Deposits and relationship lending

We empirically examine whether access to deposits with inelasticrates (core deposits) permits a bank to make contractual agreementswith borrowers that are infeasible if the bank must pay marketrates for funds. Such access insulates a bank's costs of fundsfrom exogenous shocks, allowing it to insulate its borrowersagainst exogenous credit shocks. We find that, controlling forloan market competition, banks funded more heavily with coredeposits provide more loan rate smoothing in response to exogenouschanges in aggregate credit risk. Thus we provide evidence fora novel channel linking bank liabilities to relationship lending.     

Bank reputation, bank commitment, and the effects of competition in credit markets

This article discusses the effects of credit market competitionon a bank's incentive to keep its commitment to lend to a borrowerwhen the borrower's credit quality deteriorates. It is shownthat, unlike in the borrower's commitment problem to keep borrowingfrom the same bank in 'good' times, the increased competitionmay strengthen a bank's incentive to keep its commitment. Banksoffer loans with commitment to the highest quality borrowersbut, when faced with competition from bond markets, they alsogive these loans to lower quality borrowers. An increase inthe number of banks has a non-monotonic effect; new banks reinforcea bank's incentive only if there are a small number of banks.     

Banks' option to lend,interest rate sensitivity,and credit availability

Interest rate risk is a major concern for banks because of the nominal nature of their assets and the asset-liability maturity mismatch. This paper proposes a new way to derive a bank's interest rate sensitivity, by examining separately the effects of interest rate changes on existing loans(loans-in-place) and potential loans (loans-in-process). A potential loan is shown to be equivalent to an American option to lend, and is valued using option theory. An increase in interest rates generally has a negative effect on existing loans. However, if both deposit and lending rates rise by the same amount, the value of a potential loan generally increases. Hence a bank's lending slack (or ratio of loans-in-process to loans-in-place) will determine its overall interest rate risk. Empirical evidence indicates that low-slack banks indeed have significantly more interest rate risk than high-slack banks. The model also makes predictions regarding the effect of deposit and lending rate parameters on bank credit availability. Empirical tests with quarterly data are generally supportive of these predictions. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

财政存款、银行竞争与僵尸企业形成

银行以优惠利率贷款为低质企业“输血”,是企业僵尸化的重要成因。然而,基于中国背景的文献,对银行“输血”动机的研究并不充分,本文从地方财政存款影响银行信贷分配的视角,分析僵尸企业形成的内在机理。首先,通过构建理论模型对银行竞争财政存款及影响企业融资和投资绩效进而僵尸化的逻辑进行刻画,而后依据省份财政存款、银行竞争与微观企业财务数据,对理论推论进行了验证。研究发现,财政存款占当地存款比重越大,企业僵尸化概率越高,并且银行竞争助长了企业僵尸化。此外,基于工具变量估计处理了核心变量的内生性问题,并进行了多种稳健性检验。机制检验表明,财政存款的信贷分配效应,促使企业过度投资,导致经营绩效恶化,进而提高了企业僵尸化概率,银行竞争则会加剧该效应。本文拓展了财政存款的经济效应与僵尸企业形成方面的文献,对于僵尸企业治理有一定参考意义。     

财政存款、银行竞争与僵尸企业形成

银行以优惠利率贷款为低质企业“输血”,是企业僵尸化的重要成因。然而,基于中国背景的文献,对银行“输血”动机的研究并不充分,本文从地方财政存款影响银行信贷分配的视角,分析僵尸企业形成的内在机理。首先,通过构建理论模型对银行竞争财政存款及影响企业融资和投资绩效进而僵尸化的逻辑进行刻画,而后依据省份财政存款、银行竞争与微观企业财务数据,对理论推论进行了验证。研究发现,财政存款占当地存款比重越大,企业僵尸化概率越高,并且银行竞争助长了企业僵尸化。此外,基于工具变量估计处理了核心变量的内生性问题,并进行了多种稳健性检验。机制检验表明,财政存款的信贷分配效应,促使企业过度投资,导致经营绩效恶化,进而提高了企业僵尸化概率,银行竞争则会加剧该效应。本文拓展了财政存款的经济效应与僵尸企业形成方面的文献,对于僵尸企业治理有一定参考意义。     

银行对企业经营的监督效应研究——基于控股股东掏空行为的视角

从控股股东掏空行为的视角,采用中国上市公司的贷款数据分析中国的商业银行对企业的监督作用。研究发现,银行对控股股东的掏空行为具有一定的监督作用,在银行贷款数量多、贷款期限长的公司中,控股股东的掏空行为明显减少。对不同所有制的企业,银行的监督作用存在异质性。目前,银行的监督作用主要体现在国有银行中,而国有银行能有效监督的对象仅限于地方政府和私人控制的企业,国有银行对中央企业的监督能力较弱。从事后监督来看,银行会对控股股东的掏空行为做出贷款政策的调整,对于控股股东掏空严重的企业,续新贷款的银行数量、续新贷款比例显著下降,而且贷款利率显著提高。     

Inside the black box: Bank credit allocation in China’s private sector

This study examines how the Chinese state-owned banks allocate loans to private firms. We find that the banks extend loans to financially healthier and better-governed firms, which implies that the banks use commercial judgments in this segment of the market. We also find that having the state as a minority owner helps firms obtain bank loans and this suggests that political connections play a role in gaining access to bank finance. In addition, we find that commercial judgments are important determinants of the lending decisions for manufacturing firms, large firms, and firms located in regions with a more developed banking sector; political connections are important for firms in service industries, large firms, and firms located in areas with a less developed banking sector.     

