AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: EXAMINING LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF FOUR ALTERNATIVE POLICIES

A rancorous debate continues to rage over the use of affirmative action policies in college admissions. This article uses a simple signaling model to evaluate the labor market impacts of four types of affirmative action admissions policies. RacE-based preferential policies and policies guaranteeing admission based on high school academic rank may induce discrimination in labor markets when there exists strong heterogeneity in socioeconomic disadvantage within the underrepresented minority group. Under such conditions, it may also be difficult to realize ethnic diversity with disadvantagE-based preferential policies. The article argues instead for affirmative action policies emphasizing intensive college preparation for targeted groups.     

Affirmative action in education: Evidence from engineering college admissions in India

This paper examines an affirmative action program for “lower-caste” groups in engineering colleges in India. We study both the targeting properties of the program, and its implications for labor market outcomes. We find that affirmative action successfully targets the financially disadvantaged: the upper-caste applicants that are displaced by affirmative action come from a richer economic background than the lower-caste applicants that are displacing them. Targeting by caste, however, may lead to the exclusion of other disadvantaged groups. For example, caste-based targeting reduces the overall number of females entering engineering colleges. We find that despite poor entrance exam scores, lower-caste entrants obtain a positive return to admission. Our estimates, however, also suggest that these gains may come at an absolute cost because the income losses experienced by displaced upper-caste applicants are larger than the income gains experienced by displacing lower-caste students. Limited sample sizes in our preferred econometric specifications, however, prevent us from drawing strong conclusions from these labor market findings.     

Responsiveness to priority-based affirmative action policy in school choice

We consider the priority-based affirmative action policy in school choice. We weaken the responsiveness to affirmative action policy by requiring at least one minority student to be weakly better off when their priorities are improved. We find that under both the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism and the top trading cycles mechanism at least one minority student becomes weakly better off when their priorities are improved. We also strengthen the responsiveness to affirmative action policy by requiring all minority students to be weakly better off when their priorities are improved. We call this property strict responsiveness to affirmative action policy. We find that there is no nonwasteful, individually rational, mutually best, and strategy-proof mechanism that is strictly responsive to affirmative action policy. We then find a sufficient condition for the affirmative action policy to satisfy for the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism to be strictly responsive to affirmative action policy by setting restrictions on the priority improvements made by the policy.     

A Remark on Color‐Blind Affirmative Action

Faced with legal challenges to explicitly race‐contingent admissions policies, elite educational institutions have turned to criteria that meet diversity goals without being formally contingent on applicant identity. We establish that under weak conditions that apply generically, such color‐blind affirmative action policies must be nonmonotone, in the sense that within each social group, some students with lower scores are admitted while others with higher scores are denied. In addition, we argue that blind rules can generate greater disparities in mean scores across groups conditional on acceptance than would arise if explicitly race‐contingent policies were permitted.     

“PAY IT FORWARD” AND HIGHER EDUCATION SUBSIDIES: A MEDIAN VOTER MODEL

Since 2012, at least 24 states have considered legislation on Pay It Forward (PIF) models of higher education finance (which enable students to pay the price of college upon departure from an institution, as opposed to paying upfront tuition). This paper proposes a theoretical model of PIF policies within a framework in which voters belonging to different income groups vote over the level of subsidies to higher education. We analyze the impact of two types of potential PIF policies—a deferred tuition approach and an income share approach—on college access and on voting equilibria over subsidy levels. The results show that college access is enhanced by PIF policies. The equilibrium level of subsidies depends crucially on the pattern of income distribution, in particular on the relationship between mean income and the income of the median income group, and on whether higher education widens or narrows the distribution of income. We show that the equilibrium level of subsidies to higher education will not necessarily decline under PIF, and may increase in some circumstances due to changes in college access for low‐income groups. (JEL I22, I23)     

Post‐secondary attendance by parental income in the U.S. and Canada: Do financial aid policies explain the differences?

We examine the extent to which tuition and needs‐based aid policies explain important differences in the relationship between family income and post‐secondary attendance relationships between Canada and the U.S. Using data from recent cohorts, we estimate substantially smaller attendance gaps by parental income in Canada relative to the U.S., even after controlling for family background, cognitive achievement, and local‐residence fixed effects. We next document that U.S. public tuition and financial aid policies are actually more generous to low‐income youth than are Canadian policies. Equalizing these policies across Canada and the U.S. would likely lead to a greater difference in income‐attendance gradients.     

Race-based affirmative action for higher education in Brazil: Impact assessment on performance,time, and delay in completion*

This paper aims to investigate the impact of race-based affirmative action for higher education in Brazil, through the effects of applying under a quota versus the open system for Black, Brown, and Indigenous people, on academic performance, time, and delay in completion. The data used were obtained by the survey of the National Student Performance Examination (Enade) from 2016 to 2018. Through the propensity score matching methodologies, entropy balancing, empirical quantile regression strategy, and Lewbel method, a small statistically significant negative impact on students' performance was observed. Significant effects on time and delay in completion were not found in most of the estimators used. We also observed that older students and students who are male, lack, or Indigenous are more likely to choose to enter via racial quotas, while students who live with their parents or spouse and students who have some source of income are less likely to participate in the policy.     

EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: ANTIDISCRIMINATION POLICIES IN THE LABOR MARKET

Some have criticized government antidiscrimination programs for causing efficiency losses both by devoting public resources to monitoring and enforcement and by distorting personnel decisions. This paper examines the efficiency consequences of such programs when discrimination is caused by a market failure and when regulators are imperfectly informed about individual firms' personnel policies.
This paper outlines a simple model of "statistical discrimination" and shows that an equal opportunity rule, which constrains employers from offering different wage schedules to different groups, will improve the efficiency of this economy. Employers will attempt to evade such regulation, and the paper describes an evasion strategy in which employers search for worker "qualifications" that can act as proxies for race or sex. The paper discusses problems involved in monitoring and enforcing compliance, and considers two possible responses by the regulatory agency. The first is analogous to "disparate impact" judgments in which the type of information that employers can use in personnel decisions is regulated. The second is an affirmative action-type policy that monitors the outcomes, rather than the process, of hiring and compensation decisions. Affirmative action policies have some advantages since they permit employers to use information more efficiently than do policies that attempt to regulate personnel decisions directly. However, affirmative action policies are likely to lead to charges of preferential treatment.     

Environmental justice and enforcement of the safe drinking water act: The Arizona arsenic experience

Environmental justice is concerned with the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. A wide variety of empirical studies have concluded that disparate-impact discrimination does in fact exist since minority and low-income communities are at disproportionate risk for environmental harm. In this paper we examine these issues in the context of enforcing the safe drinking water act (SDWA). Specifically, we focus on the association between race, income, and hazardous levels of arsenic concentration and analyze the broad equity implications of implementing the new arsenic regulation by examining the relationship between community-level exposure to arsenic and socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the population in Arizona. The results provide no support for the contention that continued selective implementation and enforcement of the revised SDWA arsenic standard is likely to disadvantage minority or low-income groups disproportionately in Arizona.     

Subsidizing heterogeneous higher education systems

In many countries, there is an ongoing debate on the public funding of the higher education (HE) system. Our goal is to examine the theoretical justification for the establishment of HE institutions and analyze the self-selection of students under different policies of student subsidies. We study nonstationary equilibria of an overlapping-generation economy in a hierarchical education system. Given the capacity constraints of Universities, we explore the impact of adding new institutions, to be called Colleges, to the HE system, focusing on three issues. Given that Colleges are less productive and less selective than Universities: (a) Should the government establish Colleges? (b) Should the government divert funds from Universities to Colleges? On the basis of long-run economic growth considerations, we obtain positive answers to both questions. (c) Then, we compare several policies of student subsidies across the board. Our results suggest that much caution is needed in the implementation of student subsidies. Specifically, targeting subsidies to the highly-ranked students in each institution may distort their self-selection across institutions and downgrade the human capital accumulation in the economy. To offset this distortion in the demand for HE it may be useful to target subsidies to the low-ranked students in each institution. Our model also accounts for several stylized facts over time: (1) the increase in the number of institutions and students, (2) the decline in College admission standards, and (3) the decline in public budget per student and the corresponding increase in out-of-pocket student payments.     

Competition between private and public schools: testing stratification and pricing predictions

When there are peer effects in education, private schools have an incentive to vary tuition to attract relatively able students. Epple and Romano [American Economic Review 88(1) (1998) 33] develop a general equilibrium model characterizing equilibrium pricing and student selection into schools when peer effects are present. The model predicts that competition will lead private schools to give tuition discounts to more able students, and that this will give rise to an equilibrium exhibiting stratification by income and ability between the public and private sectors and to a hierarchy of schools within the private sector. The model also yields a variety of comparative-static predictions. The predictions of the model are tested in this paper using a unique data set assembled by Figlio and Stone [Research in Labor Economics (1999) 115]. Tests of equilibrium predictions of the model reveal that: The propensity to attend private school increases with both income and ability, and, among private schools, the propensity to attend the highest-tuition schools rises with both income and ability. Within private schools, tuition declines with student ability, with a substantial number of even high-income households paying little or no tuition. The correlation between income and ability is greater in public than private schools. Tests of comparative static predictions of the model reveal that: Both income and ability become stronger predictors of private school attendance as public school expenditure falls. Income becomes increasingly important in determining placement in the private school hierarchy as public school expenditure falls. Discounts to ability in the lowest-quality private school decline as public school expenditure rises while discounts to ability in the highest-quality private school are little affected by changes in public school expenditure. Expenditure in private schools rises as expenditure in public schools increases. These empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.     

