The Henry George Theorem in a second-best world

The Henry George Theorem (HGT) states that, in first-best economies, the fiscal surplus of a city government that finances the Pigouvian subsidies for agglomeration externalities and the costs of local public goods by a 100% tax on land is zero at optimal city sizes. We extend the HGT to distorted economies where product differentiation and increasing returns are the sources of agglomeration economies and city governments levy property taxes. Without relying on specific functional forms, we derive a second-best HGT that relates the fiscal surplus to the excess burden expressed as an extended Harberger formula.     

Causes of inefficiency in Japanese railways: Application of DEA for managers and policymakers

Although railway services have been suffering financially due to modal shifts and aging populations, they have been, and will continue to be, an essential component of nations' basic social infrastructures. Since railway firms generate positive externalities, and are required to operate in pre-determined licensed areas, governmental intervention/support may, in some cases, be justified. Indeed, many types of subsidies are created and offered for railway operations in Japan; while some are meant to cover large investments, others are used as compensation for regional disparities. However, thus far, no attempt has been made to analyze the reasons for the underperformance of Japanese railway services. In other words, it is unclear whether this underperformance can be attributed to exogenous and uncontrollable causes, or endogenous phenomena and, hence, capable of being handled by managers. The optimal degree of intervention is thus not sufficiently known. In the current paper, we propose a method based on data envelopment analysis (DEA) to analyze the causes of inefficiency in Japanese railway operations, and, further, to calculate optimal subsidy levels. The latter are designed to compensate for railways' lack of complete discretion in changing location of their operations and/or increasing/decreasing these operations since they are a regulated service. Our proposed method was applied to 53 Japanese railway operators. In so doing, we identified several key characteristics related to their inefficiencies, and developed optimal subsidies designed to improve performance.     

Government Subsidies

This paper addresses the problems of defining and measuring government subsidies, examines why and how government subsidies are used as a fiscal policy tool, discusses their general economic effects in terms of real welfare costs and distributional implications, appraises international empirical evidence on government subsidies, and offers options for their reform. Recent international trends in government subsidy expenditure are analyzed for the 16‐year period from 1975 to 1990, using general government subsidy data for 60 countries from the United Nations' System of National Accounts (SNA). The paper reviews major policy options for subsidy reform, focusing on ways to improve the cost‐effectiveness of subsidy programs.     

Sharing diseconomy: impact of the subsidy war of ride-sharing companies on urban congestion

ABSTRACT

As a typical example of the sharing economy, ride-sharing, in theory, can improve market efficiency and enhance the welfare of consumers and service suppliers. However, negative externalities resulted from ride-sharing, such as quasi-public goods, are often overlooked. In this paper, we used AutoNavi’s big data to measure traffic congestion in cities, and built DID, PSM-DID and DDD models to analyse the impact of the subsidy war among ride-sharing companies on the traffic congestion in Shanghai. The subsidy war led to an increase in the congestion index of Shanghai by 0.068–0.077, which was equivalent to an increase in transit time by 3.51%–5.53%. Excessive subsidies offered by ride-sharing companies to vie for market share will eventually distort the market. As a result, increased social costs will ultimately harm the well-being of the entire society, leading to diseconomy.     

DESIGNING ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT IN A DECENTRALIZED FISCAL SYSTEM

Abstract When external effects are important, markets will be inefficient, and economists have considered several broad classes of economic instruments to correct these inefficiencies. However, the standard economic analysis has tended to take the region, and the government, as a given; that is, this work has neglected important distinctions and interactions between the geographic scope of different pollutants, the enforcement authority of various levels of government, and the fiscal responsibilities of the various levels of government. It typically ignores the possibility that the externality may be created and addressed by local governments, and it does not consider the implications of decentralization for the design of economic instruments targeted at environmental problems. This paper examines the implications of decentralization for the design of corrective policies; that is, how does one design economic instruments in a decentralized fiscal system in which externalities exist at the local level and in which subnational governments have the power to provide local public services and to choose tax instruments that can both finance these expenditures and correct the market failures of externalities?     

Are China's subsidies for electric vehicles effective?

China has implemented high subsidy schemes to promote the adoption of electric vehicles. This study constructs an industrial organization model to theoretically analyze and numerically simulate the subsidy efficacy of battery electric vehicles in China. We find that subsidies for battery manufacturers and those for electric vehicle manufacturers are equivalent. Fixed subsidies are better for social welfare maximization than linear subsidies are. Simulation based on Chinese empirical data shows that China's subsidies for electric vehicles are effective but not optimal. It could be a better option overall to enable the vertical integration of the supply chain.     

