Corruption and natural resource rents: evidence from quantile regression

This study examines the impacts of oil rents on corruption for 157 countries. While existing studies have primarily focused on average effects, we employ quantile regression to estimate the effects of natural resource abundance for different corruption levels. We consider the effects of natural resource rents, mainly oil rents and then compare them with those of total and non-oil natural resources rents. The estimation results show that, generally, more oil rents increase corruption. Specifically, impacts are larger in countries with an intermediate level of corruption and smaller in highly corrupt countries. While total resource rents increase corruption significantly, non-oil resource rents do not. This may be due to non-oil resource rent management (mainly inland) being more subject to public scrutiny. Non-oil natural resources are concentrated in the less-developed sub-Saharan African countries, where corruption is prevalent; therefore, the impacts of natural resource rents are unremarkable.     

DO INSTITUTIONS MITIGATE THE RISK OF NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICTS?

The resource curse, as manifested by an increased likelihood of conflict over rents, can be mitigated by institutions. Lei and Michaels find that discoveries of “giant” oil fields increase the likelihood of violent conflict, but they find no evidence that democratic institutions mitigate this risk. We test whether institutions mitigate the resource curse by reducing the risk of natural resource conflicts. Our results indicate that high quality economic institutions reduce the likelihood of territorial (separatist) conflicts following natural resource rent windfalls. Highly autocratic and highly democratic institutions also reduce the likelihood of territorial conflict after natural resource rent windfalls. (JEL Q34, O13, P48, D74)     

Corruption and the Political Economy of Resource-Based Development: A Comparison of Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa

We model how the “supply and demand” for bribes affects resource use by an economy, and the reinvestment of resource rents in other assets. This requires adjusting the World Bank’s measure adjusted net savings for any rent dissipation due to corruption. The impacts of corruption on long-run changes and periodic growth in the adjusted net savings rate are estimated across African and Asian economies from 1970 to 2003. Corruption rather than resource dependency per se affects negatively the ability of African countries to reinvest resource rents in the short term, but for Asian countries, corruption is less important than point resources. Corruption influences long-run growth in adjusted net savings rates in all countries, and is also the “pathway” through which this growth is affected by patterns of resource use, trade and abundance.     

Initial endowments and economic reform in 27 post-socialist countries

This study explores how initial endowments at the start of transition have shaped reform outcomes and reform trajectories in 27 former communist countries in Europe and Central Asia. Countries of the former Russian Empire that had a large resources sector at the start of transition underperformed other countries in terms of the speed and the depth of economic reforms. The effect is particularly strong for privatization, enterprise restructuring and competition policy. Within country, Ottoman or Russian provinces that had a large natural resources sector in 1989 have a lower share of entrepreneurs and of small and medium sized enterprises today and also experience endemic corruption. Our results indicate that the propensity, or ability, of special interest groups to capture the reform process that would erode their rents were facilitated by the quality of institutions whose foundations go back centuries; and that the effects on the local economy are real.     

Oil and political survival

Political economy theories on the “natural resource curse” predict that natural resource wealth is a determining factor for the length of time political leaderships remain in office. Whether resource wealth leads to longer or shorter durations in political office depends on the political incentives created by the natural resources, which in turn depend on the types of institutions and natural resource. Exploiting a sample of more than 600 political leadership durations in up to 152 countries, we find that both institutions and resource types matter for the effect that natural resource wealth has on political survival: (i) wealth derived from natural resources affects political survival in intermediate and autocratic, but not in democratic, polities; and (ii) while oil and non-lootable diamonds are associated with positive effects on the duration in political office, minerals are associated with negative duration effects.     

Media,institutions, and government action: Prevention vs. palliation in the time of cholera

This paper studies how media and the quality of institutions affect government action taken before and after a natural disaster. Provided that more media activity is focused on post-disaster action, we show that more media activity and better democratic institutions both contribute positively to the palliative effort after the disaster, although corruption has a negative effect that decreases as media activity increases. On the preventive effort, however, media and democracy both have a negative effect, as does corruption. We provide empirical evidence based on major cholera epidemics and other natural disasters around the world, which largely support these hypotheses.     

