排序方式: 共有20条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Violation-minimizing fine schedules 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jon D. Harford 《Atlantic Economic Journal》1987,15(4):49-56
2.
Jon D. Harford 《Atlantic Economic Journal》1998,26(3):317-324
The book, Pollution and the Firm, by Robert E. Kohn, provides a detailed and nearly definitive look at the application of Pigouvian taxation applied to competitive polluting firms in a static, general equilibrium framework. The reader is offered the most thorough examination of how the firm's long-run scale of output is related to the activities of pollution abatement and avoidance of which this reviewer is aware. While the reader would be advised to treat with skepticism some of the results of the models involving uncertainty, the overall set of models offers an excellent set of derivations and conclusions. Any student of firm-generated externalities would gain by exposure to this book. 相似文献
3.
4.
We analyze a sample of 72 IPO firms that went public between 1992 and 1996 for which we have detailed proprietary information about the amount and cost of D&O liability insurance. If managers of IPO firms are exploiting superior inside information, we hypothesize that the amount of insurance coverage chosen will be related to the post-offering performance of the issuing firm's shares. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a significant negative relation between the three-year post-IPO stock price performance and the insurance coverage purchased in conjunction with the IPO. One plausible interpretation is that, like insider securities transactions, D&O insurance decisions reveal opportunistic behavior by managers. This provides some motivation to argue that disclosure of the details of D&O insurance decisions, as is required in some other countries, is valuable. 相似文献
5.
We provide evidence that managers and controlling shareholders time management buyouts (MBOs) and freezeout transactions to take advantage of industry-wide undervaluation. Portfolios of industry peers of MBO and freezeout targets show significant alphas of around 1% per month over the 12-month period following the transaction. These returns are not explained by a battery of risk factors or empirical methodologies, but exhibit significant heterogeneity across deals. Additional tests show that, on average, abnormal returns to industry peers are a reliable proxy for those to the target firm. Further, MBOs and freezeouts are announced during troughs of industry profitability. 相似文献
6.
This paper considers the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on firms’ information environments and costs of capital. For NYSE/Amex firms we find little evidence of a change in the cost of capital attributable to Regulation FD. For Nasdaq firms we find that Regulation FD increased firms’ costs of capital by 10–19 basis points per annum though the statistical significance of this change is modest for some of our models. We also show substantial cross-sectional variation in the cost of capital changes. We find that cost of capital changes were negatively related to both pre-regulation firm size and PIN. In addition to the findings regarding Regulation FD, this research contributes to a growing literature that documents links between firms’ information environments and their costs of capital. 相似文献
7.
Within a cost–benefit framework, we hypothesize that independent institutions with long-term investments will specialize in monitoring and influencing efforts rather than trading. Other institutions will not monitor. Using acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring, we show that only concentrated holdings by independent long-term institutions are related to post-merger performance. Further, the presence of these institutions makes withdrawal of bad bids more likely. These institutions make long-term portfolio adjustments rather than trading for short-term gain and only sell in advance of very bad outcomes. Examining total institutional holdings or even concentrated holdings by other types of institutions masks important variation in the subset of monitoring institutions. 相似文献
8.
Using governance metrics based on antitakeover provisions and inside ownership, we find that firms with weaker corporate governance structures actually have smaller cash reserves. When distributing cash to shareholders, firms with weaker governance structures choose to repurchase instead of increasing dividends, avoiding future payout commitments. The combination of excess cash and weak shareholder rights leads to increases in capital expenditures and acquisitions. Firms with low shareholder rights and excess cash have lower profitability and valuations. However, there is only limited evidence that the presence of excess cash alters the overall relation between governance and profitability. In the US, weakly controlled managers choose to spend cash quickly on acquisitions and capital expenditures, rather than hoard it. 相似文献
9.
Poverty analysis using small area estimation: an application to conservation agriculture in Uganda 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jarrad Farris Catherine Larochelle Jeffrey Alwang George W. Norton Caleb King 《Agricultural Economics》2017,48(6):671-681
This article demonstrates the utility of small area estimation of poverty (SAEp) methods for researchers wishing to conduct a detailed welfare analysis as part of a larger survey of a small geographic area. This study applies SAEp methods as part of an impact assessment of a conservation agriculture production system in Eastern Uganda. Using SAEp, we estimate Foster–Greer–Thorbecke rural poverty indices, estimate the effects of per‐acre farm profit increases to poor households on the indices, and compare the findings to estimates of net returns from a field‐level evaluation of conservation agriculture for maize farmers. Results suggest that increasing the farm profits of the bottom 30% of households by $1.60 per‐acre per‐season would reduce rural poverty incidence by 1 percentage point. Available data on the net returns to conservation agriculture indicate that even these modest increases are achievable for few adopting households. 相似文献
10.
Prior research has shown that differential access to debt markets significantly affects capital structure. In this paper, we examine the effect of access to debt markets on investment decisions by using debt ratings to indicate bond market access. We find that rated firms are more likely to undertake acquisitions than nonrated firms. This finding remains even after accounting for firm characteristics, for the probability of being rated, and in matched sample analysis as well as in subsamples based on leverage, firm size, age and information opacity. Rated firms also pay higher premiums for their targets and receive less favorable market reaction to their acquisition announcements relative to non-rated firms. However, the average announcement returns to rated acquirers are non-negative. Collectively, these findings suggest that the lack of debt market access has a real effect on the ability to make investments as well as on the quality of these investments by creating underinvestment, instead of simply constraining overinvestment. 相似文献