Optimal unemployment insurance design: Time limits, monitoring, or workfare?

This paper analyses crucial design features of unemployment insurance (UI) policies. We examine three different means of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity in preferences for leisure. The analysis suggests that a system with monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so as to avoid the sanction. Therefore, the UI provider can offer a more generous UI replacement rate in a system with monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems. JEL Code J64 · J65 · J68     

Unemployment insurance: Risk sharing versus efficiency

Two models of spot labor markets are presented in which labor suppliers have heterogeneous attitudes towards effort and in which uncertainty prevails on labor productivity and growth. The problem of selecting efficient rules to manage unemployment insurance (UI) systems is considered. We show that there does not exist any system which combines an efficient allocation of labor with an efficient allocation of risks among employees, unemployed workers and capital-owners. Pareto-efficient policy rules are a best compromise between these two conflicting objectives. It implies that productive efficiency could be improved in periods of mass unemployment by reducing UI benefits. That would be at the expense of more inefficiencies in the sharing of macroeconomic risks. At the optimum, the UI benefit is positively correlated to growth and it is negatively correlated to labor productivity.     

The effect of retaliation costs on employee whistleblowing

We use large increases in unemployment insurance (UI) benefits to study the effects of expected retaliation costs on employee whistleblowing. Increases in UI benefits reduce the costs that arise from a job loss, one of the costliest forms of retaliation. We find that increases in UI benefits increase the number of facility-level employee workplace safety complaints filed with the regulator. Furthermore, UI benefit increases also result in more violations and more penalties. The effects are concentrated in firms where retaliation is more likely as measured by weaker employee relations, internal controls, and monitoring. Our findings show the importance of reducing retaliation costs to tap into employees’ knowledge of misconduct.     

Unemployment insurance with a hidden labor market

We consider the problem of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) in a repeated moral hazard framework. Unlike existing literature, unemployed individuals can secretly participate in a hidden labor market. This extension modifies the standard problem in three dimensions. First, it imposes an endogenous lower bound for the lifetime utility that a contract can deliver. Second, it breaks the identity between unemployment payments and consumption. And third, it hardens the encouragement of search effort. The optimal unemployment insurance system in an economy with a hidden labor market is simple, with an initial phase in which payments are relatively flat during unemployment and with no payments for long-term unemployed individuals. This scheme differs substantially from the one prescribed without a hidden labor market and resembles unemployment protection programs in many countries.     

Understanding European unemployment with matching and search-island models

To understand European and American unemployment during the last 60 years, we use a search-island model and four matching models with workers who have heterogeneous skills and entitlements to government benefits. When there is higher turbulence, in the sense of worse skill transition probabilities for workers who suffer involuntary layoffs, high government mandated unemployment insurance (UI) and employment protection (EP) in Europe increase unemployment rates and durations. But when there is lower turbulence, high European EP suppresses unemployment rates despite high European UI. Four matching models differ in how they assign unemployed workers to matching functions. That affects how strongly unemployment responds to increases in turbulence. Heterogeneity among unemployed workers highlights the central role of adverse labor market externalities in matching models and reveals that the cost of posting vacancies is the lynchpin of a matching model.     

Unemployment insurance in a three-state model of the labor market

The paper extends the model of Krusell et al. (2010) to study the welfare effects of unemployment insurance. The model unemployment insurance program includes four realistic features: 1) a 50% replacement rate up to a benefit cap; 2) finite duration of eligibility during a jobless spell; 3) limited eligibility; and 4) and an imperfectly monitored job search requirement. The model is parameterized to fit the size of scope of unemployment insurance in the United States. Removing unemployment insurance from the model leads to only a 0.1% consumption equivalent increase in average welfare. Simplifying assumptions about the structure of unemployment insurance, such as allowing all job losers to receive benefits, lead to much larger welfare effects similar to the effects found in the past literature. Understanding the welfare effects of unemployment insurance requires careful modeling of the structure of the program.     

Understanding European unemployment with a representative family model

A representative family model with indivisible labor and employment lotteries has no labor market frictions and complete markets. Nevertheless, its aggregate responses to an increase in government supplied unemployment insurance (UI) and to an increase in microeconomic turbulence are qualitatively similar to those in two macromodels with labor market frictions and incomplete markets, namely, the matching and search-island models in Ljungqvist and Sargent [2007a. Understanding European unemployment with matching and search-island models. Journal of Monetary Economics, this issue]. Because there is no frictional unemployment in the representative family model, an increase in employment protection (EP) decreases aggregate work because the representative family substitutes leisure for work, an effect opposite to what occurs in matching and search-island models. Heterogeneity among workers highlights the economy-wide coordination in labor supply and consumption sharing that employment lotteries and complete markets achieve in the representative family model. A high disutility of labor makes generous UI cause very low employment levels.     

