Can money buy EU love?

We explore the role played by Cohesion Policy in the Brexit referendum and the subsequent 2017 general election. Although the UK has been a net contributor to the EU, some regions receive significant amounts of regional aid funds. We find that while Cohesion Policy is positively correlated with the remain vote, this relationship is weak. Most of the variation in the remain vote is explained by economic factors. In contrast, there is a robust negative correlation between Cohesion Policy and voter turnout. We estimate that had there not been this negative relationship, some 2 million more voters would have participated in the referendum, which is more than the winning margin between the remain and leave votes. Our analysis of the 2017 election suggests that Conservatives lost and Labour gained votes in the regions that benefited from Cohesion Policy, while remain-supporting regions showed gains for the Liberal Democrats.     

Brexit,the City and the Contingent Power of Finance

Brexit poses a profound challenge to the economic fortunes of the financial services sector in the United Kingdom (UK) because it threatens to sever access to the single market in the European Union (EU). Recognising this, the City of London’s largest financial firms and main representative bodies supported a Remain vote in the June 2016 referendum, and subsequently lobbied for a ‘soft’ Brexit policy to preserve the City’s lucrative passporting rights. Despite this, the government led by Theresa May pursued a ‘hard’ Brexit policy which threatened to leave the UK outside the single market. How can we explain the City’s apparent failure to influence the UK’s Brexit policy? We argue that whilst the UK financial sector wielded formidable latent structural power, its capacity to translate this into instrumental influence in the policy process was constrained by three factors: the political statecraft of Brexit, leading the government to downgrade the concerns of the financial industry; the reconfiguration of institutional structures, which undermined the City’s voice within government; and constraints on business organisation, caused by collective action problems and heterogeneous preferences. These three factors constitute important scope conditions which highlight the contingent power of finance in liberal market economies.     

UK's stock market reaction to Brexit process: A tale of two halves

We examine the UK's stock market reaction to 27 events associated with the likelihood of Brexit. Though the overall market reactions to these events is negative, a dissection of these events into the pre and post Brexit referendum events unearth interesting facts. In particular, we find that the market reaction is negative and significant to the events leading up to and including the announcement of Brexit results. This negative reaction is not confined to the day of announcement of the outcome of Brexit referendum only rather it spans over the events that enhanced the likelihood of the Brexit in the pre-Brexit referendum period. However, our results show a positive market reaction to events that occurred after the Brexit referendum. These findings suggest that initially market reacted negatively to the Brexit; however, as the UK's future economic relations with EU started to take a shape, the market started to see the positive side of Brexit. Consistent with this notion, our cross-sectional analysis shows a positive market reaction for the firms that are engaged in foreign sales and that much of the negative market's reaction relates to the firms that openly stated the negative effect of Brexit on their operations. Finally, we do not find evidence of market reaction to UK firms depending on European labor force; however, we do find significantly positive stock market reaction to the firms involved more in international trade. An important caveat of our study is that our reported results are sensitive to the choice of market index.     

Paying Our Way in the World? Visible and Invisible Dangers of Brexit

The UK economy has long been associated with a weak balance of payments, reflecting an underlying growth model reliant on private household consumption. A deficit in goods trade, chiefly with the EU, has been offset by surpluses in services trade and foreign investment earnings. The Single Market provided wider markets for the UK, but did not fundamentally alter Britain's structural weaknesses. The Brexit vote took place against the background of Britain running its largest peacetime current account deficit. Financing Britain's external position represents a key challenge post-Brexit. Post-Brexit models for Britain partially address this. Any emergent model will critically depend on the nature of the Brexit deal with the EU, not least in terms of the impact on financial services and on supply chains. This paper sets out the recent evolution of the UK's current account position, particularly in relation to the EU. It then highlights particular areas of potential disruption from Brexit and sketches out scenarios of possible evolution of the Britain's external position in response to this.     

