Demand–supply imbalances in the credit default swap market: empirical evidence

This paper empirically examines demand–supply imbalances in the credit default swap (CDS) market and provides evidence of its effect on the CDS spread dynamics. Analysis is conducted on a large and homogenous data set of the 92 non-financial European companies with the most quoted Euro-denominated CDS contracts during the 2002–2008 period. Main findings indicate that short-term CDS price movements, not related to fundamentals, are positively affected by demand–supply imbalances when protection buyers outstrip protection sellers. Results illustrate that CDS spreads reflect not only the price of credit protection, but also a liquidity premium for the anticipated cost of unwinding the position of protection sellers, especially during stress periods.     

Conflicts of interest,information provision,and competition in the financial services industry

In some markets sellers have better information than buyers over which products best serve a buyer's needs. Depending on the market structure, this may lead to conflicts of interest in the provision of information by sellers. This paper studies this issue in the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, where price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We also compare conflicts of interest in two different firm structures, specialized banking and one-stop banking.     

The anatomy of buyer–seller dynamics in decentralized markets

In this paper I investigate the nexus between buyer–seller dynamics, financial frictions and market efficiency in decentralized markets. To do so, I introduce financial frictions in a dynamic market with heterogeneous traders. Heterogeneously constrained buyers sequentially enter the market to acquire units of a generic good from heterogeneously endowed sellers. I characterize two closely related classes of equilibria, respectively called homogeneous equilibrium with no entry (HEWNE) and homogeneous equilibrium with entry (HEWE). Both equilibria prescribe a market where only the efficiently endowed type of seller exists in the limit. However, the two equilibria diverge in the specification of agents’ behavior subsequent to trade. In HEWNE, sellers and buyers exit the market upon successful trading. In HEWE, like in supply chains, in every period certain types of buyers replace exiting sellers, thus becoming potential sellers for subsequent waves of buyers. First, I identify the critical role of frictions in steering the complex evolution of market heterogeneity for both classes of equilibria. Secondly, I operationalize the combined study of HEWNE and HEWE to obtain sharp predictions on market efficiency for a range of empirically-relevant situations in which buyer–seller dynamics are decoupled, for example when entry of new sellers is delayed or stopped. Third, I test the theoretical findings against a simulated artificial market.     

Taxes and the Theory of Trade Debt

In this paper, we show that taxes motivate the flow of trade credit without involving the assumption of credit market imperfections. The direction of trade credit flow depends on the distribution of marginal tax rates among buyers and sellers. In equilibrium, the trade credit decision follows a tax-induced clientele on both the supply and demand side.     

Pricing forward contracts in power markets by the certainty equivalence principle: Explaining the sign of the market risk premium

In this paper we provide a framework that explains how the market risk premium, defined as the difference between forward prices and spot forecasts, depends on the risk preferences of market players and the interaction between buyers and sellers. In commodities markets this premium is an important indicator of the behavior of buyers and sellers and their views on the market spanning between short-term and long-term horizons. We show that under certain assumptions it is possible to derive explicit solutions that link levels of risk aversion and market power with market prices of risk and the market risk premium. We apply our model to the German electricity market and show that the market risk premium exhibits a term structure which can be explained by the combination of two factors. Firstly, the levels of risk aversion of buyers and sellers, and secondly, how the market power of producers, relative to that of buyers, affects forward prices with different delivery periods.     

Limited Investment Capital and Credit Spreads

Using proprietary credit default swap (CDS) data, I investigate how capital shocks at protection sellers impact pricing in the CDS market. Seller capital shocks—measured as CDS portfolio margin payments—account for 12% of the time‐series variation in weekly spread changes, a significant amount given that standard credit factors account for 18% during my sample. In addition, seller shocks possess information for spreads that is independent of institution‐wide measures of constraints. These findings imply a high degree of market segmentation, and suggest that frictions within specialized financial institutions prevent capital from flowing into the market at shorter horizons.     

Distortions in Real Estate Transactions with Out-of-State Participants

Using the MLS and the land registration data from Indiana, this paper identifies and explains price distortions associated with out-of-state sellers and buyers in the housing market. We find that out-of-state buyers pay 20.4% higher prices than local buyers, and the premium is fully explained by the former purchasing larger homes than the latter. On the other hand, out-of-state sellers receive a 21.2% price discount, among which 9.3% is attributable to differences in transactional characteristics, 3.2% is explained by increased motivation and weak bargaining power of out-of-state sellers, and 1.5% is due to differences in agent characteristics and behaviours. The remaining 7.2% discount varies systematically with the informational disadvantage of out-of-state sellers, and with the market condition. Our results are robust to model misspecification.     

