有限责任效应下的公司负债刚性

本文提出并论证了在公司负债的有限责任效应下,财务经理具有只愿意增加负债资本而不愿只增加权益资本的动机,导致实践中公司确定的最优负债水平一般高于传统模型下的负债水平且公司负债融资具有刚性倾向的结论,从另一个角度解释了资本结构理论的相对于权益融资为什么财务经理更偏好干负债筹资的现象。     

Imperfect competition in financial markets and capital structure

We consider a model of corporate finance with imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries. Firms can finance projects either via debt or via equity. Because of asymmetric information about firms’ growth opportunities, equity financing involves a dilution cost. Nevertheless, equity emerges in equilibrium whenever financial intermediaries have sufficient market power. In the latter case, best firms issue debt while the less profitable firms are equity-financed. We also show that strategic interaction between oligopolistic intermediaries results in multiple equilibria. If one intermediary chooses to buy more debt, the price of debt decreases, so the best equity-issuing firms switch from equity to debt financing. This in turn decreases average quality of equity-financed pool, so other intermediaries also shift towards more debt.     

股权结构、债务治理与“效率悖论”——基于A股上市公司的经验数据

我国上市公司债务治理效应整体偏弱,公司业绩与债务水平显著负相关,但由于直接财务效应影响的差异性,以及债务期限结构、公司控制人性质、股权集中度和流通股比重等因素的作用,使债务水平具有较好的托宾Q效应,从而出现效率悖论现象。改善债务期限结构,增强金融机构对外信贷的预算约束和监控力度,加强国有投资主体对控股公司的约束力,强化股权制衡关系,加强证券市场建设,是解决这一问题的主要途径。     

中国上市公司融资偏好问题的重新审视

基于对中国上市公司股本融资偏好问题的重新审视,我们发现:(1)如果将短期债务考虑在内并剔除首次公开募股的影响,股本融资偏好就不复存在;(2)在企业债务比率的调整过程中,融资缺口所起的作用超过了传统的企业特征因素,这意味着顺序偏好理论能在一定程度上解释企业的融资行为;(3)股票市场状况和政府管制政策会对企业外部融资的构成产生一定的影响。以上经验证据表明,中国上市公司的融资行为并不像原先所想的那样独特,主流的资本结构理论对企业的债务政策具有相当的解释能力。     

资本结构对财务风险影响的实证研究——基于Z-score模型法和中小板上市公司数据

以2012年160家中小板上市公司为样本数据,定量分析股权结构、债务结构和所有者权益构成等对中小企业财务风险的影响。研究表明中国中小企业上市公司资本结构对财务风险影响的回归模型拟合优度良好,财务风险水平整体上较低,财务运行状况良好。     

上市公司控制权争夺的动机及其特征

本文结合国内外研究成果以及我国当前的市场环境,对可能成为控制权争夺目标的公司会具备什么样的财务特征、股权结构以及公司治理进行了分析,以寻找上市公司控制权争夺的真正动机和目的.我们研究发现:上市公司经营业绩越差,债务比率越高,当年具有增发或配股资格,产权的可转让性越低,产权性质为国有企业和终极控制人为国有企业或政府机构时,其控制权被争夺的可能性也越高.     

The impact of cross‐ownership on the reaction of corporate investment and financing constraints: A panel threshold model

This paper studies whether or not investment decisions are financially constrained in a cross‐ownership system of Taiwan. Different from the financial structure in the USA, subsidiaries in Taiwan are allowed to buy stocks of the parent companies. Hence, the conventional debt‐to‐equity ratio is inappropriate to divide firms into high and low‐debt firms. Instead, a new threshold variable?–?the adjusted debt–equity ratio (ADE)?–?is employed to divide the sample into high‐debt firms and low‐debt firms. A panel of 115 Taiwan‐listed firms for the period 1991–1997 is used. Evidence supports the cash flow hypothesis and ADE has a notable significant influence on the financial constraints.     

Debt markets and corporate debt structure in an emerging market: The South African example

This is a first attempt at gauging the effects of corporate public debt issuance on the debt structure, risk profile and valuation of firms in an emerging market. We find that financial services firms, along with government institutions, are important early supporters of an organized public debt market. Firms in this market use equity, public debt and private debt funds simultaneously as need be. Consistent with predictions of the corporate debt structure literature, public debt-issuing firms are larger, older, more profitable, and less informational opaque than non-public debt-issuing firms. Moreover, public debt-issuing firms experience significant reductions in both overall and systematic risks, and incur lower cost of capital following issuance than non-public debt issuers. These and other findings of the study suggest deepening national debt markets can be a fruitful financial market development exercise for emerging markets.     

