Host country's strategic policies and multinational firm's choice of entry mode

This paper examines the effects of contract enforceability and market structure on a firm's choice between licensing and foreign direct investment. Clearly, the firm's choice impacts upon social welfare in the host country. Therefore, the government of the host country is likely to set contract enforceability for inducing the multinational firm (MNF) to choose a desirable mode of entry. The paper takes into account two different cases. In the first case, the host country does not have an incumbent that can compete with the MNF, and in the second case, it has one incumbent that can compete. The paper shows that the government's choice of contract enforceability is crucially dependent upon the domestic market structure and the domestic capacity to absorb the advanced technology of the MNF.     

中国地区经济增长的趋同与差异——对西部开发战略的启示

西部开发战略要想取得成效 ,需要选择恰当的投资领域 ,使得西部地区获得经济增长速度趋同的机会。本文从经验上考察中国地区经济增长中存在着俱乐部趋同以及条件趋同的现象 ,意味着在中西部地区存在着一系列不利于向东部发达地区趋同的因素 ,如人力资本禀赋稀缺、市场扭曲和开放程度不足。实施西部开发战略的含义在于创造条件使地区经济增长形成趋同的趋势 ,而投资的重点应该选择那些能够改进西部地区增长条件的领域。     

人口年龄结构、养老保险制度与最优储蓄率

近年来 ,中国城镇居民的消费倾向出现了大幅度的下降。为了解释这个令人困惑的现象 ,我们首先构建了一个可以把握中国养老保险制度之基本特征的叠代模型。我们进而发现 ,人口老龄化一般说来会激励居民增加储蓄。由于人口老龄化是计划生育政策的自然结果 ,它很可能是造成中国城镇居民储蓄倾向上升的一个重要因素 ,本文中的数值模拟结果为上述判断提供了一些依据。最后 ,我们对中国的黄金律问题进行了讨论。基于多种原因 ,我们认为中国目前的储蓄率并不是社会最优储蓄率的体现 ,降低储蓄率很可能成为一个帕累托改进。     

对中国经济增长统计数据可信度的估计

中国经济增长速度统计数据的可信度问题 ,一直受到国内外各方面的注意。这项统计数据是否准确可靠 ,不但会影响经济预测与分析的准确性 ,也会直接影响宏观经济政策的合理性和准确性 ,进而可能对经济运行本身产生积极或消极影响。当研究中国经济增长状况和未来前景时 ,有必要对过去相当长时期统计数据的可信度作出独立分析和判断。本文对不同时期经济增长率的可信度进行了初步的估计。     

Public pricing of final and intermediate goods in the presence of externalities

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of externalities on pricing decisions by a public or a private regulated firm selling both final and intermediate goods. The externalities generate feedbacks in demand that affect both consumers and producers. The model is very general in that it does not impose constant returns to scale on private production, allows for distributional effects of both the publicly determined prices and private sector profits, and captures the general equilibrium effects of public pricing. Socially optimal pricing rules are derived, and the relation of the results with previous models of pricing in the presence of externalities is investigated.     

Optimal advertising of auctions

We study a symmetric independent private values auction model where the revenue-maximizing seller faces a cost cn of attracting n bidders to the auction. If the distribution of valuations possesses an increasing failure rate (IFR), the seller overinvests in attracting bidders compared to the social optimum. Conversely, if the distribution is DFR, the seller underinvests compared to the social optimum. If the distribution of valuations becomes more dispersed, both, a revenue- and a welfare-maximizing seller, attract more bidders.     

The empirical validity of the New Keynesian Phillips curve using survey forecasts of inflation

This paper investigates the performance of the New Keynesian Phillips curve when survey forecasts of inflation are used to proxy for inflation expectations. Previous authors such as Brissimis and Magginas (2008) have applied survey measures of inflation expectations to the NKPC, and have concluded that these estimates are superior to those estimated using actual data on future inflation. However this approach employs the use of the labor income share as the proxy for real marginal cost, something which is highly problematic once we consider the countercyclicality of this variable. This paper develops and tests a procyclical marginal cost variable alongside various survey measures of inflation forecasts in the NKPC, while recognizing the problem of weak instruments that occurs when estimating the model using conventional GMM. We find that the NKPC produces a counter-intuitive negative and significant coefficient on procyclical marginal cost when surveys of inflation forecasts are used, which casts serious doubt on the empirical viability of the NKPC model, even when estimated with survey inflation forecasts.     

The robustness of robust implementation

We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement ε-optimal outcomes in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of ε-optimal outcomes is thus robust to small perturbations of the environment. This is in contrast to ex-post implementation which is not robust in this sense as only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable in generic environments.     

Optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing of an investment

Corporate investment is an important determinant of economic well-being. The existing literature identifies optimal investment size and timing without the possibility of debt financing, as well as the effect of debt financing on investment timing without the option to choose investment size. This paper contributes to the literature by identifying the optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing for an investment when the firm controls all three decisions (as it usually does in practice). The investment size and investment trigger are generally positively related: when investment is delayed (accelerated) it is larger (smaller) in size, thus the overall effect on investment is ambiguous. However, when tax rate or bankruptcy cost is increased, the trigger rises and size falls, hence the effect on investment is unambiguously negative. The effect of debt financing on investment depends on the amount of debt used; with the optimal amount of debt, investment is delayed relative to the no-debt case, and this delay can be economically significant; however, the investment, when eventually made, will be larger in size. Overall, it is not appropriate to ignore either the firm’s ability to choose investment size or its option to use debt financing, when modeling the investment decision.     