Unemployment and workers' compensation programmes: rationale,design, labour supply and income support

I examine the unemployment insurance (UI) and workers' compensation (WC) insurance programmes, concentrating on labour supply, insurance and income redistribution. UI and WC increase the time employees spend out of work. Elasticities of lost work time that incorporate both the incidence and duration of claims are centred at 1.0 for UI and between 0.5 and 1.0 for WC. These elasticities are larger than elasticities typically found in studies of wage effects on hours worked by men, probably because UI and WC lead to short‐run variation in wages with mostly a substitution effect and the programmes alter the participation margin. Some good evidence suggests that UI smooths the consumption of the unemployed and more clearly indicates that UI progressively redistributes resources. There is substantial evidence that injured workers suffer material hardships even with WC programmes, but research has not provided an overall picture of the insurance and redistributive aspects of WC.     

Borrowing constraints,the cost of precautionary saving and unemployment insurance

When it is costly for individuals to save or to borrow, unemployment insurance (UI) provides an alternative source of liquidity that smooths consumption over time and leads individuals to spend longer unemployed searching for a suitable job. We show in a tractable life-cycle model how the optimal unemployment replacement ratio and the fall in consumption on job loss depend on the cost of self-insurance and the cost of borrowing. This implies that the value of UI depends on age at job loss, consumption needs (such as the presence of children), discount rates, the return on saving, access to credit and the presence of other social insurance programmes. Optimal replacement rates vary substantially with plausible variation in these factors (from less than 20 percent to almost 60 percent).     

Buffer stock saving in retirement accounts

We use a dynamic programming model to explore the possibility and extent of precautionary saving in tax-sheltered accounts such as the 401(k). The main policy experiment examines the behavior of saving for different levels of unemployment insurance (UI), which is a perfect substitute for precautionary saving against job loss. Our results indicate that increasing the generosity of UI crowds out 401(k) contributions made by younger workers, who save primarily for precautionary reasons. At the aggregate level, we find that 401(k)s increase national saving and that the magnitude of the effect depends on the generosity of UI.     

Unemployment,Government Spending and the Laffer Effect*

The paper studies the effects of income tax rate changes in a general equilibrium model with frictional unemployment. Laffer curve effects, by which a tax rate reduction may increase the level of government spending or its share in output, are shown to be possible under certain conditions. These are the presence of unemployment benefit payments, government budget balance through fiscal spending adjustment and limited quantitative importance of labour reallocation costs. Endogenous government spending acts as a fiscal accelerator if the fiscal burden of unemployment benefit payments is large, but reduces the employment effects of tax rate cuts if it is low.     

中国失业保险的稳定就业促进就业政策——从临时措施到长效机制的思考

中国的失业保险制度近3年来在发挥稳定就业促进就业作用上,有很大的突破和进展。在2008年的汶川大地震、2009年的国际金融危机面前,中国创造性地实施了一系列稳定就业和促进就业的临时措施并取得很好的效果。汶川地震后在针对个人、针对灾区企业、对对口地区就业服务和对异地就业人员等4个方面实施了就业援助新政策,社会保险制度在缓缴社会保险费以及失业保险制度方面有所创新。在应对金融危机的过程中失业保险制度与促进就业政策均有新的发展。面对中国长期的就业压力,急需将这些行之有效的稳定就业促进就业的应急措施,形成制度化的长效机制。当前中国失业保险制度应从保障基本生活功能、促进就业功能和稳定就业预防失业功能等3个方面进行改革与优化。     

Real exchange rate, productivity and labor market frictions

We extend the classic Balassa-Samuelson model to an environment with search unemployment. We show that the classic Balassa-Samuelson model with the assumption of full employment emerges as a special case of our more generalized model. In our generalized model, the degree of labor market matching efficiency affects the strength of the structural relationship between the real exchange rate and sectoral productivity through influencing labor’s choice between employment and unemployment as well as movement across sectors. When the relative labor market matching friction is high, search unemployment is high and the standard Balassa-Samuelson effect may not hold. Empirical evidence supports our theory: controlling for differences in labor market frictions across countries provides a better fit in estimating the Balassa-Samuelson effect.     

