Competition among stock exchanges for equity

We consider cross-border competition by stock exchanges for listings from firms that have controlling shareholders who have private benefits. We examine exchanges’ choices of their listing standards and firms’ choices of the exchanges where they cross-list their shares. We show that the share price compensates controlling shareholders for giving up some private benefits and enables firms with growth opportunities to obtain listings on exchanges with different listing standards. In particular, firms with high-growth opportunities tend to obtain listings on stock exchanges with high listing standards. We empirically examine these predictions and find that they are consistent with evidence.     

Investor protection and cash holdings: Evidence from US cross-listing

This paper examines (i) whether the level of firms’ cash holdings differ depending on the strength of investor protection, (ii) whether excess cash holdings are valued more with better investor protection, and (iii) whether cross-listed firms that improve investor protection through “bonding” hold relatively more cash than non-cross-listed firms. We analyze 1405 ADR firms and their corresponding matched firms from 39 different countries and document that ADR firms have significantly higher cash holdings relative to their non-cross-listed peers, especially in recent years. The increase in cash holdings is much higher for emerging market firms because of their transition from particularly poor home country investor protection and accounting standards before cross-listing to much higher standards after cross-listing. In addition, firms with level III ADR listing, which represents the strongest investor protection, have higher cash holdings relative to other types of ADR firms.     

Does corporate social responsibility affect the cost of capital?

We examine the effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the cost of equity capital for a large sample of US firms. Using several approaches to estimate firms’ ex ante cost of equity, we find that firms with better CSR scores exhibit cheaper equity financing. In particular, our findings suggest that investment in improving responsible employee relations, environmental policies, and product strategies contributes substantially to reducing firms’ cost of equity. Our results also show that participation in two “sin” industries, namely, tobacco and nuclear power, increases firms’ cost of equity. These findings support arguments in the literature that firms with socially responsible practices have higher valuation and lower risk.     

Culture and auditor choice: A test of the secrecy hypothesis

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether firms’ auditor choice relates to national culture. We construct a novel measure of secretiveness based on Hofstede [Hofstede, G., 1980. Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work Related Values. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA] cultural factors. Using a very large sample of firms from 37 countries and controlling for a number of firm- and country-level factors, we find that firms in “more secretive” countries are less likely to hire a Big 4 auditor. We also document that the relation between secrecy dimension of national culture and auditor choice is mitigated by the firms’ degree of internationalization. These results establish a link between national culture and financial reporting quality through the firm’s choice of auditor.     

Information asymmetry,information dissemination and the effect of regulation FD on the cost of capital

This paper considers the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on firms’ information environments and costs of capital. For NYSE/Amex firms we find little evidence of a change in the cost of capital attributable to Regulation FD. For Nasdaq firms we find that Regulation FD increased firms’ costs of capital by 10–19 basis points per annum though the statistical significance of this change is modest for some of our models. We also show substantial cross-sectional variation in the cost of capital changes. We find that cost of capital changes were negatively related to both pre-regulation firm size and PIN. In addition to the findings regarding Regulation FD, this research contributes to a growing literature that documents links between firms’ information environments and their costs of capital.     

“Crises” in medical malpractice insurance: Evidence of excessive price-cutting in the preceding soft market

Prior work suggests that heterogeneous information or weak incentives for solvency could have caused some general liability insurers to charge low ex ante prices during the early 1980s and mid-to-late 1990s, putting downward pressure on other firms’ prices and plausibly aggravating subsequent periods of rapid premium growth. We analyse whether the 1994–1999 “soft” market in medical malpractice insurance led some firms to underprice, grow rapidly, and subsequently experience upward revisions in loss forecasts (“loss development”), which could have aggravated subsequent market “crises”. Consistent with the underpricing hypothesis, the results indicate a positive relation between loss development and premium growth among growing firms. Underpricing was likely more prevalent among non-specialist malpractice insurers.     

Informed finance and technological change: Evidence from credit relationships

This paper empirically investigates the effect of “informed finance” on technological change. The theoretical literature offers conflicting predictions on whether the information of financiers fosters or inhibits firms’ innovation. Using data from a sample of Italian manufacturing firms, we find that the information of firms’ main banks, proxied by the duration of credit relationships, promotes innovation. This positive effect is economically and statistically more significant for product than for process innovations. Nonetheless, the role of relationship banks in innovation is quite unsophisticated: they do not foster internal research but rather fund the relevant investments that the introduction and acquisition of new technologies entails.     

