Cross‐border Mergers and Greenfield Foreign Direct Investment

This paper presents a model of international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), where FDI is comprised of greenfield FDI and mergers and acquisitions (M&A). In a monopolistically competitive environment merging firms do not reduce competition. Mergers are motivated by efficiency gains and transfer of technology. Following empirical evidence, greenfield investors are modeled as more productive than M&A firms, which are in turn more productive than exporters. The model has two symmetric countries and generates two‐way flows of both M&A and greenfield FDI. Trade liberalization makes more firms choose greenfield FDI over M&A and leads to lower productivity and welfare.     

Merger and acquisition FDI,relative wealth and relative access to bank credit: Evidence from a bivariate zero-inflated count model

We use a bivariate zero-inflated negative binomial model to examine Japanese merger and acquisition (M&A) FDI jointly with other types of Japanese FDI (or non-M&A FDI) into the United States. We find that for firms likely to engage in FDI, their rates of FDI are affected by the financial health of their main banks. However, only the rate of M&A FDI is affected by relative wealth. The rate of non-M&A FDI is affected by profitability and firm size. Our findings show the importance of distinguishing M&A FDI from non-M&A FDI and of considering the two types of FDI jointly.     

Good and useless FDI: The growth effects of greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions

We explore the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on economic growth, distinguishing between mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and “greenfield” investment. A simple model underlines that, unlike greenfield investment, M&As partly represent a rent accruing to previous owners, and do not necessarily contribute to expanding the host country's capital stock. Greenfield FDI should therefore have a stronger impact on growth than M&A sales. This hypothesis is supported by our empirical results that are based on a panel of up to 127 industrialized, emerging, and developing countries over 1990 to 2010.     

Investment Liberalization and Cross‐Border Acquisitions: The Effect of Partial Foreign Ownership

This paper investigates the optimal strategy for a multinational to conduct FDI. We find that the incentives to use acquisition rather than greenfield investment change significantly if the multinational is allowed to have already an ownership interest in the target local firm before the market is fully liberalized. Interestingly, when investment costs are sufficiently high, the multinational prefers not entering the market at all with partial ownership in place, whereas a cross‐border takeover would be the optimal entry mode otherwise. For intermediate levels of entry costs, holding a stake in the local producer reverses positively the profitability of a full acquisition compared to greenfield investment.     

Vertical alliance and vertical integration for the inflow of technology and new product development in the pharmaceutical industry

Pharmaceutical firms are increasingly seeking vertical alliance (licensing and joint venture) or bridges and vertical integration (merger and acquisition, M&A) or buffers. However, the question remains whether alliance and integration modes of organisation contribute to the clinical trials activities for a new product development. Using data on 250 pharmaceutical firms, this study examines the linkage between the external technology-sourcing modes and an increase in clinical trials activities, advancing new product development. The findings indicate that licensing mode may not be an effective in comparison to joint ventures and M&A modes of the organisation. Comparing the two modes – vertical joint venture (bridges) and vertical integration (buffer) – the former appears to be effective than the latter (M&A) in sourcing external technology acquisition in the pharmaceutical industry. Implications of these findings are addressed in terms of strategy and structure in a broader context.     

Foreign direct investment in vertically related markets

We study an MNE's choice of FDI mode in a vertically related market with local input sourcing. We show how the market's vertical structure and trading features affect this choice. An MNE's incentives to expand through cross-border acquisition rather than through greenfield investment are stronger in markets with higher upstream bargaining power, upstream concentration and unobservable contract terms. The opposite holds in markets in which wholesale price contracts, instead of two-part tariffs, are used. Our welfare analysis suggests that the host country should not always welcome FDI and should discourage FDI through acquisition.     

Fire‐sale FDI? The Impact of Financial Crises on Foreign Direct Investment

We analyze the evolution of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to developing and emerging countries around financial crises. We empirically examine the Fire‐Sale FDI hypothesis and describe the pattern of FDI inflows surrounding financial crises. We also add a more granular detail about the types of financial crises and their potentially differential effects on FDI. We distinguish between mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and greenfield investment, as well as between horizontal (tariff jumping) and vertical (integrating production stages) FDI. We find that financial crises have a strong negative effect on inward FDI in our sample. Crises are also shown to reduce the value of horizontal and vertical FDI. We do not find empirical evidence of fire‐sale FDI; on the contrary, financial crises are shown to affect FDI flows and M&A activity negatively.     

