Do firms have leverage targets? Evidence from acquisitions

In the context of large acquisitions, we provide evidence on whether firms have target capital structures. We examine how deviations from these targets affect how bidders choose to finance acquisitions and how they adjust their capital structure following the acquisitions. We show that when a bidder's leverage is over its target level, it is less likely to finance the acquisition with debt and more likely to finance the acquisition with equity. Also, we find a positive association between the merger-induced changes in target and actual leverage, and we show that bidders incorporate more than two-thirds of the change to the merged firm's new target leverage. Following debt-financed acquisitions, managers actively move the firm back to its target leverage, reversing more than 75% of the acquisition's leverage effect within five years. Overall, our results are consistent with a model of capital structure that includes a target level and adjustment costs.     

Determinants of the guarantee circles: The case of Chinese listed firms

China's external capital market has been developing rapidly since the establishment of its stock markets. However, financing from the internal capital market, especially through the guarantee system provided by other associated firms (the guarantee circle), remains significant for some Chinese firms. We analyze the importance associated with the guarantee system in China with a focus on the macro and micro determinants that affect Chinese firms' participation in the guarantee circle. Our findings suggest that both macroeconomic and microeconomic factors have significant impact on a firm's involvement in the guarantee circle. Firms in regions with higher economic growth, less developed banking system and worse legal protection are more likely to receive guarantee from firms associated with the controlling shareholders. On the other hand, firms controlled by the state are less likely to receive guarantee but more likely to provide guarantee, while firms with alternative financing sources are more likely to provide guarantee. Firms within a complex group with more pyramidal layers are more likely to get involved in the guarantee circle, either as a guarantor or a guarantee. Our findings have implications to general guarantee systems with the presence of agency and moral hazard problems.     

Investment decisions and internal capital markets: Evidence from acquisitions

In this paper, we examine the workings of internal capital markets in diversified firms that engage in related and unrelated corporate acquisitions. Our evidence indicates that bidders invest outside their core business (diversify) when the cash flows of their core business fall behind those of their non-core lines of business. However, bidders invest inside their core business (i.e., undertake non-diversifying investments) when their core business experiences superior cash flows. We also find that bidders whose core business are in industries with low growth prospects engage in diversifying acquisitions while bidders whose core business are in high growth industries undertake non-diversifying acquisitions. The pre-acquisition evidence, then, suggests that firms tend to diversify when the cash flows and the growth opportunities of their core business are considerably lower than those of their non-core business. Subsequent to acquisitions we find that diversifying bidders continue to allocate financial resources from less profitable business segments (i.e., core business) to more profitable business segments (i.e., non-core business). Given the low profitability of diversifying bidders’ core business, this capital resource allocation suggests that diversification increases do not result in capital allocation inefficiencies. The evidence for non-diversifying bidders, however, supports the existence of “corporate socialism” in the sense that there is transfer of funds from the profitable (core) to the less profitable (non-core) business segments in multi-segment bidders. We find that the capital expenditures of bidders’ non-core business segments rely on both core and non-core cash flows.     

Local social environment and the speed of leverage adjustment

This study examines the impact of social capital on firms’ leverage adjustment speed. Using a comprehensive dataset of 83,374 firm-year observations for 744 US counties for 1990–2016, we find that both underleveraged and overleveraged firms located in US counties with higher levels of social capital incur slower leverage adjustment towards their optimal target capital structure. This finding is robust to alternative measures of leverage and social capital, different model specifications, controlling for county- and firm-level characteristics, and endogeneity. We further identify two mechanisms through which social capital affects leverage adjustments: monitoring (channel for underleveraged firms) and disciplinary (channel for overleveraged firms) mechanisms.     

Going public to acquire? The acquisition motive in IPOs

Newly public firms make acquisitions at a torrid pace. Their large acquisition appetites reflect the concentration of initial public offerings (IPOs) in mergers and acquisitions-(M&A-) intensive industries, but acquisitions by IPO firms also outpace those by mature firms in the same industry. IPO firms’ acquisition activity is fueled by the initial capital infusion at the IPO and through the creation of an acquisition currency used to raise capital for both cash- and stock-financed acquisitions along with debt issuance subsequent to the IPO. IPO firms play a bigger role in the M&A process by participating as acquirers than they do as takeover targets, and acquisitions are as important to their growth as research and development (R&D) and capital expenditures (CAPEX). The pattern of acquisitions following an IPO shapes the evolution of ownership structure of newly public firms.     

A stubborn persistence: Is the stability of leverage ratios determined by the stability of the economy?