Risk aversion and inequity aversion in demand for unemployment benefits

This paper is an empirical study of what motivates net contributors to support redistributive policies. While studies in the area have tended to consider broad measures of inequality and support for redistribution in general, we focus on a single, salient relationship between local unemployment rates and demand for spending on unemployment benefits. Using a particularity of the Spanish labour market, we estimate how workers’ stated preferences for unemployment benefits spending respond to changes in the local unemployment rate. We then decompose this response into the part explained by risk aversion, and thus demand for insurance, and the part explained by inequity aversion. Our results suggest that increases in local unemployment rates lead to increased demand by workers for unemployment benefits spending. Moreover, our results are consistent with an insurance motive driving this relationship but provide little support for inequity aversion. Our results suggest that studies of the relationship between inequality and demand for redistribution might benefit from considering both the source and measure of the inequality and the instrument of redistribution.     

In search of the natural rate of unemployment

The natural rate of unemployment can be measured as the time-varying steady state of a structural vector autoregression. For post-War US data, the natural rate implied by this approach is more volatile than most previous estimates, with its movements accounting for the bulk of the variation in the unemployment rate, as well as substantial portions of the variation in aggregate output and inflation. These movements, in turn, can be related to variables associated with labor-market search theory, including unemployment benefits, labor productivity, real wages, and sectoral shifts in the labor market. There is also a strong negative relationship between inflation and the corresponding measure of cyclical unemployment, supporting the existence of a short-run Phillips curve.     

Search Frictions,Labor Supply,and the Asymmetric Business Cycle

We develop a business cycle model that generates asymmetry between peaks and troughs of the unemployment rate and symmetric fluctuations of the participation rate as in the U.S. data. We calibrate the model and find that search frictions are solely responsible for the peak–trough asymmetry. Participation decisions do not generate asymmetry but contribute to the fluctuations in search frictions by changing the size and composition of the pool of job seekers, which in turn affects the tightness ratio and thereby slack in the labor market. The participation rate would be counterfactually asymmetric absent labor supply responses to shocks.     

Transitions in the German labor market: Structure and crisis

Since the so-called Hartz IV reforms around 2005 and during the global crisis of 2008/2009, the German labor market featured mainly declining unemployment rates. We develop a search and matching model with heterogeneous skills to explore the role of structural and cyclical policies for this performance. Calibrating unemployment benefits to approximate legislation before and after the reforms, we find a large reduction in unemployment and its duration, with the transition concluding after about three years. During the crisis, the extended use of short-time labor subsidies that prevent jobs from being destroyed is likely to have prevented strong increases in unemployment.     

Unemployment and debt dynamics in a highly indebted small open economy

The paper analyzes the dynamic effects of a total factor productivity shock and an interest rate risk premium shock in a highly indebted open economy. In contrast to the standard open economy framework, search unemployment and wage bargaining are introduced. We find that a negative total factor productivity shock primarily has effects on the economy's production side and on welfare, but not on its stock of foreign debt and the country specific risk premium, and large part of the adjustment happens in the short-run. In contrast, a pure increase in the country specific risk premium causes substantial dynamics and a considerable reduction in foreign debt, allowing higher consumption in the long run and creating an intertemporal welfare gain, even though unemployment increases strongly in the short-run. A 50% haircut of foreign debt significantly reduces the initial response of the unemployment rate. In case of a temporary productivity shock, sticky wages imply smaller employment, but generate higher welfare than flexible wages.     

A theory of the natural unemployment rate and the duration of employment

In this paper, a theory of the natural or equilibrium rate of unemployment is built around a theory of the duration of employment. Evidence is presented that most unemployed workers became unemployed because their previous jobs came to an end; only a minority are on temporary layoff or have just entered the labor force. Thus, high-unemployment labor markets are generally ones where jobs are brief and there is a large flow of newly jobless workers. The model of the duration of employment posits that employment arrangements are the efficient outcome of the balancing of workers' and employers' interests about the length of jobs. Full equilibrium in the labor market also requires that the rate at which unemployed workers find new jobs be efficient. The factors influencing the resulting natural unemployment rate are discussed. Under plausible assumptions, the natural rate is independent of the supply or demand for labor. Only the costs of recruiting, the costs of turnover to employers, the efficiency of matching jobs and workers, and the cost of unemployment to workers are likely to influence the natural rate of unemployment strongly. Since these are probably stable over time, the paper concludes that fluctuations in the natural unemployment rate are unlikely to contribute much to fluctuations in the observed unemployment rate.