FDI Policy,Greenfield Investment and Cross‐border Mergers

This paper examines a multinational's choice between greenfield investment and cross‐border merger when it enters another country via foreign direct investment (FDI) and faces the host country's FDI policy. Greenfield investment incurs a fixed plant setup cost, whereas the foreign firm obtains only a share of the joint profit from a cross‐border merger under the restriction of the FDI policy. This trade‐off is affected by market demand, cost differential, and market competition, among other things. The host country's government chooses its FDI policy to affect (or alter) the multinational's entry mode to achieve the maximum social welfare for the domestic country. We characterize the conditions shaping the optimal FDI policy and offer intuitions on FDI patterns in developing and developed countries.     

Greenfield FDI and skill upgrading: A polarized issue

Outbound FDI is often accused of increasing income inequality in developed countries by shifting labour demand from low‐skilled towards high‐skilled workers (wage polarization). In response, we employ data on greenfield FDI that, in contrast to M&As, may be more clearly linked to skill upgrading. Our data also delineate greenfield FDI by sector, function and destination, allowing us to control for different motives and skill intensities for 17 developed countries for 2003–2005. We find that greenfield FDI in support services, e.g., back and front office services, induces polarized skill upgrading, benefitting high‐skilled workers at the expense of medium‐skilled workers, thereby polarizing wages.     

An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment

We develop an assignment theory to analyse the volume and composition of foreign direct investment (FDI). Firms conduct FDI by either engaging in greenfield investment or in cross-border acquisitions. Cross-border acquisitions involve firms trading heterogeneous corporate assets to exploit complementarities, while greenfield FDI involves setting up a new production division in the foreign country. In equilibrium, greenfield FDI and cross-border acquisitions coexist within the same industry, but the composition of FDI between these modes varies with firm and country characteristics. Firms engaging in greenfield investment are systematically more efficient than those engaging in cross-border acquisitions. Furthermore, most FDI takes the form of cross-border acquisitions when production-cost differences between countries are small, while greenfield investment plays a more important role for FDI from high-cost into low-cost countries. These results capture important features of the data.     

Direct Foreign Investment Versus Licensing

This paper examines the choice among alternative modes of direct foreign investment, namely, the wholly owned subsidiary (the S option) and joint venture (the J option), vis-à-vis licensing (the L option). The focus is on the role of moral hazard, difference in risk attitude and the prospect of the host country's policy toward the venture. An apparently surprising result is that riskiness of the project is a factor against the J option. Moreover, in the absence of policy intervention, L is dominated by either S or J, whereas if there is an anticipation of policy intervention (i.e., there is a policy moral hazard) L may emerge as the best option.     

The duration of international joint ventures an foreign wholly-owned subsidiaries

An international joint venture is formed when the partners contribute different benefits to the venture. Each party learns from the others through the joint venture. However, the literature suggests that joint ventures are unstable. So it is hypothesized that, on average, an international joint venture will have a shorter duration than a foreign wholly-owned subsidiary. Data on US foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad and FDI in the United States are applied to test the instability of joint ventures. The proportional hazards model is applied while exponential distribution and Weibull distribution are used to cross-check the results. On the whole, the results are consistent with the hypothesis. In particular, the two types of US affiliates are significantly different in duration although the support for the hypothesis from FDI in the United States is weak.     

Determinants of Chinese direct investments in the European Union

This article analyses the determinants of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) activities in the European Union (EU). Evidence is based on panel Poisson models drawing on two investment monitors at the individual project level. Greenfield investments (GI) and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are distinguished. The findings indicate that market size and bilateral trade are the main factors for Chinese investment in the EU. In contrast, business-friendly institutions do not foster FDI. Probably, Chinese investors are risk averse, and prefer regions with less competitive markets. The striking difference between GIs and M&As is related to unit labour costs. Higher costs make the host country less attractive for the establishment of new firms, but do not affect the involvement in existing firms. The sectoral dispersion of Chinese FDI in the EU did not change much since the global financial crisis. Most relevant shifts have occurred in research and development (R&D), where low-income EU countries have become increasingly attractive.     

Risky business: Institutions vs. social networks in FDI

Political economy scholarship on foreign direct investment (FDI) emphasizes variation in host country political risk but overlooks variation in investors' sensitivity to political risk. We show that relational contracting, relationship‐based contract enforcement, is more efficient for high‐risk, human capital‐intensive activities for which the costs of writing legally enforceable contracts are prohibitive. We disaggregate FDI into two distinct varieties: mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and venture capital (VC). We propose that VC flows are less sensitive to host institutions but correlate strongly with skilled migrant networks that monitor compliance and impose reputational costs. Our empirical analysis of dyadic VC and M&A flows covers over 100 countries during 1980–2009. We address other mechanisms through which migrant networks facilitate FDI and verify our results hold at the country‐industry level. These findings suggest that relational contracting facilitates global integration of dynamic, knowledge‐intensive industries even when formal institutions are weak.     