Trade Credit Terms: Asymmetric Information and Price Discrimination Evidence From Three Continents

Abstract:   Trade credit terms offer firms contractual solutions to informational asymmetries between buyers and sellers. The credit period permits buyers to reduce uncertainty concerning product quality prior to payment, while the seller can reduce uncertainty concerning buyer payment intentions by prescribing payment before/on delivery or through two‐part payment terms and other mechanisms. Variation in trade credit terms also offers firms price discriminating opportunities. This study, drawing on the responses of 700 large firms in the US, UK and Australia, explores trade credit terms through the twin objectives of reducing information asymmetries and discriminatory pricing. Support is found for both theories.     

Selling price,financing premiums,and days on the market

Home buyers face the task of trading off selling price and the time required to sell a property. One factor that may affect this decision is the presence of financing premiums. The effects of financing premiums on the time a single-family home remains on the market is examined in this paper. The question is to what extent home sellers are willing to compromise on financing premiums and make concessions to buyers in order to sell their properties more quickly.The study uses a sample of single-family residential homes sold with assumption financing and new conventional financing. The sample covers segments of time when interest rates were relatively low and stable (1975–1976) and when rates were much higher on average and more volatile (1980).The results show that financing premiums were present in selling prices of assumption-financed home sales during the 1975–1976 period and that sellers were able to capture a premium and maintain the same average time on the market as properties with other types of financing. During a period of unfavorable market conditions, such as 1980, the results indicate that home sellers with assumption financing conceded or negotiated away any premium in order to significantly decrease the number of days their properties stayed on the market for sale.     

Search Costs,Behavioral Biases,and Information Intermediary Effects

In many markets, buyers, sellers, and their agents have differential information about the quality of heterogeneous assets. We study negotiated transaction prices in the commercial real estate market, which is characterized by heterogeneous assets, illiquidity, and highly segmented local markets, all of which increase the importance of asymmetric information in negotiated pricing outcomes. Using 114,588 industrial, multi-family and office sale transactions that occurred during 1997–2011, we document that distant commercial real estate buyers pay, on average, premiums of 4 % to 15 % relative to local buyers, controlling for individual property characteristics as well as time fixed-effects. We also examine the extent to which the sources of these observed premiums are a product of higher search costs/information asymmetry problems associated with distance (search cost channel) or a result of reference-dependence preference/anchoring based on the price levels in the investors’ local market (behavioral biases channel). Our results suggest the observed price premiums are explained by distant investors who face higher search costs and are at an information disadvantage compared to investors located in closer proximity to the property. In contrast, anchoring plays a more muted role in explaining observed premiums. The use of an intermediary (broker) increases, on average, the acquisition prices of buyers and decreases the disposition prices of sellers by 3 % to 8 %. This result is consistent with the incentive real estate agents have to convince sellers to dispose of their properties too quickly and to convince buyers to search less and therefore pay higher prices.     

Investor behaviour and reaching for yield: Evidence from the sterling corporate bond market

We provide evidence on how corporate bond investors react to a change in yields, and how this behaviour differs in times of market‐wide stress. We also investigate ‘reaching for yield’ across investor types, as well as providing insights into the structure of the corporate bond market. Using proprietary sterling corporate bond transaction data, we show that insurance companies, hedge funds and asset managers are typically net buyers when corporate bond yields rise. Dealer banks clear the market by being net sellers. However, we find evidence for this behaviour reversing in times of stress for some investors. During the 2013 ‘taper tantrum’, asset managers were net sellers of corporate bonds in response to a sharp rise in yields, potentially amplifying price changes. At the same time, dealer banks were net buyers. Finally, we provide evidence that insurers, hedge funds and asset managers tilt their portfolios towards higher risk bonds, consistent with ‘reaching for yield’ behaviour.     

Private and Public Merger Waves

We document that public firms participate more than private firms as buyers and sellers of assets in merger waves and their participation is affected more by credit spreads and aggregate market valuation. Public firm acquisitions realize higher gains in productivity, particularly for on‐the‐wave acquisitions and when the acquirer's stock is liquid and highly valued. Our results are not driven solely by public firms' better access to capital. Using productivity data from early in the firm's life, we find that better private firms subsequently select to become public. Initial size and productivity predict asset purchases and sales 10 and more years later.     

Optimal Portfolio Choices, House Risk Hedging and the Pricing of Forward House Transactions

This paper develops a utility indifference model for evaluating various prices associated with forward transactions in the housing market, based on the equivalent principle of expected wealth utility derived from the forward and spot real estate markets. Our model results show that forward transactions in the housing market are probably not due to house sellers?? and buyers?? heterogeneity, but to their demand for hedging against house price risk. When the imperfections of real estate markets and the risk preferences of market participants are taken into consideration, we are able to show that the idiosyncratic risk premium, which mainly depends on the participants?? risk preferences and the correlation between the traded asset and the real estate, is a remarkable determinant of house sellers?? and buyers?? forward reservation prices. In addition, we also find that the market clearing forward price usually will not converge toward the expected risk-neutral forward price. The sellers?? or buyers?? risk aversion degrees and market powers are also identified to play crucial roles in determining the clearing forward price.     

