What happened to profitability? Shocks,challenges and perspectives for euro area banks

This paper analyses the evolution of bank profitability from 2005 to 2016, with a focus on the period covering both the global financial crisis and the euro area crisis. To accomplish this, we constructed a dataset that includes financial statement information from 310 euro area banks. Using a dual approach – a ‘bottom-up’ approach as applied by bank analysts and macroeconomists' ‘top-down’ approach, we find that the profitability of euro area banks was hit by two shocks of different nature. The Lehman Brothers collapse affected mostly big banks with diversified portfolios via losses in their securities investment. The subsequent euro area debt crisis and economic recession hit more traditional banks specialising in retail lending activities, mainly through increasing impairment costs. If the first shock had a one-off impact on bank profitability, the second shock is far more long-lasting and is still depressing the profitability of banks in peripheral Europe.     

Usefulness of fair values for predicting banks’ future earnings: evidence from other comprehensive income and its components

This paper examines whether fair value adjustments included in other comprehensive income (OCI) predict future bank performance. It also examines whether the reliability of these estimates affects their predictive value. Using a sample of bank holding companies, we find that fair value adjustments included in OCI can predict earnings both 1 and 2 years ahead. However, not all fair value-related unrealized gains and losses included in OCI have similar implications. While net unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities are positively associated with future earnings, net unrealized gains and losses on derivative contracts classified as cash flow hedges are negatively associated with future earnings. We also find that reliable measurement of fair values enhances predictive value. Finally, we show that fair value adjustments recorded in OCI during the 2007–2009 financial crisis predicted future profitability, contradicting criticism that fair value accounting forced banks to record excessive downward adjustments.     

Does Fair Value Accounting Exacerbate the Procyclicality of Bank Lending?

This study investigates whether fair value accounting contributes to the procyclicality of bank lending. Using banks’ approval/denial decisions on residential mortgage applications to capture banks’ supply of credit, I find no evidence that fair value accounting has procyclical effects on bank lending over the past two business cycles. I further identify two reasons for this result. First, the main accounting item distinguishing fair value accounting from historical cost accounting—unrealized gains and losses on available‐for‐sale securities—does not affect lending decisions. Second, unrealized gains and losses on available‐for‐sale securities are not procyclical, as the risk‐free interest rate rises during some expansionary periods, resulting in unrealized losses, while the risk‐free interest rate (and sometimes the default spread) falls during some recessionary periods, resulting in unrealized gains.     

Is Historical Cost Accounting a Panacea? Market Stress,Incentive Distortions,and Gains Trading

Accounting rules, through their interactions with capital regulations, affect financial institutions’ trading behavior. The insurance industry provides a laboratory to explore these interactions: life insurers have greater flexibility than property and casualty insurers to hold speculative‐grade assets at historical cost, and the degree to which life insurers recognize market values differs across U.S. states. During the financial crisis, insurers facing a lesser degree of market value recognition are less likely to sell downgraded asset‐backed securities. To improve their capital positions, these insurers disproportionately resort to gains trading, selectively selling otherwise unrelated bonds with high unrealized gains, transmitting shocks across markets.     

Market price accounting and depositor discipline: The case of Japanese regional banks

We examine the determinants of Japanese regional bank pricing-to-market decisions and their impact on the intensity of depositor discipline, in the form of the sensitivity of deposit growth to bank financial conditions. To obtain consistent estimates, we first model and estimate the bank pricing-to-market decision and then estimate the intensity of depositor discipline after conditioning for that decision. We find that banks were less likely to adopt market price accounting the larger were their unrealized securities losses. We also find statistically significant evidence of depositor discipline among banks that elected to price to market. Our results indicate that depositor discipline was more intense for the subset of banks that adopted market price accounting.     

Bank earnings and regulatory capital management using available for sale securities

Based on a large sample of publicly listed and non-listed US commercial banks from 1996 to 2011, we find robust evidence consistent with banks using realized available for sale (AFS) securities gains and losses to smooth earnings and increase low regulatory capital. We also find that (i) banks with positive earnings smooth earnings, and banks with negative earnings generally take big baths; (ii) regulatory capital constrains big baths; (iii) banks with more negative earnings and more unrealized beginning-of-quarter losses (gains) take big baths (smooth earnings); and (iv) banks with low regulatory capital and more unrealized gains realize more gains. Also, banks with negative earnings take big baths (avoid or reduce the earnings loss) if their unrealized gains are insufficient (sufficient) to offset the negative earnings. Our inferences apply to listed and non-listed banks, which indicates that the earnings management incentives do not derive solely from public capital markets. Our findings reveal that the accounting for AFS securities gains and losses enables banks to manage regulatory capital and earnings in a variety of ways.     

