The effects of reciprocation wariness on negotiation behavior and outcomes

This study examined the influence of reciprocation wariness, a general fear of exploitation in interpersonal relationships, on negotiators’ motivational orientation, direct information sharing and negotiation outcomes. We predicted that low-wary negotiators are more likely to be prosocial and to engage in direct information sharing, and low-wary negotiators will perceive their opponents more positively after the negotiation. We asked 150 graduate students of business administration to formed 75 dyads to participate in a simulated business negotiation, each taking the role of a buyer or a seller. The results showed that reciprocation wariness had a significant effect on negotiators’ motivational orientation and the amount of information sharing. Negotiating dyads with low–low reciprocation wariness got higher joint gains than those with high–high reciprocation wariness, and information sharing fully mediated the relationship. After the negotiation, low-wary negotiators evaluated the other party more positively and were more willing to interact with their opponents in the future. Contributions and limitations are discussed.     

Sweet Little Lies: Social Context and the Use of Deception in Negotiation

Social context shapes negotiators’ actions, including their willingness to act unethically. We use a simulated negotiation to test how three dimensions of social context—dyadic gender composition, negotiation strategy, and trust—interact to influence one micro-ethical decision, the use of deception. Deception in all-male dyads was relatively unaffected by trust or the other negotiator’s strategy. In mixed-sex dyads, negotiators consistently increased their use of deception when three forms of trust (identity, benevolent, deterrent) were low and opponents used an accommodating strategy. However, in all-female dyads, negotiators appeared to use multiple and shifting reference points in deciding when to deceive the other party. In these dyads, the use of deception increased when a competitive strategy combined with low benevolence-based trust or an accommodating strategy combined with high identity-based trust. Deception in all-female dyads decreased when a competitive strategy was used in the context of low deterrence-based trust.     

Market Alternatives, Third Party Intervention, and Third Party Informedness in Negotiation

Negotiation is one possible mechanism for setting transfer prices when no unique transfer price is obviously correct, allowing divisional managers to run their divisions with some degree of autonomy. This study examines the effects of market alternatives, third party intervention and third party informedness in transfer pricing negotiation.Experiment 1 examined the effects of market alternatives in a fully crossed design of buyer and seller's Best Alternatives To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) at four levels (no, low, medium, or high). Experiment 2 examined the effects of third party intervention with reference to role (binding vs. nonbinding) and informedness (informed vs. uninformed).Results of Experiment 1 indicated that both the existence and level of market alternatives affected reservation prices, expected profits, aspiration levels, and individual profits. Dyads with unequal BATNAs did not obtain higher joint profits than those with equal BATNAs, while dyads with unequal BATNAs distributed profits more unevenly between negotiators than dyads with equal BATNAs. Results of Experiment 2 indicated that only making the third party's role binding had an effect on joint profits. However, the presence of a third party and both the role and informedness manipulations affected resource distribution.     

Social Embeddedness in Electronic Negotiations

This study contributes to electronic negotiation research by analyzing the role of social embeddedness of actors in a controlled laboratory experiment. In particular, we analyze the effect of prior negotiator relationship in different conflict levels in web-based negotiations. We hypothesize that with increasing intensity of conflicts, negotiators who have a personal relationship use more value creating strategies compared to anonymous negotiators. As a consequence, we also hypothesize to find fewer impasses in electronic negotiations involving subjects who are socially embedded. Our results confirm that, in fact, in severe conflicts socially embedded actors reach significantly more agreements than subjects of the control group while such an effect is not found in weak conflict situations. These findings are related to more yielding between embedded actors but not to more value creating behavior. From these results, we can conclude that socially embedded negotiators better manage to reach agreements in difficult situations. Furthermore, an institutionalized pre-negotiation phase which allows negotiators to establish a personal relationship can counteract the threat of impasses.     