The Determinants of Location Choices of China's ODI: Institutions,Taxation and Resources

China has become the third largest source of outward direct investment (ODI). This paper studies how institutions in the host countries affect the location choices of China’s ODI. Based on a deal-level sample from 2002–2011, this paper empirically tests how political institutions, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and contrd of corruption in the host countries affect the location choices of China’s ODI. On top of these institutional factors, we study the effects of tax evasion and natural resources in host countries, and their interactions with institutional factors. We find that political institutions in the host countries are not major concerns of the ODI, while government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of corruption have significant effects on the locations of ODI. In addition, China’s ODI tends to avoid countries with strict legal systems. Tax evasion and resources are also major motives of China’s ODI. General institutional quality and tax evasion are substitutes in China’s ODI location decisions.     

Media freedom and democracy in the fight against corruption

Democratization and media freedom have been suggested as useful tools in the fight against political corruption, but so far their interplay in this fight has received scant attention. We present a game theoretic model which allows for varying quality of media freedom and democratic institutions. The model predicts, among others, that democratization and media freedom are complements in the fight against political corruption. We test our theoretical predictions using differences-in-differences estimations and panel data covering 129 countries from 1980 to 2007. We find evidence of causal effects of democratization and media freedom on corruption, and that the two are complements. Our main results hold after controlling for income, country fixed effects, and continent-specific time-varying shocks.     

Education, corruption, and the distribution of income

We examine how the interaction between education and corruption affects institutional reform and economic development. While corruption reduces average income and education, education increases not only output and hence potential corruption rents, but also produces more informed electorates that better monitor government actions. We find that economies with intermediate levels of education remain in a poverty trap since the level of skills creates sufficient corruption rents but not enough monitoring. Economies with low or high levels of education can escape the poverty trap, and inequality plays a key role in determining whether this occurs through a change in institutions or an expansion of education.     

Constitutions and the resource curse

Utilizing the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed among countries, we investigate how public income shocks have different long run economic effects dependent on constitutional arrangements. We find that (i) the so-called ‘resource curse’ is present in democratic presidential countries—but not in democratic parliamentary countries, (ii) being parliamentary or presidential matters more for the growth effects of natural resources than being democratic or autocratic, and (iii) natural resources are more likely to reduce growth when proportional electoral systems are in place than when the electoral systems are majoritarian. The two first effects appear very robust, the last effect less so.     

Testing the neocon agenda: Democracy in resource-rich societies

Resource-rich countries have tended to be autocratic and also have tended to use their resource wealth badly. The neoconservative agenda of promoting democratization in resource-rich countries thus offers the hopeful prospect of a better use of their economic opportunities. This paper examines whether the effect of democracy on economic performance is distinctive in resource-rich societies. We show that a priori the sign of the effect is ambiguous: Resource rents could either enhance or undermine the economic consequences of democracy. We therefore investigate the issue empirically. We first build a new dataset on country-specific resource rents, annually for the period 1970-2001. Using a global panel dataset, we find that in developing countries the combination of high natural resource rents and open democratic systems has been growth-reducing. Checks and balances offset this adverse effect. Thus, resource-rich economies need a distinctive form of democracy with particularly strong checks and balances. Unfortunately, this is rare: Checks and balances are public goods and so are liable to be undersupplied in new democracies. Over time they are eroded by resource rents.     

Constitutions and the resource curse

Utilizing the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed among countries, we investigate how public income shocks have different long run economic effects dependent on constitutional arrangements. We find that (i) the so-called ‘resource curse’ is present in democratic presidential countries—but not in democratic parliamentary countries, (ii) being parliamentary or presidential matters more for the growth effects of natural resources than being democratic or autocratic, and (iii) natural resources are more likely to reduce growth when proportional electoral systems are in place than when the electoral systems are majoritarian. The two first effects appear very robust, the last effect less so.     

