DIRECTED SEARCH ON THE JOB AND THE WAGE LADDER*

We model a labor market where employed workers search on the job and firms direct workers' search using wage offers and employment probabilities. Applicants observe all offers and face a trade‐off between wage and employment probability. There is wage dispersion among workers, even though all workers and jobs are homogeneous. Equilibrium wages form a ladder, as workers optimally choose to climb the ladder one rung at a time. This is because low‐wage applicants are relatively more sensitive to employment probability than to wage and thus forgo the opportunity to apply for a high wage, with a lower chance of success.     

A MATCHING MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS SKILL REQUIREMENTS>*

We consider a labor market in which workers differ in their abilities and jobs differ in their skill requirements. The distribution of worker abilities is exogenous, but we model the choice of skill requirements by firms. High‐skill jobs produce more output than low‐skill jobs, but high‐skill jobs require high‐skill workers and thus are more difficult to fill. We use a matching model together with a Nash bargaining approach to wage setting to determine the equilibrium mix of job types, along with the equilibrium relationship between worker and job characteristics, wages, and unemployment.     

On the Provision of Insurance against Search‐Induced Wage Fluctuations*

Should workers be provided with insurance against search‐induced wage fluctuations? To answer this question, I rely on the numerical simulations of a model of on‐the‐job search and precautionary savings. The model is calibrated to low‐skilled workers in the United States. The extent of insurance is determined by the degree of progressivity of a non‐linear transfer schedule. The fundamental trade‐off is that a more generous provision of insurance reduces incentives to search for better‐paying jobs, which increases the cost of providing insurance. I show that progressivity raises the search intensity of unemployed workers, which reduces the equilibrium rate of unemployment, but it lowers the search intensity of employed job seekers, which reduces the output level. I also solve numerically for the optimal non‐linear transfer schedule. The optimal policy is to provide little insurance up to a monthly income level of $1350, so as to preserve incentives to move up the wage ladder, and nearly full insurance above $1450. This policy reduces the standard deviation of labor income net of transfers by 34 per cent and generates a consumption‐equivalent welfare gain of 0.7 per cent. The absence of private savings does not fundamentally change the shape of the optimal transfer function, but tilts the optimal policy towards more insurance, at the expense of a less efficient allocation of workers across jobs.     

Reducing Start‐up Costs for New Firms: The Double Dividend on the Labor Market*

Starting a firm with expansive potential is an option for educated and high‐skilled workers. If there are labor market frictions, this additional option can be seen as reducing the chances of ending up in a low‐wage job and hence as increasing the incentives for education. In a matching model, we show that reducing the start‐up costs for new firms results in higher take‐up rates of education. It also gives rise—through a thick‐market externality—to higher rates of job creation for high‐skilled labor as well as average match productivity. We provide empirical evidence to support our argument.     

OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS, WAGES, AND JOB MOBILITY IN GERMANY

Pension‐covered workers in Germany are three times less likely to change jobs than workers not covered by an occupational pension scheme. This paper examines the effects of occupational pension coverage and pension portability loss on voluntary job changes using a sample selection model with endogenous switching. The model estimates, derived from western German panel data for 1985–1998, indicate that occupational pension coverage reduces worker mobility by imposing a capital loss on those leaving their job before retirement age. Moreover, pension‐covered workers receive a higher compensation, which discourages mobility. Making pensions portable increases mobility, but from a low initial level.     

JOB FLOWS AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT MODEL WITH FIRM‐SPECIFIC SKILL TRAINING*

We introduce productivity enhancing firm‐specific skill training into the labour search model in which the firm‐specific skill training intensity and the job destruction rate are endogenously determined. It is shown that the higher the intensity of such training, the lower the rates of unemployment, job creation and job destruction. The paper's model provides a theoretical framework to understand the often mentioned peculiarity of the Japanese labour market; prevalently low rates of unemployment, job creation and job destruction in Japan are due to its training system which promotes workers to acquire firm‐specific skills.     

Career Paths,Unemployment, and the Efficiency of the Labor Market: Should Youth Employment Be Subsidized?

