Überlegungen zu einem fairen Risikomanagement-Mix in Versicherungsunternehmen

This article deals with the question of how a ?fair risk management mix“ that does not lead to a wealth transfer between shareholders and policyholders can be achieved in a joint-stock insurance company. In our financial model of an insurer, the ?fair“ situation, it is assumed that there is no wealth transfer between shareholders and policyholders when both parties receive a net present value of zero on their investments. Taking the default risk of the insurance company into account, we first model a ?fair“ situation for the insurer’s existing portfolio. Surprisingly, closing a new insurance contract that has been priced on a fair basis and then included in the insurer’s existing portfolio leads to a disequilibrium situation because the net present value for the shareholders is no longer zero. This new net present value can be viewed as the fair price of any risk management measure the insurer must take so as to reestablish an equilibrium for both parties, the shareholders and the policyholders.     

The Effect of Risk Aversion and Loss Aversion on Equity-Linked Life Insurance With Surrender Guarantees

We price equity-linked life insurance with surrender guarantees and account for risk preferences in the form of risk-averse and loss-averse policyholders in continuous time. Risk-averse policyholders surrender their policy for higher equity index values. Compared to optimally surrendered policies, this behavior creates substantial policy value losses. In contrast, loss-averse policyholders surrender once the surrender benefit realizes a gain but keep under-performing policies. This disposition effect reduces the policy value relative to both optimally surrendered policies and policies surrendered by risk-averse policyholders. Insurers in competitive markets need to estimate their policyholders’ risk preferences accurately.     

Insurance guaranty fund—what good is it?

In this paper, we analyze under which conditions a self-supporting insurance guaranty fund can be beneficial for the policyholders in an incomplete market. Within the analyzed setting, we find out that in general, if existent, the potential advantages from its introduction cannot be fairly divided among the participating insurers. Thereby, we have to expect systematic wealth transfers between the policyholders of different insurance companies. We introduce a framework for utility-based fund charges as a solution to this problem.     

Ownership Structure and Control: Property-Casualty Insurer Conversion to Stock Charter

We examine 98 property-casualty insurance companies that convert to stock charter from a mutual or reciprocal form of organization. Our evidence shows converting firms have low surplus, significant growth in premium income, and draw down on their non-financial assets in years prior to conversion. Following conversion there is significant growth in assets and the number of States licensed. We also show by examining evidence on the riskiness of firms' operations that converting companies began operating like stock companies prior to conversion. Thus, our evidence suggests there can be important costs associated with the operation of a mutual or reciprocal insurance company. These costs can include the opportunity costs associated with foregone investments arising because of higher incremental capital costs inherent in the mutual or reciprocal forms of ownership. There also is a cost disadvantage if a mutual or reciprocal is operating in activities more appropriate for the stock ownership form. These costs can in particular circumstances offset the advantage mutual ownership affords in controlling incentives to transfer wealth from policyholders to equityholders.     

Value-at-risk vs. building block regulation in banking

Existing regulatory capital requirements are often criticized for only being loosely linked to the economic risk of the banks' assets. In view of the attempts of international regulators to introduce more risk sensitive capital requirements, we theoretically examine the effect of specific regulatory capital requirements on the risk-taking behavior of banks. More precisely, we develop a continuous time framework where the banks' choice of asset risk is endogenously determined. We compare regulation based on the Basel I building block approach to value-at-risk or ‘internal model’-based capital requirements with respect to risk taking behavior, deposit insurance liability, and shareholder value. The main findings are: (i) value-at-risk-based capital regulation creates a stronger incentive to reduce asset risk when banks are solvent, (ii) solvent banks that reduce their asset risk reduce the current value of the deposit insurance liability significantly, (iii) under value-at-risk regulation the risk reduction behavior of banks is less sensitive to changes in their investment opportunity set, and (iv) banks' equityholders can benefit from risk-based capital requirements.     

Under What Conditions Is an Insurance Guaranty Fund Beneficial for Policyholders?

In this article, we derive conditions in an imperfect market setting, under which the introduction of a self‐supporting insurance guaranty fund improves the position of the policyholders. When a guaranty fund is advantageous given homogeneous firms in the market, all policyholders benefit from it to the same extent, if they have the same underlying risk preferences and are charged identical premiums. In a more realistic heterogeneous setting, the introduction of an insurance guaranty fund is in general no longer beneficial for all policyholders in the same manner. Hence, systematic wealth transfers take place between the policyholders of different insurance companies. As a possible solution, and in order to counteract this effect, we introduce a framework for utility‐based fund charges.     

Price Regulation in Property-Liability Insurance: A Contingent-Claims Approach

A discrete-time option-pricing model is used to derive the “fair” rate of return for the property-liability insurance firm. The rationale for the use of this model is that the financial claims of shareholders, policyholders, and tax authorities can be modeled as European options written on the income generated by the insurer's asset portfolio. This portfolio consists mostly of traded financial assets and is therefore relatively easy to value. By setting the value of the shareholders' option equal to the initial surplus, an implicit solution for the fair insurance price may be derived. Unlike previous insurance regulatory models, this approach addresses the ruin probability of the insurer, as well as nonlinear tax effects.     