Bank earnings management and performance reporting of comprehensive income

FASB’s ASU 2011-05 mandated that comprehensive income (CI) and other comprehensive income (OCI) be reported in performance statements (a single income statement or a separate statement of CI) rather than equity statements. Employing a difference-in-differences research design with ASU 2011-05 as the treatment, I find that presenting accounting information in different statements affects bank earnings management, specifically, presenting CI and OCI in performance statements (especially in single-statements with net income) reduces earnings management through selective sales of available-for-sale (AFS) securities in the banking industry. I also find that the influence of ASU 2011-05 is primarily on banks with high equity incentives in the CEO’s compensation package or less CEO job security. Additional analyses suggest that performance reporting of CI and OCI increases the predictive ability of realized gains and losses of AFS securities; however, banks may manage loan loss provision as a substitute strategy when they have to decrease selective sales of AFS securities.     

The impact of IAS 39 on the risk-relevance of earnings volatility: Evidence from foreign banks cross-listed in the USA

We examine the impact of adopting International Accounting Standard 39 – Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement (IAS 39) by non-US commercial banks cross-listed in the US on earnings volatility and its risk relevance. As IAS 39 requires the recognition of unrealized fair-value gains and losses for a larger set of financial and derivative-financial instruments, and the impairment charges for loans and receivables, we expect and find that IAS 39 adoption increased earnings volatility in IFRS-adopting firms from 2005 onwards. Furthermore, both hedge accounting and the fair value option under IAS 39 are designed to reduce mixed-measurement volatility and to improve the sensitivity of firm risk measures to earnings volatility. We also find that the relationship between credit ratings (proxy for risk) and earnings volatility increases for IFRS-adopting firms after 2005. The evidence is consistent with the argument that IAS 39 increases the credit relevance of earnings volatility.     

Preserving amortized costs within a fair-value-accounting framework: reclassification of gains and losses on available-for-sale securities upon realization

SFAS No. 115 requires firms to recognize available-for-sale (AFS) securities at fair value with accumulated unrealized gains and losses (AUGL) recorded in accumulated other comprehensive income. Firms reclassify AUGL to net income when they realize gains and losses. We refer to the amount reclassified each period by “RECLASS.” As of 1998, SFAS No. 130 requires firms to present RECLASS prominently in their financial statements. We investigate the incremental explanatory power of RECLASS for banks’ market values and market-adjusted returns. In the market value analysis, we control for AUGL, other components of book value of equity, net income before extraordinary items and RECLASS (NIBEX^other), and other components of comprehensive income. In the returns analysis, we control for ΔAUGL, ΔNIBEX^other, and extraordinary items. We find high positive coefficients on RECLASS in both analyses, consistent with investors pricing RECLASS as a relatively permanent component of net income. Exploring possible explanations for these pricing implications, we find no evidence that they are attributable to RECLASS remedying unreliable fair value measurement of AUGL. We provide three distinct analyses indicating that RECLASS’s pricing implications are explained in significant part by it helping investors predict banks’ future performance. Our results illustrate that an important type of amortized cost accounting information, realized gains and losses, remains highly useful to investors despite the overall fair-value-accounting framework for AFS securities.     

How prompt was regulatory corrective action during the financial crisis?

This paper empirically investigates the incidence of regulatory forbearance during the financial crisis. Using an option pricing technique in concert with valuation data gathered from failed bank sales, I find that failed banks consistently underreported the level of impairment in loan portfolios during the financial crisis period of 2008–2010, helping these market value insolvent banks to report adequate capital for regulatory purposes. Impairment-adjusted capital ratios provide evidence of regulatory forbearance for up to 18 months prior to seizure. Analyses of bank coverage ratios reveal that coverage ratios are negatively and significantly related to impairment levels and are significantly lower for banks with critically low levels of capital.     

