我国创业板IPO抑价之谜

2009年10月30日,首批28家创业板市场股票上市,其疯狂表现引发了人们对我国股票市场IPO抑价问题的再度热议。IPO抑价是指一只股票在首次公开发行后,第一天的收盘价远高于发行价的现象。IPO抑价问题广泛存在于世界各国股票市场,只是抑价程度有所区别。我国股市被认为是世界上IPO抑价程度最高的市场：     

全流通背景下我国IPO抑价的特征分析

IPO抑价现象普遍存在于世界各国市场，抑价程度高低不同，近几十年来。一直备受国内外学者的关注。研究表明，成熟市场IPO抑价程度较低，而新兴市场IPO抑价程度较高。我国IPO抑价现象，自股市建立之初至2005年股权分置改革前一直存在，而且抑价程度相当高，远远高于西方发达国家成熟市场，也高于其它新兴市场。股权分置改革后，大部分上市公司完成了股改，     

我国A股市场IPO抑价多因素影响的实证分析

本文通过构建影响我国A股市场新股IPO抑价的多因素模型，对IPO抑价影响因素进行实证分析．结果表明我国IPO发行抑价主要与我国新股发行机制不完善、资本市场不够成熟有关。要降低新股的IPO抑价水平．需要提高新股发行的信息披露程度、缩短新股发行日至上市日的时间间隔、增加新股发行的定价效率、规范和培育一批高质量的承销商。     

不同杠杆率对IPO抑价的影响比较——基于上证A股的实证研究

我国股市IPO高抑价问题一直备受关注。文章选取2014~2018年上证A股IPO公司为样本,运用OLS方法,比较不同杠杆率对IPO抑价的影响。研究发现,经营杠杆与IPO抑价率显著正相关,但财务杠杆、联合杠杆和资产负债率与IPO抑价率之间的关系并不显著。说明降低经营杠杆是解决IPO高抑价问题的有效方法之一。     

涨跌幅受限放开对科创板IPO抑价影响研究

科创板采用上市后前5个交易日不设涨跌幅限制的交易规则,基于2019年7月22至2020年3月31日包括科创板在内的170个新发行股票,研究涨跌幅受限放开对科创板IPO抑价的影响。通过添加涨跌幅受限虚拟变量和交互项建立多元线性回归模型,并通过因子分析法提取代表公司基本面作为控制变量。实证结果表明,相比新股设置首日涨跌幅限制,科创板IPO抑价有了改善,并且在限制首日涨跌幅情况下,首发募集资金净额对IPO抑价负向作用显著。     

需求、承销商声誉、发行特征与IPO抑价的实证关系研究——基于A股市场

本文用2009-2013年A股上市的887只股票,研究了承销商声誉、需求、政府管制和其他发行特征等因素对IPO抑价的影响,发现需求对IPO抑价的影响最大,需求越大,IPO抑价率也越高,承销商声誉几乎不显著,政府管制显著,且有正向的影响.其他的发行特征表明：发行价格越低,IPO抑价率越高,承销商选择认购也会提升IPO抑价率.     

我国商业银行A股IPO抑价问题分析

新股发行抑价现象几乎存在于所有的资本市场。本文以1999年以来沪深A股15家商业银行为样本,对我国商业银行A股IPO抑价进行实证研究,结果发现商业银行A股IPO抑价与发行价格和融资总额负相关,与上市首日换手率和每股摊薄市盈率正相关。并提出了相关的政策建议,以期提高我国商业银行IPO定价效率。     

沪市A股IPO抑价现象研究

研究表明：IPO抑价现象在我国很明显。本文旨在结合我国证券市场的特性寻找我国IPO高抑价的原因．并以此为依据提出减轻IPO抑价程度的政策建议。     

中国A股IPO抑价现象研究——基于A股及创业板IPO同期数据的分析

文章选取2010年1月到2011年6月18个月间在A股市场IPO上市的501只股票为样本(其中195只为创业板IPO股票).利用随机前沿方法证明一级市场定价在研究选取的时间段内无效率,从而将IPO抑价分为来源于一级市场和来源于二级市场两个部分在证明了抑价存在的基础上,文章选取不同的指标构造多个线性回归模型,进一步解释了一级市场和二级市场中抑价的具体来源,并分析了影响抑价率的若干因素.     

