ESTIMATING THE TAX BENEFITS OF DEBT

The standard approach to valuing interest tax shields assumes that full tax benefits are realized on every dollar of interest deduction in every scenario. The approach presented in this paper takes account of the possibility that interest tax shields cannot be used in some scenarios, in part because of variations in the firm's profitability. Because of the dynamic nature of the tax code (e.g., tax-loss carrybacks and carryforwards), it is necessary to consider past and future taxable income when estimating today's effective marginal tax rate. The paper uses a series of numerical examples to show that (1) the incremental value of an extra dollar of interest deduction is equal to the marginal tax rate appropriate for that dollar ; and (2) a firm's effective marginal tax rate (and therefore the marginal benefit of incremental interest deductions) can actually decline as the firm takes on additional debt.
Based on marginal benefit functions for thousands of firms from 1980–1999, the author concludes that the tax benefits of debt averaged approximately 10% of firm value during the 1980s, while declining to around 8% in the 1990s. By taking maximum advantage of the interest tax shield, the average firm could have increased its value by approximately 15% over the 1980s and 1990s, suggesting that the consequences of being underlevered are significant. Surprisingly, many of the companies that appear best able to service debt (i.e., those with the lowest apparent costs of debt) use the least amount of debt, on average. Treasurers and CFOs should critically reevaluate their companies' debt policies and consider the benefits of additional leverage, even if taking on more debt causes their credit ratings to slip a notch.     

Employee Stock Options, Corporate Taxes, and Debt Policy

We find that employee stock option deductions lead to large aggregate tax savings for Nasdaq 100 and S&P 100 firms and also affect corporate marginal tax rates. For Nasdaq firms, including the effect of options reduces the estimated median marginal tax rate from 31% to 5%. For S&P firms, in contrast, option deductions do not affect marginal tax rates to a large degree. Our evidence suggests that option deductions are important nondebt tax shields and that option deductions substitute for interest deductions in corporate capital structure decisions, explaining in part why some firms use so little debt.     

Analyzing the Tax Benefits from Employee Stock Options

Employees tend to exercise stock options when corporate taxable income is high, shifting corporate tax deductions to years with higher tax rates. If firms paid employees the same dollar value in wages instead of stock options, the average annual tax bill for large U.S. companies would increase by $12.6 million, or 9.8%. These direct tax benefits of options increase in the convexity of the tax function. In addition, profitable firms can realize indirect tax benefits because stock options increase debt capacity. Although tax minimization is probably not the main motive for option grants, firms with larger potential tax benefits grant more options.     

Leverage and Taxes: Evidence from the Real Estate Industry

Finance theory has long viewed corporate income taxes as a potentially important determinant of corporate financing decisions and capital structures. But finance academics have been unable to provide convincing empirical evidence of a material effect of taxes on corporate leverage, in part because of difficulties in constructing an effective proxy for marginal corporate tax rates, and hence for the tax benefits of debt, for large samples of individual companies. The authors address this by analyzing leverage decisions in an industry whose publicly traded entities are organized either as taxable corporations, or as real estate investment trusts (REITs) that effectively avoid entity level taxation. This enables them to measure the relative tax benefits of debt with greater precision while controlling for important nontax characteristics that affect debt usage. The tax hypothesis predicts that for real estate firms with similar asset portfolios, taxable firms should have more debt than their nontaxable counterparts. Both the nontaxable and the taxable real estate firms in our sample routinely have more than twice the leverage of industrial firms, which suggests that factors other than taxes are contributing to their use of debt. But among real estate firms, tax status appears to play a much weaker role. Taxable firms have significantly more leverage only after 2000, when restrictions on REITs were removed through new regulations that made their operations much more like those of taxable real estate firms. Our findings also depend on real estate characteristics—most notably, only residential real estate firms demonstrated differences that are consistent with the tax hypothesis. Taken together, the authors’ findings suggest that although taxes do seem to matter, their role is clearly secondary relative to factors such as the nature of the firm’s assets. A generous interpretation of our evidence puts the effect of taxes between one‐third and one‐half of that implied by prior research.     