Maybe It’s Right,Maybe It’s Wrong: Structural and Social Determinants of Deception in Negotiation

Context shapes negotiators’ actions, including their willingness to act unethically. Focusing on negotiators use of deception, we used a simulated two-party negotiation to test how three contextual variables—regulatory focus, power, and trustworthiness—interacted to shift negotiators’ ethical thresholds. We demonstrated that these three variables interact to either inhibit or activate deception, providing support for an interactionist model of ethical decision-making. Three patterns emerged from our analyses. First, low power inhibited and high power activated deception. Second, promotion-focused negotiators favored sins of omission, whereas prevention-focused negotiators favored sins of commission. Third, low cognition-based trust influenced deception when negotiators experience fit between power and regulatory focus, whereas affect-based trust influenced deception when negotiators experience misfit between these structural context variables. We conclude that regulatory focus primes different moral templates: promotion-focused negotiators’ decision to deceive is determined by moral pragmatism, whereas prevention-focused negotiators’ decision to deceive is determined by opportunism. Because each combination of power and regulatory focus was tied to a specific subcomponent of trust, we further conclude that negotiators engage in motivated information search to determine whether they should deceive their opponents.     

An empirical study of an interactive,session-oriented computerized Negotiation Support System (NSS)

Negotiating is one of the four major decisional roles played by managers. In fact, resolving conflict is said to occupy 20% of a manager's working hours. This growing frequency of negotiation scenarios coupled with the increasing complexity of the issues which need to be resolved in a negotiation make the possibility of computer enhancement for negotiation very appealing. Implementations of computerized Negotiation Support Systems (NSS) in the business world, international affairs, labor law, and environmental and safety disputes have demonstrated their potential for making negotiation problems more manageable and comprehensible for negotiators. Still, pioneers in NSS research have expressed their dismay at the lack of rigorous empirical research and evaluation of NSS. In particular, research is needed which will determine how and under what circumstances negotiation processes can be enhanced by NSS support.This article describes empirical research on the effects of a highly structured, interactive NSS on the outcome of face-to-face issues resolution and the attitudes of negotiators in both low- and high-conflict situations. In a laboratory experiment, bargaining dyads played the roles of manufacturers negotiating a four-issue, three-year purchase agreement for an engine subcomponent in conditions of high and low conflict of interest. The results of the study showed that NSS support did help bargainers achieve higher joint outcomes and more balanced contracts, but that the NSS support increased negotiation time. Satisfaction was greater for NSS dyads in both conflict levels, and perceived negative climate was reduced in low conflict.One primary implication of the results of this study is that NSS developers should keep in mind the importance of providing users with a system with interactive qualities which not only enhance the decision-making process but also provide them with a sense of participation in reaching the solution, as was done in this study.     

The effect of communication medium on negotiation performance

Concepts of media efficiency and media richness are employed to describe the impact of communication media on two key aspects of negotiation behavior—reducing uncertainty about the task, and managing equivocality about negotiator's bargaining orientation. A controlled experiment was conducted to examine how the use of either audio or text forms of verbal communication, and the presence or absence of visual communication, impacts negotiation performance in a bilateral monopoly task. Each member of a pair of negotiators received private instructions either to maximize joint profit (a cooperative bargaining orientation) or to maximize individual profit (an individualistic bargaining orientation). Negotiation performance was measured via the total amount of relative cooperativeness of verbal communication and joint profit. In the audio mode as opposed to the text mode, the total amount of verbal communication and joint profit was increased. In the presence of visual communication the relative cooperativeness and joint profit of pairs of individualistic negotiators was less than that of cooperative negotiators. In the absence of visual communication the relative cooperativeness and joint profit of pairs of individualistic negotiators was no less than that of cooperative negotiators. In sum the findings suggest that uncertainty regarding the logical structure of the task was reduced primarily via verbal communciation, while equivocality regarding the bargaining orientation of the other negotiator was reduced primarily via visual communication. The implications for group decision and negotiation research and practice are explored.     

Mediation with Incomplete Information: Approaches to Suggest Potential Agreements

In bilateral Negotiation Analysis, the literature often considers the case of complete information. In this context, since the negotiators know the value functions of both parties, it is not difficult to calculate the Pareto efficient solutions for the negotiation. Thus rational negotiators can reach agreement on this frontier. However, these approaches are not applied in practice when complete information is not available. The research question of our work is “It is possible to help negotiators achieving an efficient solution in the absence of complete information regarding the different parameters of the model?”. We propose to derive incomplete information about the preferences of negotiators from the statements they make and the offers they exchange during the negotiation process. We present and discuss three approaches that use this information in order to help a mediator proposing a better solution than the compromise the negotiators have reached or are close to reach.     

