数字经济中竞争性垄断与算法合谋的治理困境

在数字经济的治理结构中,传统政府治理范式与数字经济特征的不相匹配诱发诸多治理困境与挑战.对数字经济治理困境进行学理性解释,应在适应经济发展形势变化的基础上,完善数字经济治理理论基础,探索反垄断规制具体治理举措.本文对数字经济的考察以竞争性垄断市场结构中算法合谋现象作为出发点,挖掘数字经济中竞争性垄断市场产生的原因及算法合谋的治理困境.首先,基于数字经济的资源特点和技术特征,分析了数字经济中市场结构变化与算法合谋形成的本质内涵和机理;其次,对比传统经济,分析得出竞争性垄断市场结构是数字经济中技术竞争、创新以及标准化约束的必然结果;再次,基于算法合谋的高隐蔽性以及数字经济中出现的竞争性垄断市场的特点,分析了国家反垄断规制中数据市场边界与数据纠纷、市场支配地位认定、算法卡特尔与垄断协议模糊等问题;最后,提出在竞争性垄断市场中算法合谋治理应实现监管机构、平台、用户三方共治的应对策略.     

反垄断执法主导与行业规制协同的平台经济监管研究——理论分析与中国的模式创新

2018年以来，世界主要经济体掀起了一场平台经济领域的反垄断立法执法热潮，政府行业规制机构参与其中，单独或协同监管平台运营商的反竞争行为。学术界对这种以行业规制代替反垄断执法的现象，是否会妨碍竞争政策基础地位的建立、削弱反垄断法的权威性等问题存在争议。本文从反垄断监管实践和平台经济特性出发，分析了行业规制机构监管平台经济的原因、优势和弊端，并以加快建立平台经济“全方位、多层次、立体化监管体系，实现事前事中事后全链条全领域监管”为目标，构建了反垄断执法主导与行业规制协同监管模式。国家市场监督管理总局和金融监管机构对阿里巴巴集团相关行为调查、处罚和救济的实践，是中国政府监管平台经济的模式创新，也证明反垄断执法主导与行业规制协同监管模式的可行性和有效性。     

数字经济时代反垄断规制的主要挑战与国际经验

进入数字经济时代,全球范围的反垄断部门都将面临来自数字平台的挑战。过去静态、单向的反垄断分析框架及判断标准很难适用于数字经济时代动态、跨界的平台经济,界定相关市场难度加大,市场支配地位认定困难。面对以掠夺性定价、"二选一"、跨界垄断、平台间并购、算法共谋或歧视等为代表的平台垄断行为,不仅准确判断更加复杂,争议也会更多。在反垄断执法过程中,范围和时机难以抉择、取证难,法律救济不及时,执法队伍建设滞后等挑战也不容忽视。这一系列挑战引发了国际上主要反垄断辖区的高度关注。尽管各国因产业发展及制度差异在规制理念和执法方式上有所差别,但都强调拓展监管思路、创新分析工具和灵活执法,并注重考虑国家利益。现行反垄断法的基本制度仍然适用,但需要及时根据新问题做出适当调整。     

人力资本价值及其定价分析

人力资本对企业和国家经济的作用日益凸显,关于如何评价人力资本价值的方法,理论界存在很多不同观点.本文以人力资本所有者提供劳动、形成最后产出作为分界,将人力资本的价值评价分为"事前评价"与"事后评价",从人力资本分类出发,结合不同类型人力资本的特点,提出人力资本的权变定价模型.本模型将人力资本按"职务"与"贡献"两个雏度分为四种类型,对于低职务低贡献的人力资本,其定价以事前评价为主,而高职务高贡献人力资本,其定价以事后评价为主,高职务低贡献以及低职务高贡献人力资本的评价则应结合事前定价与事后定价.这一理论模型避免人力资本评价的"一刀切",为完善人力资本评价理论与实务提供新的思路.     