The choice of capital structure firms make is a fundamental issue in the financial literature. According to a recent finding, the capital structure of firms remains almost unchanged during their lives. This stability of leverage ratios is mainly generated by an unobserved firm-specific effect that is liable for the majority of the variation in capital structure. We demonstrate that even substantial changes in the economic environment do not affect the stability of firms' leverage due to the presence of credit constraints. Financially unconstrained firms are more responsive to economic changes and adjust to the target substantially faster than constrained firms. Moreover, accounting for the ownership structure of firms boosts the explanatory power of the model in the subsample of unconstrained firms, suggesting that annual information on ownership and ownership changes together with financial constraints have the potential to be an answer to the puzzle of stability in capital structure.     

Acquisitions and CEO power: Evidence from French networks

During mergers and acquisitions, the CEOs of the acquiring firms are likely to cancel the deal if the market does not react favorably to its announcement. Using a sample of French acquisition announcements during the period from 2000 to 2005, this paper studies the conditions in which CEOs are more willing to listen to investors. Furthermore, according to the strong networks developed through French elite schools' alumni and board ties, the well-connected CEOs are more likely to complete any deal in spite of a negative market reaction to acquisition announcements.     

Bond market access and investment

Prior research has shown that differential access to debt markets significantly affects capital structure. In this paper, we examine the effect of access to debt markets on investment decisions by using debt ratings to indicate bond market access. We find that rated firms are more likely to undertake acquisitions than nonrated firms. This finding remains even after accounting for firm characteristics, for the probability of being rated, and in matched sample analysis as well as in subsamples based on leverage, firm size, age and information opacity. Rated firms also pay higher premiums for their targets and receive less favorable market reaction to their acquisition announcements relative to non-rated firms. However, the average announcement returns to rated acquirers are non-negative. Collectively, these findings suggest that the lack of debt market access has a real effect on the ability to make investments as well as on the quality of these investments by creating underinvestment, instead of simply constraining overinvestment.     

Managerial Ownership, the Method of Payment for Acquisitions, and Executive Job Retention

This study investigates how acquiring and target firm managers' preferences for control rights motivate the payment for corporate acquisitions. We expect that managers of target firms who value influence in combined firms will prefer to receive stock. One reason top managers desire influence is to enhance their chances of retaining jobs in the combined firm. Our analysis shows a strong, positive association between managerial ownership of target firms and the likelihood of acquisitions for stock. We also find that managers of target firms are more likely to retain jobs in combined firms when they receive stock rather than cash.     

Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US

Using governance metrics based on antitakeover provisions and inside ownership, we find that firms with weaker corporate governance structures actually have smaller cash reserves. When distributing cash to shareholders, firms with weaker governance structures choose to repurchase instead of increasing dividends, avoiding future payout commitments. The combination of excess cash and weak shareholder rights leads to increases in capital expenditures and acquisitions. Firms with low shareholder rights and excess cash have lower profitability and valuations. However, there is only limited evidence that the presence of excess cash alters the overall relation between governance and profitability. In the US, weakly controlled managers choose to spend cash quickly on acquisitions and capital expenditures, rather than hoard it.     

Firm size and the effectiveness of the market for corporate control

Recent research has shown evidence that larger firms are more likely to destroy shareholder wealth through acquisitions. Those findings suggest that managers of larger firms are less likely to be disciplined by the market for corporate control than managers of smaller firms. With a sample of nearly 8000 acquisitions over the period from 1980–1999, this paper offers evidence to the contrary. The results suggest that larger firms are more likely to be the target of a disciplinary takeover than smaller firms. Further tests indicate that CEOs of larger firms are significantly more likely to be replaced following a series of poor acquisitions than CEOs of smaller firms. In total, managers of the largest firms continue to make the worst acquisitions despite the evidence that they are more likely to be punished for doing so.     

How and When Do Firms Adjust Their Capital Structures toward Targets?

If firms adjust their capital structures toward targets, and if there are adverse selection costs associated with asymmetric information, how and when do firms adjust their capital structures? We suggest a financing needs‐induced adjustment framework to examine the dynamic process by which firms adjust their capital structures. We find that most adjustments occur when firms have above‐target (below‐target) debt with a financial surplus (deficit). These results suggest that firms move toward the target capital structure when they face a financial deficit/surplus—but not in the manner hypothesized by the traditional pecking order theory.     

Foreign competition and acquisitions

I provide evidence on the impact of foreign competition on firms' propensities to engage in mergers and acquisitions. Using import tariff reductions as exogenous shocks that increase foreign competition, I find that affected firms are more likely to make acquisitions following tariff reductions. Cross-sectional tests show that this association is more pronounced for single segment firms, capital intensive firms, firms with higher profit margins, and firms with better growth opportunities, which suggests that this association is stronger for firms that are affected by increased competition to a greater extent and firms that stand to gain more from acquisitions when faced with increased competition. Moreover, the positive relation between acquisition propensities and tariff cuts is more pronounced for financially unconstrained firms and during times of high capital liquidity, which implies that it is easier for firms with greater access to capital to respond to increases in foreign competition by making acquisitions. Finally, I find some evidence that the acquisitions made in response to tariff decreases are associated with better firm profitability ratios in the following year, indicating that firms respond to increased competition by making acquisitions to improve their operational efficiency.     