This paper studies the implications of learning‐by‐doing on youth unemployment and market efficiency when workers benefiting from this kind of training experience search (while on the job) for a higher skill job. Firms with low‐skill jobs suffer from a poaching behavior by firms with high‐skill jobs, causing a shortage of low‐skill jobs and excessive youth unemployment. An optimal policy, consisting of taxing the output of high‐skill jobs and subsidizing the output of low‐skill jobs, restores market efficiency and reduces youth unemployment.     

Optimal Income Taxation and Job Choice

In this paper, we study optimal income taxation when different job types exist for workers of different skills. Each job type has some feasible range of incomes from which workers choose by varying labor supply. Workers are more productive than others in the jobs that suit them best. The model combines features of the classic optimal tax literature with labor variability along the intensive margin, with the extensive‐margin approach where workers make discrete job choices and/or participation decisions. We find that first‐best maximin utility can be achieved in the second‐best, and marginal tax rates below the top can be negative or zero.     

Job protection,housing market regulation,and the youth

Young Europeans experience high unemployment rates, job instability, and late emancipation. Meanwhile, they do not support reforms weakening protection on long‐term contracts. In this paper, we suggest a possible rationale for such reform distaste. When the rental market is strongly regulated, landlords screen applicants with regard to their ability to pay the rent. Protecting regular jobs offers a second‐best technology to sort workers, thereby increasing the rental market size. We provide a model where nonemployed workers demand protected jobs despite unemployment and the share of short‐term jobs increases, whereas the individual risk of dismissal is unaffected. Our theory can be extended to alternative risks and markets involving correlated risks and commitment under imperfect information.     

Making the risk of job loss a way of life: Does it affect job satisfaction?

This study investigates the relationship between job satisfaction and job security in European countries. In doing so, it attempts to take into account the endogenous nature of the job security–job satisfaction relationship after controlling for the various economic and personal characteristics. The results show that workers in jobs with low likelihood of job termination derive higher utility from work compared to the workers in insecure jobs. This holds even after controlling for endogeneity by using both a conventional IV approach and a selection model. This appears to be the case for both men and women.     

STRUCTURAL EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF JOB SEARCH MONITORING

To evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers, it is important to take account of post‐unemployment wages and job‐to‐job mobility. We structurally estimate a model with search channels, using a controlled trial in which monitoring is randomized. The data include registers and survey data on search behavior. We find that the opportunity to move to better‐paid jobs in employment reduces the extent to which monitoring induces substitution toward formal search channels in unemployment. Job mobility compensates for adverse long‐run effects of monitoring on wages. We examine counterfactual policies against moral hazard, like reemployment bonuses and changes of the benefits path.     

Duration of disability,job mismatch and employment outcomes

Workers with disabilities have functional limitations that affect their productivity in some, but not necessarily all, jobs. Workers who find a job that is a good match for their functional limitations (i.e. a job where their limitations have little or no impact on important job functions) should expect better employment outcomes (e.g. higher wages, longer job tenure) than workers with similar disabilities who are mismatched in their jobs. Merging data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation with O*Net data on job demands, we construct two continuous measures of job mismatch for workers with physical disabilities. We then extend the literature on disability and employment by exploring relationships between duration of disability, job mismatch, wages and hours worked. The results indicate that workers with long durations of disability are employed in jobs that are a better match to their physical limitations than are similar workers with shorter durations of disability. And, workers who are mismatched earn lower wages and work fewer hours than their counterparts whose jobs are a better match. Overall, the findings suggest that disability employment policies should include systematic efforts to help workers with disabilities find good job matches.     

Worker turnover at the firm level and crowding out of lower educated workers

This paper investigates whether employers exploit cyclical downturns to improve the average skill level of their work force. We use a unique dataset that contains information on workers, jobs as well as firm characteristics. Our findings are that at each job level mainly lower educated workers leave during downturns. Furthermore, at each level of job complexity, workers with a higher education are not more productive than lower educated workers. We find no evidence that higher educated workers crowd out lower educated workers during recessions.     