DEMONSTRATED INTEREST: SIGNALING BEHAVIOR IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS

In college admission decisions, important and possibly competing goals include increasing the quality of the freshman class and making the school more selective while attaining the targeted size of the incoming class. Especially for high‐quality applicants who receive multiple competing offers, colleges are concerned about the probability that these students accept the offers of admission. As a result, applicants' contacts with admissions offices, such as campus visits, can be viewed positively by the officers as demonstrated interest in the colleges. We provide empirical evidence on the effects of demonstrated interest on admission outcomes. Specifically, we use unique and comprehensive administrative data, which include all contacts made by each applicant to the admissions office of a medium‐sized highly selective university during two admission cycles. We find that an applicant who contacts the university is more likely to be admitted, and that the effect of the contact on the probability of admission is increasing in the applicant's Scholastic Assessment Test score, particularly when the contact is costly to make. We also use a numerical example to explore policies to reduce the inequity associated with the use of demonstrated interest in admission decisions, examining in particular the subsidization of costly demonstrated interest by low‐income students. (JEL D83, I23)     

高校收费标准与我国居民的支付能力

我国当前高等学校的收费问题,是一个颇受关注的社会问题。就收费标准而言,超过了绝大多数居民的负担能力。为此,提出以下改革建议:科学计算高校运营成本,以人均可支配收入为依据,重新审定并适当降低收费标准,采用略有差别的收费标准,城镇居民不多收,农村学生要少收。     

Affirmative action in contest games

This paper analyzes the incentive effects of affirmative action in competitive environments. Competition is between heterogeneous players in a contest game where heterogeneity might be due to past discrimination. Two policy options are analyzed that tackle the underlying asymmetry: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented to neutralize the disadvantages of discriminated players. Comparing the induced effort exertion under the two policies reveals that in a two-player contest game the normative neutralization objective of affirmative action coincides with higher effort exertion. However, in the multi-player contest affirmative action might have adverse incentive effects as the participation of additional weak players detrimentally affects effort incentives of other players. These results also obtain under imperfect information of the contest organizer.     

Higher Education: Subsidizing Tuition versus Subsidizing Student Loans

We use a simple two‐period equilibrium framework to explore the effects of two different subsidization regimes for higher education on the formation of human capital and on the distribution of incomes. Individuals finance their investments in higher education through income‐contingent education loans as well as subsidies from the government. The subsidy is tax‐financed. We compare an egalitarian subsidy scheme, which reduces by a uniform amount the tuition charged to students, with a student loan subsidy which is proportional to the student's debt service obligation. We show that both types of subsidies reduce the economy‐wide underinvestment in higher education and lead to a more equal income distribution. Furthermore, according to some social welfare criterion, the student loan subsidy regime dominates the tuition subsidy regime if the subsidy level is predetermined, while the converse is true if the subsidy level constitutes a choice variable of the government.     

Taxes,Tuition Fees,and Education for Pleasure

The fact that education provides both a productive and a consumptive (nonproductive) return has important and, in some cases, dramatic implications for optimal taxes and tuition fees. Using a simple model, we show that when the consumption share in education is endogenous and tuition fees are unconstrained, the optimal tax/fee system involves regressive income taxes and high tuition fees. A progressive labor income tax system may, on the other hand, be a second‐best response to politically constrained, low tuition fees. Finally, the existence of individuals with different abilities will also move the optimal income tax system toward progressivity.     

Racial/ethnic match and student–teacher relationships

This paper explores the role of teacher race/ethnicity in the teacher-perceived relationships with kindergarten and early elementary school students. Employing a model with both student and teacher fixed effects, we discover a positive link between the racial/ethnic match and the teacher-reported relationships with students. Specifically, minority students tend to have closer relationships with their teachers when they are taught by a minority teacher. Our analyses also provide suggestive evidence that the effects on the teacher–student relationships could not be driven by differential racial discrimination between white and minority teachers. Particularly, white and minority teachers are not differentially biased in judging their relationships with minority students, implying that the source of the racial/ethnic interaction effects is likely to come from the role modeling of behaviors. Given the importance of the relationships between young children and nonparental adults in their early stages of life, these findings have crucial policy implications.     

A model of vertically differentiated education

We analyze the allocation of students who differ in their ability to two school types. We assume that there are peer effects (students learn more the better their classmates) and that the expected income after school also depends on the average productivity of peers. We derive the allocation under free school choice and decentralized determination of the academic level; we show that, compared to the social optimum, the level is suboptimal and too many students attend the better school type. A social planner can improve on the allocation under free school choice by prescribing a higher academic level.     

The impact of governing structure on the pricing behavior and market structure of public institutions of higher education in the U.S

The governance structure of a state university system is the relationship between the individual institutions and the governing board. We hypothesize that the structure will impact both the pricing behavior as well as the market structure of the institutions. The more centralized the governance structure, the more aligned it will be with the interests of the state government. Assuming that the state’s interest is to educate in-state students, those who are most likely to remain in-state therefore generating future tax revenue for the state, institutions with more centralized governance structure are more likely to offer in-state students a lower tuition price relative to out-of-state students. This hypothesis is tested with an OLS model using data from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) for the 1997–1998 academic year. We find that the ratio of out-of-state to in-state tuition is greatest among those institutions with the most centralized governance structures. They engage in the highest level of price discrimination relative to institutions with other types of governance structures. Using the classification of instructional programs, we calculate a weighted average of the percent of duplicate degrees for each type of governance structure. We find that as the governance structure becomes more centralized, the percentage of duplicate degrees in a field decreases across institutions within the same state. This suggests states with a more centralized structure have less homogeneous institutions and educational offerings.