The impact of minimum goals and aspirations on judgments of success in negotiations

Experiment 1 examined the impact of minimum goals and aspiration values on feelings of success. Negotiators with low minimum goals felt more successful than did those with higher minimum goals, even though their final settlements were identical. Furthermore, negotiators with low aspirations felt more successful than did negotiators with higher aspirations, even though the final settlement was identical. Experiment 2 examined the relative impact of minimum goals and aspirations and found that aspirations influenced negotiators' perceptions of success more than did minimum goals. Experiment 3 examined how goals affected the demands negotiators made to their opponents. Negotiators with low minimum goals and high aspirations demanded more from their opponents than did negotiators with high minimum goals and low aspirations. In general, aspirations, as compared to minimum goals, exerted a more powerful influence on the demands people made to others in negotiations and how successful they felt about negotiated outcomes.This research was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation, #SES8921926, #SE9210298, and PYI9157447. Research reported in this article was completed while the author was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences with the support of NSF grant SBR8921926. I thank Terri DeHarpport, Dennis Hrebec, and Linda Palmer for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article.     

Strategies and language trends in learning success and failure of negotiation

In negotiation by electronic means, language is an important deal-making tool which helps realize negotiation strategies. Negotiators may use language to request information, exchange offers, persuade, threaten, as well as reach a compromise or find prospective partners. All this is recorded in texts exchanged by negotiators. We explore the language signals of strategies—argumentation, persuasion, negation, proposition. Leech and Svartvik’s approach to language in communication gives our study the necessary systematic background. It combines pragmatics, the communicative grammar and the meaning of English verbs. Language signals become features in the task of classifying those texts. We employ Statistical Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning techniques to find general trends that negotiation texts exhibit. Our hypothesis is that language signals help predict negotiation outcomes. We run experiments on the Inspire data. The electronic negotiation support system Inspire was gathering data for several years. The data include text messages which negotiators may exchange while trading offers. We conduct a series of Machine Learning experiments to predict the negotiation outcome from the texts associated with first halves of negotiations. We compare the results with the classification of complete negotiations. We conclude the paper with an analysis of the results and a list of suggestions for future work.     

Mutually Dependent: Power,Trust, Affect and the Use of Deception in Negotiation

Using a simulated two-party negotiation, we examined how trustworthiness and power balance affected deception. In order to trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties. We found that high cognitive trust increased deception whereas high affective trust decreased deception. Negotiators who expressed anxiety also used more deception whereas those who expressed optimism also used less deception. The nature of the negotiating relationship (mutuality and level of dependence) interacted with trust and negotiators’ affect to influence levels of deception. Deception was most likely to occur when negotiators reported low trust or expressed negative emotions in the context of nonmutual or low dependence relationships. In these relationships, emotions that signaled certainty were associated with misrepresentation whereas emotions that signaled uncertainty were associated with concealment of information. Negotiators who expressed positive emotions in the context of a nonmutual or high dependence relationship also used less deception. Our results are consistent with a fair trade model in which negotiator increases deception when contextual and interpersonal cues heighten concerns about exploitation and decrease deception when these cues attenuate concerns about exploitation.     

I Expected More from You: The Influence of Close Relationships and Perspective Taking on Negotiation Offers

Three experimental studies show that interpersonal relationships influence the expectations of negotiators at the negotiation table. That is, negotiators expect more generous negotiation offers from close others (Study 1), and when expectations are not met, negative emotions arise, resulting in negative economic and relational outcomes (Study 2). Finally, a boundary condition for the effect of interpersonal relationships on negotiation expectations is shown: perspective taking leads the parties to expect less from friends than from acquaintances (Study 3). The findings suggest that perspective taking helps negotiators reach agreement in relationships. The article concludes with implications for practice and future research directions.     

Positive affect and decision frame in negotiation

This study examined decision frame (“gain” vs. “loss”) and negotiator affect (positive vs. control) in a simulated bilateral negotiation where negotiators dealt with a programmed opponent and made offers and counteroffers on three issues that differed in value. Direct comparisons between the gain and loss frame conditions, in the control-affect condition, revealed a replication of the standard frame effect: a loss frame produced fewer concessions than a gain frame. However, an interaction effect indicated that the frame effect reversed in the positive affect condition: under positive affect, a loss frame produced greater concessions than a gain frame. In addition, the data indicated a replication of earlier work showing that positive affect can lead to more integrative agreements in negotiation. The results suggest that positive affect can influence location of a reference point in evaluating prospective outcomes; one implication is that prospect theory can be useful for understanding the effects of affect in bilateral negotiation.     