Understanding Basis Risk in Insurance Contracts

There is a tremendous amount of resources being tied up in litigation between insurance companies and policyholders over things like the extent of coverage for various loss scenarios or allegedly bad faith delays in settlement payments. The fact that policyholders formally dispute insurer coverage positions or claims payment strategies gives credibility to the idea that mismatches exist between what policyholders expect insurance policies to cover and what the insurance contracts actually provide as loss indemnification. This mismatch essentially represents insurance basis risk, the analysis of which can more accurately reflect the value and overall efficiency of insurance contracts and suggest factors that may influence policyholder dissatisfaction and consequently insurance contract disputes. This article takes a detailed look at insurance basis risk and finds that subjectivity plays a prominent role in its definition. Using Bayesian inference, it is shown how factors can affect the magnitude of insurance basis risk depending on the individual situation in which the mismatch between losses and coverage exists.     

Bank regulation under nonbinding capital guidelines

A one-period model of bank equity is presented in which the end of the period can be interpreted as the next regulatory examination. A capital guideline is in place that may or may not be met as the values of the bank's assets and liabilities fluctuate during the period. If the guideline is not met at the time of examination, however, equityholders bear some cost. The bank's risk-taking incentives between examinations are studied. The model suggests that higher capital guidelines may cause riskier bank behavior at some points in time, but do not imply a trend toward a riskier banking system.     

Economic capital for nonperforming loans

A portfolio of nonperforming loans requires economic capital. We present two models for forecasting the portfolio loss and its probability distribution. In the first model, the loss for each nonperforming loan entails a change in provision over the risk horizon. The risk determinants are the single-name concentration, measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschmann index, as well as a systematic factor and the idiosyncratic risk. Our second model allows for interportfolio diversification with a portfolio of performing loans because banks typically own both performing and nonperforming loans. In this model, the nonperforming loan is identified with its systematic risk. Both models allow for closed-form expressions of economic capital and for the capital charge of the single loan. We calibrate the macroeconomic model parameters statistically with a loss panel; the microeconomic parameters depend on the portfolio. The portfolio risk for nonperforming loans mainly depends on the volatility of the systematic economic factor. The dependence becomes more pronounced when interportfolio diversification is taken into account. The magnitude of interportfolio diversification is also marked. Finally, we calculate regulatory capital charges according to Basel II for past-due loans. The regulatory charges are on average smaller than our economic charges and, additionally, take the volatility of economic activity into account only implicitly.     

Erklärungsansätze für vertragswidriges Verhalten Versicherungsnehmern aus Sicht der ökonomischen Theorie

The two main purposes of this paper are an introduction to the economic analysis of insurance fraud and furthermore a derivation of factors that determine fraudulent behavior of policyholders on insurance markets. Consequently, we analyze the strategic decision problems of insurance companies and the policyholders and identify some factors that can help to reduce fraudulent behavior. In this context we evaluate two derived starting points for the combat against insurance fraud: fraud detection systems and a consequent charge policy of detected defrauders. We illustrate that both points can help to reduce the cost of fraud. Furthermore, we enhance our earlier analysis with respect to the empirical fact that some individuals care about fairness or — in the insurance fraud context — the legitimacy of their actions. Surprisingly, in some market situations these concerns of some policyholders do not lead to a lower fraud probability. Finally, we discuss how and to what extent insurance companies can influence such ethical concerns of policyholders. On that score, we distinguish insurance specific and insurance unspecific factors and their impact on the consumers attitudes towards insurance fraud.     

中国的“影子保险”:来自监管自然实验的证据

影子保险在金融稳定中扮演着重要角色,但现有文献较多关注影子银行,对影子保险关注不足。“影子保险”即保险公司通过再保险方式将保险业务转移给不受监管或者受监管较弱的关联企业的活动,这会推高其真实的杠杆水平,增加金融体系脆弱性。然而,由于影子保险的不透明性和缺少自然实验,现有研究仅基于有限数据或模型给出简单的特征事实或结构性估计,很少能从因果关系上清楚地识别影子保险活动及其机制。本文利用中国加强对中资保险公司(处理组)再保险关联交易监管的政策冲击这一自然实验,使用微观数据和双重差分方法,识别了中国金融体系中的影子保险活动。研究发现,相关监管有效降低了影子保险活动,这一效应对集团公司的影响尤为显著;在机制方面,相关监管通过影响中资保险公司资产负债表两端的结构性调整进而降低了其风险承担行为,提高了经营稳定性。本文方法对识别金融机构的监管套利和防范系统性金融风险具有一定参考意义。     

An option pricing approach to the valuation of real estate contaminated with hazardous materials

This paper uses option pricing to examine how the presence of hazardous materials affects real estate value. The property owner has two options. The first option is to remove the hazardous materials at the best time. The second option, embedded in the first one, is to redevelop the property at the best opportunity. The owner has three possible timing strategies with respect to the exercise of these two options: remove the hazardous materials first and retain the option to redevelop the property later, remove and redevelop at the same time, or do nothing. Conditions under which the presence of the hazardous materials may either expedite or postpone the decision to redevelop are also derived. If the regulatory environment does not allow the property owner to make optimal timing decisions with respect to the exercise of these options, then our results provide an indication of the cost of regulation as measured by the additional loss in property value.     