中国进口铁矿石定价权缺失与反垄断政策

本文针对中国进口铁矿石定价权缺失问题,构建了企业间部分交叉所有权下合谋形成机制的理论模型,并对澳大利亚必和必拓、力拓（文中简称“两拓”）及巴西淡水河谷进行了案例研究,研究结果显示,“两拓”部分交叉所有权有利于其合谋,也有利于其与巴西淡水河谷合谋。国际铁矿石巨头企业合谋实施超高定价是导致中国进口铁矿石定价权缺失的根本原因;国际金融巨头对铁矿石巨头企业的部分交叉所有权及操纵行为应当引起反垄断当局的重视。笔者认为,中国应从完善反垄断立法、加强反垄断执法和国际反垄断合作三个方面予以应对。     

中国自由贸易区外商投资事中事后监管制度优化研究——基于新制度经济学理论视角

中国自由贸易区外商投资事中事后监管制度改革核心是构建政府监管、行业自律、企业自控、社会监督"四位一体"的监管体系,重点是使企业经营由原来的政府单独监管转为政府与社会共同监管,进而提高企业自律意识和社会共治意识。通过制度经济学的理论分析可判断,当前中国自由贸易区外商投资事中事后监管制度改革虽存在路径依赖,但其程度仅处于"中低度"状态且属于"非完全锁定",应采取适当措施突破路径依赖的束缚。为实现中国自由贸易区外商投资事中事后监管制度不断优化,应加快建立监管制度协同创新机制、积极完善事中事后监管配套制度、稳步落实安全审查和反垄断制度。     

反垄断实施宽严特征研究:一个分析框架

中国反垄断实施的宽严问题一直是业内争议的一个焦点,但从现有文献看,对这个问题还缺乏规范和系统的研究。通过引入执法决策的积极失误成本和消极失误成本概念,建立最优执法标准决定模型,可确立衡量反垄断执法宽严变化的标准。通过对各变量对最优执法标准的影响机理分析,可得出反垄断执法标准的宽严受市场制度、法制环境、执法投入、执法效率和执法收益等因素影响。中国当前反垄断执法较为宽松的重要原因是执法供给能力不足,并具有结构性、相对性、阶段性等特征。现阶段中国的反垄断执法应采用宽严相济的政策组合工具,加强反垄断执法能力建设,建立执法机构协调机制,构建反垄断与管制行业分类监管体制,淡化反行政垄断职能。     

国家创新体系视角下的数字平台垄断现象及其治理策略

数字经济已成为中国经济发展的新增长极。数字平台企业作为数字经济时代的代表性产物，凭借双边或多边市场特性汇聚海量用户和数据，在取得快速发展的同时也引发了数字平台垄断现象。数字平台垄断现象治理应在不突破底线的前提下，从多维度把握鼓励平台健康发展与防止平台垄断之间的平衡点，以大国科技博弈和提升国家创新体系整体效能的视角，权衡加强创新产出和反垄断规制间的关系，秉持“促创新、强监管、守底线”原则健全数字经济治理体系，明确数字平台垄断现象治理的动态调节标准，创新反垄断调节方法，建立数字平台垄断现象治理动态调节机制。     

政企合谋、环境规制与企业全要素生产率*

本文利用中国工业企业数据库和地级市层面的企业治污投资数据构建了一个2003—2007年的面板,实证检验了环境规制对企业全要素生产率的影响以及政企合谋在背后的作用。实证结果表明,用企业治污投资占工业增加值比重衡量的环境规制强度每上升1%,企业当期的生产率下降约1%。当政企合谋可能性上升时,环境规制对企业生产率的边际影响在减弱,说明政企合谋带来的监管放松和处罚不力弱化了环境规制对合谋企业生产率的影响。本文的政策启示在于中央政府应加强环保领域统一执法,破解囚徒困境式的环境规制。同时,本文的发现为环保机构监测监察执法垂直管理制度改革提供了合理性依据。     

