The impact of institutions on financial development: Evidence from East Asian countries

This paper examines the impact of institutions on regional financial development using a panel data model of 11 East Asian countries during 1996–2017. It divides the institutional factors into six economic factors and six legal‐political factors. The analysis demonstrates that the legal‐political institutional factors have a stronger impact on financial development than the economic institutional factors in East Asia. Improvement in institutional quality such as fiscal freedom, business freedom, control of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law can promote financial development. Improvements of these institutional factors facilitate the ability of enterprises to allocate resources and improve the strength of business operations, thereby reducing transaction costs and making the financial operating environment fairer and more efficient. With the improvement of institutional factors, financial development will have more opportunities to develop better. Institutional impacts are more pronounced in the financial development in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Myanmar than in the other countries such as China, Japan, Korea and Singapore.     

Remittances and deforestation in developing countries: Is institutional quality paramount?

This study examines the impact of remittance inflows on deforestation in developing countries. We also investigate the role of institutional quality in enhancing remittances’ effect in reducing deforestation. Our results suggest that overall remittances reduce deforestation. We show that remittances’ reduction effect on deforestation is greater in middle-income countries than in low-income countries. Considering institutional quality, our findings suggest that, for the entire sample, and in low- and middle-income countries, control of corruption, political stability, government effectiveness and rule of law act to reduce deforestation. Moreover, institutional quality enhances the impact of remittances on reducing deforestation in the entire sample and in middle-income countries. In contrast, in low-income countries, institutional quality does not complement remittances to reduce deforestation.These results imply that, to reduce deforestation rates, the focus should not only be on economic development, but to an even greater extent, on institutional quality.     

Short- and long-term relation between economic development and government spending: the role of quality of institutions

ABSTRACT

This paper tests the Wagner’s assumption of the one-sided directional flow moving from economic growth to public spending considering an international database over the 1996–2012 period. By using indicators on the level of country control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, rule of law, regulatory quality and voice and accountability, the paper analyses the economic performance-public spending nexus controlling for the quality of the institutions. The empirical evidence supports the existence of the Wagner’s law, showing that, in the short-run, public spending positively reacts to a positive shock in national income, with a lower magnitude for democratic countries. In the long run, the error-correction model shows the convergence between public spending and national output occurring less quickly for non-democratic, low-income and to a smaller extent for non-OECD countries. Institutional quality, such as effort in controlling corruption and the presence of regulations that permit and promote private sector development, may help reducing the amount of per capita public spending and making it more productive. Higher expenses in compositional amenities such as public services for the elderly may explain why public spending per capita will increase the most in economies with a higher share of the population that need healthcare facilities.     

Tax enforcement,tax compliance and tax morale in transition economies: A theoretical model

The focus of this paper is the analysis of the relationship between tax enforcement, tax compliance and tax morale within countries characterised by rapid introduction of market institutions and slow evolution of political regimes, such as transition economies. The paper investigates a coordination game in which the government is ex-ante committed to tax enforcement and can observe the proportion of tax-compliant agents in the economy. In turn, two groups of agents (third-party reporting and self-reported income) are keen to evade taxes unlawfully but have limited information on how many others evade taxes; their tax morale is therefore an endogenous function of agents' perception on tax compliance. The model predicts that the lower the quality of political institutions and the weaker tax morale, the less tax compliance can be achieved. The third-party reporting group will also be bearing higher tax burden than the self-reported income group. The model entails that having political institutions of good quality is not a sufficient condition to conduce to tax enforcement or tax compliance. Due to the endogenous role of tax morale, the government could be pushed ex-post towards poor or no tax enforcement. If good political institutions are not accompanied by good information about the enforcement of tax collection, there is scope for co-existence of poor tax enforcement, low tax compliance and weak tax morale. As such, this model well describes the tax evasion behaviour observed since the outset of transition from planned to market economy.     

