Accounting Standards and Earnings Management: Evidence from China

This article examines the effect of an asset impairment–related regulatory reform on earnings management in China. Chinese Accounting Standard No. 8 (CAS No. 8), which prohibits the reversal of long‐lived asset impairments, was promulgated to constrain managerial opportunism with respect to previously recognized impairment loss reversal. CAS No. 8 forbids the reversal of long‐lived asset impairment losses only, while allowing the reversal of short‐term asset impairment losses. Based on a sample of China's A‐share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period 2001–2008, we reveal that managers use less current asset write‐downs and more reversals in the post–CAS No. 8 period. However, such reporting practices do not appear to be influenced by managerial incentives to avoid reporting losses and/or for “big bath” accounting purposes.     

The Effect of Personnel Characteristics in the Internal Accounting Control System on Discretionary Tax Accruals: Evidence from Korea

This study examines whether the characteristics of personnel in a firm's internal accounting control system (IACS) and auditor characteristics control managers’ discretionary behaviour for tax planning. The study uses a sample of 4210 firm‐year observations from 2006 to 2014. The results show that managers’ discretionary tax planning cannot be controlled when the personnel in charge of internal accounting control are at an optimum level or higher. On the other hand, when a CPA is included among the personnel, the manager's discretionary behaviour is somewhat controlled. Moreover, the results show that firms audited by a large accounting firm also control the manager's discretionary tax planning to some extent. Unlike previous studies that examine the effects of IACS on discretionary accruals mostly in terms of book income, this study's contribution is an examination of the effects of the characteristics of personnel in IACS on the relationship between discretionary book‐tax conformity accruals and discretionary book‐only accruals that can be used when the manager establishes a tax plan. Additionally, this study also provides indirect evidence that the characteristics of auditors and personnel in charge of internal accounting perform a monitoring role that controls the manager's opportunistic behaviour.     

Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management

We consider a model where investors can invest directly or search for an asset manager, information about assets is costly, and managers charge an endogenous fee. The efficiency of asset prices is linked to the efficiency of the asset management market: if investors can find managers more easily, more money is allocated to active management, fees are lower, and asset prices are more efficient. Informed managers outperform after fees, uninformed managers underperform, while the average manager's performance depends on the number of “noise allocators.” Small investors should remain uninformed, but large and sophisticated investors benefit from searching for informed active managers since their search cost is low relative to capital. Hence, managers with larger and more sophisticated investors are expected to outperform.     

Goode Food Trucks Inc.*

This fictional case centers around a young Dutch couple who emigrated to Canmore, Alberta. Upon arriving, Saul and Rens opened two successful food trucks and are now looking to promote each truck's main chef to truck manager. They plan to offer a performance bonus based on the net income of each truck and have requested a local accounting student to advise them on the new bonus structure. Goode Food Trucks Inc. presents an opportunity for students to demonstrate technical competence in managerial accounting (rate methods, period cost allocation, and data visualization); strategy and governance (employee performance incentives); and financial reporting (reporting needs) while incorporating enabling competencies (communicating and adding value). The case and teaching notes were adapted from principles used to train and evaluate Chartered Professional Accountant (CPA) candidates and tailored to an appropriate level for undergraduate learners. MBA instructors may also use this case to apply multiple concepts in a defined context, thus enhancing a course's “real-life” applicability.     

Reliability-Relevance Trade-Offs and the Efficiency of Aggregation

This paper studies how an accountant's method of aggregating information in a financial report is affected by differences in the reliability and relevance of components of the report. We study a firm that hires an accountant to produce a report that reveals information to investors regarding the returns to the firm's past investments. In constructing the report, the accountant must combine information elicited from the firm's manager with other information directly observable to the accountant. The manager's information is assumed to be directly observable only by the manager and to be of superior quality to the other information available to the accountant. Reliability‐relevance trade‐offs arise because as the accountant places more weight on the manager's report, potentially more useful information gets included in the report, at the cost of encouraging the manager to distort his or her information to a greater extent. Capital market participants anticipate this behavior and price the firm accordingly. We show how the market's price response to the release of the firm's aggregate report, the efficiency of the firm's investment decisions, and the manager's incentives to manipulate the soft information under his or her control are all affected by—and affect—the aggregation procedure the accountant adopts. In addition, we identify a broad range of circumstances under which aggregated reports are strictly more efficient than disaggregated reports because aggregation tempers the manager's misreporting incentives. We also demonstrate that, as any given component of the aggregated accounting report becomes softer, the equilibrium level of the firm's investment diminishes and the market places greater weight on the remaining components of the report.     