发展中国家普遍服务义务的经济分析

本文构建一个简单的非对称信息模型,分析发展中国家特定的普遍服务问题。在模型中,政府与垄断企业的非对称信息产生于在农村提供服务的边际成本,最优普遍服务政策可以用两种规制手段即资费和网络投资来实现。本文对区别定价和统一定价两种情形进行了对比分析,得出的结论是：在实施区别定价时,与完全信息相比,不完全信息将提高农村地区的资费水平,并且减小相应的网络覆盖面积;而在实施统一定价时,农村地区的定价可能降低,但这是以网络覆盖面积的减小为代价。模型结果还表明,合谋的成胁会弱化企业的激励。有意思的是,在这两种定价机制下,企业和纳税人这两种不同的利益集团均有同规制者合谋的动机。实际上,纳税人利益集团的存在,强化了规制者和企业之间的防止合谋约束,并且为了减少规制者同纳税人利益集团的合谋收益,即使规制者具有高成本信息,也会使配置结果扭曲。     

INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND MULTIMARKET CONTACT*

This article analyzes cartel formation and international antitrust enforcement when multinational firms operate in several jurisdictions with local antitrust authorities. We are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by a negative demand relationship. The interdependence of cartel stability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions. Local antitrust enforcement equilibrium enforcement may exhibit a nonmonotonicity in the degree of market integration. We compare it with globally optimal antitrust enforcement policy and discuss the role of international antitrust coordination.     

纵向结构与投入品竞价合谋的悖论分析--日资配件企业“垄断协议”案的若干思考

2013年以来，跨国公司主导的价格合谋和价格歧视受到了中国反垄断机构的调查和处罚。文章以汽车配件行业中“日资企业”的价格垄断案为线索，构建了一个纵向股权关联下投入品价格合谋和集团内转移定价的理论模型，通过静态比较分析发现：关联企业之间的价格投标合谋并不符合“利润最大化”的目标，而是跨国公司作为实际控制人在上下游股权比例和盈利能力不对等的条件下，将下游整车合资企业的利润转移到上游配件企业的一种手段。文章从股权比例和企业运营模式的层面论证了利润转移假说的合意性，并结合主要细分市场的结构和利润关系，对“结构－合谋”原理所面临的现实矛盾进行了深入分析。文章的主要政策建议是：中国汽车产业的反垄断立法要实现从行为惩罚到规则干预的转化，要适当增加产业组织分析的证据以提高执法的科学水准，需要更多地使用合理推定原则以避免对企业理性行为的不当干预。     

Preemptive collusion among corruptible law enforcers

This paper considers collusion between a supervisor and an agent within a Principal–Supervisor–Agent model. Other papers consider the possibility of collusion after the supervisor has exerted costly effort to obtain hard (“verifiable”) evidence regarding the agent’s actions, information which, if reported would result in the agent being fined with a certain probability. That is, collusion occurs because the supervisor may accept a bribe in exchange for hiding the information he has obtained. This paper allows the supervisor and the agent to enter into a collusive contract either before or after the supervisor has exerted effort to find verifiable information regarding the agent’s actions. The former type of collusion, which occurs after the supervisor has exerted effort, entails ex-post corruption, while the latter, which occurs before the supervisor has exerted effort, entails preemptive corruption. This paper shows that although raising the supervisor’s reward discourages ex-post corruption, it can simultaneously encourage preemptive corruption. Hence, raising the supervisor’s reward will not always discourage collusion. This result further implies that though privatizing law enforcement can always be used to eliminate ex-post corruption, it cannot be used to eliminate preemptive corruption. Furthermore, when compared to ex-post collusion, an equilibrium without corruption is always socially preferred. However, when compared to preemptive collusion, an equilibrium without corruption may not always be socially preferred.     

欧盟合并控制竞争执法中创新损害问题研究

创新是欧盟竞争法中重要的非价格竞争要素之一，在分析企业合并对创新的影响时，欧盟委员会传统上主要从与特定及明确产品市场相关联的潜在竞争角度进行评估。近几年的执法实践表明，欧盟竞争执法范围已经扩展到具有动态性的创新竞争领域，开始关注无形的创新损害，并通过个案审查逐渐在理论基础、制度依据、执法政策、分析框架和方法等方面形成相对体系化的应对方案。欧盟应对创新问题的竞争执法经验为当下我国反垄断法修订以及执法完善提供了良好参考。     

