Contrasting Worldviews at Bank and Securities Market Regulators

Bank and securities regulators operate with different attitudes about the appropriate regulation of financial institutions and markets. Bank regulators’ prudential oversight protects depositors from worrying about the repayment of their bank claims. In contrast, securities market regulators tend to presume that security markets (almost) always clear quickly at prices close to the asset's fundamental value. These regulators seek to assure full disclosure of information, which facilitates active securities trading. In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) investor protection duties are tailored to the financial sophistication of individual investors.     

Financial Economists' Roundtable Statement on THE STRUCTURE OF SECURITIES MARKETS

Market practitioners, regulators, and economists are now debating the merits of a national market system—a single, fully integrated securities market that would be coordinated by a central computer and mandated by the SEC. This brief statement, signed by 29 distinguished financial economists, argues that such a system is a badidea. The multiplicity of U.S. markets is a sign of innovation and vibrant competition, not a problem that requires regulatory intervention. As a variety of markets with different technologies and trading procedures vie for somewhat different groups of customers with different needs, the result is competing market centers—registered exchanges (such as NYSE and AMEX) with designated specialists; NASDAQ with competing dealers; third market dealers in listed securities; and alternative trading systems (regulated as brokers) serving institutional investors or providing on-line trading to individual investors. Moreover, the fact that the different U.S. markets are linked in various ways and degrees—for example, by information and by private order routing systems of brokers and markets—should caution us against viewing market "fragmentation" as a public policy problem in need of a solution     

消费金融创新与监管:欧美经验、教训与启示

本文针对消费金融市场金融服务和产品不断创新化和复杂化的趋势以及消费者金融素养参差不齐的现状,从消费者、金融机构和监管部门三个角度分析目前消费金融市场的问题,综述近年来欧美颁布的重要消费金融监管政策和计划,涵盖信用卡借贷、抵押贷款再融资、贷款合同条款再协商、消费者保护等领域,详细阐述其实施的经济效果,以期为中国未来政策的制定提供有效参考。从发达国家消费金融监管的经验教训来看,应重视信息呈现方式的经济效果,完善披露制度,制定政策时需考虑同目标不同政策组合的合理性与可行性。     

Evaluating the boundaries of SEC regulation

Ostensibly, the SEC's new round of regulatory activity is motivated by a bout of well-publicized business scandals and an explosive increase in financial innovations and instruments. Many critics of the “new” SEC question the proportionality and usefulness of the responses, which move the SEC well beyond reliance on disclosure and promotion of transparency. Others argue that more heavy-handed and far-reaching regulation is necessary given the vast changes in financial markets, the increasing importance of (largely unregulated) hedge funds and private equity, and corporate scandals that allege fraud and deception. This paper provides a rationale for studying recent regulatory changes and for addressing the overarching question of how to define the boundaries of SEC intervention in financial markets. The study provides an overview of papers in this special issue and concludes with suggestions for how policymakers can use research to better evaluate the costs and benefits of regulation.     

金融监管信号传递与金融市场有效运行

金融市场是金融监管当局与金融市场参与者之间动态博弈、合作共生的信息不对称系统。通过把信号博弈和重复博弈思想引入金融监管理论研究,构建以金融市场有效运行为反馈信号的金融监管当局与金融市场参与者之间的监管信号传递模型,分析金融市场治理中有效监管信号的传递机制。结果表明：金融监管力度与金融市场有效运行水平之间存在分离、混同两种均衡关系;在金融监管声誉效应的驱动下,金融监管当局倾向于选择混同均衡策略,而不是分离均衡。因而只有建立通畅的金融监管信号传递及反馈机制,强化并放大金融监管信号显示,增大监管乘数效应,形成良性的监管声誉效应,才能保障金融市场的有效运行。     

A new paradigm for forecasting security returns in a market regulated by price limits

Numerous futures markets in the US and many stock markets around the world set a “limit” price before each trading session, based on the settlement price at the end of the previous trading day. Price limits are boundaries set by market regulators to restrict large daily fluctuations in the price of securities. Once the return limit is triggered, traders cannot observe the equilibrium return that would have prevailed in the absence of such regulation. We develop an innovative approach for forecasting security returns (and prices) in a market regulated by price limits. Our forecasting model allows for multiple limit-hits. The model is robust, straightforward and easy for practitioners to use. A few numerical predictions are provided for hypothetical securities, and for seven traded futures contracts.     