城市生活垃圾资源化政府最优补贴博弈分析

城市生活垃圾资源化能够带来巨大的经济效益、环境效益与社会效益,是贯彻国家绿色发展理念的必经之路。城市生活垃圾资源化体系的持续发展需要政府补贴作为保障,减少资源化产品与同类非资源化产品的价格差异,弥补相关企业投入产出不匹配的矛盾。本文基于社会福利最大化理论,将政府补贴作为决策变量,构建各利益主体之间的价格博弈模型,确定政府最优补贴额度和其他主体的最优决策,并根据结论提出相关建议。研究表明:要实现整体效益最大化,政府需要在不同环节采取不同的补贴方式与补贴额度。     

The dynamic effects of an earnings subsidy for long-term welfare recipients: Evidence from the self sufficiency project applicant experiment

In the Self Sufficiency Project Applicant Experiment, new welfare entrants were informed that if they remained on public assistance for a year they would become eligible to receive a generous earnings subsidy offer. Those who satisfied the waiting period, and then left welfare and began working full time within the following year, were entitled to receive payments for up to 36 months whenever they were off welfare and working full time. A simple optimizing model suggests that the program rules created an unusual sequence of incentives: (1) to prolong the initial spell on welfare for at least 12 months to become eligible for the subsidy offer; (2) to lock in subsidy entitlement by finding full time work and leaving welfare in the 12–24 month period after initial entry; and (3) to choose work over welfare during the three years that subsidies were available. Consistent with these implications, comparisons between the experimental treatment group and a randomly assigned control group show that the program increased welfare participation in the first year after initial entry and lowered it over the following 5 years. We develop an econometric model of welfare participation and program eligibility status that allows us to separately identify the behavioral effects associated with the program rules. We find important responses to all three incentives, and that the program impact persisted after subsidy payments ended, although the effect decayed over time.     

The market price of Low-Income Housing Tax Credits

The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program awards a subsidy to private developers who construct and operate housing units with income-targeted rent controls for at least 15 years. The program allocated $6.6 billion to developers in 2006, and over 1.6 million units have been subsidized under the program since its inception in 1987. A historical literature suggests place-based housing subsidies, such as the LIHTC program, will be more expensive in providing the same level of housing support to the poor than tenant-based strategies (i.e., housing vouchers). This paper uses an administrative data series of LIHTC subsidized properties in California to show the program encourages developers to construct housing units that are an estimated 20% more expensive per square foot than average industry estimates. It is additionally shown that due to liquidity constraints faced by LIHTC primary developers in how the subsidy is allocated, virtually all developers sell the tax credits at a substantial discount below their statutory value immediately after construction. This price is estimated to be $0.73 per $1 of tax credit, or $1.8 billion annually, as compared to alternatively allocating a lump sum grant to developers.     

基于社会、经济可持续发展的城镇廉租住房租金定价及补贴模型研究——以广州市为例

利用可持续发展理论,从社会、经济可持续发展视角对廉租住房租金与补贴方案的制定进行理论分析。从廉租户的房租负担能力、政府财政负担能力、建造运营成本、区域因素与个别因素等方面分析影响廉租住房租金和补贴的因素。结合广州现行的廉租住房租金政策,逐步建立符合可持续、可负担原则和具备动态调整性的廉租住房实物配租租金定价模型与货币配租补贴模型,并利用案例对其检验,最后得出结论。     

环境的外在性和保护策略

一个简单的环境污染模型发展后,环境污染具有外部性,在这个内生增长模型中,考虑了通过税收提供的资本来保护环境的两条途径。在政府不参与环境控制时,经济增长率最高,但污染也最严重,社会福利要比政府采取补贴情形时底。当环境外部性较少时,环境保护采取政府补贴社会福利要比完全由政府控制时的福利要大,而当外部性较大时,则环境保护应当采取完全由政府控制为妙。     

Deposit insurance subsidies,moral hazard,and bank regulation

The model developed in the paper separates deposit insurance subsidies into two components: a premium-linked subsidy which arises from an ex-ante mispricing of the deposit insurance premium, and an asset-linked subsidy which arises from a lack of ex-post monitoring of the bank's actions. The identification of these two subsidies provides important insight into the relation between deposit-insurance subsidies and bank risk. The asset-linked subsidy is higher for banks of average risk and lower for very-high and very-low risk banks. The premiumlinked subsidy behaves differently under risk-adjusted and fixed-rate premiums. The model also indicates that the implementation of a riskadjusted insurance-rate schedule alone would not be sufficient to eliminate the bank's excessive risk-taking behavior. Thus, some combination of risk-sensitive deposit-insurance pricing and regulatory control is necessary to reduce the moral hazard problem.     

Do employment subsidies work? Evidence from regionally targeted subsidies in Turkey

This paper studies the effects on registered employment and number of registered establishments of two employment subsidy schemes in Turkey. We implement a difference-in-differences methodology to construct appropriate counterfactuals for the covered provinces. Our findings suggest that both subsidy programs did lead to significant net increases in registered jobs in eligible provinces (5%–13% for the first program and 11%–15% for the second). However, the cost of the actual job creation was high because of substantial deadweight losses, particularly for the first program (47% and 78%). Because of better design features, the second subsidy program had lower, though still significant, deadweight losses (27%–46%). Although constrained by data availability, the evidence suggests that the dominant effect of subsidies was to increase social security registration of firms and workers rather than boosting total employment and economic activity. This supports the theory that in countries with weak enforcement institutions, high labor taxes on low-wage workers may lead to substantial incentives for firms and workers to operate informally.     