FDI,Poverty, and the Politics of Potable Water Access

How does foreign direct investment (FDI) affect the wellbeing of the poor? We address this question by analyzing the impacts of FDI on access to potable water. We predict that higher levels of greenfield FDI in water‐intensive sectors slow the rate of access to potable water in developing countries, with these adverse effects conditional on subnational politics. We hypothesize that this is more likely to occur in polities marked by relatively large poor and marginalized populations, where regulatory capture is more likely to occur. To test our intuition, we analyze subnational data on greenfield FDI in India, confirming that multinational investment in “thirsty” manufacturing sectors are negatively associated with improvements in potable water access. We then present a controlled comparison case study of two Indian states, Kerala and Rajasthan, highlighting the political mechanisms conditioning FDI's effects on potable water.     

Analyzing Modes of Foreign Entry: Greenfield Investment versus Acquisition

This paper studies the entry decision of a multinational enterprise into a foreign market. Two alternative entry modes for a foreign direct investment are considered: greenfield investment versus acquisition. In contrast to existing approaches, the acquisition price and the profits under both entry modes are endogenously determined. Interestingly, we find that the optimal entry mode decision is affected by the competition intensity in the market in a nonmonotonic way. When markets are very much or very little competitive, greenfield investment is the optimal entry mode, while for intermediate values it is acquisition.     

Core competencies,matching and the structure of foreign direct investment

We develop a matching model of foreign direct investment to study how multinational firms choose between greenfield investment, acquisitions and joint ownership. Firms must invest in a continuum of tasks to bring a product to market. Each firm possesses a core competency in the task space, but the firms are otherwise identical. For acquisitions and joint ownership, a multinational enterprise (MNE) must match with a local partner that may provide complementary expertise within the task space. However, under joint ownership, investment in tasks is shared by multiple owners and, hence, is subject to a holdup problem that varies with contract intensity. In equilibrium, ex ante identical multinationals enter the local matching market, and, ex post, three different types of heterogeneous firms arise. Specifically, the worst matches are forgone and the MNEs invest greenfield; the middle matches operate under joint ownership; and the best matches integrate via full acquisition. We link the firm‐level model to cross‐country and industry predictions and find that a greater share of full acquisitions occur between more proximate markets, in hosts with greater revenue potential and within contract‐intensive industries. Using data on partial and full acquisitions across industries and countries, we find robust support for these predictions.     

Strategic timing in R&D agreements

We study the endogenous formation of R&D agreements in a R&D/Cournot duopoly model with spillovers where also the timing of R&D investments is endogenous. This allows us to consider the incentives for firms to sign R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are sufficiently low, firms may find difficult to maintain a stable agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In this case, the stability of an agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, thus avoiding any delay. When spillovers are sufficiently high, the coordination of R&D efforts becomes a profitable option, although firms may also have an incentive to sequence noncooperatively their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and knowledge mainly leaks from the leader to the follower, investing as follower may become extremely profitable, making R&D agreements hard to sustain unless firms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D.     

外商直接投资对中国经济影响分析

本文认为外商直接投资在中国的发展变化为：①发展有波折、但总体增长迅速；②由合作企业转向合资企业；③港台地区成为主要外资源地；④重点由服务业转向制造业；⑤主要集中于沿海地区。外商直接投资对中国经济的影响表现在：①资本总量和产出增长；②就业机会和劳力素质；③经济体制和管理体制：④技术引进；⑤市场扩大。     

Trade,foreign direct investment or acquisition: Optimal entry modes for multinationals

We examine multinationals' optimal entry modes into foreign markets as a function of market size, FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs. Our results highlight why large countries are more likely to attract acquisition investment, while intermediate sized countries may be served predominantly through trade, even in the presence of high tariffs. Small countries are most likely to experience either FDI or no entry. We also show how these results vary with the competition intensity in the host country.FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs are crucial not only in determining whether to engage in FDI or trade, but they are also shown to influence the acquisition choice as trade and FDI threats influence the acquisition price. Finally, we explore the welfare implications of tariff reductions for both the local firm and the multinational and investigate political motives to impose endogenous tariffs that influence not only the welfare of a local firm, but also the entry mode of the multinational.