Making sense of Brexit losses: An in-depth review of macroeconomic studies

Almost all economic assessments of Brexit conclude that there would be significant losses for both the UK and the EU. This paper examines the driving forces behind these results. We consider the strong economic relationships between the UK and EU both at the sectoral and macroeconomic levels that are at risk from Brexit. We review fifteen studies that explore various Brexit scenarios (hard and soft) and explain why their different methodologies and assumptions yield different degrees of economic damage. Our review concludes that GDP losses for the UK from a hard Brexit range from 1.6% to 7.8%, while a soft Brexit would moderate the losses by roughly half. We also find that potential UK trade agreements with third countries could partially compensate for significant Brexit losses.     

Growth effects of EU and EZ memberships: Empirical findings from the first 15 years of the Euro

One of the major economic reasons for the creation of the European Union (EU) and of the Euro-zone (EZ) was an expected bonus of economic growth for member countries. Whilst several studies exist on the growth bonus of EU membership, there are none for the EZ, the latest and deepest step of economic integration in Europe. The aim of this article is to investigate whether EU and EZ memberships enhance growth for their members. In order to perform our empirical analysis, we estimate different growth models restricting the time frame to the first 15 years of the Euro - from 1999 to 2013. We find a positive impact of EU membership on economic growth, but no impact of being part of the EZ, except during the financial crisis, when the EZ has a negative impact on growth amongst its members. Considering the heated political debate related to the Brexit referendum, our results favour a “yes” to the EU but a less clear answer when it comes to the EZ.     

The sectoral effects of Brexit on the British economy: early evidence from the reaction of the stock market

We investigate the impact of the outcome of the EU referendum (Brexit) on various sectors of the British economy over the period June–July 2016. Using the event study methodology, we assess the effects of Brexit, relative to what had been anticipated, as measured by abnormal returns (ARs). The results show that the banking and travel and leisure sectors were affected negatively, with a cumulative AR of ?15.37% for the banking sector. We observe that Brexit has a mixed effect on ARs with apparent sector-by-sector differences.     

Initial wealth effects of the Brexit vote on UK ADRs

On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom voted to exit the European Union. The outcome of this vote, called Brexit, impacted financial markets in the days following the vote results. This article investigates the impact of Brexit upon UK equities trading as American Depository Receipts (ADRs) on the New York Stock Exchange. On the day after the vote results were in, UK ADRs lost over 10% of their value with an additional loss of over 5% the following day. These losses were significantly greater than those of the S&P 500 and the FTSE 100 indexes.     

Policy uncertainty and international financial markets: the case of Brexit

ABSTRACT

This study assesses the impact of the Brexit probability on both the UK and on international financial markets, for the first and the second statistical moments. As financial markets are by nature highly interlinked, one might expect that the uncertainty engendered by Brexit also has an impact on financial markets in several other countries. We first estimate the time-varying interactions between UK policy uncertainty, which to a large extent is attributed to uncertainty about Brexit and UK financial market volatilities. Second, we use two other measures of the perceived probability of Brexit before the referendum, namely daily data released by Betfair and results of polls published by Bloomberg. Based on these data sets, and using both panel and single-country SUR estimation methods, we analyse the Brexit effect on levels of stock returns, sovereign CDS, 10-year interest rates in 19 predominantly European countries, and those of the British pound and the euro. We show that Brexit-induced policy uncertainty will continue to cause instability in key financial markets and has the potential to damage the real economy in both the UK and other European countries. The main losers outside the UK are the ‘GIIPS’ economies: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.     

The Political Economy of Brexit and the Future of British Capitalism First Symposium

The political economy of Brexit generates new challenges for the UK’s national business model and for European capitalism more broadly. Two symposia examine the implications of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU in key economic policy areas. These symposia contribute to two main bodies of academic literature: the political economy literature on varieties of capitalism, with a specific focus on the UK, and the political economy literature on key economic policy areas of the EU. This short introduction to the first symposium first outlines the key features of the British variety of capitalism and highlight the main questions raised by Brexit in that respect. It then summarises the main findings of the papers of the first symposium and tease out some common themes.     