A unique “T + 1 trading rule” in China: Theory and evidence

Unique to the world, China adopts a “T + 1 trading rule”, which prevents investors from selling stocks bought on the same day. We develop a dynamic price manipulation model to study the effects of the “T + 1 trading rule”. Compared to the “T + 0 trading rule”, which allows investors to buy and sell the same stocks during the same day, we show that the “T + 1 trading rule” reduces the total trading volume and price volatility, and improves the trend chasers’ welfare when trend-chasing is strong. An empirical test using data on China’s B-share stock market supports the model’s theoretical predictions.     

Corporate fraud and bank loans: Evidence from china

Receiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts between a firm and its bank, as both the firm’s credit risk and information risk increase after punishment. By focusing on Chinese firms’ borrowing behavior after events of corporate fraud, we find that firms’ bank loans after punishment are not only significantly lower, but are also less than those for non-fraudulent firms. In addition, loan interest rates after punishment are not only higher than before, but also higher than those for their non-fraudulent counterparts. In addition, we find that corporate fraud indirectly destabilizes the “performance-bank loan” relationship. Our results suggest that corporate fraud negatively affects a firm’s ability to source debt financing, which provides new evidence about the economic consequences of fraud.     

The value of excess cash and corporate governance: Evidence from US cross-listings

We examine whether and how a US cross-listing mitigates the risk that insiders will turn their firm’s cash holdings into private benefits. We find strong evidence that the value investors attach to excess cash reserves is substantially larger for foreign firms listed on US exchanges and over-the-counter than for their domestic peers. Further, we show that this excess-cash premium stems not only from the strength of US legal rules and disclosure requirements, but also from the greater informal monitoring pressure that accompanies a US listing. Overall, because investors’ valuation of excess cash mirrors how they expect the cash to be used, our analysis shows that a US listing constrains insiders’ inefficient allocation of corporate cash reserves significantly.     

Stock returns’ sensitivities to crisis shocks: Evidence from developed and emerging markets

We consider three “crisis shocks” related to key features of the 2007–2008 crisis, for emerging and developed economies: (1) the collapse of global trade, (2) the contraction of credit supply, and (3) selling pressure on firms’ equity. Using an international cross-section of firms, we find that returns’ sensitivities to these shocks imply large and statistically significant influences on residual equity returns during the crisis period (after controlling for normal risk factors that are associated with expected returns). Similar analysis for several placebo periods shows that these effects are generally less severe or absent in non-crisis periods. Relative to developed economies, emerging markets are more responsive to global trade conditions (in crisis and in placebo periods), but less responsive to selling pressures. An analysis of portfolios of firms during various placebo periods indicates that investors are not compensated for the risks associated with the crisis shocks. Finally, a month-by-month analysis of returns during the crisis period shows that the time variation of the importance of each of the sensitivities to shocks tracks related changes in the global economic environment.     

Firm age and the evolution of borrowing costs: Evidence from Japanese small firms

This paper investigates how firms’ borrowing costs evolve as they age. Using a new panel data set of about 100,000 bank-dependent small firms for 1997–2002 and focusing on the channel of “adaptation” (i.e., surviving firms’ borrowing costs decline as they age) and that of “selection” (i.e., total borrowing costs decline as defaulting firms exit), we find that the reputation hypothesis suggested by Diamond (1989) provides a more plausible explanation of the downward sloping age profile of borrowing costs than the firm dynamics (Cooley and Quadrini, 2001) or the relationship banking (Boot and Thakor, 1994) hypothesis. In addition, we examine whether the firm selection process in Japan has been natural or unnatural. Our findings suggest that it has been natural in that firms with lower quality are separated, face higher borrowing costs, and are eventually forced to exit, which contrasts with the results of previous studies on credit allocations in Japan, including Peek and Rosengren (2005). Further, we find that the evolution of borrowing costs is partially due to selection but is mainly attributable to adaptation.     

Institutional investment horizon and investment–cash flow sensitivity

This paper examines the relevance of institutional investors’ investment horizon, as reflected in the response of firm investment to internal cash flows. We argue that institutional investors with longer investment horizons have greater incentives and efficiencies to engage in effective monitoring. This improved monitoring mitigates asymmetric information and agency problems, and in turn reduces the wedge between the costs of internal and external funds. As a result, the sensitivity of firms’ investment outlays to internal cash flows decreases in the presence of institutional investors with long-term investment horizons. Using a sample of 8402 US firms over the period 1981–2008, we provide empirical evidence consistent with these arguments.     