Bank valuation and accounting discretion during a financial crisis

This paper shows that banks overstate the value of distressed assets and their regulatory capital during the US mortgage crisis. Real estate-related assets are overvalued in banks' balance sheets, especially those of bigger banks, compared to the market value of these assets. Banks with large exposure to mortgage-backed securities also provision less for bad loans. Furthermore, distressed banks use discretion over the classification of mortgage-backed securities to inflate their books. Our results indicate that banks' balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks and provide suggestive evidence of regulatory forbearance and noncompliance with accounting rules.     

Expected-loss-based Accounting for Impairment of Financial Instruments: The FASB and IASB Proposals 2009–2016

The financial and banking crisis of the late 2000s prompted claims that the incurred-loss method for the recognition of credit losses had caused undesirable delay in the recognition of credit-loss impairment. In the wake of the crisis, the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) worked towards the development of expected-loss-based methods of accounting for credit-loss impairment. Their work included an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to develop a converged FASB/IASB standard on credit-loss impairment. The FASB and IASB eventually developed their own separate expected-loss models to be included, respectively, in a 2016 FASB standard and in the IASB’s 2014 final version of IFRS 9 Financial Instruments. The failure to achieve convergence on an issue of such high profile and materiality has generated some controversy, and it is claimed that it will impose significant costs on the preparers and users of the financial statements of banks. This paper examines the various sets of expected-loss-based proposals issued separately or jointly since 2009 by the FASB and the IASB. It describes and compares key features of the different approaches eventually developed by the two standard setters, referring to issues that arose in arriving at practically workable solutions and to issues that may have impeded FASB/IASB convergence. It also provides information indicative of the possible effect of differences between the two approaches.     

Financial instruments,financial reporting,and financial stability

I review new empirical evidence from the recent financial crisis on the relation between financial reporting and financial stability. I draw the following conclusions: First, there is still no evidence that fair value accounting caused widespread fire sales of asset or contagion. Second, the empirical evidence suggests that accounting and regulation might have contributed to the crisis by allowing several banks to delay actions. Third, even if share prices reacted positively to the relaxation of fair value accounting rules during the crisis, the origin of the problem might be lax rules that allowed banks to run into financial and regulatory problems. Fourth, fair values can be relevant for assets that a bank intends to hold until maturity if that bank strongly relies on short-term financing. Fifth, the recognition of fair values is no substitute for information that allows investors to judge a bank's risk exposure and the validity of reported fair values.     

The impact of securitization on credit rationing: Empirical evidence

We study whether banks’ involvement into different types of securitization activity – asset backed securities (ABS) and covered bonds – in Spain influences credit supply before and during the financial crisis. While both ABS and covered bonds were hit by the crisis, the former were hit more severely. Employing a disequilibrium model to identify credit rationing, we find that firms with banks that were more involved in securitization see their credit constraints more relaxed in normal periods. In contrast, only greater covered bonds issuance reduces credit rationing during crisis periods whereas ABS aggravates these firms’ credit rationing in crisis periods. Our results are in line with the theoretical predictions that a securitization instrument that retains risk (covered bond) may induce a more prudent risk behavior of banks than an instrument that provides risk transferring (ABS).     

Efficiency in Turkish banking: post-restructuring evidence

Turkish banking sector went through a significant restructuring process in the aftermath of the country's financial crisis of 2000–2001. In this paper, we analyze the evolution of banking performance using a novel approach due to Ray [(2007). “Shadow Profit Maximization and a Measure of Overall Inefficiency.” Journal of Productivity Analysis 27, 231–236]. We derive ‘shadow unrealized profit scores’ as well as ‘shadow input–output prices’ for each year and bank in the sector from 2002 to 2011. We argue these scores operationalize the Hicksian concept of ‘monopolistic quiet life’. We provide some evidence the sector came closer to the ‘zero profit condition’ as well as displaying a closer approximation to the ‘law of one price’ over time. We show the variability of these ‘shadow prices’ essentially coincides with that of corresponding actual prices. We utilize shadow price information to show that business models and competitive choices of banks differ across ownership types with foreign banks competing on the broadest front compared to state-owned and privately owned Turkish banks.     

Prudential Application of IFRS 9: (Un)Fair Reporting in COVID‐19 Crisis for Banks Worldwide?!

