中央银行独立性、收入不平等与通货膨胀--来自中国的实证检验

本文就中国人民银行独立性、收入不平等对通货膨胀的影响机制进行了分析探讨.我们引入中央银行目标函数,对中央银行独立性、收入不平等与通货膨胀间的作用机制进行了模型推理分析.而后我们整合了转型国家中央银行独立性的测度方法,并用此方法对中国人民银行的独立性进行了详细测定.最后,通过计量分析检验了以下结论:收入不平等是引致通货膨胀的一个经验性因素;中央银行独立性越强,越能有效抑制收入不平等引起的通货膨胀.     

我国中央银行的独立化进程及其问题研究

本文从中国银行业监督管理委员会正式成立提出我国中央银行独立性的问题，然后从中央银行独立性的定义、意义和测度方法入手，阐述了我国中央银行独立化的进程及其存在的问题并分析问题产生的原因。最后，本文指出在中国建立真正独立的中央银行的迫切性并且提出了从法律上重新确定国务院与中国人民银行之间关系的政策建议。     

提高内部审计独立性的探讨

内部审计的独立性是审计理论和实务必须认识和解决的问题。受托经济责任需要内部审计拥有独立性,但当前的管理体制、机构和人员设置状况,法律环境、人员素质和工作质量等制约了内部审计的独立性。文章从我国公司制企业内部审计机构的组织模式,按隶属关系逐一分析内部审计的独立性,并提出合理的模式,来保证内部审计的独立性,更好地实现内部审计促进"改善经营管理、提高经济效益"作用的发挥。     

信息约束博弈、中央银行独立性与货币、金融稳定政策

以中国金融制度现况为基础,通过构建中央银行-政府-金融机构-居民四部门的博弈模型,将中央银行宏观独立性、微观独立性、货币稳定政策及金融稳定政策纳入统一框架之下。信息约束使中央银行与虚增流动风险、极力游说的金融机构博弈时微观独立性受挫,货币稳定屈服于金融体系稳定;与偏好经济增长和通货膨胀的强势政府博弈时货币与金融双稳定政策屈服于增长政策,进一步加剧通货膨胀风险;居民则被动地为通货膨胀、流动性风险买单。十多年来的货币金融政策操作实践为此提供了佐证,因此,重新设计保证中央银行宏微观独立性的机制尤为重要。     

论我国信托法中财产独立性

信托在我国起步较晚,作为一个完全源于英美法系的制度,对信托如何在我国法律体系下进行规范从而良性运行就显得尤为重要,通过对信托核心概念———信托财产的独立性进行分析,结合我国现行法律的规定,对信托财产独立性在我国的法律发展提出设想。     

对加强中国人民银行相对独立性的认识和建议

目前我国国民经济长时间面临着价格总水平处于高位的突出矛盾,在这样的经济环境下,文章分析了中国人民银行的独立性程度,提出了使我国未来中央银行独立性有所提高的措施.     

论我国IPO定价主体的独立性及其法律完善

新股发行(IPO)市场化定价模式要求定价主体在定价过程中保持既独立于政府又相互独立的地位。2009年我国开始新一轮新股发行制度的市场化改革,效果不甚理想,症结在于定价主体的独立性未实现。政府掌控证券市场进入、退出的关口,决定IPO的频度与数量,影响IPO定价;定价主体之间的独立性也不足,形成利益同盟。加强定价主体的独立性必须完善法律制度。放开证券市场进入、退出环节,加强审核机关的责任;同时,通过事前约束和事后补偿强化定价主体之间的独立性。     

我国国际收支对货币政策独立性的冲击

随着我国经济对外开放程度的日益提高,货币政策的传导机制已经不完全取决于国内的经济变量,因此,研究来自外部经济因素的影响就越发显得重要.本文通过Granger影响关系、VAR模型的冲击反应和误差方差分解方法证实了,在开放经济条件下我国国际收支状况的变化引致通货膨胀和国内生产总值的变动,继而揭示了外部冲击对我国货币政策独立性具有影响.     

