The role of legal status in influencing bank financing and new firm growth

We provide an empirical assessment of the suggestion, based on Severo (2012), to use a systemic liquidity risk index (SLRI) for estimating liquidity premia that could be charged on large banks as a compensation for the implicit liquidity support obtained from public authorities (Blancher et al., 2013). To this end we compute, over the period January 2004–December 2012, a parsimonious and fully documented SLRI. We also investigate its statistical significance in explaining the level and variability of stock returns for a group of large international banks across the subprime and the Eurozone sovereign debt crises. Main findings are two: our more parsimonious SLRI is close to Severo’s but provides a stronger signal of liquidity stress and recovery episodes; we consistently fail to detect, within and across the two crises, a stable group of banks among the global systemically important ones listed by the Financial Stability Board.     

The role of debt profile vulnerabilities in sovereign distress

Sovereign debt distress has raised difficult issues in terms of debt sustainability in the past, but it has been associated not only with medium-term debt dynamics, but also with various dimensions of the debt profile that have typically built vulnerabilities over time. Vulnerabilities associated with the public debt structure and liquidity may play an important role in derailing a stable debt trajectory and thus contribute to debt distress. Financial developments may also contribute to the building in sovereign debt vulnerabilities, as deterioration in financial stability indicators can affect the balance sheet of the national treasury. Based on the experience during 37 debt distress events in countries with market access between 1993 and 2010, this article identifies early warning indicators of sovereign debt distress and defines thresholds – for the whole sample and for different regions – at which these latter have been associated with distress in the past. This approach allows us to assess indicators on an individual basis, and to develop a composite indicator of debt vulnerabilities as well.     

我国国债二级市场的流动性分析

国债流动性在现代国债有效市场机制和效率管理中具有十分重要的地位,它对降低债务风险、提高国债管理效率和充分发挥国债二级市场的经济调控功能都具有重要意义。与发达国家相比,我国国债的流动性处于较低的水平。本文对此问题进行了分析。并提出相应的对策。     

央行票据调控可持续性分析

央行票据是中央银行为调节商业银行超额准备金而向商业银行发行的短期债务凭证,是中央银行为调节商业银行流动性而出台的一项货币政策工具,其实质是中央银行债券。目前,央票已经是债券市场不可或缺的短期投资工具和流动性管理工具。但伴随中国经济增长趋势的放缓,央行票据发行规模的下降,央票是否继续存在的争论也由此而起。通过分析我国央行票据的发展情况及现状,对央票调控的利弊进行分析,并为央票存在的持续性寻求合理的理论支持。     

银行流动性过剩的自愿性与非自愿性因素辨析——兼论对货币政策的影响

本文将很行的流动性资产分为自愿性(预防性)流动资产和非自愿性流动资产两部分,并建立银行自愿性流动资产需求模型,进一步的实证分析表明:自愿性因素和非自愿性因素共同促使我国银行流动性过剩,自愿的预防性流动资产过剩和非自愿的流动资产过剩并存,银行的部分流动性过剩资产是为了规避融资成本、汇率风险和存款波动风险而自愿持有的.脉冲响应分析表明银行流动性过剩制约了我国贷币政策有效性的发挥.     

BANK COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: LIQUIDITY RISK PERSPECTIVE

We study whether competition affects banks' liquidity risk‐taking, which was at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. We find that banks with greater market power take more liquidity risk, implying that decreased competition leads to financial fragility. During a financial crisis, however, the effect of market power on liquidity risk varies across bank size. Small banks with greater market power reduce liquidity risk while large banks with greater market power do not change their liquidity risk‐taking behavior. This suggests that enhanced charter values due to reduced competition lowers small banks' risk‐shifting incentives when their default risk significantly increases during a crisis. (JEL G21, G28)     

Regional Liquidity Risk and Covered Interest Parity During the Global Financial Crisis: Evidence from Tokyo,London, and New York*

ABSTRACT

During the global financial crisis, there were substantial deviations from covered interest parity (CIP) condition. In particular, in the post-Lehman period, the US dollar interest rate became very low on the forward market. However, the deviations from the CIP condition varied across markets. After presenting a simple model, the following analysis examines how the CIP condition between the Japanese yen and the US dollar was violated in Tokyo, London, and New York markets. We show that the CIP deviations became largest in the New York market soon after the Lehman shock but were largest in the Tokyo market in the rest of the turmoil period. The regressions suggest that market-specific credit risks and central banks’ liquidity provisions explained the difference across the markets. In particular, they indicate that larger dollar-specific risk and smaller yen-specific risk caused larger deviations in the Tokyo market.     