我国IPO高抑价原因探析

本文对我国IPO高抑价进行了深入的分析,认为我国IPO抑价与西方发达资本主义国家存在根本性差别,我国IPO抑价的根本原因是我国资本市场层次单一、金融工具匮乏、投资者需求旺盛,从而引发的二级市场股价高估与市场投机过度;新股定价并没有偏低,反而是偏高。     

How regulatory changes affect IPO underpricing in China

This paper examines the underpricing of IPOs in the Chinese A-share market during the period 1992–2006. Since its inception, the Chinese IPO market has transformed from a tightly-controlled system to a more market-oriented system. Reforms include the abolishment of listing quotas and fixed issue price determination; allowing for more market participation in IPO pricing. The regulatory changes of Chinese IPO market, though improving over time, actually are not monotonic. The regulatory framework started from over-restrictive to over-unrestrictive, then fine-tuned with additional restrictions. This study documents the regulatory reforms during the sample period and investigates how these regulatory changes affect IPO underpricing in China. During this period, we find that Chinese IPOs exhibit a huge underpricing. The size of the underpricing, however, decreases over the sample period. This study further finds that the IPO pricing method before the regulatory changes, which was based on a fixed P/E ratio pre-determined by the regulators, contributed significantly to the IPO underpricing in China. After adopting a series of regulatory reforms allowing underwriters discretion in the determination of issue price, this regulatory underpricing component vanishes. This study has policy implications in demonstrating the impacts of regulatory frameworks on IPO underpricing.     

Does Disclosure Regulation Work? Evidence from International IPO Markets*

This study examines whether IPO disclosure requirements mandated by countries’ securities laws are associated with variation in IPO underpricing in international IPO markets. Our empirical analysis uses a unique sample of 6,025 IPOs from 34 countries over the period from 1995 to 2002. We show for the first time that the stringency of disclosure requirements for IPO prospectuses is negatively associated with the extent of IPO underpricing, after controlling for various country‐ and firm‐level determinants of underpricing. Moreover, we find that the disclosure effect on IPO underpricing is moderated by the extent of a country’s capital market integration. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the view that increased disclosure regulation appears to reduce IPO underpricing and hence the cost of equity, and that institutional factors such as capital market integration play an important role in understanding the economic consequences of disclosure regulation in international IPO markets.     

市场分割下中国双重上市公司资产定价效率问题研究

文章对双重上市公司在不同市场首次公开发行定价、上市首日抑价和二级市场交易价格差异三个层次对资产定价效率进行了经验数据分析,结果表明,内资股相对外资股具有发行定价高、首目抑价高的“双高”现象;在定价效率方面,对于“A＋H”公司,A股的发行定价受到发行时H股二级市场价格的显著影响,而与H股的发行价格之间没有显著关系,但“A＋B”公司A股和B股的发行价格之间存在显著的正相关,同时在二级市场上,“A＋H”公司的市场价差波动相对于“A＋B”公司小。这意味着“A＋H”公司的资产定价效率要高于“A＋B”公司,H股的价格较能反映公司的真实估值,对A股的定价具有指导作用。     

中小企业融资约束对R&D投入的影响分析——基于门限效应模型

在对国内外IPO定价有效性相关理论和文献进行梳理和归纳基础上,确定IPO抑价程度作为衡量新股定价有效性评价标准,并将其设为模型的被解释变量;另外,选取新股IPO中的募集资金净额、首发市盈率、上市市盈率、上市换手率、发行至上市期间市场回报率等作为解释变量。运用多元线性回归方法构建模型,样本数据来自于2005年-2016年A股市场IPO企业。实证检验结果表明,IPO抑价率与募集资金净额、发行市盈率和发行至上市期间市场回报率呈负相关关系,与上市市盈率、上市换手率呈正相关关系,揭示出我国A股市场IPO抑价现象是由一级市场与二级市场综合影响所致的。据此,提出相应的政策建议。     