CEO Compensation and Fair Value Accounting: Evidence from Purchase Price Allocation

This study investigates the impact of CEO compensation structure on post‐acquisition purchase price allocation, an accounting procedure that involves fair value estimation of various assets and liabilities. We find that CEOs whose compensation packages rely more on earnings‐based bonuses are more likely to overallocate the purchase price to goodwill, the largest asset recorded post‐acquisition. Because goodwill is not amortized, the overallocation likely increases post‐acquisition earnings and bonuses. We also find that, when the acquirer's CEO bonus plan includes performance measures that are not affected, or are less affected, by the overstatement of goodwill, such as cash flows, sales, or earnings growth, the overallocation to goodwill motivated by bonus plans diminishes.     

Motivating Management to Reveal Inside Information

This paper develops incentive schemes which motivate a manager to release private information that he has concerning the probabilities of occurrence of the various output levels of his firm. It is shown that, in the context of a pure-exchange economy, a complete prohibition on the manager's trading in his firm's stock is sufficient to motivate him to truthfully release his private information. When the setting is extended to that of a production-exchange economy, the manager must also be allowed to choose the production plan that he most prefers in order for him to be motivated to release his information truthfully. In fact, no incentive scheme in a general production-exchange economy can be guaranteed to motivate the manager to release his information truthfully if he is not allowed to choose the production plan freely. However, when more structure is placed on the economy, such an incentive scheme can be developed as described in the latter part of this paper.     

Fund Manager Use of Public Information: New Evidence on Managerial Skills

We show theoretically that the responsiveness of a fund manager's portfolio allocations to changes in public information decreases in the manager's skill. We go on to estimate this sensitivity (RPI) as the R² of the regression of changes in a manager's portfolio holdings on changes in public information using a panel of U.S. equity funds. Consistent with RPI containing information related to managerial skills, we find a strong inverse relationship between RPI and various existing measures of performance, and between RPI and fund flows. We also document that both fund‐ and manager‐specific attributes affect RPI.     

Efficient management remuneration plan design: A consideration of specific human capital investments

This paper investigates the contractual relationship between the manager and the firm. The results indicate that cross-sectional variation in the components of management remuneration plans can be explained by variations in the specificity of both the manager's human capital investments and the firm's resources. Where the returns on the firm's resources are relatively more dependent upon (specific to) a particular manager, that manager is more likely to be able to negotiate his/her remuneration. The manager is also more likely to be paid on a long run contingent basis and to be offered deferred forfeitable remuneration. The results also indicate that the greater the firm-specificity of a manager's human capital investments the greater the likelihood that the manager is offered termination compensation as part of the remuneration package.     

Discussion of Accounting Discretion in Fair Value Estimates: An Examination of SFAS 142 Goodwill Impairments

Beatty and Weber examine an accounting choice that managers made upon adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 142: whether to record a goodwill asset impairment as a cumulative effect of an accounting change at the time of adoption or delay the recognition of such an impairment to the future (perhaps indefinitely) when they would be recorded as expenses in earnings from continuing operations. The authors consider several factors that might influence management's reporting of transition effects, including contracting, equity market incentives, and regulatory forces. Participants at the 2005 Journal of Accounting Research Conference questioned whether such a complex accounting decision can be captured with simple linear models and noisy proxy variables, while also speculating upon whether the results would generalize to other settings. In this discussion, I summarize Beatty and Weber's research, highlight its contribution to the accounting literature, and provide a record of the main issues raised by the conference participants.     

PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATION UNDER TRACKING ERROR AND WEIGHTS CONSTRAINTS

The performance of active portfolio managers who must comply with a weights constraint is often assessed against a benchmark. The weights constraint is common as the funds are committed by their own prospectus to a minimum (or maximum) portfolio concentration. We characterize the optimal asset allocation and analyze the implications of the weights constraint on the manager's performance and on the relevance of the information ratio. We obtain that because of the weights constraint, at the optimum, the information ratio often decreases when the manager is free to deviate more from the benchmark.     

Fair Value Accounting and Stewardship*

Current standards define fair value as the market price at which an asset could be sold or a liability could be settled in the normal course of business. Setting aside measurement issues, assessing the relevance of exit values has intensified in recent years as fair value becomes a pervasive component of accounting regulation. The current debate about accounting measurement is framed in terms of making a choice between fair value and historical cost. In this article I argue that this is not a correct framing of the issues; knowledge of fair value alone cannot help investors to evaluate stewardship, because they would not know how much resources the management had sacrificed to obtain that fair value. To properly evaluate stewardship, investors need both types of information, historical cost and fair value.Using this information, a rate‐of‐return‐like index of stewardship quality is proposed. This commentary concludes with a statement about three significant drawbacks of relying solely on fair value accounting.     

Optimal allocation to hedge funds: an empirical analysis

What percentage of their portfolio should investors allocate to hedge funds? The only available answers to the above question are set in a static mean-variance framework, with no explicit accounting for uncertainty on the active manager's ability to generate abnormal return, and usually generate unreasonably high allocations to hedge funds. In this paper, we apply the model introduced in Cvitanic et al (2002b Working Paper USC) for optimal investment strategies in the presence of uncertain abnormal returns to a database of hedge funds. We find that the presence of the model risk significantly decreases an investor's optimal allocation to hedge funds. Another finding of this paper is that low beta hedge funds may serve as natural substitutes for a significant portion of investor risk-free asset holdings.     

Market efficiency,managerial compensation,and real efficiency

We examine how an exogenous improvement in market efficiency, which allows the stock market to obtain more precise information about the firm's intrinsic value, affects the shareholder–manager contracting problem, managerial incentives, and shareholder value. A key assumption in the model is that stock market investors do not observe the manager's pay-performance sensitivity ex ante. We show that an increase in market efficiency weakens managerial incentives by making the firm's stock price less sensitive to the firm's current performance. The impact on real efficiency and shareholder value varies depending on the composition of the firm's intrinsic value.     

On the origin of shared beliefs (and corporate culture)

This article shows how corporate culture, in the sense of shared beliefs and values, originates (often unintentionally) through screening, self‐sorting, and manager‐directed joint learning. It shows that such culture will be stronger among more important employees and in older and more successful firms where employees make important decisions and the manager has strong beliefs. It further shows how a manager's beliefs influence culture, how culture persists despite turnover, and why the suggested link between culture and performance may be a case of inverse causality. It finally shows that, from an outsider's perspective, organizations may tend to overinvest in corporate culture.     

A Theory of Noise Trading in Securities Markets

In a recent article, Black 1 introduces a type of trading that he terms noise trading. He asserts that noise trading, which he defines as trading on noise as if it were information, must be a significant factor in securities markets. However, he does not provide an explanation of why any investors would rationally want to engage in noise trading. The goal of this paper is to provide such an explanation for one type of investor, managers of investment funds. As shown here, the incentive for a manager to engage in noise trading arises because of the positive signal that the level of the manager's trading provides about his or her ability to collect private information concerning current and potential investments. If the manager's compensation is directly related to investors' perceptions of his or her ability, the manager will then trade more frequently than is justified on the basis of his or her private information. In addition to providing this explanation for noise trading, the results of this analysis may also be useful for further empirical exploration of the relation between investment fund portfolio turnover and subsequent performance.     