Rethinking banking. Debt discounting and the making of modern money as liquidity

The article radically challenges the conventional view of modern banking as financial intermediation and rejects the mutually related notion, firmly entrenched in both the mainstream and alternative imaginary, of fractional reserve banking. By contrast, it argues that modern banks are peculiar financiers which, far from banking other people's money, are originally and primarily involved with making money by creating a most fundamental institution of capitalism: liquidity. Crucially, central to the bank-engendered creation of liquidity is a negotiation of value that does not involve any formal lending of cash by a creditor – in fact, it does not require a creditor at all. Instead, it relies on a quid pro quo of debts performed by means of discounting whereby a regime of fluid property relations of mutual indebtedness, commonly known as debt finance, is established. In this regime of liquidity, money is constructed as entirely a debtors’ money: it is the outcome of a process of monetisation of bank debts entangled with a capitalisation of other people's debts.     

The explosive growth of the ABCP market between 2004 and 2007: A “search for yield” story

Abstract

The years immediately preceding the financial crisis of 2007 witnessed an explosive growth in the supplies both of the long-term securities issued by the shadow banking entities, the asset-backed securities (ABSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and of the short-term securities issued by these entities, notably asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). Although there is now some acknowledgment that the search for yield was the major driver of ABS and CDO growth in the United States, the same is not true of the U.S. ABCP market where other factors such as regulatory arbitrage on the part of banks or the safety and liquidity concerns of institutional investors are seen as having been the more important growth driving force. This article argues that the search for yield did play a crucial role in U.S. ABCP growth between 2004 and 2007. To back up this argument, the article points to four variables that were closely correlated with this growth: the federal funds rate; U.S. money market mutual funds asset holdings; the change in the geographical breakdown of the institutions supplying ABCP; and, finally, the change in the program breakdown of the ABCP market.     

Credit in Times of Stress: Lessons from Latin America during the Global Financial Crisis

The 2008–2009 global financial crisis disrupted the provision of credit in Latin America less than in previous crises. This paper tests whether specific characteristics at both the bank and country levels at the onset of the global crisis contributed to the behavior of real credit growth in this region during the crisis. As shown, financial soundness characteristics of Latin American banks, such as capitalization, liquidity, and bank efficiency in the pre‐crisis period, played a role in explaining the dynamics of real credit during the crisis. We also found that foreign banks and banks that had expanded credit growth more before the crisis were also those that cut credit the most. Among country‐specific characteristics, we found evidence that balance sheet measures such as the economy's overall currency mismatches and external debt ratios (measuring either total debt or short‐term debt) were key variables in explaining credit growth resilience.     

我国国债市场的金融功能与流动性分析

国债市场是货币市场的重要组成部分,在发达国家其金融功能已超越财政功能。我国国债市场由于流动性水平较低,难以执行宏观金融调控功能。为此,应当合理规划我国国债市场,并以提高其流动性水平为目标,拓展我国国债的金融功能。     

Bank liquidity risk and monetary policy. Empirical evidence on the impact of Basel III liquidity standards

We extend the literature on the bank lending channel in two aspects. First, rather than following the literature by analyzing the impact of banks’ liquidity (measured via their asset portfolio) on monetary policy transmission, we study the role of banks’ actual liquidity risk, as measured by the Basel III liquidity regulations. Second, we investigate the effect of complying with the Basel III liquidity standards on monetary policy transmission. We use highly detailed bank-level data from Luxembourg for the period 2003q1--2010q4. Our findings are that monetary policy transmission works its way through small banks that also have a large maturity mismatch, as measured by the Net Stable Funding Ratio. In contrast, large banks with a small maturity mismatch increase their lending following a monetary policy shock, which confirms existing results that Luxembourg’s banks are liquidity providers to the European market. Based upon in-sample predictions and upon simulated data from an optimization model that takes the banks’ business models into account, we conclude that the bank lending channel will no longer be effective once banks adhere to the new Basel III liquidity regulations.     

Market power and risk of Central and Eastern European banks: Does more powerful mean safer?

As understanding the market power–risk relationship in CEE banking systems is of the utmost importance to policy-makers in these countries, we investigate whether CEE banks must have greater market power to be safer. Our results suggest that more market power reduces the fragility of banking institutions, on one hand, and that banking market concentration tends to make these banks riskier, on the other. Our findings are robust to whatever form of market power-risk relationship and whatever market-power measures we use. More precisely, financial markets perceive CEE banks with more market power as less fragile, while the latter are also better capitalised with respect to the distribution of their returns. Moreover, they are even (much) better capitalised when they hold less-diversified and less-liquid assets and when they operate within a stricter banking regulatory environment, which suggests a risk-stabilising role for diversification, liquidity and the bank regulatory environment in these countries.     

