear estimate of the treatment effect is preferable to its linear counterpart, in which case training prolongs unemployment spells.     

Business start-ups by the unemployed — an econometric analysis based on firm data

Active labour market policies to promote firm foundation from unemployment were improved considerably in Germany in August 1994, a fact which led to a sharp increase in the number of start-ups by the unemployed. The study compares firm survival and employment growth of start-ups by unemployed and others, based on firm data from 15 regions in East and West Germany. Self-selection effects are taken into account by using simultaneous models of start-up promotion and firm development. While firm survival is negatively affected by foundation from unemployment in East Germany (−6%), an influence on employment growth is not evident.     

Turning Unemployment into Self‐Employment: Effectiveness of Two Start‐Up Programmes*

Turning unemployment into self‐employment has become a major focus of German active labour market policy (ALMP) in recent years. If effective, this would not only reduce Germany's persistently high unemployment rate, but also increase its notoriously low self‐employment rate. Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of such programmes is scarce. We evaluate the effectiveness of two start‐up programmes for the unemployed, where we include the probability of being employed, the probability of being unemployed and personal income as outcome variables. Our results show that at the end of the observation period, both programmes are effective. The considerable positive effects present a stark contrast to findings from evaluations of other German ALMP programmes in recent years. Hence, ALMP programmes aimed at moving the unemployed into self‐employment may prove to be among the most effective, both in Germany and elsewhere.     

The measurement of unemployment when unemployment is high

Are jobless persons who want work but are not actively searching, unemployed or out of the labour force? Previous research on this issue has focused on North America and used as the test whether the probability of transition to employment is similar for searching and non-searching jobless persons. This paper develops three new tests as to whether those not searching but wanting work are distinct from the searching unemployed. It asks: are non-searching persons richer, happier, and do they have a lesser impact on local wages, than the searchers? These tests are implemented using data from South Africa, a country in which unemployment is very high and where the treatment of non-searchers really matters for the understanding of poverty and labour market issues. The results favour the ‘discouraged worker’ view of the non-searching unemployed and the use of the broad, inclusive, measure of unemployment.