The evolution of pay premiums for managerial attributes

This paper proposes and estimates an interactive fixed effects model of executive compensation, which allows for time-variant pay premiums for unobserved manager attributes. We find that two managerial traits can explain executive compensation over time: talent and conservatism. The market premium for talent is higher in bull markets, as the higher marginal productivity of human capital during these periods increases the demand and thus the price for talents. Such pay premium is concentrated among top talented managers, who earn a premium about five times that of median talented managers. The pay premium for conservatism is linked to the equity market risk premium, with conservatism being discounted (compensated) during the low (high) risk premium periods. We show that risk-taking managers are rewarded during the early period of our sample. However, after the periods characterized by higher risk premium, such as the financial crisis, conservatism becomes a more desirable trait.     

Excessive financial services CEO pay and financial crisis: Evidence from calibration estimation

The questions of whether there ever existed excessive risk-taking incentives from executive compensation in the financial industry, and whether top executives of financial services firms actually responded to such excessive incentives that eventually led to the crisis remain unanswered. The prior research has attempted to answer the second question, however, with conflicting evidence and without a clear definition of excessive. To answer the first question, this paper uses a numerical calibration approach to estimate the optimal level of CEO pay and derive the excessive compensation which provides excessive risk-taking incentives. We then examine the extent of excessive compensation in the financial industry relative to the non-financial industries during the 2000s and whether there were changes in compensation practices between the post Sarbanes–Oxley period and the pre-crisis period. We find mixed evidence in favor of the presence of higher excessive pay in the financial industry, and the CEO compensation practices remained largely unchanged over time. In addition, the relation between excessive pay and excessive risk-taking in the financial industry is somewhat weak, suggesting that CEO compensation might not be a major cause for the crisis in 2008.     

The wolves of Wall Street? Managerial attributes and bank risk

We find that chief executive officers and chief financial officers exert significant individual effects on bank risk. Manager transitions, including transitions generated by plausibly exogenous manager departures, lead to abnormally large changes in bank risk. We demonstrate that the effects of managers on bank risk are sizable and manager-specific. The effects are also partly anticipated by the board because they are reflected in managers’ pay. However, wide-ranging personal attributes, including biographical, experience, and compensation data, only explain a small share of managers’ impact on bank risk. This implies that attempts to rein in bank risk-taking by targeting manager characteristics will be challenging for investors and regulators.     

Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies

This paper tests the proposition that higher tournament incentives will result in greater risk-taking by senior managers in order to increase their chance of promotion to the rank of CEO. Measuring tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of senior managers, we find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives. Further, we find that greater tournament incentives lead to higher R&D intensity, firm focus, and leverage, but lower capital expenditures intensity. Our results support the hypothesis that option-like features of intra-organizational CEO promotion tournaments provide incentives to senior executives to increase firm risk by following riskier policies. Finally, the compensation levels and structures of executives of financial institutions have received a great deal of scrutiny after the financial crisis. In a separate examination of financial firms, we again find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives.     

Credit unions vs. commercial banks,who takes more risk?

A unique feature of the financial services industry is that both shareholder-owned banks and member-owned credit unions coexist and compete against each other. In this study, we investigate two research questions. First, we compare risk-taking by banks and credit unions, with an additional consideration as to how regulatory oversight (state or federal) relates to such risk-taking. Second, we examine how competition affects the difference in risk-taking between these two types of financial institutions. To answer both questions, we rely on a matched sample (by loan type, size, and county) of commercial banks and credit unions, covering the period between 2010 and 2017. We use three empirical proxies for risk-taking, the Z-score, measuring an institution’s insolvency risk, as well as the ratios of non-performing loans to total loans and loan charge-offs to total loans, measuring the credit risk. Our results suggest that banks tend to engage in more risk-taking than credit unions; however, state regulatory oversight reduces the risk-taking gap, especially in terms of the Z-score. We further find that competition induces different risk-taking behaviors in banks and credit unions. Our results are robust to several alternative specifications.     

Financial statement comparability and bank risk-taking

This study examines the relationship between financial statement comparability and bank risk-taking. Our analysis of a sample of publicly listed U.S. banks over the 1994–2019 period shows that banks with more comparable financial statements are related to significantly less risk-taking. We also find that the negative relationship between comparability and risk-taking is more pronounced for firms with more severe moral hazard and agency problems. Our documented findings are robust across alternative measures of comparability and risk-taking and considering change analysis, after controlling for strength of corporate governance and using propensity score matching and two-stage least squares estimation to address endogeneity concerns. Our analysis also shows that the relationship between financial statement comparability and bank risk-taking is stronger for smaller banks than for larger banks. Overall, this study provides unique insights into the role of financial statement comparability in curbing risk-taking in the banking sector.     