Taxing audit markets and reputation: An examination of the U.S. tax shelter controversy

From 2002 to 2007, the nation's largest CPA firms faced allegations of illegal activity related to the sale of tax shelters: EY, KPMG and PwC paid fines; KPMG was investigated by a federal grand jury; and EY faced a criminal inquiry. These shelter events occurred shortly after the 2002 collapse of Arthur Andersen, when policy makers were concerned about audit market concentration. This is the first paper to provide a chronological summary of how the tax shelter controversy started and ended. We investigate the stock market reaction to tax shelter news developments between 2003 and 2005 to make inferences about the market's view of audit competition and CPA firm reputation. Our results are consistent with market concern over large audit firm concentration, evidenced by large negative returns for clients of all audit providers upon the KPMG grand jury investigation announcement. We also find that tax shelter activities impact both the reputation of the accounting profession and the individual CPA firms marketing tax shelter products.     

Do Publicly Disclosed Tax Reserves Tell Us About Privately Disclosed Tax Shelter Activity?

We examine whether public disclosures of tax reserves recently made available through Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) reflect corporate tax shelter activities. Understanding this relation is important to corporate stakeholders and researchers keen to infer the aggressive nature of a firm's tax positions from its tax reserve accrual. Our study links public disclosures of tax reserves with mandatory private disclosures of tax shelter participation as made to the Internal Revenue Service's Office of Tax Shelter Analysis. We find strong, robust evidence that the tax reserve is positively associated with tax shelters, while other commonly used measures of tax avoidance are not. Based on out‐of‐sample tests, we also show that the reserve is a suitable summary measure for predicting tax shelters. The tax benefits of tax shelters are economically significant, accounting for up to 48% of the aggregate FIN 48 tax reserves in our sample.     

Corporate Leverage and Nondebt Tax Shields: Evidence on Crowding-Out

A negative relationship between corporate leverage and tax shields has been predicted because a large nondebt tax shield reduces the expected value of interest tax savings and lessens the advantage of debt financing. Previous studies, however, have provided inconclusive and contradictory evidence on whether nondebt tax shields crowd-out debt financing. The analysis herein relies on unique constructs of discounted depreciation tax shields and presents evidence that crowding-out does not occur. Furthermore, it is shown that contradictory inferences may result from analysis of annual tax depreciation deductions instead of discounted tax shields. The findings suggest that firms with substantial cash flow from depreciation exploit their higher debt capacity by maintaining a capital structure with significantly more debt than otherwise.     

CEO Inside Debt Incentives and Corporate Tax Sheltering

This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax sheltering. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside creditors. As such, theory (Jensen and Meckling [1976]) suggests that inside debt holdings negatively impact CEO risk‐appetite. To the extent that corporate tax shelters are likely to result in high cash flow volatility in the future, we expect that inside debt holdings will curb CEOs from engaging in tax shelter transactions. Consistent with the prediction, we document a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and tax sheltering. Additional analyses suggest that the effect of inside debt on tax sheltering is more (less) pronounced in the presence of high default risk and liquidity threats (cash‐out options in pension packages). Overall, our results highlight the importance of investigating the implication of CEO debt‐like compensation for corporate tax policies.     

Agency costs,taxes and debt: The UK evidence

This paper provides an empirical examination of the impact of the corporation tax and agency costs on firms' capital structure decisions. Our evidence suggests that the agency costs are the main determinants of corporate borrowing. Consistent with the agency theory, we find that firms that have fewer growth options have more debt in their capital structure. Moreover, our results show that debt mitigates the free cash flow problem and that firms that are more likely to be diversified and less prone to bankruptcy are highly geared. the negative effect of insider shareholding on leverage disappears, however; when all the agency mechanisms are accounted for. In addition, we find that, in the long run, companies that are tax exhausted exhibit significantly lower debt ratios than tax-paying firms. However, in the short run, firms' capital structure decisions are not affected by taxation.     

Do Firms Hedge in Response to Tax Incentives?