Who voted for Brexit? Individual and regional data combined

Previous analyses of the 2016 Brexit referendum used region-level data or small samples based on polling data. The former might be subject to ecological fallacy and the latter might suffer from small-sample bias. We use individual-level data on thousands of respondents in Understanding Society, the UK's largest household survey, which includes the EU referendum question. We find that voting Leave is associated with older age, white ethnicity, low educational attainment, infrequent use of smartphones and the internet, receiving benefits, adverse health and low life satisfaction. These results coincide with corresponding patterns at the aggregate level of voting areas. We therefore do not find evidence of ecological fallacy. In addition, we show that prediction accuracy is geographically heterogeneous across UK regions, with strongly pro-Leave and strongly pro-Remain areas easier to predict. We also show that among individuals with similar socio-economic characteristics, Labour supporters are more likely to support Remain while Conservative supporters are more likely to support Leave.     

What's Left for ‘Social Europe’? Brexit and Transnational Labour Market Regulation in the UK-1 and the EU-27

The paper examines UK government positions on the regulation of transnational labour in the context of Brexit. Through an analysis of EU regulations on posted workers – the practice whereby a company based in one EU member state sends workers to carry out a service in another EU member state – the paper argues that the UK has consistently advocated further liberalisation of transnational labour markets in EU level decision-making, a position consistent with promoting increasingly ‘flexible’ labour markets at home. Brexit marks a turning point. Demands from British workers for stronger protection against liberalising pressure help explain the UK's recent shift towards relaxing its opposition to ‘market-correcting’ EU initiatives like the revised posted worker directive. Brexit provides a window of opportunity for the revitalisation of ‘Social Europe’ in the EU-27, without a longstanding veto player at the bargaining table, but one more likely focused more on upholding national labour protections than initiating new supranational policies.     

A first look at Brexit and global equity markets

Global equity markets fell by nearly 5% overall on 24 June 2016 following news of the Brexit referendum result. Although nearly all EU stock market indices experienced additional significantly negative abnormal returns, especially poor performance was registered by the debt-ridden PIIGS group (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain). In this article, we identify a systematic tendency for more severe stock market responses to be concentrated amongst countries with higher debt to GDP ratios. This effect endures even after controlling for the degree of openness, EU membership and for being part of the PIIGS group.     

Work and welfare take-up of enlargement migrants in the United Kingdom

The Brexit decision was affected by the false perception that European Union (EU) enlargement migration, in particular from Romania and Bulgaria (EU2), has been a burden to the UK. The article analyses the debated but largely underresearched EU2 migration to the UK after accession to the EU in 2007 using data of the British Labour Force Survey. The novel findings are that EU2 migrants are found to exhibit quite different characteristics and behaviour than the other European migrants while doing better concerning work, self-employment and welfare take-up.     

Bound by Gravity or Living in a ‘Post Geography Trading World’?* Expert Knowledge and Affective Spatial Imaginaries in the Construction of the UK’s Post-Brexit Trade Policy

A key battle has been fought within the UK cabinet on the direction of post-Brexit trade policy. The opposing sides have favoured either continued alignment or a ‘hard’ break with the European Union’s (EU’s) regulatory and customs regime, in the latter case to allow the UK to pursue an independent and ambitious trade policy agenda. Contrary to much commentary on ‘post-truth’ politics, both sides have relied on rival forms of expertise to support their claims. I argue for the need to not only re-emphasise the malleability and political nature of expert knowledge, but also appreciate its emotional bases. The Treasury has led the charge in favour of a softer Brexit by drawing on econometric (‘gravity’) models that emphasise the economic costs of looser association with the EU. In contrast to this attempt at technocratic legitimation, the specific legal expertise drawn upon by cabinet advocates of ‘hard’ Brexit has appealed to an emotive political economy of bringing the UK, and its (in this imaginary) overly regulated economy, closer to its ‘kith and kin’ in the Anglosphere, deepening the UK ‘national business model’. I conclude by calling for more explicitly emotive and values-based argumentation in the public debate on the UK’s future trade policy to improve the quality of democratic deliberation.     