Democracy, Governance, and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence

The paper examines how democracy affects long-run growth by influencing the quality of governance. Empirical evidence is first presented showing that measures of the quality of governance are substantially higher in more democratic countries. A general-equilibrium, endogenous growth model is then built to show how a governance-improving democracy raises growth. In this model, stronger democratic institutions influence governance by constraining the actions of corrupt officials. Reducing corruption, in turn, stimulates technological change and spurs economic growth. Empirical evidence is presented showing that democracy is in fact a significant determinant of total factor productivity (TFP) growth between 1960 and 1990 in a cross-section of countries. But this contribution occurs only insofar as stronger democratic institutions are associated with greater quality of governance.     

Do natural resources help or hinder development? Resource abundance,dependence, and the role of institutions

The resource curse literature presents conflicting evidence on the relationship between natural resources and development. We evaluate the direct effect of resources on developmental outcomes vis-à-vis their indirect effect through the weakening of political institutions using a 3SLS instrumental variable setup that simultaneously estimates development outcomes and institutions. We find that resource abundance and resource dependence affect development outcomes through different channels. While resource abundance generally has a direct positive effect on developmental outcomes, resource dependence has a stronger negative indirect effect that operates through its negative impact on institutional quality. The results also depend on the type of development outcome considered, with more consistent positive direct effects found for physical capital measures and stronger negative indirect effects for human capital development. The use of a simultaneous framework and dual measures of resources reconciles seemingly contradictory findings in earlier work.     

Private enforcement,corruption, and antitrust design

We examine how the rationale for enabling versus precluding private antitrust enforcement depends on whether antitrust enforcement is corruption-free or plagued by corruption. Corruption in courts affects the incentives to bring forth private antitrust lawsuits. This, in turn, along with corruption in antitrust agency enforcement, alters the incentives to commit antitrust violations. The social welfare effect of enabling private antitrust enforcement in the presence of corruption depends on whether corrupt officials in the ensuing bribery contests favor a particular firm and if so which one and to what extent. Under some circumstances, corruption actually increases the social desirability of private antitrust enforcement relative to the no-corruption scenario. Our analysis highlights that the effects of a given legal arrangement for antitrust enforcement critically depend on the corruption environment and, thus, that the appropriate design of antitrust institutions is context-specific.     

Political foundations of the resource curse

In this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse. We show: (1) politicians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much, and (2) resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path. However, (3) resource booms, by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections, increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy. (4) The overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes. Countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create. Countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse.     

Democracy,Development and Comparative Institutional Advantage in Africa

Development in Africa has been stalled for decades in a vicious cycle of poverty, underdevelopment, corruption, and conflict. In this paper, we argue that donors should focus on democracy and accountability as a first priority in development aid. We use the theory of comparative institutional advantage to identify the key institutions that are most likely to facilitate economic development in communities in the modern world. These institutions include an efficient non-corrupt government sector. Subsequently, we discuss how a lack of democracy and accountability inevitably undermines development efforts and investment, referring especially to the Ethiopian experience but also considering the experiences of other African dictatorships. Finally, we discuss how donors, by emphasizing democracy and accountability along with other policies that support democratic institutions, have a greater chance of effectively contributing to African economic development.     

Producing energy in a stochastic environment: Switching from non-renewable to renewable resources

In this paper, we study the determinants of switching from non-renewable natural resource inputs to renewable resource inputs in energy production. We assume that the stocks of both natural resources are stochastic, and that the adoption of renewable resources is costly and irreversible. Our formulation gives raise to an optimal stopping/switching problem that cannot be solved analytically, then we turn to numerical simulations. Our results suggest that the optimal switching time depends not only on the uncertainty parameters, but also on energy demand, costs, and the relative productivity of the resources.     

The regional distribution of foreign investment in Russia

This article conducts a plant‐level study of the factors affecting foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow to a large opening economy endowed with specific factor advantages. We conclude that the distribution of FDI in Russian regions depends on market access and can be most notably described by the knowledge‐capital framework. Factor endowments built by natural resources are more successful in explaining the location decisions of export–platform affiliates. The impact of natural resources depends on how the availability of these resources is measured. The results reject the crowding out effects of resource FDI and prove co‐location mode, when service investments are attracted to resource‐rich regions. Labour cost advantages better explain the preferences of non‐trading service affiliates.