On the credibility of harassment in the insider—outsider model

In a well-known version of the insider-outsider model, the decision by outsiders not to underbid follows from the threats made by insiders to harass new entrants, thereby raising the entrants' disutility of work. It has been argued, however, that the harassment threat is not credible, at least in the one-period case. In the current paper we explore this claim, concluding that the existence of a social convention, together with associated social pressure effects, provides a possible explanation of the credibility of the harassment threat. Moreover, we suggest that such a convention is likely to play a role even in a multi-period analysis.     

Growth, welfare and optimal trade taxes: a fallacy of composition

Optimal export taxation rules out the possibility of immiserizing growth in a two-country world. Thus, productivity increases in the exporting sector must be welfare improving. This paper shows that in a multicountry world such reasoning commits a fallacy of composition. Simultaneous growth of exporting nations can lead to welfare losses in the presence of unilaterally optimal export taxes. Also, optimal export taxes can decline in response to such growth. This result further strengthens the possibility of perverse welfare movements. Thus, standard policy recommendations of increasing productivity in the exporting sector may lead to unintended and self-defeating outcomes.     

Evolutionary selection of ‘chivalrous’ conventions in coordination games without common expectations

We study an evolutionary game-theoretic model where players have to choose within a predetermined set of mixed strategies in a coordination game. Players are of two different kinds, male and female. No common expectations assumption is made; players tend therefore to adopt the strategy that yields larger than average expected payoffs for their kind. In this framework, every stable stationary point of the population dynamics can be interpreted as the emergence of a particular convention. A classification of the possible conventions is provided; conditions for their emergence are determined.     

Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules

We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have instantaneous preferences represented by continuous, concave and single-peaked utility functions, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, and we provide its explicit characterization. The uniqueness of the equilibrium permits an analysis of the set of Pareto optimal voting rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks and uniform recognition probabilities unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule.     

The implications for an open economy of partisan political business cycles: Theory and evidence

This paper develops and tests the predictions of two open economy models in which partisan effects are present, a small-country-one-good model of exchange rate determination and a model that assumes the two countries each specialize in the production of one good. From these models, we can obtain predictions for the behaviour of the terms of trade, the current account, and real and nominal exchange rates. The predictions are tested empirically using panel data from 14 OECD countries and the results provide support for the theoretical predictions that systematic partisan effects are present in current accounts, real exchange rates, and the terms of trade.     

Tests of Financial Intermediation and Banking Reform in China

We develop tests of financial intermediation by national banking systems based on the expectation that, in commercial systems, financial intermediation should not be overly influenced by policy variables; should be greater in richer, faster growing industrial areas; and should direct funds to the best projects regardless of where deposits originate. Using Chinese provincial data from 1991 to 1997, we test whether financial reforms in the mid-1990s increased efficient intermediation by different financial institutions. We find that the importance of policy lending by state banks did not fall during the recent period and that lending by financial institutions did not respond to economic fundamentals. J. Comp. Econ., December 2001, 29(4), pp. 608–644. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109; and Department of Government, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755. © 2001 Elsevier ScienceJournal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, O16, O53, P34.     

Comment on “C.E.S. production functions in the light of the Cambridge critique”

The controversy revived in Bertram Schefold’s paper is based on three common assumptions: (1) the underlying techniques are linear (2) perfect competition obtains (3) the economy operates in a putty-putty context. The consequences of dropping these assumptions are discussed, and the relation between nonlinearity and the error due to the use of an “imprecise” production function is examined.     

Structural changes in exports of an emerging economy: Case of Turkey

This paper indicates that Turkish exports are subject to structural changes as Turkey integrates into global production networks. Integration, which leads vertical specialization in production and changes in the commodity composition of Turkish exports in favor of non-traditional commodities, paces up during economic reform periods. As the export shares of non-traditional commodities, which have higher import and income sensitivity but lower real exchange rate elasticity, increases, coefficients of the aggregate export function change accordingly. Nevertheless, high import and income elasticity of exports imply that the global growth pattern plays a significant role in determining exports of Turkey.     

The econometric critique of computable general equilibrium modeling: the role of functional forms

Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are among the most influential tools in applied economics. However, some serious questions have been raised about the empirical validity of these models. The core of the critique is that the parameter selection criteria are unsound and the use of first-order (CES class) functional forms imposes influential restrictions on the model's structure. A formal summary of the case against standard CGE modeling is presented, as is an alternative econometric-based modeling strategy which answers the critique. We then present a comparative CGE modeling experiment designed to assess the role of function forms. It is found that choice of functional forms affects not only industry-specific results, but aggregate results as well, even for small policy shocks.     

Bayesian estimation of duration models: An application of the multiperiod probit model

The multiperiod probit model is presented and Bayesian estimation using the Gibbs sampler with data augmentation is described. As an empirical illustration, the multiperiod probit model is then used to estimate a duration model using employment duration data for the Canadian province of New Brunswick. Bayesian estimation with unobserved heterogeneity is shown to be a simple extension of estimation of a duration model with no unobserved heterogeneity. More importantly, perhaps, some numerical problems encountered by other authors using Maximum Likelihood are avoided.I would like to thank M. Baker, G. Koop, A. Melino and D. Poirier for helpful comments and discussions. I would also like to thank M. Baker for providing his data.