Does good governance matter for FDI? New evidence from emerging countries using a static and dynamic panel gravity model approach

This paper assesses the impact of institutional factors on foreign direct investment (FDI) attractiveness using a pool of 25 emerging host countries (ECs) for the period 1996–2012. In particular, the paper aims to examine whether higher institutional quality and good governance do improve FDI attractiveness, and thereby to identify which institutional factors are the main drivers of FDI in ECs. Using a static and dynamic panel gravity model with various estimation techniques, we find that FDI is positively and significantly influenced by political stability, government effectiveness and regulatory quality. The remaining set of governance indicators is found to be statistically significant and negatively linked to FDI. Our findings also show that factors like a larger GDP per capita difference between investing partner and ECs, higher degree of trade openness and better infrastructure have positive and significant effects on FDI attractiveness. These results have important policy implications for ECs. Fostering FDI inflows into these countries requires policymakers to improve the quality of their institutions and business climate through implementing sound economic policies and regulations.     

Tax Evasion,Corruption and Tax Loopholes

This paper addresses tax loopholes that allow firms to exploit borderline cases between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. In general, tax loopholes are detrimental to a revenue‐maximizing government. This may change in the presence of corruption in the tax administration. Tax loopholes may serve as a separating mechanism that helps governments maximize revenues and curb corruption, which may explain why developing countries only gradually close loopholes in their tax codes.     

Corruption and growth: Historical evidence, 1790–2010

We use a newly assembled indicator of corruption from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) to examine the effects of corruption on economic growth. The V-Dem indicator is coded for almost all contemporary and historical polities since the year 1900 and, for some countries, since the French Revolution. This global dataset allows us to exploit long-run, slow-moving variation within countries for identification, circumventing many of the difficulties faced by previous studies based on cross-section data or short panels. We present robust evidence of a negative effect of corruption on steady-state growth. Yet, we find that corruption interacts with political regime type, giving rise to heterogeneous effects. In particular, corruption is found to be significantly more deleterious for growth in democracies than in autocracies. Since corruption tends to be decentralised in democracies and centralised in autocracies, these findings are in line with theories of the ‘industrial organisation’ of corruption. We find little to no evidence that institutional weaknesses along other dimensions (state capacity, regulatory quality, property rights protection) make corruption any less harmful for growth, casting doubt on the thesis that corruption may ‘grease the wheels’ of dysfunctional institutions. Our findings provide a rationale to target anti-corruption efforts to young democracies.     

Interrelationship among institutional infrastructure,technological innovation and growth. An empirical evidence

This paper uses a multi-equation model to achieve an overall study of two key factors which explain growth, technology and institutions. The paper focuses on the process of the accumulation of these factors and the interrelationship arising among them. A theoretical model is given, together with empirical evidence for the joint impact of these factors on economic growth in a wide-ranging sample of countries between 1985 and 1997. This paper also contributes certain novel aspects in the variables employed. Thus, an indicator of human capital and an index reflecting institutional infrastructure have been used. The human capital indicator considers health, formal education, informal education and accumulated experience. It embraces a wider range of factors than the variables conventionally used in empirical studies. As to the institutional infrastructure index, it has been constructed on the basis of six institutional sub-indices, comprising voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Thus, the index constructed captures a greater wealth of the items commonly covered by the concept of institutions.     

Does the quality of political institutions affect intra-industry trade within trade blocs? The ASEAN perspective

There has been a renewed resolve for deeper integration and cooperation within ASEAN. Intra-industry trade (IIT) is often viewed as a way of achieving economic as well as political integration. This article tests for the effect that political regime and governance may have on the intensity of IIT. We particularly examine if quality of political institutions which includes corruption and democracy indices as well as economic factors comprising corporate tax rate, regional FDI flow, flexibility of exchange rate regime, size of the market, economic distance affect the intensity of horizontal and vertical IIT. The study finds that control of corruption and good governance both increase the vertical IIT but not the horizontal IIT. The study further finds that intra-economy FDI flow, stable exchange rate regime, market size and proximity positively affect IIT within the trade bloc. However the negative effect of corporate tax rate suggests that if countries were to coordinate their tax policies, they could avoid harmful tax competition and promote IIT across their borders. The findings regarding the effect those economic and political factors have on the intensity of IIT certainly warrants the attention of policy makers and researchers alike.     