我国上市公司资本结构的问题、成因及其优化——以我国三大行业上市公司为例

目前,我国上市公司的资本结构存在外源融资较多、内源融资较少,债务融资较少、股权融资较多,流动负债较多、长期负债较少等问题。我国资本市场发展不完善、公司治理结构不健全、公司利润分配不合理等是导致上述问题的主要原因。为了优化我国上市公司的资本结构,必须完善资本市场结构,完善公司治理结构,努力提高公司的盈利水平。     

Capital Structure under Costly Enforcement*

We consider financial structure and repayment behavior in a setting where cash flows are private information to the entrepreneur and the cost of enforcing repayment differs across security holders. If enforcement costs are lower for shareholders than for creditors, a mixed capital structure with debt and equity can obtain in equilibrium. Under a mixed capital structure, creditors intervene in low cash‐flow states while shareholders intervene in high cash‐flow states. Moreover, strategic defaults, costly bankruptcy, shareholder intervention, and violation of absolute priority occur with positive probability on the equilibrium path. Several of the predictions from our framework are consistent with evidence not readily explainable by existing theories.     

Taxes,risk taking,and financial stability

After the global financial crisis, the use of taxes to enhance financial stability received new attention. This paper analyzes the corrective role of taxes in banking and compares two instruments, namely, an allowance for corporate equity (ACE), which mitigates the debt bias in corporate taxation, and a Pigovian tax on bank debt (bank levy). We emphasize financial stability gains driven by lower bank asset risk and develop a principal-agent model, in which risk taking depends on the bank's capital structure and, by extension, on the tax treatment of debt and equity. We find that (i) the ACE unambiguously reduces risk taking, (ii) bank levies reduce risk taking if they are independent of bank performance but may be counterproductive otherwise, and (iii) taxes are especially effective if regulatory capital requirements are constrained to low levels.     

ENDOGENOUS DEBT‐EQUITY RATIO AND BALANCE‐SHEET CHANNEL: IMPLICATIONS FOR GROWTH AND WELFARE

This paper endogenizes the debt‐equity ratio and embodies financial leverage in a cash‐in‐advance model of endogenous growth. Our analysis finds that the debt‐equity ratio is positively related to the balanced‐growth rate, since it serves as a ‘financial accelerator’ to stimulate investment projects. Compared to previous studies, this positive relationship gives rise to an additional balance‐sheet effect, which substantially affects the macroeconomic consequences of monetary and taxation policies. Due to the existence of the balance‐sheet effect, we also find that the Friedman rule is not necessarily optimal.     

An endogenous structural credit risk model incorporating with moral hazard and rollover risk

In this paper, we embed optimal contracting between the manager and equity holders into Leland-Toft endogenous structural credit risk model to study the impact of moral hazard on the firm's credit risk with rollover debts. Our model quantitatively shows that the agency costs induced by the moral hazard can endogenously have significant impacts on credit spreads, besides the costs of rolling over the maturing debts of the firm. It originates from the conflicts that these two costs should be covered by equity holders while both the manager and maturing debt holders are still paid in full. The numerical results show that the credit spread with the agency costs of moral hazard is larger than the one without the agency costs. Thus, the moral hazard could be used to explain “credit spread puzzle” as an endogenous factor. The explicit formulae of the equity value, the debt value, and the endogenous default boundary are also given.     

Patterns of Corporate Financing and Financial System Convergence in Europe

The paper investigates the possibility of convergence in the European Union (EU) in terms of the patterns of corporate financing by banks, bond markets, and stock markets; and in the context of whether the economies are converging towards an Anglo‐Saxon (capital‐market‐oriented) or a continental (bank‐oriented) financial system. GMM estimation of a dynamic fixed‐effects model is implemented to test for conditional and unconditional convergence using a panel of flow of funds data for the period 1972–1996 for seven EU member countries. It is found that the pattern of corporate financing is consistent with the pecking order theory of financing choices. Overall, the evidence suggests convergence of the EU financial systems on a variant of the Anglo‐Saxon model, depicting heavy reliance on internal financing as well as direct financing via equity and bond markets, while bank debt is becoming relatively less important.     