金融开放与银行风险承担的异质性研究——基于98个国家的实证分析

金融开放是加剧银行业风险还是分散风险,是颇具争议的研究课题。本文借助Gygli et al.(2018)的金融开放指标,应用1999-2016年98个国家的跨国数据,检验了金融开放和银行风险承担的长期均衡和短期关系。从长期均衡关系来看,金融开放显著地提高了银行抵御风险能力,具有长期"促进效应";从短期关系来看,金融开放则存在一定"风险效应"①。进一步研究发现,短期"风险效应"与外资银行资产占比不存在关联,而与市场制度环境显著相关,即完善的制度环境有助于弱化"风险效应"。结合中国实际情况,文章支持"以开放促改革"的观点,强调完善市场制度环境的重要性,为政策制定者提供实证依据。     

How Do Ex Ante Severance Pay Contracts Fit into Optimal Executive Incentive Schemes?

We analyze a sample of over 3,600 ex ante explicit severance pay agreements in place at 808 firms and show that firms set ex ante explicit severance pay agreements as one component in managing the optimal level of equity incentives. Younger executives are more likely to receive explicit contracts and better terms. Firms with high distress risk, high takeover probability, and high return volatility are significantly more likely to enter into new or revised severance contracts. Finally, ex post payouts to managers are largely determined by the ex ante contract terms.     

CEO contractual protection and debt contracting

Chief Executive Officer (CEO) contractual protection, in the forms of CEO employment agreements and CEO severance pay agreements, is prevalent among S&P 1500 firms. While prior research has examined the impact of these agreements on corporate decisions from shareholders’ perspective, there is little research on the impact from debt holders’ perspective. We find that, compared with other loans, loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection on average contain more performance covenants and performance-pricing provisions. This effect increases with CEOs’ risk-taking incentives and opportunities, but it decreases with CEOs’ preference for and opportunity of enjoying a quiet life. Furthermore, for loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection, debt holders include stricter covenants, charge a higher interest rate and use a more diffuse syndicate structure. Collectively, these results shed light on the impact of CEO contractual protection on debt contracting.     

CEO risk-taking incentives and relative performance evaluation

This paper examines how changes in CEO risk-taking incentives are associated with changes in the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEO contracts. Using a shock to the accounting for executive stock options (FAS 123R), I confirm that risk-taking incentives and option grants declined following FAS 123R using a within-firm design, but not a within-CEO-firm design. Decreased risk-taking incentives lead executives to invest in projects with lower systematic risk and can result in reduced incentives to hedge exposure to systematic risk in CEO compensation contracts via RPE. However, CEO relative risk aversion increases with decreases in risk-taking incentives, potentially increasing incentives to protect CEO wealth from systematic performance via RPE. Testing these competing predictions, I find modest evidence consistent with reduced RPE surrounding FAS 123R, suggesting that when CEO risk-taking incentives are reduced, so are incentives to shield CEO pay from systematic performance.     

Managerial incentives to take asset risk

We argue that incentives to take equity risk (”equity incentives”) only partially capture incentives to take asset risk (“asset incentives”). This is because leverage, while central to the theory of risk-shifting, is not explicitly considered by equity incentives. Employing measures of asset incentives that account for leverage, we find that asset risk-taking incentives can be large compared to incentives to increase firm value. Stock holdings can induce substantial risk-taking incentives, contrary to the assumption that only stock options drive risk-taking. Finally, asset incentives help explain asset risk-taking of U.S. financial institutions before the 2007/08 crisis.     

Bank dividends,risk, and regulatory regimes

This paper investigates the relation between bank dividends and bank risk over the period 1984–2011, and assesses the existence of risk-taking and risk-shifting in the US commercial banking sector subject to regulatory regime changes. The introduction of PCA in 1992 and TARP in 2008 constitute significant regulatory regime changes, and provide the necessary framework to explore whether regime-dependent risk-shifting or risk-taking is present. We find strong evidence of risk-shifting and risk-taking over the post-PCA regime spanning the period 1992–2008. We interpret this evidence as indication of ineffectiveness of PCA in controlling risk-taking and risk-shifting. The finding of risk-taking just prior to the recent financial crisis suggests that risk-taking may be a factor contributing to this crisis. As risk-taking and risk-shifting are important aspects of bank behavior (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009), these results are of interest to bank regulators and important to Basel III.     

极端气候对商业银行风险承担的影响——来自中国地方性商业银行的经验证据

深化对气候相关金融风险的认识,对于促进绿色低碳发展,防范系统性金融风险具有重要意义。本文以2004—2018年期间281家中国地方性商业银行为样本,实证检验了极端气候对银行风险承担的影响及其机制。研究发现,极端强降水气候显著提升了银行风险承担,极端高温和极端低温气候对银行风险承担不存在明显影响。极端强降水主要通过给银行信贷主体带来经济损失,影响违约概率和银行信贷资产质量,进而影响银行风险承担水平;提高灾前的保险保障水平、强化碳减排机制以及确保银行资本的充足性均有利于弱化极端气候对银行风险承担的影响;相较于以地级和省会城市工商业和居民为主要服务对象的地方性商业银行,极端强降水对以“三农”为主要服务对象的县域地方性商业银行风险承担的影响更大。因此,提升商业银行应对极端气候风险意识,提高气候灾害保险保障水平,强化碳减排机制和银行资本充足管理,均有利于降低极端气候对银行风险的影响。     

Financial networks,bank efficiency and risk-taking

Networks with a core–periphery topology are found in many financial systems across different jurisdictions. Though the theoretical and structural aspects of core–periphery networks are clear, the consequences that core–periphery structures bring for banking efficiency stand as an open question. We address this gap in the literature by providing insights as to how the structure of financial networks can affect bank efficiency. We find that core–periphery structures are cost efficient for banks, which is a characteristic that encourages the participation of banks in financial networks. On the downside, we also show that core–periphery structures are risk-taking inefficient, because they imply higher systemic risk levels in the financial system. In this way, regulators should be aware of the excessive risk inefficiency that arises in the financial system due to individual decisions made by banks in the network.     