政策独立性如何影响中小企业资本结构调整速度:基于普惠金融的研究

提高普惠金融政策的有效性是助企纾困解难的重要路径。本文通过文本大数据分析,探讨地方普惠金融政策独立性的效果。研究发现,地方普惠金融政策独立性越低,中小企业的资本结构调整速度越慢,表明地方政府的“搭便车”行为降低了普惠金融政策效果。金融发展程度好、中小企业活跃度高、货币政策紧缩时期以及高创新投入企业样本中,上述不利影响更明显。普惠金融政策独立性通过缓解融资约束发挥作用,进一步探究政策失效原因发现,“贷款”和“支柱”作为普惠金融政策文本中的两个高频词,独立性较低的普惠金融政策在这两方面均没有发挥出有效作用。本文对理解和优化普惠金融政策制定、提高普惠金融政策的有效性以及促进中小企业可持续发展具有一定意义。     

关于我国中央银行独立性与宏观经济表现的实证分析

本文对1984年中国人民银行正式行使中央银行职能至今20年的分析,探讨在我国CBI与通货膨胀率和GDP增长率之间的关系。通过回归分析,发现我国的数据支持已有的结论:1995年人民银行规范之前,存在CBI过低与通货膨胀率过高的现象;而1995年之后,CBI提高对应着较低的通胀率;1984-2001年的经济增长并没有表现出与CBI之间的明显关系。历史数据显示,我国的中央银行独立性过度受到政府干预,造成物价和经济激烈波动;但是随着金融体制改革的深入,中央银行的独立性在逐步提高,货币政策的效力也在增强。     

The Evolution of European Central Bank Independence: An Updating of the Masciandaro and Spinelli Index

In an earlier paper in this journal, Masciandaro and Spinelli computed an index of central bank independence for a number of countries on the basis of the institutional arrangements in place in 1990. Since then the situation has changed and therefore that work needs an updating. This shows that the Bundesbank remains the most independent central bank, but several other central banks have increased their independence: see the cases of Spain, Italy, France, the Netherlands and Great Britain. The Bank of Spain has registered the biggest improvement and the Bank of Portugal remains the least independent.     

A Framework for Independent Monetary Policy in China

As the Chinese economy becomes more market based and continuesits rapid integration into the global economy, having an independentand effective monetary policy regime oriented to domestic objectiveswill become increasingly important. Employing modern principlesof monetary policy in light of the current state of China'sfinancial institutions, we motivate and present a package ofproposals to guide the operation of a new monetary policy regime.Specifically, we recommend an explicit low long-run inflationobjective, operational independence for the People's Bank ofChina (PBC) with formal strategic guidance from the government,and a minimal set of financial sector reforms (to make the Chinesebanking system robust against interest rate fluctuations). Weargue that anchoring monetary policy with an explicit inflationobjective would be the most reliable way for the PBC to tiedown inflation expectations, and thereby enable monetary policyto make the best contribution to macroeconomic and financialstability, as well as economic growth. The management and monitoringof money (and credit) growth by the PBC would continue to playa useful role in the stabilization of inflation, but a moneytarget would not constitute a good stand-alone nominal anchor.(JEL codes: E5 and P2)     

More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries

This study examines the effect of legal central bank independence on inflation in developing countries. In spite of the policy consensus suggesting that central bank independence is an effective tool to control inflation, the evidence is still limited, particularly for developing countries. Using a novel dataset, we analyze the effect of central bank independence on inflation for a sample of 118 developing countries between 1980 and 2013. We find that higher central bank independence is associated with lower inflation rates. This effect on inflation is stronger the more democratic a country is, but it is also present in non-democratic countries. Our results are robust to different specifications and methodologies. Furthermore, we find that all dimensions included in the measurement of central bank independence (objectives, personnel, policy, and financial independence) contribute to curb inflation. Our results shed light on which types of reforms may be more effective at fighting inflation in developing countries.     

Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design

Abstract. The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two‐stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy are implemented in the second stage. When fiscal policy is taken into account, there is a continuum of combinations of central bank independence and conservatism that produce optimal outcomes. This indeterminacy is resolved by appealing to practical considerations. In particular, it is argued that full central bank independence facilitates the greatest degree of policy transparency and political coherence.     

Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies

The paper discusses recent changes in central bank laws and the relationship between inflation and central bank independence in transition economies. Two indices of legal independence are constructed, covering political and economic aspects of independence. Most of the countries experienced high-inflation episodes in the recent past and changes introduced to the laws after, or simultaneously, with stabilization programmes strengthened the position of the central banks. In further analysis, an inverse relationship emerges between inflation and indices of central bank independence. However, the robust relationship is present only at a high level of economic liberalization. This conclusion is supported by results from regressions on time-aggregated and panel data, even after controlling for the government fiscal position and the absence/presence of an IMF stabilization package.     

中国外汇冲销干预和货币政策独立性研究

2002年以来,中国国际收支"双顺差"加剧,外汇储备急剧增长,货币供应量增长,通货膨胀压力凸现。为了稳定人民币汇率和抑制通货膨胀,中央银行采取了一系列外汇冲销干预措施。文章在分析外汇冲销干预有效性理论的基础上,分析外汇储备急剧增长下外汇冲销干预的效力和制约因素,认为外汇冲销干预短期内能抵消外汇占款、控制信贷增长,但效力有限;在长期内,外汇冲销干预不仅会影响货币政策独立性,还可能导致通货膨胀、利率上升、汇率升值乃至经济"滞胀",因而难以具有可持续性,最后,文章提出加强外汇储备管理,增强外汇冲销干预效力和货币政策独立性的政策建议。     

Optimal monetary policy regime for oil producing developing economies: Implications for post-war Iraq

This paper theoretically investigates optimal monetary policy regime for oil producing developing countries. We analyze credibility and reputation of the Central Bank and macroeconomic dynamics under alternative monetary policy regimes. We construct a detailed and realistic model that can be used to analyze macroecomic structure and expectation dynamics of an oil producing open economy. We take into account the asymmetric information between the public and the central bank and theoretically investigate how this asymmetric information impacts the real economy and the credibility of the central bank. The simulation results indicate that central bank achieves higher credibility and lower inflation under dollarization and higher output levels under currency board regime. The model constructed in this paper has many policy implications for oil producing open economies. Using the implications of the model, we make monetary policy regime recommendations for post-war Iraq.     

澳中中央银行独立性:比较与借鉴

澳大利亚中央银行经过几十年的改革和发展，其独立性已有很大进展，这一点已为学们的研究所证实。建立市场经济体制的中国迫切需要一个独立的中央银行，为此需借鉴包括澳大利亚在内的西方发达国家的经验，增强和完善中国中央银行的独立性。     

MONEY AGGREGATES MANAGEMENT: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN CHINA'S ECONOMIC TRANSITION

This study discusses China's money supply management in its economic transition. Institutional analysis and empirical evidence suggest (i) the People's Bank of China is capable of conducting indirect monetary policy in the central banking system, (ii) integral financial reforms in the areas of legislation, management, regulation, supervision, governance, and structure are required to overcome difficulties of the monetary base control, (iii) the money multipliers are technically predictable. These results provide ways for the central bank to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy enforcement. ( JEL E51, E58, G21, P21)     

The influence of government ideology on monetary policy: New cross‐country evidence based on dynamic heterogeneous panels

Using data of 23 OECD countries over the 1980–2005 period, we examine whether government ideology affects monetary policy, conditional on central bank independence. Unlike previous studies in this line of literature, we estimate central bank behavior using forward‐looking and real‐time data in Taylor rule models and use estimators that allow for heterogeneity across countries. Our models with heterogeneous slope coefficients for the full sample do not suggest partisan effects. We also do not find evidence that central bank behavior is conditioned by the interaction of the ideology of the incumbent government and the electoral calendar.