Earnings management,market discounts and the performance of private equity placements

Private equity placement data allow us to determine whether sophisticated investors can uncover the true value of firms. This can be done by defining sophisticated investors as those who meet the stringent participation requirements of the private equity market. Our results show private equity issuing firms overstate their earnings in the quarter preceding private equity placement announcements and that sophisticated investors do not ask for a fair discount when purchasing the shares of the private issuing firms. We also find evidence showing that the reversal of the effects of pre-issue earnings management is a significant determinant of the long-term performance of private issues. Results further show that post-issue stock performance and operating performance of firms using “aggressive” earnings management significantly underperform those using more “conservative” earnings management.     

Who benefited from the disclosure mandates of the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments?

The 1964 Securities Acts Amendments extended disclosures mandated of NYSE firms to most firms trading in the Over-the-Counter (OTC) market. Although some prior evidence suggests substantial value increases for OTC firms due to the “value enhancing” mandated disclosures, we find no statistical difference in announcement returns for OTC firms moving to the NYSE before and after the legislation. One purported advantage to investors from the 1964 legislation was increased financial reporting. Yet, we document that the bulk of OTC firms analyzed in prior studies was already providing investors financial information before the legislation. Apparently, investors did not value the mandated disclosures. We do find evidence that the NYSE benefited from the legislation by increasing the number of OTC firms switching to their exchange around its passage.     

Information asymmetry and firms’ credit market access: Evidence from Moody's credit rating format refinement

I exploit Moody's 1982 credit rating refinement to examine its effects on firms’ credit market access, financing decisions, and investment policies. While firms’ ex ante yield spread can partially predict the direction of refinement changes, firms with refinement upgrades experience an additional decrease in their ex post borrowing cost compared with firms with downgrades. The former subsequently also issue more debt and rely more on debt financing over equity than the latter. Lastly, upgraded firms have more capital investments, less cash accumulation, and faster asset growth than downgraded firms. These findings show that credit market information asymmetry significantly affects firms’ real outcomes.     

Dual class IPOs: A theoretical analysis

We consider an incumbent who wishes to sell equity to outsiders at an IPO to implement his firm’s project. He may be talented (lower cost of effort, comparative advantage in project-implementation) or untalented. The project may have high (intrinsically more valuable, but showing less signs of success in the near-term) or low near-term uncertainty. Under a single class share structure, the incumbent has a greater chance of losing control to potential rivals if he undertakes the project with high near-term uncertainty, since outsiders may vote for the rival if they believe the project is not progressing well. A dual class share structure allows the incumbent to have enough votes to prevail against any rival, but may be misused by untalented incumbents to dissipate value. Our results help to explain firms’ choices between dual class and single class IPOs and the post-IPO operating performance of dual class versus single class firms.     

How do firms react to the prohibition of long-lived asset impairment reversals? Evidence from China

New Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS) released on February 15, 2006, prohibit the reversal of long-lived asset impairments, effective for reporting periods beginning January 1, 2007 and later. This development in the Chinese market provides a unique experimental setting to directly investigate how firms react to the ban on previously-allowed long-lived asset impairment reversals, especially firms that use impairment charges as “cookie jar reserves.” By contrasting write-off recognition and reversal across the pre- and post- new CAS announcement regimes, we show that firms listed on Chinese stock exchanges recognized less impairment charges during the “transition” period—after announcement of the new standard and before the effective date—than in pre-announcement periods. Meanwhile, firms with substantial previous write-downs reversed more impairment charges to achieve their earnings targets in the transition period. The new CAS also constraints “big bath” reporting by loss firms. As US GAAP prohibits these reversals and IFRS allows them, our empirical evidence depicts firms’ possible reactions in other regimes contemplating doing away with such reversals.     

The structure and formation of business groups: Evidence from Korean chaebols

We study the evolution of Korean chaebols (business groups) using ownership data. Chaebols grow vertically (as pyramids) when the controlling family uses well-established group firms (“central firms”) to acquire firms with low pledgeable income and high acquisition premiums. Chaebols grow horizontally (through direct ownership) when the family acquires firms with high pledgeable income and low acquisition premiums. Central firms trade at a relative discount, due to shareholders’ anticipation of value-destroying acquisitions. Our evidence is consistent with the selection of firms into different positions in the chaebol and ascribes the underperformance of pyramidal firms to a selection effect rather than tunneling.     

Crushed by a rational stampede: Strategic share dumping and shareholder insurrections

In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of institutional share dumping surrounding control events. Institutional investors sometimes dump shares, despite trading losses, in order to manipulate share prices and trigger activism by “relationship” investors. These institutional investors are motivated to trade not only by trading profits but also by a desire to protect the value of their inventory and to disguise the quality of their own information. Relationship investor profit from targeting firms both by improving firm performance and by generating private information.