Dynamic Financial System: Complexity,Fragility and Regulatory Principles

A financial system improves the allocation of real resources and enhances the performance of the production economy, but these benefits are offset in part by the risk of financial distress and the associated deadweight loss resulting from bankruptcy costs. We argue that “tiers” of financial claims increase complexity and fragility of the financial network. In equilibrium, the financial system grows relative to the real economy as the allocation of funds and risks becomes more sophisticated and as more financial claims are tiered. Growth is limited by the risk of a tiered, complex financial network and by the need to set aside additional capital as the financial sector grows. We discuss several sources of fragility in the financial system. We propose that regulators should limit the breaks in the system and do more to improve the resiliency of the network and less on individual issues that are only symptoms of fundamental problems of a network. We advocate a market based system of regulation in which market participants regulate each other, to a degree. In order for this to be feasible, the financial network must be organized according to three principles: trading transparency, competitive markets and competitive regulators, and incentive alignment of participants. Insofar as these regulatory approaches are successful in limiting network fragility, capital requirements can be reduced. Regulators should keep in mind this tradeoff between capital and regulation. With regard to regulatory policy, regulators should let the three principles be their guide in adapting to the evolving financial system rather than implementing narrowly conceived regulations that are quickly outmoded.     

The economic rationale for the nature and extent of corporate financial disclosure regulation: A critical assessment

The regulatory framework for corporate financial disclosure has been the subject of a large literature, most of which has focused on the economic rationale for disclosure requirements. This extant economic analysis has not led to any definitive conclusions regarding the necessity for disclosure regulation nor has it provided public policy guidance as to the nature and extent of required corporate financial disclosure. It is evident that broader-based analysis and research incorporating relevant social and political (as well as economic) factors is necessary to gauge appropriate public policy for financial information disclosure.     

Recent Changes in the Regulation of Financial Markets and Reporting in Canada*

The regulation of financial reporting and financial markets has undergone significant change in both the United States and Canada since 2000. In Canada, the regulatory regime is particularly complex and politically controversial, with much speculation about possible future directions. This paper's purpose is to explain the current regulatory environment as it stands in mid‐2006 to assist those who teach or conduct research in this domain. On the basis of a review of existing regulations and related studies, this paper first provides an explanation of the major jurisdictional issues that affect financial reporting and regulation in Canada, including identifying the roles of the key players. Second, it identifies specific reporting changes that might be of particular relevance to prospective capital market researchers. Where relevant, comparisons are made with regulatory provisions in the United States, because the majority of capital markets research concerns U.S. securities exchanges regulation, and the Canadian regulations themselves often refer to U.S. regulations as a point of comparison. We find that the lack of a single national securities regulator in Canada and overlaps in federal and provincial jurisdiction and among regulatory bodies mean there is a large range of players involved in financial markets regulation. Ongoing efforts to improve integration include the new passport system, improved harmonization of securities regulation, and consideration of mergers between some of the involved organizations. Other changes have led to a greater emphasis in Canada on the regulation of continuous disclosure and corporate governance than was previously the case. Changes in specific reporting regulations and guidelines since 2002 have generally increased the amount of disclosure.     