THE IMPACT OF ANTITRUST GUIDELINES ON BUSINESS

The dual antitrust goals of predictable law enforcement and accurate decisions in individual cases have been in conflict for decades. There are three dimensions to this conflict. First, there may be insufficient information on how the courts and enforcement agencies interpret the antitrust statutes. Second, the enforcement agencies may not use consistent standards to evaluate actual and potential antitrust cases. Third, antitrust guidelines may differ significantly from case law.
Unfortunately, attempts to improve one dimension of antitrust policy generally create conflicts elsewhere. Thus, the search for better antitrust decision making in individual cases has made antitrust counseling more complex and expensive. Over time, standards have evolved at different rates at the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the courts, and inconsistencies among these three decision-making bodies have further complicated the task of antitrust counseling. In this environment, improved and updated information on antitrust standards can potentially be very valuable to the business community.     

Fiscal policy rules,budget deficits,and forecasting biases

In this paper, we analyze the impact fiscal policy rules have on budget deficits and forecasting biases in official budget outlooks. Persistent budget deficits and over-optimistic budget forecasts have been observed in many countries in the past, especially in the euro area. To prevent such developments from happening in the future, fiscal rules have been revised or implemented with the aim to strengthen both preventive (ex-ante) and corrective (ex-post) elements of fiscal rules frameworks. Do such ex-ante and ex-post rules differ in their effects? In an attempt to answer this question, we build a two-period model and distinguish between ex-ante rules that apply to budget forecasts and ex-post rules that apply to realized budget deficits. Our model indicates that effectively enforced ex-post rules are more effective than ex-ante rules at reducing budget deficits. Interestingly, ex-ante rules differ from ex-post rules in their effects on forecasting biases. Only ex-post sanctions reduce forecasting biases, while ex-ante rules have no impact on such biases. In addition, we show that political stability and the size of government increase the effectiveness of fiscal rules. If, however, financial markets have a disciplining effect on governments, the effectiveness of fiscal rules is reduced. Our results imply that if fiscal policy rules cannot be effectively enforced, reforming other areas such as electoral rules or financial market regulations might be a more promising approach to ensuring sound public finances than fiscal policy rules.     

反垄断调查的一个鉴别：一致性定价行为背后的差异与合谋

如何区分成本上涨时企业同时涨价的行为究竟是价格合谋还是寡头竞争的企业正常的价格调整行为？这是反垄断执法机构面临的一个难题。本文通过数理模型证明了无论企业进行伯川德竞争还是古诺竞争，寡头竞争的企业的定价随着成本的变化存在一个连续调整路径，而组成卡特尔的企业的定价则会随着成本的变化出现一个不连续的跳跃。因此反垄断执法机构在观察到企业的一致性定价行为之后，如果能从以往的价格监测纪录中发现这些企业在成本下跌时，价格存在着更大幅度的下调，则可以据此怀疑这些企业存在着价格合谋，应开展更深入的调查来搜集这些企业违反《反垄断法》的全面证据。     

Generalized Progress of Abatement Technology: Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law

This paper considers the incentives environmental liability creates to improve pollution abatement technology. Our analysis considers technical progress in end-of-pipe abatement and in the production technology used, thereby generalizing the approach taken by Endres et?al. (Environ Resour Econ 36:341?C366, 2007). We establish that this generalization has drastic repercussions on incentives under negligence liability, while the performance of strict liability is not compromised. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the social desirability of investment in abatement or production technology (or both) decisively determines how ex-ante and ex-post regulation fare with respect to welfare maximization in the case of negligence liability.     

Legal Principles in Antitrust Enforcement

We study antitrust enforcement that aims to channel price‐fixing incentives of cartels through setting fine schedules and detection levels. Fines obey legal principles, such as the punishment should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. Bankruptcy considerations limit maximum fines, ensure abnormal cartel profits, and impose a challenge for optimal antitrust enforcement. We derive the fine schedule and detection level that are constrained‐optimal under legal principles and sustainability of cartel prices. This fine schedule lies below the maximum fine, makes collusion on lower prices more attractive than on higher prices, and, hence, relates to the body of literature on marginal deterrence.