An empirical examination of IPO underpricing in the Chinese A-share market

Research in the literature shows that initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stocks are systematically priced at a discount to their subsequent initial trading price. The large underpricing magnitude in the Chinese IPO market has attracted much attention. We consider three hypotheses that may explain the IPO underpricing in China. These are the winner's curse hypothesis, the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis and the signaling hypothesis. Among these hypotheses, the winner's curse hypothesis has not been tested in the Chinese market. Using IPO data for online fixed-price offerings from November 1995 to December 1998, our results show that the winner's curse hypothesis is the main reason for the high IPO underpricing in China. The signaling hypothesis is not empirically supported in the Chinese market during the sample period.     

An International IPO Review with a Focus on China

I. IntroductionThe academic research on financial field has undergone considerable development overthe last thirty years. Many important theories and models have been developed whichhave greatly influenced the current financial field. However, although remarkable successhas been achieved in the academic development of finance, there are still many unsolvedproblems in this area. For example, the underpricing of unseasoned new issues of commonstock is still one of the most puzzling phenomena (B…     

IPO破发成因的实证分析

本文使用2010年A股市场IPO数据,采用逐步线性回归法调查IPO公司的内在价值和投资行为因素对于IPO破发的影响。研究发现,除盈利能力指数以及发行中签率对于IPO破发有显著的影响,其他因素的影响均不显著。具体而言:①IPO公司上市前盈利能力指数对IPO抑价率的影响是负向的,表明业绩较好的IPO公司有着更高的市盈率,从而其破发概率较高;②中签率对于IPO抑价率的影响是负向的,表明中签率高的IPO公司股票一级市场需求满足度较高,二级市场更容易破发。造成IPO破发的主要原因在于IPO发行价格不合理,中签率高,发行制度的市场化程度不高。     

我国房地产行业IPO发行抑价对比分析

本文以上市的IPO公司为样本,对比房地产行业和所有行业的一级市场抑价现象,同时将公司规模、公司年龄、市盈率作为解释变量对比解释结果发现,房地产行业抑价情况相较于所有行业较轻,对于公司规模、公司年龄等变量较敏感。     

25 Years of Dutch Ipos: An Examination of Frequently Cited Ipo Anomalies Within Main Sectors and During Hot- and Cold-Issue Periods

Summary This study examines the existence of the initial underpricing and the long-term underperformance anomalies in the Dutch IPO market between 1977 and 2001. We found an average initial underpricing level of 17.6%, measured relative to a sector-specific benchmark. The median initial return was 5.0%, while there were negative initial returns in only 17% of the IPOs. During their first 3 years of listing, IPOs on average underperformed their benchmark by a cumulative 10.0%, but this result is statistically insignificant. The period 1997—beginning of 2000 was a true hot-issue period for growth stocks: their level of initial underpricing was 35.8%, compared to 9.2% during cold-issue periods. These growth IPOs also significantly underperformed their benchmark by 38.4% after 3 years.The authors are grateful to Nico van der Sar for his constructive comments and to two anonymous referees for their useful suggestions.     

对我国T＋1交易制度下IPO抑价和高换手问题的探析

文章从我国特殊的交易制度T＋1的特点出发,分析了在该交易制度下,我国IPO股票的不正常高抑价和高换手率。T＋1的特点是：首日只能是中签者卖出,且涨跌无限制,而买者当日无论股价涨跌多大,都不能卖出。因此,按常理IPO股票不应该出现高抑价和高换手率,但我国的IPO股票却出现了。这种制度造成了IPO股票出现高抑价和高换手率,建议管理层应加强对现行交易制度下,不正常的新股首日高抑价和高换手的监管,防范动机不良的交易者的违法乱市行为。