美国《多德-弗兰克法案》域外管辖效力对衍生产品市场的影响

2012年6月29日,美国商品期货交易委员会（CFTC）发布《关于〈多德-弗兰克法案〉中掉期相关规则域外效力影响的指引（草案）》,进一步明确了美国监管者对与美国实体进行衍生产品交易的外国机构的管辖权,体现了美国干预他国金融机构治理和金融监管体系的政策走向。《指引》的出台引起大部分非美国的金融机构和监管机构的反对和质疑。文章围绕《指引》的内容,分析其出台背景、原因,及其对其他国家市场造成的潜在影响,并对我国发展衍生品市场提出相关对策建议。     

Derivatives Markets and Systematic Risks: Some Reflections ∗ ‡

Derivatives are an essential part of risk management by all economic agents (financial or non financial). They contribute, with other financial innovations, to the allocative efficiency. Under certain circumstances they could also generate systemic risks. The purpose of this article is to underline the dramatic growth of derivatives instruments and the articulation between OTC and exchange-traded markets. The current debate about the regulatory framework applied to derivatives instruments and the implementation of internal control procedures (leading to more appropriate disclosure and reporting standards) is also discussed.     

Bank Capital and Risk: Is Voluntary Disclosure Enough?

This paper considers whether banks have an incentive to disclose accurate information concerning their risk and capital adequacy. State-of-the-art capital regulation relies on quantitative capital requirements, bank supervision, and public disclosure of information to the markets. Is voluntary regulatory disclosure of risk information sufficient to achieve policy objectives? The game-theoretic model of this paper suggests that voluntary disclosure can be usefully supplemented with other regulatory tools, in particular with direct supervision and financial market discipline.     

Data analytic approach for manipulation detection in stock market

The term “price manipulation” is used to describe the actions of “rogue” traders who employ carefully designed trading tactics to incur equity prices up or down to make profit. Such activities damage the proper functioning, integrity, and stability of the financial markets. In response to that, the regulators proposed new regulatory guidance to prohibit such activities on the financial markets. However, due to the lack of existing research and the implementation complexity, the application of those regulatory guidance, i.e. MiFID II in EU, is postponed to 2018. The existing studies exploring this issue either focus on empirical analysis of such cases, or propose detection models based on certain assumptions. The effective methods, based on analysing trading behaviour data, are not yet studied. This paper seeks to address that gap, and provides two data analytics based models. The first one, static model, detects manipulative behaviours through identifying abnormal patterns of trading activities. The activities are represented by transformed limit orders, in which the transformation method is proposed for partially reducing the non-stationarity nature of the financial data. The second one is hidden Markov model based dynamic model, which identifies the sequential and contextual changes in trading behaviours. Both models are evaluated using real stock tick data, which demonstrate their effectiveness on identifying a range of price manipulation scenarios, and outperforming the selected benchmarks. Thus, both models are shown to make a substantial contribution to the literature, and to offer a practical and effective approach to the identification of market manipulation.     

Regulator performance,regulatory environment and outcomes: An examination of insurance regulator career incentives on state insurance markets

In this paper we test whether the past or future labor market choices of insurance commissioners provide incentives for regulators in states with price regulation to either favor or oppose the industry by allowing prices that differ significantly from what would otherwise be the competitive market outcome. Using biographical data on insurance regulators, economic and state specific market structure and regulatory variables, and state premium and loss data on the personal automobile insurance market, we find no evidence consumers in prior approval states paid significantly different “unit prices” for insurance than consumers in states that allow competitive market forces to determine equilibrium prices during the time period 1985–2002. We do, however, find evidence regulators who obtained the position of insurance commissioner by popular election and those who seek higher elective office following their tenure as insurance commissioner allow higher overall “unit prices” relative to competitive market states. The “unit price” of insurance in regulated states is not statistically different from the competitive market outcome for regulators that make lateral moves back into state government and it is mildly higher for regulators who enter the insurance industry following their tenure. Finally, we find some evidence regulators who describe themselves as consumer advocates are successful reducing the price of insurance in favor of consumers in regulated markets. Overall the results are consistent with the existence of asymmetric information in the regulatory process that agents use to enhance their career aspirations.     