There are two tax incentives for corporations to hedge: to increase debt capacity and interest tax deductions, and to reduce expected tax liability if the tax function is convex. We test whether these incentives affect the extent of corporate hedging with derivatives. Using an explicit measure of tax function convexity, we find no evidence that firms hedge in response to tax convexity. Our analysis does, however, indicate that firms hedge to increase debt capacity, with increased tax benefits averaging 1.1 percent of firm value. Our results also indicate that firms hedge because of expected financial distress costs and firm size.     

Firms' Off-Balance Sheet and Hybrid Debt Financing: Evidence from Their Book-Tax Reporting Differences

We match large U.S. corporations' tax returns during 1989–2001 to their financial statements to construct a firm‐level proxy of firms' use of off‐balance sheet and hybrid debt financing. We find that firms with less favorable prior‐period Standard & Poor's (S&P) bond ratings or higher leverage ratios in comparison to their industry report greater amounts of interest expense on their tax returns than to investors and creditors on their financial statements. These between‐firm results are consistent with credit‐constrained firms using more structured financing arrangements. Our within‐firm tests also suggest that firms use more structured financing arrangements when they enter into contractual loan agreements that provide incentives to manage debt ratings. Specifically, we find that after controlling for S&P bond rating and industry‐adjusted leverage, our sample firms report greater amounts of interest expenses for tax than for financial statement purposes when they enter into performance pricing contracts that use senior debt rating covenants to set interest rates. Furthermore, we find that the greatest book‐tax reporting changes occur when firms become closer to violating these debt rating covenants. These latter findings are consistent with firms' contractual debt covenants influencing their use of off‐balance sheet and hybrid debt financing.     

Have the tax benefits of debt been overestimated?

We re-examine the claim that many corporations are underleveraged in that they fail to take full advantage of debt tax shields. We show prior results suggesting underleverage stems from biased estimates of tax benefits from interest deductions. We develop improved estimates of marginal tax rates using a non-parametric procedure that produces more accurate estimates of the distribution of future taxable income. We show that additional debt would provide firms with much smaller tax benefits than previously thought, and when expected distress costs and difficult-to-measure non-debt tax shields are also considered, it appears plausible that most firms have tax-efficient capital structures.     

Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a Source of Value

This paper estimates the value of tax benefits in 76 management buyouts of public companies completed in the period 1980 to 1986. The median value of tax benefits, estimated at the time the buyout company goes private, has a lower bound of 21% and an upper bound of 143% of the premium paid to pre-buyout shareholders. The estimated value depends on the rate buyout debt is repaid and the tax rate applied to the interest deductions. The paper also presents evidence on the actual taxes paid and debt repayment rates by these companies after the buyout. The results in this paper suggest that tax benefits are an important source of the wealth gains in management buyouts.     

A Multinational Perspective on Capital Structure Choice and Internal Capital Markets

This paper analyzes the capital structures of foreign affiliates and internal capital markets of multinational corporations. Ten percent higher local tax rates are associated with 2.8% higher debt/asset ratios, with internal borrowing being particularly sensitive to taxes. Multinational affiliates are financed with less external debt in countries with underdeveloped capital markets or weak creditor rights, reflecting significantly higher local borrowing costs. Instrumental variable analysis indicates that greater borrowing from parent companies substitutes for three‐quarters of reduced external borrowing induced by capital market conditions. Multinational firms appear to employ internal capital markets opportunistically to overcome imperfections in external capital markets.     

The Net Benefits to Leverage

I estimate the market's valuation of the net benefits to leverage using panel data from 1994 to 2004, identified from market values and betas of a company's debt and equity. The median firm captures net benefits of up to 5.5% of firm value. Small and profitable firms have high optimal leverage ratios, as predicted by theory, but in contrast to existing empirical evidence. Companies are on average slightly underlevered relative to the optimal leverage ratio at refinancing. This result is mainly due to zero leverage firms. I also look at implications for financial policy.     