Governance during Social Transformations: Challenges for Africa

The governance advice that is offered to Africa usually identifies a list of ‘good governance’ goals like stable property rights, a rule of law, low corruption and government accountability as preconditions for development. These goals are difficult to implement not only because they are expensive public goods but in addition their enforcement is typically at variance with powerful interests in the political settlements of developing countries. The historical evidence and much institutional theory suggests that during their social transformations successful developing countries had a different set of ‘developmental’ or ‘growth-enhancing’ governance capabilities that enabled their states to support critical property rights transformations and assist firms in acquiring and learning to use new technology. The institutions and policies they used differed because their political and institutional starting points were different. There are therefore no blueprints for Africa or anywhere else, but certainly the good governance menu is unrealistic. Rather African countries have to experiment and develop institutional and policy solutions that work in their context and which are appropriate for transforming property rights and accelerating technology adoption.     

双边政治关系、制度质量与中国对外直接投资*

本文利用中国与其他国家在联合国大会决议的投票行为作为双边政治关系的代理变量,以中国对89个国家2003—2015年对外直接投资数据为样本,分析了双边政治关系对中国对外直接投资的影响。研究表明：整体而言,中国的对外直接投资会受到双边政治关系的显著影响,政治关系的亲密有利于中国对外直接投资的增加。东道国制度质量可以降低中国对外直接投资对双边政治关系的敏感度,且制度质量的调节只能在中国对比自己制度质量高的国家投资时发挥作用。以2008年为分界点,后危机时代双边政治关系对投资的影响更加显著,双边政治关系的经济效应也会显著地受到东道国制度质量的调节。此外,中国改善与“一带一路”沿线国家的政治关系,可以促进中国的对外直接投资。     

The role of institutions and immigrant networks in firms’ offshoring decisions

The offshoring of production by firms has expanded dramatically in recent decades, increasing their potential for economic growth. What determines the location of offshore production? How do countries’ policies and characteristics affect a firm's decision about where to offshore? Do firms choose specific countries because of the countries’ policies or because they know them better? In this paper, we use a rich dataset on Danish firms to analyze how decisions to offshore production depend on the institutional characteristics of the country and firm-specific bilateral networks. We find that institutions that reduce credit risk and corruption increase the probability that firms will offshore there, while those that increase regulation in the labour market decrease this probability. We also show that a firm's probability of offshoring increases with the share of its employees who are immigrants from that country of origin. Finally, our analysis reveals that the negative impact of institutions that hinder offshoring is attenuated by a strong bilateral network of foreign workers.     

Toward a Humanist Reconstruction of Economic Science

This paper examines whether governance matters for the economic growth of developing countries, empirically captured within the institutional economics theoretical framework using the panel data estimation procedure. In doing so, it tests the effect of several dimensions of governance on the growth of 84 low and middle-income economies using regression specifications common in the growth literature. The empirical results show that political stability and government effectiveness is significantly positively correlated with growth. Voice and accountability and corruption are statistically significantly negatively correlated with growth. The regulatory quality and rule of law dimensions of governance are negatively but statistically insignificantly correlated with growth. The findings of this study imply that the dynamics of the current modern economy makes it necessary for developing countries to act now and within their own country, improve the dimensions of governance and establish good governance practices that are domestically relevant and internationally comparable and consistent.     

东道国科技创新、制度质量与中国OFDI门槛效应分析——基于“一带一路”视角

“一带一路”应当成为科技合作之路和创新之路。以2003-2017年“一带一路”沿线50个东道国面板数据为基础构建门槛回归模型，以东道国制度质量为门槛变量考察东道国科技创新对中国直接投资的影响。研究表明：东道国政治稳定程度、施政有效性、规制质量、法治程度、贪腐控制和公民参政与问责6个制度质量指标均存在单一门槛，说明东道国制度质量对其科技创新及中国直接投资具有影响。但是，6个制度质量指标的回归系数各不相同，说明东道国制度质量各指标的相关影响也不尽相同，中国企业在投资决策时应具体分析。最后，“一带一路”沿线国家科技水平普遍不高，而其较低的制度质量更是制约了各国科技创新，中国企业在“一带一路”沿线国家直接投资时应注意防范“技术陷阱”。     