Public policy,footloose capital,and union influence

This document sets up a unionized general oligopolistic equilibrium model of countries, where capital is footloose and governments maximize utilitarian welfare. When capital owners have weak influence on public policy, there is unemployment and the governments compete for jobs, causing a distortion with suboptimal wages. Then globalization—as characterized by a decrease in impediments to international investment—increases the wage elasticity of capital flight, decreasing wages and increasing employment. This benefits the capital owners and the unemployed workers getting a job, but harms the other workers. International coordination of public policy alleviates these consequences of globalization.     

Whose Job Goes Abroad? International Outsourcing and Individual Job Separations

This paper focuses on the adjustment costs of globalisation by studying the effects of international outsourcing on individual transitions out of jobs in the Danish manufacturing sector for the period 1990–2003. A competing risks duration model that distinguishes between job‐to‐job and job‐to‐unemployment transitions is estimated. Outsourcing is found to increase the unemployment risk of low‐skilled workers, but the quantitative impact is modest. Outsourcing is also found to reduce the job change hazard rate for all education groups. Thus, the paper provides evidence for small adjustment costs of globalisation.     

DYNAMIC CONTRACTS WITH WORKER MOBILITY VIA DIRECTED ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH

This article proposes a model with dynamic incentive contracts and on‐the‐job search in a frictional labor market. The optimal long‐term contract exhibits an increasing wage–tenure profile. With increasing wages, worker effort also increases with tenure. These two features imply that the probabilities of both voluntary and involuntary job separation decrease with both job tenure and the duration of employment. Given these results, workers experience differing labor market transitions—between employment, unemployment, and across different employers—and the equilibrium generates endogenous heterogeneity among ex ante homogeneous workers.     

ENDOGENOUS JOB CONTACT NETWORKS

We develop a model where workers, anticipating the risk of becoming unemployed, invest in connections in order to access information about available jobs that other workers may have. The investment in connections is high when the job separation rate in the labor market is moderate, whereas it is low for either low or high levels of job separation rate. The equilibrium response of network investment to changes in the labor market conditions generates novel empirical predictions. In particular, the probability that a worker finds a new job via his connections increases in the separation rate when the separation rate is low, whereas it decreases when the separation rate is high. These predictions are supported by the empirical patterns that we document for the U.K. labor market.     

Informal work networks

Abstract We present a model of time allocation between formal and informal labour supply, where workers learn of informal job opportunities from their peers. In addition to formal income taxation and enforcement, individuals’ labour supply decisions depend on the number of their peers with informal jobs and the strength of social ties. Workers allocate more time to informal activities when tax enforcement is lax and job information transmission is good. More connected social networks (e.g., wheel, complete) feature lower average income but higher average utility than poorly connected social networks (e.g., star, empty). Average income may be non‐monotonic in tax enforcement.     

Do Migrants get Good Jobs in Australia? The Role of Ethnic Networks in Job Search*

We study the role of ethnic networks in migrants’ job search and the quality of jobs they find in the first years of settlement. We find that there are initial downward movements along the occupational ladder, followed by improvements. As a result of restrictions in welfare eligibility since 1997, we study whether this increases the probability that new migrants accept ‘bad jobs’ quickly and then move onto better jobs over time. Holding employability constant, our results support this view. However, accounting for their higher employability, new migrants seem to fare better up to 1.5 years after settlement.     

Kinetics of jobs in multi-link cities with migration-driven aggregation process

Immigration has long been a hotly debated issue. The core of this debate is immigrants' impact on local job markets. Some people insist that instead of creating more jobs, immigrants actually take away more jobs thus decrease the living standard of natives. Others argue that the presence of immigrants benefits the society as a whole since they enlarge the labor force and lower the production cost. In this paper, we propose a model describing the migration-driven aggregation behaviors in job markets with foreign immigration, and introduce the method of network and aggregation to look at this issue from a new perspective. We divide the job market in each city into two groups: native and immigrant. And we view each city as a node with l links; each link represents a way of transportation to other cities. Then it is not hard to see that cities with more links tend to be more job concentrated with larger flows of jobs. We assume that both native and immigrant job markets have a migration of jobs within themselves and the native ones have birth rate and death rate of jobs as well. Through analyzing different rates: K₁ and K₂, initial conditions, and the combined effect of birth rate and death rate, we are able to predict the changes of some variables in the long run. These changes indicate the impact of immigrants on native job markets. Thus provide some helpful information to this issue.