The Theory of the Second Best and the Competitive Equilibrium Model

We study the international transmission of bank liquidity shocks from multinational, Islamic, bank-holding companies to their subsidiaries. Based on a total sample of 120 Islamic and conventional bank subsidiaries, we test whether foreign bank lending for Islamic and conventional banks is determined by different factors. We estimate a model that includes subsidiary and parent bank characteristics as well as host and home country variables. Our empirical findings show that lending is negatively affected by the fragility of conventional parent banks' subsidiaries. Nevertheless, we show that parent Islamic banks do not significantly affect lending by subsidiaries. Finally, we examine the market discipline regarding the transmission of liquidity shocks. We also find that reduction in foreign Islamic bank lending is stronger for those that are dependent on the interbank market. We establish that the depositors react to a deterioration of bank performance and punish their institutions by withdrawing their money. We show that market discipline has a more important role for Islamic banks, whereas liquidity needs determine the change in conventional banks.     

Liquidity risk and bank portfolio management in a financial system without deposit insurance: Empirical evidence from prewar Japan

Using data from prewar Japan, this paper investigates the impact of a liquidity shock induced by depositors' behavior on bank portfolio management during financial crises in a system lacking deposit insurance. It is found that banks reacted to the liquidity shock sensitively through an increase in their cash holdings not by liquidating bank loans but by selling securities in the financial market. Moreover, banks exposed to local financial contagion adjusted the liquidity of their portfolio mainly by actively selling and buying their securities in the financial market. Finally, there is no evidence to conclude that the existence of the lender of last resort mitigated the liquidity constraints in bank portfolio adjustments.     

Debt monetization,inflation, and the ‘neutral’ interest rate

The main purpose of this study is to explore the potential expansionary effect stemming from the monetization of debt. We develop a simple macroeconomic model with Keynesian features and four sectors: creditor and debtor households, businesses, and the public sector. We show that such expansionary effect stems mainly from the reduction in the financial cost to servicing the public debt. The efficacy of the channel that operates allegedly through the compression of the risk/term premium on securities is found to be ambiguous. Finally, we show that countries that issue their own currency can avert getting stuck in a structural ‘liquidity trap’ provided their central banks are willing to monetize the debt created by a strong enough fiscal expansion.     

Public debt and financial development

We examine the role of public debt in financial development. The literature has highlighted its supportive role through providing collateral and benchmark. We contrast this “safe asset” view to a “lazy banks” view: developing banking sectors that lend mainly to the public sector may develop more slowly, because it could make banks profitable but inefficient. Results from country-level and bank-level regressions are more supportive of the “lazy banks” view, but the “safe asset” view seems to play a role at moderate levels of public debt held by banks. There is also evidence of a harmful interaction between public debt and financial repression.     

No more discount under enhanced fair value hierarchy

We use an integrated approach to analyse the reasons behind the discount on the balance-sheet fair value of illiquid financial instruments held by European banks and classified into the Level 3 Fair Value hierarchy under IFRS 7. We believe that the potential sources of misalignment are (1) the lack of disclosure, (2) earnings management, and (3) the lack of liquidity. We show that the discount implicit in market values is linked to the lack of mandatory additional disclosure required by IFRS 7 and that this result supports the strong enforcement activity made by national authorities.     

Monetary–fiscal interactions with endogenous liquidity frictions

I develop a tractable macro model with endogenous asset liquidity to understand monetary–fiscal interactions with liquidity frictions. Agents face idiosyncratic investment risks and meet financial intermediaries in competitive search markets. Asset liquidity is determined by the search friction and the cost of operating the financial intermediaries, and it drives the financing constraints of entrepreneurs (those who have investment projects) and their ability to invest. In contrast to private assets, government bonds are fully liquid and can be accumulated in anticipation of future opportunities to invest. A higher level of real government debt enhances the liquidity of entrepreneurs׳ portfolios and raises investment. However, the issuance of debt also raises the cost of financing government expenditures: a higher level of distortionary taxation and/or a higher real interest rate. A long-run optimal supply of government debt emerges. I also show that a proper mix of monetary and fiscal policies can avoid a deep financial recession.     

优化金融供给结构防范流动性风险*

2018年以后，中国经济金融运行中出现了三对相互关联的“两难选择”：“去杠杆”与“稳增长”之间的矛盾、资金“脱实向虚”与“脱虚向实”之间的矛盾、金融整治与防风险之间的矛盾。实施宽松的货币政策、加大向经济金融运行注入流动性，难以破解这些“两难选择”，甚至有可能引致南辕北辙的效应。破解之策在于：拓展商业票据市场、债券市场和股票市场，允许城乡居民和实体企业以资金供给者和资金需求者的身份直接进入金融市场；加快发展资产管理市场，将金融服务对象从法人机构向居民家庭扩展，推动实体企业的暂时闲置资金从存款（尤其是定期存款）转向现金管理（或资金管理）；形成以负面清单为基础的行为监管机制和监管沙盒机制。