IFRS 9 and ASC 326 were developed after the 2008–2009 financial crisis, and both accounting standards include an expected loss model as a means of providing for credit losses. As a result of the COVID‐19 worldwide pandemic, however, banks face considerable uncertainty about the potential scale of the bad debts for which they will need to provide. Banks need to reassess their loan assets, by updating their risk models with expectations about potential default rates and future macro‐economic and financial developments. However, we see several interventions worldwide. The European Securities and Markets Authority addresses a position paper on the prudential application of IFRS 9. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act in the US has given banks an optional deferral of implementation of the CECL model until 31 December 2020. This paper addresses the challenges banks face when applying the expected losses model during the current crisis. More importantly, it discusses the impact of supervisor and regulators’ intervention on future financial reporting comparability, transparency and whether there is a level playing field.     

Market reactions to policy deliberations on fair value accounting and impairment rules during the financial crisis of 2008–2009

Fair value accounting (FVA) has been blamed for amplifying the financial crisis of 2008–2009. We investigate investor and creditor reactions to policymaker deliberations, recommendations and decisions about FVA and impairment rules in the banking industry. If FVA was a key contributor to the financial crisis as some industry pundits and academic research suggest, we first should observe positive stock market reactions to proposals that relax FVA rules and negative reactions when policymakers support FVA. Second, we investigate cross-sectional stock price reactions to bank-specific factors that potentially contributed to pro-cyclical contagion. Third, we examine whether banks that have fewer alternative sources of information about fair values experience relatively negative reactions to potential relaxation of FVA and impairment rules. Finally, we investigate credit market reactions to these policy deliberations, recommendations and decisions by examining changes in credit default swap spreads for a subset of banks in our sample.     

Liberal Fair Value Accounting in Banks: A South African Case Study

Research findings on the role of fair value accounting (FVA) in the global financial crisis suggest that FVA is not applied neutrally by banks. The results of FVA are accepted when they contribute to higher profits and are actively resisted when they lead to losses. The aim of this article is to investigate how FVA is practically applied by banks in detail. The focus is on banks as most of their assets are financial instruments and thus potentially fair valued, and banks’ behaviour is significantly influenced by their regulatory environment. The research objective is pursued by using a case study of two South African banks. One of these is the largest and most systemically important bank in the South African system and the other is on the crossover between systemic and not systemic. It is found that FVA as applied by these two banks is not neutral. Also included is a demonstration of a method to derive the unrealised portion of profit and equity, the identification of the gap between assets and liabilities at fair value as the driver of where in a banking group FVA profits and losses are realised, and the finding that the restatement of comparative figures was used to circumvent the prohibition on reclassifications into and out of the ‘designated as at fair value’ category.     

Resaleable debt and systemic risk

Many debt claims, such as bonds, are resaleable; others, such as repos, are not. There was a fivefold increase in repo borrowing before the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Why? Did banks’ dependence on non-resaleable debt precipitate the crisis? In this paper, we develop a model of bank lending with credit frictions. The key feature of the model is that debt claims are heterogenous in their resaleability. We find that decreasing credit market frictions leads to an increase in borrowing via non-resaleable debt. Such borrowing has a dark side: It causes credit chains to form, because, if a bank makes a loan via non-resaleable debt and needs liquidity, it cannot sell the loan but must borrow via a new contract. These credit chains are a source of systemic risk, as one bank’s default harms not only its creditors but also its creditors’ creditors. Overall, our model suggests that reducing credit market frictions may have an adverse effect on the financial system and even lead to the failures of financial institutions.     

IAS 39 reclassification choice and analyst earnings forecast properties

In October 2008, the International Accounting Standards Board amended IAS 39 to allow banks to retroactively reclassify financial assets that previously were measured at fair value to amortized cost. By reclassifying financial assets, a bank can potentially avoid recognizing the unrealized fair value losses and thereby increase its income and regulatory capital during a market downturn. We examine the implications of the reclassification decision by banks for the properties of financial analyst earnings forecasts during 2008–2009, when economic conditions were highly volatile. We find that the reclassification choice during the financial crisis reduced analyst forecast accuracy and increased forecast dispersion. We also find that the observed decline in analyst forecasting ability is limited to the year of adoption when the economic environment was highly volatile.