Does political connection distort competition and encourage corporate risk taking? International evidence

We investigate the impact of political connection on corporate risk-taking by connected firms, their industry counterparts, as well as non-rival firms from 48 countries. We find that political connection induces higher risk taking by connected firms. By contrast, we do not find evidence that political connection, with the attendant potential competitive distortions in the industry, induces higher risk taking by competitors. We focus on non-financial industries. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the inability to avail themselves of political rents compels the non-connected rivals to adopt more conservative strategies. However, large rival firms, generally considered to be too-important-to-fail, exhibit evidence of higher risk taking. The top size quartile industry rivals take as much risk as the politically connected firms. The higher risk exhibited by large rivals of politically connected firms suggests that our baseline regression results of lower risk-taking among rivals of politically connected firms are biased upward by firms that would be considered too-big-to-fail. This finding also suggests that the too-big-to fail phenomenon is not unique to banks. Our results are robust to the use of alternative measures of risk, to the exclusion of privatized and state-owned firms, and to controlling for the effects of financial crisis.     

The prevention of excess managerial risk taking

Executives with poor prior performance may be inclined to take excessive risk in the hope of meeting performance targets, in which case a compensation contract featuring severance pay can be optimal. While prior work has shown that severance can induce managers to take positive NPV risks, we show that it can also keep them from taking negative NPV risks. We show that severance should be contingent on results: complete failure should nullify any payments. We also show that mandating a firm size that is larger than first-best, while costly, can help screen for good managers.     

Individual investor perceptions and behavior during the financial crisis

Combining monthly survey data with matching trading records, we examine how individual investor perceptions change and drive trading and risk-taking behavior during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. We find that investor perceptions fluctuate significantly during the crisis, with risk tolerance and risk perceptions being less volatile than return expectations. During the worst months of the crisis, investors’ return expectations and risk tolerance decrease, while their risk perceptions increase. Towards the end of the crisis, investor perceptions recover. We document substantial swings in trading and risk-taking behavior that are driven by changes in investor perceptions. Overall, individual investors continue to trade actively and do not de-risk their investment portfolios during the crisis.     

Restricting CEO pay

We analyze several proposals to restrict CEO compensation and calibrate two models of executive compensation that describe how firms would react to different types of restrictions. We find that many restrictions would have unintended consequences. Restrictions on total realized (ex-post) payouts lead to higher average compensation, higher rewards for mediocre performance, lower risk-taking incentives, and the fact that some CEOs would be better off with a restriction than without it. Restrictions on total ex-ante pay lead to a reduction in the firm's demand for CEO talent and effort. Restrictions on particular pay components, and especially on cash payouts, can be easily circumvented. While restrictions on option pay lead to lower risk-taking incentives, restrictions on incentive pay (stock and options) result in higher risk-taking incentives.     

Do foreign banks take more risk? Evidence from emerging economies

This paper addresses the impact of foreign ownership on the risk-taking behavior of banks. Using bank-level panel data of more than 1300 commercial banks in 32 emerging economies during 2000–2013, we find that foreign owned banks take on more risk than their domestic counterparts. We further examine several factors that may potentially contribute to foreign banks’ differentiated riskiness from four perspectives, namely, foreign banks’ informational disadvantages, agency problems, the contagious effect of parent banks’ financial conditions and the disparity between home and host markets. We find supportive evidence that these factors play a significant role in affecting foreign banks’ risk-taking.     

跨境资本流动会加大金融波动吗?

日益活跃的跨境资本流动与金融波动的关系备受学术界关注,"国际风险承担渠道效应"的提出使人们开始重视金融中介在其中发挥的重要作用。本文基于全球79个国家1996-2017年的面板数据,采用系统GMM估计方法,考察了跨境资本流动对金融波动的影响,以及"国际风险承担渠道效应"存在与否。研究结果表明:大规模的跨境资本流动会增大金融体系脆弱性,加剧金融波动,对一国金融稳定造成强有力的威胁;跨境资本巨额的流出与流入均无助于金融稳定;跨境资本流动会通过影响金融中介的风险感知来改变其风险承担行为,最终会进一步放大跨境资本流动对金融稳定的负向作用,即存在"国际风险承担渠道效应"。因此,中国应坚持完善跨境资本流动管理体系与健全宏观审慎监管框架,严守资本充足率这一重要风险防线,加强对跨境资本和金融中介行为的监管,维护金融稳定。