R&D financing and growth

ABSTRACT

R&D investment are an important engine of growth and development. Yet economists have often claimed underinvestment, based on the consideration that these projects are more costly to finance, especially, due to the asymmetric information between inside and outside investors. Coherently, a recent empirical evidence has shown that firms intensively active in R&D are less leveraged and rely more heavily on internal finance. Motivated by this evidence, we study the effects of asymmetric information and financial frictions within a GE economy of Schumpeterian tradition. The model and equilibrium concept are rich enough to represent investment and innovation decisions, technology adoption/diffusion through patent licensing and, most importantly, firms' financial decisions. In this representation, R&D-intensive firms might effectively rely more on internal sources and equity than on debt financing, relative to what would happen in frictionless markets. Further, financial decisions affect aggregate investment and income dynamics.     

产险业资本结构与承保风险对获利能力的影响——基于结构方程模型的实证分析

文章以资本结构理论为基础,利用国内产险公司2001～2004年的财务数据,运用结构方程模型探讨产险公司资本结构与承保风险对获利能力的影响。实证结果发现,资本结构的变化对我国产险公司的获利能力有正负两方面的影响,而资本结构与风险之间是相互影响的。当不考虑风险的影响时,资产负债率的提高会增强公司的获利能力,而随着资产负债率的提高,公司承保风险加大,对公司的获利能力有显著的负向影响。因此,产险公司不应一味地通过提高资产负债率来取得短期获利,还应注意控制风险,增强长期获利能力。     

市场时机效应难以对资本结构产生持久性影响的原因——基于债务成本视角的实证研究

提出投资者情绪影响资本结构选择的一条渠道,即价格偏离会造成企业债权人预期变化,进而影响债务成本、融资约束,最终改变经理人的融资决策。应用我国上市公司1999—2008年的财务数据进行横截面实证检验。结果表明:市场情绪在很大程度影响上市公司的债务融资成本;在投资者非理性假设下,考虑市场情绪对债务成本的影响并结合市场时机理论才能解释上市公司的长期资本结构选择的经验数据。     

How does equity capital cost affect bank performance during a financial crisis?

This article theoretically examines how equity capital cost affects return performance and safety of a bank and how this effect varies across a financial crisis comparing to a normal time when the bank manager’s performance reveals the like of higher equity return and the dislike of higher equity risk. We derive two main results. First, an increase in the bank’s equity capital cost from an increase of the interest rate of the Federal funds results in a reduced loan risk-taking at an increased optimal bank interest margin, implying better bank performance. Second, by ignoring the dislike, we find that the better performance is reinforced during a financial crisis but is reduced during a normal time. Financial crises and the dislike preference as such contribute a relatively low return and the stability of banking activities.     

Implications of manager replacement: evidence from the Spanish mutual fund industry

We analyse the financial consequences of manager replacement in a sample that includes all domestic and European equity funds in Spain. Specifically, we examine a total of 104 funds of the sample that experience manager turnover over the period 1999–2009. We find that underperforming funds in the pre-replacement period experience a significant improvement in the excess returns and performance after the manager change, an improvement that lasts over time for domestic equity funds. The analysis of the risk profile indicates that funds experiencing a manager change do not show significantly different levels of risk before the replacement dates although they tend to show an increase in the level of total risk after the change. Finally, the pool-regression analysis of the investment flows confirms that manager changes tend to impact negatively on subsequent flows of those funds with manager turnover.     

RETURNS TO DEBT AND EQUITY IN FARM PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS

While the capital structure irrelevance proposition is the point of departure in corporate finance, it is unknown if debt‐or‐equity decisions matter to farm producer organizations. To inform decisions of capital acquisition, a panel study is conducted to estimate the relationships of different types of debt (current, long‐term) and equity (allocated, unallocated) to the financial performance of 707 farm producer organizations in the United States during the 2005–2011 period. Using 3,120 observations, the panel analysis indicates net sales in period t is increased by $1.97, $9.59, and $4.01 with an addition of $1 in current debt, allocated equity, or unallocated equity in period t_‐1. Furthermore, the magnitude of the positive relationship of an additional dollar of allocated (unallocated) equity to net income is estimated at $0.32 ($0.14). We thus reject the notion managers and directors of farm producer organizations should decide to use debt or equity with a coin toss.