另类交易系统的法律界定

作为一种新型证券交易场所，另类交易系统是一种以互联网为基础的，依据一定规则自动聚集并撮合投资者委托买卖证券指令的电子交易系统。它属于场外交易场所的范畴，与传统交易所相比，其交易对象更广，交易流程更为便捷，交易规则特殊，同投资者之间的法律关系也不同。它的出现，不仅对传统交易所和中介机构的地位产生了强烈冲击，而且对传统的证券监管体制和证券诉讼也产生了深刻影响。本文在国外对另类交易系统概念界定的基础上，论述了其基本概念和特征，以期为将来我国另类交易系统的立法和监管提供理论参考。     

Regulatory arbitrage and the efficiency of banking regulation

We study the efficiency of banking regulation under financial integration. Banks freely choose the jurisdiction where to locate their activities and have private information about their efficiency level. Regulators non-cooperatively offer any regulatory contract that satisfies information and participation constraints of banks. We show that the unique Nash equilibrium of the regulatory game is a simple pooling contract: financial integration is characterized by the inability for regulators to discriminate between banks with different efficiency levels. This result is driven by the endogenous restriction caused by regulatory arbitrage on the capacity of regulators to use several regulatory instruments.     

Accounting for financial instruments: An analysis of the determinants of disclosure in the Portuguese stock exchange

This paper studies the determinants of disclosure level in the accounting for financial instruments of Portuguese listed companies. An index of disclosure based on IAS 32 and IAS 39 requirements is computed for each company. The analysis includes variables that capture intrinsic features of Portuguese companies and institutional regulatory context, such as capital structure and characteristics of the corporate governance structure, within contingency theory. We could not find any significant influence of corporate governance structure or of financing structure. We conclude that the disclosure degree is significantly related to size, type of auditor, listing status and economic sector. This research reveals areas for improvement of Portuguese companies' reporting practices and suggests areas for intervention of the Portuguese capital markets regulator in the context of mandatory IAS after 2005.     

宏观审慎监管:内容与框架

宏观审慎监管将整个金融体系看作一个完整的系统,重点关注对金融稳定具有系统重要性影响的金融机构和金融市场,并由监管当局采取针对性的监管措施,维护金融体系的健康运行.宏观审慎监管框架包括宏观审慎分析、宏观审慎政策工具和宏观审慎政策安排三大要素.建立我国宏观审慎监管体系,应从建立宏观审慎框架和宏观审慎分析系统着手,并注重宏观审慎政策工具的研究开发.     

How financial information disclosure affects risk perception. Evidence from Italian investors’ behaviour

This paper investigates how different representations of financial information may be appraised in terms of complexity and usefulness, and how financial disclosure influences individuals’ risk perception. By using a consumer testing analytical approach, we run a survey on a sample of Italian investors: 254 bank customers were submitted 4 different templates, each combining a different typology of data (historical and prospective) and framing (words, numbers and charts) to indicate the same level of risk and return of four real-life financial instruments. Representation formats partially overlap with those mandated by regulators and used within the financial industry. Results show that the perceived riskiness of financial products is affected by the way information is disclosed. Perceived complexity of the financial information disclosure intensifies perception of riskiness of the product solicited. Gender, age, personal traits, behavioural biases and financial knowledge, do also play a role. Overall, given investors’ heterogeneity and behavioural biases, neither simplifying disclosure nor a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach may be sufficient to ensure correct risk perception and to prevent unbiased investment choices.     

Did Regulation Fair Disclosure,SOX, and Other Analyst Regulations Reduce Security Mispricing?

Between 2000 and 2003 a series of disclosure and analyst regulations curbing abusive financial reporting and analyst behavior were enacted to strengthen the information environment of U.S. capital markets. We investigate whether these regulations reduced security mispricing and increased stock market efficiency. After the regulations, we find a significant reduction in short‐term stock price continuation following analyst forecast revisions and earnings announcements. The effect was more pronounced among higher information uncertainty firms, where we expect security valuation to be most sensitive to regulation. Analyst forecast accuracy also improved in these firms, consistent with reduced mispricing being due to an improved corporate information environment following the regulations. Our findings are robust to controls for time trends, trading activity, the financial crisis, analyst coverage, delistings, and changes in information uncertainty proxies. We find no concurrent effect among European firms and a regression discontinuity design supports our identification of a regulatory effect.