Political risk,project finance,and the participation of development banks in syndicated lending

How should loan contracts for financing projects in countries with high political risk be designed? We argue that non-recourse project finance loans and the participation of development banks in the loan syndicate help mitigate political risk. We test these arguments by conducting a study with a sample of 4978 loans made to borrowers in 64 countries. Our results show that if political risk is higher, then project finance loans are more likely to be used, and development banks are more likely to participate in the syndicate. We also show that the terms of the loan contract depend not only on the political risk but also on the legal and institutional environment as well.     

Corporate Debt Structure and the Financial Crisis

We present a DSGE model where firms optimally choose among alternative instruments of external finance. The model is used to explain the evolving composition of corporate debt during the financial crisis of 2008–09, namely, the observed shift from bank finance to bond finance, at a time when the cost of market debt rose above the cost of bank loans. We show that the flexibility offered by banks on the terms of their loans and firms' ability to substitute among alternative instruments of debt finance are important to shield the economy from adverse real effects of a financial crisis.     

Financial deregulation and efficiency: An empirical analysis of Indian banks during the post reform period

The paper investigates the performance of Indian commercial banking sector during the post reform period 1992-2002. Several efficiency estimates of individual banks are evaluated using nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Three different approaches viz., intermediation approach, value-added approach and operating approach have been employed to differentiate how efficiency scores vary with changes in inputs and outputs. The analysis links the variation in calculated efficiencies to a set of variables, i.e., bank size, ownership, capital adequacy ratio, non-performing loans and management quality. The findings suggest that medium-sized public sector banks performed reasonably well and are more likely to operate at higher levels of technical efficiency. A close relationship is observed between efficiency and soundness as determined by bank's capital adequacy ratio. The empirical results also show that technically more efficient banks are those that have, on an average, less non-performing loans. A multivariate analysis based on the Tobit model reinforces these findings.     

Money creation within the macroeconomy: An integrated model of banking

We develop a monetary framework to describe a macroeconomic system consisting of households, firms, the government, the central bank, and banks. The framework is based on the balance sheets of all sectors, in which the monetary flows between them govern the dynamics of the items. The whole system evolves over time and eventually attains a stationary state. Using this integrated model, we find that all flows coming from banks, including issuing loans, purchasing bonds, paying dividends, and paying interest on deposits, create money. On the contrary, all flows going to banks, including receiving repayments, selling bonds, issuing equities, and receiving interest on loans and bonds, destroy money. These flows associated with the behaviors of money creation and destruction are core factors that determine stationary states. We show the relationships between these flows and stationary stocks, especially the quantity of money. We also present the dependence of final output on these flows. We analyze the effects of monetary policies, such as changing the rate on loans and the amount of bank reserves. We find that an increase in the rate may yield higher output, while injecting more reserves may result in lower output.     

Financial effects of an uncertain change in VAT rates in the EU

The paper analyses how close relationships to banks influence a firm’s choice of financing its debt through publicly marketed bonds or bank loans. It is shown that large Japanese firms use less bank debt, if banks own shares in the firm or bank employees are members of the firm’s board. This result supports a theoretical framework, where banks are able to control agency problems associated with debt. Firms use bank loans in order to be monitored, which enables them to access cheaper bond finance. Closer bank–firm relationships facilitate monitoring for the bank and reduce therefore the need for bank finance.     

The stability of short-term interest rates pass-through in the euro area during the financial market and sovereign debt crises

We analyse the dynamics of the pass-through of banks’ marginal cost to bank lending rates over the 2008 crisis and the euro area sovereign debt crisis in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. We measure banks’ marginal cost by their rate on new deposits, contrary to the literature that focuses on money market rates. This allows us to account for banks’ risks. We focus on the interest rate on new short-term loans granted to non-financial corporations in these countries. Our analysis is based on an error-correction approach that we extend to handle the time-varying long-run relationship between banks’ lending rates and banks’ marginal cost, as well as stochastic volatility. Our application is based on a harmonised monthly database from January 2003 to October 2014. We estimate the model within a Bayesian framework, using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods (MCMC).We reject the view that the transmission mechanism is permanent over time. The long-run relationship moved with the sovereign debt crises to a new one, with a slower pass-through and higher bank lending rates. Its developments are heterogeneous from one country to the other. Impediments to the transmission of monetary rates depend on the heterogeneity in banks marginal costs and therefore, its risks. We also find that rates to small firms increase compared to large firms in a few countries. Using a VAR model, we show that overall, the effect of a shock on the rate of new deposits on the unexpected variances of new loans has been less important since 2010. These results confirm the slowdown in the transmission mechanism.     