建筑垃圾再生利用的有效途径探析

随着我国城市化进程的不断推进,城市中的建筑垃圾的产生的排放日益增加,据有关部门估算,建筑施工、装修、拆迁等产生的建筑垃圾每年都有数亿吨,其浪费之大,危害之险,已经到了不容忽视的关键时期。因此,如何探索出一条建筑垃圾再生利用的有效途径,将建筑垃圾变废为宝,实现经济、社会和环境可持续发展就成了我们必须解决的问题。     

政府补助与公司投资行为——基于中国上市公司的数据

基于公司投资视角,以2007—2012年我国资本市场上A股上市公司为样本,研究政府补助对公司投资行为的影响,结果显示：政府补助越多,公司投资支出水平越高;政府补助对非国有公司的投资激励作用比国有公司更有效;公司产权性质差异会影响政府补助的投资激励效应;市场化程度越低、经济增长越缓慢的地区,政府补助对公司投资支出的影响越敏感;上市公司的非效率投资问题比较突出,政府补助加剧了上市公司的过度投资行为。因此,政府应根据微观企业主体的差异性来制定和实施相应的补助政策,以实现预期效果。     

THE SIZE OF HOUSING SUBSIDIES IN CHINA*

Inexhaustible, strong demand for housing, which is generated from the current low rents and the work-unit-distribution housing system, has caused permanent housing shortages in China's urban sector. It is also one of the main sources of China's cost-push inflation. The transition from public to private saving, which is included in current housing reform, is the only way to solve the housing problems facing the country. Calculation of the size of housing subsidies is the very foundation of any housing reform program. Based on my estimates, the annual housing subsidy per woker expanded 8.6 limes during the period from 1978 to 1988, increasing at an anual rate of 24.1%. Total housing subsidies expanded 12.4 times, rising at an annual rate of 28.6%. Relative to GNP, the housing subsidies grew from 1.3% to 4.2% during the period. The rapid expansion of housing subsidies has several significant policy implications for China's economy. These include the need for reappraising real worker income identifying the enlarged portion of revenue in kind, and recalculating housing consumption.     

论“合同制,以增产定补贴”的良种推广应用新模式

本文分析了良种推广应用补贴的意义,以及目前"以面积定补贴"的弊端,提出了"走合同制,以增产定补贴"的良种推广应用补贴新模式,论述了改模式能更大程度的激发良种推广应用补贴对粮食生产的作用,并且制定了补贴的原则。     

Does public transit reduce car travel externalities? Quasi-natural experiments' evidence from transit strikes

One of the unanswered questions in the field of urban economics is to which extent subsidies to public transit are justified. We examine one of the main benefits of public transit, a reduction in car congestion externalities, the so-called congestion relief benefit, using quasi-natural experimental data on citywide public transit strikes for Rotterdam, a city with mild congestion levels. On weekdays, a strike induces travel times to increase only marginally on the highway ring road (0.017 min/km) but substantially on inner city roads (0.224 min/km). During rush hour, the strike effect is much more pronounced. The congestion relief benefit of public transit is substantial, equivalent to about 80% of the public transit subsidy. We demonstrate that during weekends, travel time does not change noticeably due to strikes. Furthermore, we show that public transit strikes induce similar increases in number of cyclists as number of car travelers suggesting that bicycling-promoting policies to reduce car congestion externalities might be attractive in combination with first-best congestion pricing.     

GRANT EQUIVALENT EXPENDITURE ON INDUSTRIAL SUBSIDIES IN THE POST-WAR UNITED KINGDOM

ABSTRACT The paper constructs a consistent series for UK central government expenditure on industrial subsidies over the post-war period, valuing incentives in grant equivalent terms from the position of a firm undertaking investment appraisal. The analysis includes direct subsidy payments, as well as tax allowances, and provides a disaggregation between those subsidies available on a national, regional and sectoral or firm specific basis. A time-series analysis of the assembled data shows important differences between these components, with regional assistance performing a long-run distributive role, while other elements perform a stabilisation function. The short-run patterns are broadly constant across governments, but the long-run relationships exhibit structural breaks related to both political and economic events.     

政府补贴促进制造业企业研发投入了吗?——基于资本结构的门槛效应研究

本文以2016~2018年沪深股市的制造业上市公司为研究样本,通过建立门槛效应模型,验证了政府补贴与企业研发投入的作用关系会随着资本结构的变化而变化。研究发现,政府补贴能够促进企业研发投入,并且在资本结构的调节作用下呈现三重门槛效应。进一步研究还发现,政府补贴对非国有企业研发投入的影响系数更高。因此,政府研发补贴政策需要综合考虑企业资金状况、企业性质,建立有效甄别机制,实施差异化补贴策略,加大对非国企补贴力度,拓宽中小企业融资渠道。