Social Motives and Trust: Implications for Joint Gains in Negotiations

This study examined the role of trust via contingency model in a multi-issue multi-party negotiation setting and how it relates to outcomes. Results of a laboratory experiment with 288 undergraduate students confirmed both a main effect of Social Value Orientations (SVO), such that cooperative negotiators achieved higher joint gains than pro-self negotiators, and a main effect of Motivational Orientations (MO), such that pro-social negotiators attained higher joint gains than egoistic-oriented negotiators. Furthermore, the predicted interaction effect between SVO and MO, such that negotiators with a pro-self SVO attained higher joint gains in a pro-social, in contrast to an egoistic MO, condition was confirmed. This effect was fully mediated by trust. The dimension of trust that explained the SVO and MO interaction was that of concern for fellow negotiators as rated by oneself, as well as by an objective third-party observer. Implications for the strategic use of social motives and trust on effective information exchange and negotiated outcomes are discussed.     

The Impact of Time Pressure and Information on Negotiation Process and Decisions

The amount of time available to reach an agreement, information about a negotiator's own position, and information about the opponent's position were manipulated in a simulated contract negotiation. As in decision making research, time pressure in negotiation was expected to decrease response time and change response strategy. Information was expected to be an advantage to negotiators when clarifying their preferences but a disadvantage if information about competing opponent interests was present. Results supported this expectation. Different patterns of concessions and in concessions and inconsistencies were found under high and low time pressure and type of information.     

An experimental study of alternative preparation aids for international negotiations

We test the relative effectiveness of alternative preparation aids in the context of an international negotiation. We consider three forms of training: reading material, a course on negotiation, and an expert system (NEGOTEX) expressly designed to train negotiators. We conducted a laboratory experiment involving 66 pairs of negotiators—one of each pair being American and the other Chinese. Results suggest that in this context, the course had the greatest effect on performance, followed by NEGOTEX, and then followed by reading material. In addition, we found that training effects were additive: multiple forms of training lead to better results than individual forms of training, suggesting that (1) training forms complement and do not substitute for one another, and (2) multiple forms of training should be considered, especially when stakes are high.     

A method for examining learning in negotiation

The impact of feedback on interpersonal learning in negotiation was examined. An interactive computer program was developed to isolate the effect of individual judgment on performance. Subjects negotiated three times with a computerized opponent whom they were led to believe was another subject. Some subjects received a complete diagnosis of their opponents' interests following each negotiation (full feedback); others only learned about their opponents' payoffs (outcome feedback); some did not receive any information about the opponent (control). The prediction was that subjects who received a complete diagnosis would make more accurate judgments about their opponents' interests and reach more integrative agreements in subsequent negotiation situations. The results provided weak support for the model. Two indices of performance were studied: negotiators' ability to recognize compatible issues and logrolling, or the ability to make mutually beneficial tradeoffs among issues. The pattern of findings was dramatically different for the two performance measures: Whereas logrolling improved as negotiators gained experience, recognition of compatible issues worsened over trials. The degradation of performance for compatible issues was curbed for negotiators who were provided with full feedback. The feedback did not affect logrolling performance.The research reported in this article was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation #SES89211926.     

Negotiators' Communication, Perception of Their Counterparts, and Performance in Dyadic E-negotiations

The aim of this study was to improve our understanding of negotiation strategies, behaviors, and outcomes, and the relationships between these factors based on data collected from questionnaires, actual behavior during the negotiation process implemented using e-negotiation system, and the negotiation outcomes. This study clustered the negotiators based on either the negotiators' own strategies or their thoughts about those of their partners. This resulted in a division into cooperative and noncooperative clusters. We found that the negotiators whose own strategies are less cooperative tend to submit more offers but fewer messages. However, these people consIDer that they have less control over the negotiation process compared with those who adopt a more cooperative strategy, who make fewer offers but send more messages. Those in the cooperative cluster consistently feel friendlier about the negotiation and more satisfied with the outcome and their performance. Further, there is a correlation not only between self-strategies and the thoughts about partners' strategies, but also between strategies and final agreements. Finally, the proportion of negotiations reaching agreement is larger for the cooperative cluster than for the noncooperative cluster.