Bank Finance versus Bond Finance

We present a model with agency costs where heterogeneous firms raise finance through either bank loans or corporate bonds and where banks are more efficient than the market in resolving informational problems. We document some major long‐run differences in corporate finance between the United States and the euro area, and show that our model can explain those differences based on information availability. The model fits the data best when the euro area is characterized by lower availability of public information about corporate credit risk relative to the United States, and when European firms value more than United States firms banks’ flexibility and information acquisition role.     

The performance of banks around the receipt and repayment of TARP funds: Over-achievers versus under-achievers

In this paper, we look at how the pre-crisis health of banks is related to the probability of receiving and repaying TARP capital. We find that financial performance characteristics that are related to the probability of receiving TARP funds differ for the healthiest (“over-achiever”) versus the least healthy (“under-achiever”) banks. We find that TARP under-achievers have some, but not consistent, weaknesses in income production. These banks also are experiencing liquidity issues as customers, shut out of public debt markets, get bank loans through drawdowns of loan commitments. Unlike TARP under-achievers, TARP over-achievers’ loans are performing well. Yet, liquidity issues (from low levels of liquid assets and core deposits and drawdowns of loan commitments) hurt the abilities of these banks to continue their lending. Differences between under-achiever and over-achiever banks are also found for repayment and deadbeat TARP banks.     

Optimal credit risk transfer, monitored finance, and banks

We examine the implications of optimal credit risk transfer (CRT) for bank-loan monitoring, and the incentives for banks to engage in optimal CRT. In our model, properly designed CRT instruments allow banks to insure themselves against loan losses precisely in those states that signal monitoring. We find that optimal CRT enhances loan monitoring and expands financial intermediation, in contrast to the findings of the previous literature. Optimal CRT instruments are based on loan portfolios rather than individual loans and have credit-enhancement guarantees, pretty much as banks do in practice. But the extent of credit enhancement needs to be precisely delimited. Above that exact level, monitoring incentives are undermined (loan quality deteriorates) and wealth is transferred from the bank's financiers to the bank. Properly designed risk-based capital requirements are shown to prevent such a wealth transfer and to provide banks with the incentive to engage in optimal CRT.     

Capital ratios and bank lending: A matched bank approach

This paper examines the impact of bank capital ratios on bank lending by comparing differences in loan growth to differences in capital ratios at sets of banks that are matched based on geographic area as well as size and various business characteristics. We argue that such comparisons are most effective at controlling for local loan demand and other environmental factors. For comparison we also control for local factors using MSA fixed effects. We find, based on data from 2001 to 2011, that the relationship between capital ratios and bank lending was significant during and shortly following the recent financial crisis but not at other times. We find that the relationship between capital ratios and loan growth is stronger for banks where loans are contracting than where loans are expanding. We also show that the elasticity of bank lending with respect to capital ratios is higher when capital ratios are relatively low, suggesting that the effect of capital ratio on bank lending is nonlinear. In addition, we present findings on the relationship between bank capital and lending by bank size and loan type.     

Bank Competition with Financing and Savings Substitutes

This paper models the banking competition in loan and deposit markets on two levels. We measure the competition among different banks and among banks and non-bank financing and saving alternatives. We estimate a model of demand, cost, and market equilibrium equations for differentiated products by using data from the confidential reports that Spanish banks provide to the Bank of Spain during the period from 1988 to 2003. This database contains information on the effective interest rates on new loans and deposits, and the expected loan losses obtained from the Spanish Credit Register. The estimated price elasticities show that the products offered by different banks are close substitutes, which puts pressure on the banks’ profits margins. However, the substitutability between bank and non-bank products is much lower than the substitutability among products offered by different banks. The results also show that Spain’s entrance into the Eurozone did not cause a structural change in the demand and cost conditions of Spanish banks. The banks financed most of the imbalances between bank loans and domestic deposits before the crisis through the interbank market.     

IPO underwriting and subsequent lending

This study investigates the relation between IPO underwriting and subsequent lending. We find that when a bank underwrites a firm’s IPO, the bank is more likely to provide the issuer with future loans at a lower cost, compared to banks without an IPO underwriting relationship. The evidence also suggests that the underwriting banks share information surplus with the IPO firms in the post-IPO loans, supporting the cost-saving hypothesis. Overall, the evidence for the relation between prior IPO underwriting and subsequent lending supports the notion that firms can derive value from investment bank relationships.     

Deflation,bank credit growth,and non-performing loans: Evidence from Japan

In this paper, I examine the link between bank credit growth and non-performing loans in an economy with deflationary pressures. Using panel OLS regressions and two-step GMM regressions, I find evidence for the time-varying relationship between bank credit growth and non-performing loans in a sample of 82 publicly listed commercial banks in Japan during the period 1993–2013. I show that bank credit growth positively correlates with non-performing loans prior to the onset of the global financial crisis of 2007 but negatively correlates with non-performing loans afterwards. I find evidence to support the notion that large banks drive the observed effects of credit growth on non-performing loans. In addition, credit growth and non-performing loans have no effect on profitability. Overall, the findings suggest that while the increase in the supply of bank loans increases the level of non-performing loans, it does not lead to higher profitability.