Cross-Jurisdictional Income Shifting by U.S. Multinationals: Evidence from International Bond Offerings

We examine whether tax incentives influence where U.S. multinationals locate their interest deductions worldwide. Our sample includes international bond offerings by U.S. multinationals during 1987–1997 denominated in the currencies of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, or the United Kingdom. Our results suggest that U.S. multinationals' debt location decisions take into account the effect of jurisdiction-specific tax-loss carryforwards and binding foreign tax credit limitations on the value of debt tax shields. Our results are also consistent with U.S. multinationals locating interest deductions in different tax jurisdictions as a mechanism to achieve tax-motivated income shifting.     

Corporate governance and the dynamics of capital structure: New evidence

The effects of corporate governance on optimal capital structure choices have been well documented, though without offering empirical evidence about the impact of corporate governance quality on the adjustment speed toward an optimal capital structure. This study simultaneously considers two effects of debt originating from agency theory—the takeover defense and the disciplinary effects of debt—on the speed of adjustment to the optimal capital structure. Corporate governance has a distinct effect on the speed of capital structure adjustment: weak governance firms that are underlevered tend to adjust slowly to the optimal capital structure, because the costs of the disciplinary role of debt outweigh the benefits of using debt as a takeover defense tool. Although overlevered weak governance firms also adjust slowly, they do so because they are reluctant to decrease their leverage toward the target level to deter potential raiders, especially if they face a serious takeover threat. Therefore, this study finds that both overlevered and underlevered firms with weak governance adjust slowly toward their target debt levels, though with different motivations.     

Credit Crunch and Target Capital Structure: Empirical Studies Based on Natural Experimentin China

Abstract:

Data from China’s credit crunch, which started in 2007, is utilized to establish a natural experiment to investigate the impact of the credit crunch on target capital structures. The sample consists of 1,128 listed companies in China during the period 2000–2011. The interest-bearing debt to total assets ratio is used as a representative indicator for capital structures. The results indicate that the credit crunch was associated with a decrease in the target debt ratios for all listed companies. Small firms, privately owned enterprises, and firms with weak mortgage capabilities responded more sensitively to the credit crunch by showing a substantial decrease in target debt ratios.     

CEO's Inside Debt and Dynamics of Capital Structure

Debt‐type compensation (inside debt) exacerbates the divergence in risk preferences between the chief executive officer (CEO) and shareholders and, in turn, affects capital structure decisions. An excessively risk‐averse CEO tends to use less debt than the shareholders desire, reduce debt quickly when the firm is overlevered, but is reluctant to increase debt when the firm is underlevered. We find that higher CEO's inside debt ratio (i.e., inside debt as a percentage of total incentive compensation) is associated with lower firm leverage and faster (slower) leverage adjustments toward the shareholders’ desired level for overlevered (underlevered) firms. The CEO's inside debt ratio most conducive to capital structure rebalancing is around 10% of the firm's market debt ratio.     

When are preferred shares preferred? Theory and empirical evidence

This paper demonstrates that preferred stock may arise as an optimal security in a tax-induced equilibrium. This result is driven by graduated tax schedules and by uncertainty. In a more general sense, our results can be interpreted as a template for including any security with a different tax treatment in a firm's capital structure. The first part of the paper demonstrates that the Miller equilibrium framework can accommodate more than two securities if different investor classes are taxed differently on each security and the tax schedule for each investor group is upward sloping. We then simplify the tax schedule, but introduce uncertainty, which implies the possibility of bankruptcy and the possible loss of tax shelters. The interaction of tax rates and seniority now affects the contribution of each security to after-tax firm value, as in some states the firm may not be able to pay either interest (or dividends) or even principal to its various claimholders. It is shown why and how these features, i.e. the various tax rates and seniority, determine the financing equilibrium, which is obtained by equating the expected marginal tax benefit of all securities. We demonstrate that non-profitable firms will tend to issue preferred shares whereas profitable firms will not find preferred stock advantageous in our framework. Comparative statics with respect to various tax rates are derived as well. These predictions are tested using a large sample of firms for the last 25 years. The empirical testing broadly confirms the theoretical predictions.