Corporate Debt Maturity and Acquisition Decisions

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the effects of corporate debt maturity on firms’ acquisition decisions using a large sample of acquisitions from 1991 to 2010. We find that firms with shorter debt maturity are less likely to undertake acquisitions. If they do, they are more likely to undertake smaller deals, take more time to complete, are less likely to make all cash offers, and tend to use less cash in the payment. These results support the predictions of the increased liquidity risk hypothesis. We also find that acquirers with shorter debt maturity realize higher announcement returns and experience better long‐term stock returns and operating performance. These results suggest that short debt maturity improves the efficiency of capital allocation through acquisition decisions.     

Acquisitions driven by stock overvaluation: Are they good deals?

Theory and recent evidence suggest that overvalued firms can create value for shareholders if they exploit their overvaluation by using their stock as currency to purchase less overvalued firms. We challenge this idea and show that, in practice, overvalued acquirers significantly overpay for their targets. These acquisitions do not, in turn, lead to synergy gains. Moreover, these acquisitions seem to be concentrated among acquirers with the largest governance problems. CEO compensation, not shareholder value creation, appears to be the main motive behind acquisitions by overvalued acquirers.     

Partial adjustment toward target capital structures

The empirical literature provides conflicting assessments about how firms choose their capital structures. Distinguishing among the three main hypotheses (“tradeoff”, pecking order, and market timing) requires that we know whether firms have long-run leverage targets and (if so) how quickly they adjust toward them. Yet many previous researchers have applied empirical specifications that fail to recognize the potential for incomplete adjustment. A more general, partial-adjustment model of firm leverage indicates that firms do have target capital structures. The typical firm closes about one-third of the gap between its actual and its target debt ratios each year.     

Acquisition finance and market timing

Bidders have an incentive to pay with stock when their shares are overvalued, but target firms should be reluctant to accept such overvalued payment. In a sample of 2978 acquisitions, we find that stock payment is readily accepted only when the bidder can justify the financing decision in terms of such economic fundamentals as optimal capital structure. Yet even when the fundamentals justify stock payment, paying with cash is common. In that way, firms can preclude paying with undervalued stock and are more likely to experience positive long-term excess returns.     

Acquirer-target social ties and merger outcomes

This article investigates the effect of social ties between acquirers and targets on merger performance. We find that the extent of cross-firm social connection between directors and senior executives at the acquiring and the target firms has a significantly negative effect on the abnormal returns to the acquirer and to the combined entity upon merger announcement. Moreover, acquirer-target social ties significantly increase the likelihood that the target firm?s chief executive officer (CEO) and a larger fraction of the target firm?s pre-acquisition board of directors remain on the board of the combined firm after the merger. In addition, we find that acquirer CEOs are more likely to receive bonuses and are more richly compensated for completing mergers with targets that are highly connected to the acquiring firms, that acquisitions are more likely to take place between two firms that are well connected to each other through social ties, and that such acquisitions are more likely to subsequently be divested for performance-related reasons. Taken together, our results suggest that social ties between the acquirer and the target lead to poorer decision making and lower value creation for shareholders overall.     

Cooking the books: Recipes and costs of falsified financial statements in China

We examine the causes and consequences of falsified financial statements in China. Using bivariate probit regression analysis, we find that firms with high debt and that plan to make equity issues are more likely to manipulate their earnings and thus have to restate their financial reports in subsequent years. We also find that corporate governance structures have an effect on the occurrence and detection of financial fraud. There are significant negative consequences to fraudulent financial statements. Restating firms suffer negative abnormal stock returns, increases in their cost of capital, wider bid-ask spreads, a greater frequency of modified audit opinions, and greater CEO turnover. We also find that firms located in highly developed regions suffer more severe consequences when they manipulate their accounts.     

Industry Expertise,Information Leakage and the Choice of M&A Advisors

This paper examines the impacts of M&A advisors’ industry expertise on firms’ choice of advisors in mergers and acquisitions. We show that an investment bank's expertise in merger parties’ industries increases its likelihood of being chosen as an advisor, especially when the acquisition is more complex, and when a firm in M&A has less information about the merger counterparty. However, due to the concerns about information leakage to industry rivals through M&A advisors, acquirers are reluctant to share advisors with rival firms in the same industry, and they are more likely to switch to new advisors if their former advisors have advisory relationship with their industry rivals. In addition, we document that advisors with more industry expertise earn higher advisory fees and increase the likelihood of deal completion.