Economic Reform and Corruption: Evidence from Panel Data

The notion that economic reform can reduce corruption remains prevalent in the policy agenda of international financial institutions, especially of the World Bank. Economic reforms have, therefore, been carried out throughout various parts of the world to improve the performance of the economies. Using data from 94 low‐ and middle‐income nations for the period 1996–2015, this study employs static and dynamic panel analysis to examine whether economic reform undertaken in accordance with the World Bank's reform programs negatively affects corruption. Our findings suggest that enhancing government effectiveness (i.e. independence of civil service from political pressure, provision of quality public services, effective policy formulation and the government's commitment to such policies) and improving public rights and civil liberties could be some of the most promising policies in terms of fighting corruption. The role of economic development and growth in real per capita income is also found to be significant in some of the specifications. However, the assertion that economic reform can reduce corruption is rejected in all the specifications. We rather find evidence that economic reforms negatively affect the ability of democracy to fight corruption, although on a slim margin. The central theme of the implications of our findings is that in combating corruption, social, institutional and legal means are far more important than economic means. The finding thus is compatible with the World Bank's effort in the later years to introduce governance and democracy as effective tool against corruption.     

An Exploration of the Greek Shadow Economy: Can Its Transfer into the Official Economy Provide Economic Relief Amid the Crisis?

We explore the determinants of the Greek shadow economy, its interaction with the official economy, and its relationship with corruption. In doing so, we undertake — for the first time — an interdisciplinary review of economic and political studies on the size and determinants of the shadow economy, tax evasion, undeclared work and, moreover, of their relation with corruption in Greece in order to reveal the extent and complexity of these phenomena. We estimate the size and determinants of the shadow economy via a multiple-indicators-multiple-causes (MIMIC) approach. Our findings indicate that the important determinants are factors related to macroeconomic conditions, such as unemployment and GDP growth, and institutional factors, such as tax morale and the rule of law. We also indicate that the shadow economy and corruption are complementary and that the official and the shadow economy substitute each other over the business cycle. An adoption of policy based on these findings would lead to a successful transfer of part of the shadow economy to the official economy, would boost government revenue, and would eventually lead the Greek economy out of the depression that emerged as a result of the sovereign debt crisis.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

GENDER AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD CORRUPTION AND TAX EVASION

The topics of corruption and tax evasion have attracted significant attention in the literature in recent years. We build on that literature by investigating empirically: (1) whether attitudes toward corruption and tax evasion vary systematically with gender and (2) whether gender differences decline as men and women face similar opportunities for illicit behavior. We use data on eight Western European countries from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey. The results reveal significantly greater aversion to corruption and tax evasion among women. This holds across countries and time, and across numerous empirical specifications. (JEL H260, D730, J160, Z130)     

Country governance,corruption, and the likelihood of firms’ innovation

Using a sample of firms from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for the period 2006–2016 in emerging and developing countries, we find that corruption has a negative impact on the likelihood of innovations, thus supporting the “sanding-the-wheels” hypothesis. Our empirical results also show that corruption at the firm level, in the manufacturing industry, and in regions with the worst governance or that are more corrupt has a significant negative effect on innovation. In addition, country governance plays a particularly important role in innovative activity for corrupt firms. The policy implication is that the government or authority should strengthen the positive role of government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of corruption in order to improve firms’ innovation within an environment of corruption.     

REGIONAL ANTI‐CORRUPTION EFFORT,POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRM INNOVATION EFFORT: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

This paper examines how firm characteristics and local anti‐corruption effort moderate the influence of political connections on enterprises’ private R&D investment using data from 2,587 Chinese A‐share listed enterprises. Our results show that the local anti‐corruption institutional environment significantly moderates the strong relationship between political connections and enterprises’ private R&D investment. Firm characteristics (i.e., firm size and firm age) also show a moderating effect on the relationship between political connection and enterprises’ private R&D investment; larger and older enterprises are more likely to have innovative resources and business cooperation partners, and thus are able to reduce their degree of reliance on political connections and government funding. The results of our study suggest the importance of having a transparent and fair institutional environment for enterprise innovation activities.