International Labor Union Policy and Growth with Creative Destruction*

A multi‐economy Schumpeterian growth model is constructed. Economies are interdependent through technology transfer. Households can stay as workers or become researchers at some cost. Workers are employed in production and researchers in R&D. Workers are unionized and union power depends on the government's protection. The main findings are as follows. If international technological dependence increases, then workers’ wages, the growth rate, and the level of welfare fall. The international coordination of labor union policy raises workers’ wages and promotes growth and welfare.     

Future images of meat consumption in 2030

The issue of meat consumption has been a subject of interest that has been looked at from environmental, animal and human perspectives. This paper contributes to the discussion by clarifying the diversity of views with regard to the future of meat consumption. Two round Delphi expert interviews and a consumer survey were conducted in order to collect information. Five coherent future images were constructed: Traditional Approach, Business as Usual, Humans First, Wellness and Vegetarian Society. The discussion part of the paper presents possible ways of influencing meat consumption according to the holders of these different images of the future.     

Land reforms and population growth

One of the greatest puzzles in demographic history is why in the rich and urbanized England, fertility declined much later than in the poor and rural France. We consider the effects of a land reform on demographic growth by a family-optimization model where relative per capita wealth generates social status and welfare. We show that tenant farming is the major obstacle to escaping the Malthusian trap with high fertility and low productivity. A land reform provides peasants with higher returns for their investments, inducing them to increase their productivity and status rather than their family size. Consequently, the population growth rate slows down, but the productivity of land increases.     

Public policy,footloose capital,and union influence

This document sets up a unionized general oligopolistic equilibrium model of countries, where capital is footloose and governments maximize utilitarian welfare. When capital owners have weak influence on public policy, there is unemployment and the governments compete for jobs, causing a distortion with suboptimal wages. Then globalization—as characterized by a decrease in impediments to international investment—increases the wage elasticity of capital flight, decreasing wages and increasing employment. This benefits the capital owners and the unemployed workers getting a job, but harms the other workers. International coordination of public policy alleviates these consequences of globalization.     

Disaggregative policy Delphi: Using cluster analysis as a tool for systematic scenario formation

A critical phase of scenario making is the choosing of scenarios. In the worst case, a futures researcher creates scenarios according to his/her subjective views and cannot see the real quality of the study material. Oversimplification is a typical example of this kind of bias. In this study, an attempt towards a more data sensitive method was made using Finnish transport policy as an example. A disaggregative Delphi method as opposed to traditional consensual Delphi was applied. The article summarises eight Delphi pitfalls and gives an example how to avoid them. A two-rounded disaggregative Delphi was conducted, the panelists being representatives of interest groups in the traffic sector. Panelists were shown the past development of three correlating key variables in Finland in 1970-1996: GDP, road traffic volume and the carbon dioxide emissions from road traffic. The panelists were invited to give estimates of their organisation to the probable and the preferable futures of the key variables for 1997-2025. They were also asked to give qualitative and quantitative arguments of why and the policy instruments of how their image of the future would occur. The first round data were collected by a fairly open questionnaire and the second round data by a fairly structured interview. The responses of the quantitative three key variables were grouped in a disaggregative way by cluster analysis. The clusters were complemented with respective qualitative arguments in order to form wider scenarios. This offers a relevance to decision-making not afforded by a nonsystematic approach. Of course, there are some problems of cluster analysis used in this way: The interviews revealed that quantitatively similar future images produced by the panelists occasionally had different kind of qualitative background theory. Also, cluster analysis cannot ultimately decide the number of scenarios, being a choice of the researcher. Cluster analysis makes the choice well argued, however.     

Optimal patent length and breadth in an economy with creative destruction and non-diversifiable risk

In this paper, I examine the optimal patent shape in an economy in which R&D firms innovate and imitate, households face non-diversifiable risk and there is externality in production and R&D. With non-diversifiable risk, a household’s consumption and investment decisions are interlinked. This economy contains industries of two kinds: monopoly industries with an innovator only, and duopoly industries with an innovator and an imitator. I define patent length as the expected time in which an innovation is imitated, and patent breadth as the innovator’s profit share in an industry after a successful imitation. The government can control patent length by the requirements for accepting a substitute for a patented good, and patent breadth by imposing compulsory licensing and royalties for the patentee after a successful imitation. I show that the stronger the externality in production relative to R&D is, the slower the optimal growth rate, the larger the optimal proportion of duopoly industries, and the longer and narrower the optimal patent.     

Investment, expropriation, and unionization

In this paper, I examine an economy where output is produced from labor, capital and public services, and where firms and labor unions bargain over labor conditions and lobby the government over union bargaining power and public services. I compare three institutional cases: (a) competitive wage settlement, (b) bargaining over wages and employment, and (c) bargaining over wages only. I show that in cases (a) and (b) the government expropriates investment rents, but right-to-manage bargaining (c) protects investors from this expropriation.