Financial guarantors’ executive compensation,charter value and risk-taking

Financial guarantees have been extensively used recently as part of rescue packages to bail out troubled institutions and governments around the world. We propose a new incentive compensation model for studying agency conflict between the shareholders and the manager of a typical financial guarantor. In our model, the manager chooses the guarantor's risk level, with disutility to reduce risk (i.e., reducing the risk of the guarantor incurs a direct cost to the manager). Moral hazard causes the manager to select a level of risk that is higher than the level chosen in an otherwise first-best environment with no conflict of interest between the shareholders and the manager. However, in our proposed framework, charter value plays a self-disciplining role on the manager's appetite for risk, therefore it helps mitigate the extent of the deviation from first best with agency conflict found previously (e.g., 0055, 0015 and 0020). This suggests that researchers should study charter value, managerial compensation and risk decisions within a unified framework and not separately, as all studies have done in the past.     

Dynamic portfolio strategy by loss-averse fund managers facing performance-induced fund flows

In a continuous-time framework, we establish an optimal dynamic portfolio strategy for a loss-averse fund manager facing performance-induced fund flows. Using the martingale approach, we derive closed-form solutions to both the optimal terminal value and optimal dynamic strategy of the fund under management. The model shows that the loss-averse manager strives to earn high returns in good market conditions at the risk of losing all investments at the terminal date in bad market conditions. The prospect of higher fund inflows induced by superior performance motivates fund managers to take more aggressive investment strategies, increasing the fund's risk exposure, whereas the prospect of fund outflows due to underperformance has no impact on the fund manager's investment decision. While the prospect of higher fund inflows increases dynamic optimal wealth as well as optimal terminal wealth in good market conditions, in bad market conditions, it reduces dynamic optimal wealth and results in a higher chance of a complete loss at the terminal date. Finally, a manager with a higher degree of loss aversion tends to take a conservative investment strategy with a lower risk exposure especially in bad market conditions, leading to a lower dynamic and terminal wealth in good market conditions and also a lower chance of a complete loss in bad market conditions.     

Financial guarantors’ executive compensation,charter value and risk-taking

Financial guarantees have been extensively used recently as part of rescue packages to bail out troubled institutions and governments around the world. We propose a new incentive compensation model for studying agency conflict between the shareholders and the manager of a typical financial guarantor. In our model, the manager chooses the guarantor's risk level, with disutility to reduce risk (i.e., reducing the risk of the guarantor incurs a direct cost to the manager). Moral hazard causes the manager to select a level of risk that is higher than the level chosen in an otherwise first-best environment with no conflict of interest between the shareholders and the manager. However, in our proposed framework, charter value plays a self-disciplining role on the manager's appetite for risk, therefore it helps mitigate the extent of the deviation from first best with agency conflict found previously (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Cadenillas et al., 2004, Cadenillas et al., 2007). This suggests that researchers should study charter value, managerial compensation and risk decisions within a unified framework and not separately, as all studies have done in the past.     

A Look Back at the Beginnings of EVA and Value‐Based Management

In this interview conducted five years ago, one of the pioneers of value‐based management discusses his life's work in converting principles of modern finance theory into performance evaluation and incentive compensation plans that have been adopted by many of the world's largest and most successful companies, including Coca‐Cola, SABMiller in London, Siemens in Germany, and the Godrej Group in India. The issues covered include the significance of dividend payouts (are dividends really necessary to support a company's stock price and, if so, why?) as well as the question of optimal capital structure (whether and why debt might be cheaper than equity). But the most important focus of the interview is corporate performance measurement and the use of executive pay to strengthen management incentives to increase efficiency and value. As Stern never tired of arguing, the widespread tendency of public companies to manage “for earnings”—or in accordance with what he refers to as “the accounting model of the firm”—often leads to value‐destroying decisions. As one example, the GAAP accounting principle that requires intangible investments like R&D and training to be written off in the year the money is spent is likely to cause significant underinvestment in such intangibles. At the same time, the failure of conventional income statements to reflect the cost of equity almost certainly encourages corporate overinvestment. Stern's solution to this problem was an executive incentive compensation plan whose rewards were tied to increases in a measure of economic profit called economic value added, or EVA, which research has shown to have a significance relation to changes both in share value and the premium of market value over book value. Moreover, by combining such a plan with a “bonus bank” that pays out annual awards over a multiyear period, boards could ensure that management will be rewarded not for good luck but for sustainable improvements in performance.