Valuing Assets Using Real Options: An Application to Deregulated Electricity Markets

This paper provides a detailed case of the application of real options valuation techniques to value a contract for the use of a power generation facility. The authors' aim is not primarily to offer a valuation "recipe" for a specific type of asset, but to show how the real options framework can be actually made to work in a variety of situations.
The case illustrates how minor adaptations that take into account the ways in which actual settings differ from the assumptions of standard formulas like Black-Scholes can be used to increase the precision and realism of results. By introducing relatively simple changes to a standard options valuation model, the authors obtain results that are reasonably close to those reported for actual transactions involving similar types of assets. Despite the industry-specific context of the analysis, the applicability of the techniques discussed in the paper should extend beyond the energy industry to other contexts characterized by similar types of uncertainty and production process, particularly those associated with minerals and other commodities.     

Switching to a poor business activity: optimal capital structure, agency costs and covenant rules

We address the issue of modeling and quantifying the asset substitution problem in a setting where equityholders decisions alter both the volatility and the return of the firm cash flows. Our results contrast with those obtained in models where the agency problem is reduced to a pure risk-shifting problem. We find larger agency costs and lower optimal leverages. We identify the bankruptcy trigger written in debt indenture, which maximizes ex-ante firm value, given that equityholders will ex-post be able to risk-shift. Our model highlights the tradeoff between ex-post inefficient behavior of equityholders and inefficient covenant restrictions.      

Investment guarantees in unit-linked life insurance from the customer perspective

Interest rate guarantees are a typical contract feature in unit-linked-life insurance products. As the financial crisis of 2007/2008 has shown, these guarantees can be of substantial value for policyholders since they ensure that at least a minimum amount will be paid back even if the mutual fund value falls below a specific guaranteed level. However, from the insurance company’s view, these guarantees can be costly—especially in highly volatile markets—due to the required risk management measures which must be undertaken to secure the guarantees promised to the customers. Thus, the aim of this paper is to investigate whether customers really value these guarantees and if their willingness to pay (WTP) is sufficient to cover the guarantee costs. To elicit customer WTP, we use an online questionnaire and compare these results to the actual guarantee costs calculated with the Black and Scholes option pricing formula. One main finding is that even though most of the participants in the online questionnaire work in the financial industry, subjective prices are difficult to derive and are lower, on average, than the prices obtained using a financial pricing model. However, many participants are still willing to pay a substantially higher price.     

Estimating financial risk measures for options

This paper proposes a simulation-lattice procedure to estimate financial risk measures for option positions. The framework proposed can be applied to many different kinds of options, including exotic and vanilla options; it can take account of early exercise features; heavy tails in underlying processes; estimate different risk measures, including VaR, Expected Shortfall and Spectral Risk Measures; and in a limited way it can be generalized to accommodate multiple-factors. It avoids many of the limitations of existing approaches and, in particular, avoids the problems associated approaches based on delta–gamma and similar approximations. It also generates some interesting results about the risk measures of some illustrative options positions.     

Market Consistent Embedded Value in der privaten Krankenversicherung

The Market Consistent Embedded Value (MCEV) allows for a principal based valuation of insurance contract portfolios. An important aspect of the MCEV methodology is the possibility to compare different insurance companies. In this paper we introduce the valuation principles with respect to German private health insurance. To this end we first explain the different components of a MCEV. In the following we discuss the relevant aspects of market consistent valuation of German private health insurance and show, how financial options and guarantees of private health insurance contracts influence the shareholder value. In particular we analyze the impact of surplus distribution and the different surrender options of policyholders on the value.     

Insurance Markets With Differential Information

This article attempts to understand the outcomes when each party of an insurance contract simultaneously has superior information. I assume that policyholders have superior information about specific risks while insurers have superior information about general risks. I find that low-general-risk policyholders purchase insurance, while high-general-risk policyholders are self-insured. Among the low-general-risk policyholders, high-specific-risk policyholders purchase full insurance, while low-specific-risk policyholders purchase partial insurance. When insurers can strategically publicize their information, efficiency is improved because high-general-risk policyholders purchase actuarially fair insurance. The market segmentation is also found based on the general-risk type and the publicizing of information.     

The relationship between conditional value at risk and option prices with a closed-form solution

Options and CVaR (conditional value at risk) are significant areas of research in their own right; moreover, both are important to risk management and understanding of risk. Despite the importance and the overlap of interests in CVaR and options, the literature relating the two is virtually non-existent. In this paper we derive a model-free, simple and closed-form analytic equation that determines the CVaR associated with a put option. This relation is model free and is applicable in complete and incomplete markets. We show that we can account for implied volatility effects using the CVaR risk of options. We show how the relation between options and CVaR has important risk management implications, particularly in terms of integrated risk management and preventing arbitrage opportunities. We conduct numerical experiments to demonstrate obtaining CVaR from empirical options data.