Estimating the trade and welfare effects of Brexit: A panel data structural gravity model

This paper proposes a new panel data structural gravity approach for estimating the trade and welfare effects of Brexit. Assuming different counterfactual post‐Brexit scenarios, our main findings suggest that the UK's exports of goods to the EU are likely to decline within a range between 7.2% and 45.7% six years after Brexit has taken place. For the UK, the negative trade effects are only partially offset by an increase in domestic trade and trade with third countries, inducing a decline in the UK's real income of between 0.3% and 5.7%. The estimated welfare effects for the EU are not different from zero, but some members like Ireland are expected to also experience welfare losses.     

The Brexit effect: the case of UK ADR performance one year later

In an unexpected outcome, UK voters decided that it was time to exit the European Union based on the results of a vote held on 23 June 2016. Studies of the affects and implication of Brexit include a study showing that the vote was met with a negative short-term wealth effect for UK American depository receipts (ADRs). This study examines the one-year anniversary holding period returns of these ADRs along with the British Pound and the FTSE 100 to discover any lingering effects from the historical vote. Results indicate that the one-year holding period returns for the ADRs averaged 5.8% for the year while the FTSE gained 4.8%, the S&P 500 gained 15.4% and the Pound lost 13.2% of its value.     

Skill Formation,Immigration and European Integration: The Politics of the UK Growth Model

ABSTRACT

While a reluctant European player now heading for the Exit, the UK was also an enthusiastic adopter of several key EU economic policies – namely, the skills and technology policies of Agenda 2020 and labour mobility. These initiatives worked with existing British policy, and structural biases, to exacerbate the already bifurcated structure of UK capitalism – between the high-paid technology and financial services sector on the one hand, and low-cost, low-wage sectors on the other hand. In particular, and central to the argument of this paper, immigration from Eastern and Central Europe after 2004 helped to sustain low-cost manufacturing and services industries by undermining firms’ incentives to invest in training. This combined with endemic failures in the UK’s skills system, which is heavily geared towards producing graduates with general skills but neglects the needs of mid and lower segments of the labour market. EU integration, therefore, exacerbated cleavages over skills between high- and low-productivity sectors and may have contributed to social divisions that led to Brexit.     

Exploring Voter Preferences in Cultural Policy: A Case Study for Austria

The aim of the paper is to explore the demographic, social, economic and politicaldeterminants of voting behavior in a recently held referendum on the constructionof a new theater (``Musiktheater') in the city of Linz (Upper Austria) in 2000. Itwas the first referendum on cultural policy of its kind in Austria, and it led to arejection of the proposal by a majority of the voters (59.70% of ``No' votes).Exploring the determinants of approval or disapproval of the proposition by usingfor group data in communities is thus an interesting question from an economic aswell as a political point of view. We find econometric evidence for the influence ofthe size of the population in the community, the distance of the community from thecity of Linz, income-related variables, variables denoting the economic structure ofthe community, and political variables such as the ratio of the communities' debt torevenues and voters' preferences in the last national election.     

Why do people non-demand reveal in hypothetical double referenda for public goods?

Hypothetical contingent valuation surveys used to elicit values for environmental and other public goods often employ variants of the referendum mechanism due to the cognitive simplicity and familiarity of respondents with this voting format. One variant, the double referendum mechanism, requires respondents to state twice how they would vote for a given policy proposal given their cost of the good. Data from these surveys often exhibit anomalies inconsistent with standard economic models of consumer preferences. There are a number of published explanations for these anomalies, mostly focusing on problems with the second vote. This article investigates which aspects of the hypothetical task affect the degree of nondemand revelation and takes an individual-based approach to identifying people most likely to non-demand reveal. A clear profile emerges from our model of a person who faces a negative surplus i.e. a net loss in the second vote and invokes non self-interested, non financial motivations during the decision process.