GLAMOUR VERSUS VALUE: TRADING BEHAVIOR OF INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS

We design a new metric to measure the net buying and selling by institutions and individual investors and find that from 1980 to 2004 institutional investors were net buyers of growth stocks and net sellers of value stocks, implying that individual investors were net buyers of value stocks and net sellers of glamour stocks. The institutional preference for glamour and value stocks seems to be related to sell‐side analysts' recommendations and recent favorable stock price performances, especially during the post‐1994 period. Finally, the institutional buying of growth stocks and sale of value stocks was not based on superior information.     

Inflation and Welfare in Retail Markets: Prior Production and Imperfectly Directed Search

This paper considers the effect of monetary policy and inflation on retail markets: goods are dated and produced prior to being retailed; buyers direct their search on price and general quality; buyers’ match‐specific tastes are private information. Sellers set the same price for all buyers, some of whom do not value the good highly enough to buy it. The market economy is typically inefficient as a social planner would have the good consumed. Under free entry of sellers, the Friedman rule is optimal policy. When the upper bound on the number of participating sellers binds, moderate levels of inflation can be welfare improving.     

Spatial Competition and Shopping Externalities: Evidence from the Housing Market

In search markets, greater spatial concentration of sellers increases price competition. At the same time, though, a greater concentration of sellers can create a shopping externality by attracting more buyers to the site. Using housing sales data, we test for spatial competition and shopping externality effects on prices and marketing time. We find that they reflect both competitive and shopping externality effects from surrounding houses, although the relative strength varies with how fresh the house is in the market, the freshness of surrounding houses, and the phase of the market cycle. New listings have the strongest shopping externality effect on neighboring houses that have been on the market for some time. Vacant houses have their strongest competition effects in the declining market and externality effects in the rising market. Fresh houses on the market reap little benefit from shopping externalities in all phases of the market cycle.     

Liquidity and Information Asymmetry in the Real Estate Market

George Akerlof??s asymmetric information theory explains why lemons are rarely, if at all, transacted. We extend his theory to explain liquidity in the second-hand real estate market. The idea is to decompose real estate into two components: land and the building structure. While sellers may know more about the quality of their structures than buyers, information on land, predominantly its locational attributes, is much more transparent. Without assuming any credit constraints or loss aversion behaviour, our information asymmetry model shows that: 1) the liquidity of real estate increases with the share of its land value; 2) there is a positive relationship between real estate prices and turnover rates when land supply is more inelastic than the supply of structures; 3) the positive relationship is stronger when the land value component gets smaller; and 4) while the availability of first-hand real estate may divert demand away from the second-hand market, such a substitution effect is weaker when the land value component is large. These four implications were confirmed with panel data analysis using Hong Kong??s housing transactions from 1992 to 2008 across 50 districts.     

Fear of rejection? Tiered certification and transparency

Product quality certifiers may not reveal the identity of unsuccessful applicants/sellers for three reasons. First, they respond to the desire of individual sellers to avoid the stigma from rejection. Second, nontransparency helps a certifier to increase his market power by raising the stigma from lower‐tier certification. Third, transparency does not help screen among heterogeneous sellers. Strategic complementarities arise as sellers move down the certification pecking order and lead to the stigmatization of the lower tiers. Mandating transparency benefits the sellers but has an ambiguous impact on buyers, who actually become less informed about product quality.     

Asymmetric information and the death of ABS CDOs

A key feature of the 2007 financial crisis is that for many securities trading had ceased; where trading did occur, market prices were well below intrinsic values, especially for ABS CDOs. One explanation is that information had been asymmetric, with sellers having better information than buyers. We first show the information advantages sellers had over buyers in both the issuance of CDOs and, through vertical integration, performance of the CDO collateral that could well have disrupted trading after the onset of the crisis. Using a “workhorse” model for pricing securities under asymmetric information and a novel dataset, we show how adverse selection could explain why the bulk of these securities either traded at significant discounts or did not trade at all.     

Determinants of bid and ask quotes and implications for the cost of trading

Financial transaction costs are time varying. This paper proposes a model that relates transaction cost to characteristics of order flow. We obtain qualitatively consistent model results for different stocks and across different time periods. We find that an unusual excess of buyers (sellers) relative to sellers (buyers) tends to increase the ask (bid) price. Hence, the ask and bid components of spread change asymmetrically about the efficient price. For a fixed order imbalance surprise these effects are muted when unanticipated total volume is high. Unexpected high volatility in the transaction price process tends to widen the spread symmetrically about the efficient price. Our findings are consistent with predications from market microstructure theory that the cost of market making should depend on both the risk of trading with better-informed traders and inventory risk. We also find that order flow surprises have a significant impact on the efficient price and can also explain a substantial amount of persistence in the volatility of the efficient price. This dependence does not violate the efficient market hypothesis since the surprises, by definition, are not predictable.