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一、商业银行资本充足率《巴塞尔协议》将银行资本分为核心资本和附属资本。核心资本包括普通股实收股本、公开储备及不能赎回且不能累积的优先股。附属资本包括未公开储备、资产重估准备、普通准备金、普通呆账准备金及混合资本性工具和一定期限的次级债。混合资本工具包括永久性次级债务和可 相似文献
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混合资本债券是针对《巴塞尔资本协议》有关混合资本(债务、股权)工具的要求而设计的一种债券,所募资金可计入银行附属资本。新的《巴塞尔协议》按照资本质量及弥补损失的能力,将银行资本 相似文献
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中国银监会根据巴塞尔协议原则,于2003年11月,发出了《关于将次级定期债务计入附属资本的通知》。该通知的出台,使各商业银行有望通过发行次级定期债务拓宽资本筹措渠道,增强资本实力,这将有肋于缓解我国商业银行资本实力不足、资本补充渠道以及资本结构单一的状况。本文分析了我国商业银行资本金的现状及其影响,阐述了次级债与银行资本的互换机理,并对商业银行在发行次级债补充资本金的过程中应注意的问题提出了自己的看法。 相似文献
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中国银监会发布的《商业银行资本管理办法(征求意见稿)》明确了对我国商业银行资本监管的要求,必将对次级债等资本工具的发展产生深远的影响次级债是商业银行等机构发行的,清偿顺序介于一般债务和股票资本之间的一种债务工具。近年来,次级债凭借其快捷高效、成本低廉的优势,在商业银行资本补充渠道中占据了重要地位。然而作为债务工具,次级债仅 相似文献
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定义(一)账面资本(BookCapital)又称为可用资本、实有资本,就是指所有者权益,金额为企业合并后资产负债表中资产减去负债后的余额,包括实收资本或普通股、优先股和附属银行债。(二)监管资本(RegulatoryCapital)是指银行已经持有的或者是必须持有的符合监管当局要求的资本。巴塞尔新协议将监管资本分为两类:核心资本和附属资本。核心资本包括实收资本或普通股、公开储备,并扣除商誉因素;附属资本包括未公开储备、资产重估储备、普通准备金、混合债务资本工具、次级长期债务。根据《商业银行资本充足率管理办法》的定义,我国银监会定义的核… 相似文献
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江志流 《金融经济(湖南)》2008,(3):57-58
近年来,我国资本充足率监管逐步向巴塞尔资本协议的要求靠拢,但商业银行可用的资本工具仍较为缺乏.笔者就巴塞尔资本协议规定的资本结构与我国商业银行资本结构进行了对比,分析了我国商业银行发行新的资本工具--"混合一级资本"实现资本补充的可行性,并就国内发行"混合一级资本"进行了具体的条款设计. 相似文献
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积极利用附属资本工具提高商业银行资本充足率 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
1988年资本协议规定合格的监管资本包括核心资本、附属资本和三级资本,其中核心资本由股本金和从税后利润中提取的公开储备组成,是商业银行承担风险的基础附属资本包括未公开储备、资产重估储备,普通准备/贷款损失普通准备、混合型资本债务工具和长期次级债务工具;三级资本指原始期限不低于2年且受锁定条款限制的次级债券工具,其只能用于抵御市场风险。 相似文献
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GIORGIA PIACENTINO 《The Journal of Finance》2019,74(3):1261-1314
I show that venture capitalists' motivation to build reputation can have beneficial effects in the primary market, mitigating information frictions and helping firms go public. Because uninformed reputation‐motivated venture capitalists want to appear informed, they are biased against backing firms—by not backing firms, they avoid taking low‐value firms to market, which would ultimately reveal their lack of information. In equilibrium, reputation‐motivated venture capitalists back relatively few bad firms, creating a certification effect that mitigates information frictions. However, they also back relatively few good firms, and thus, reputation motivation decreases welfare when good firms are abundant or profitable. 相似文献
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We derive the optimal labor contract for a levered firm in an economy with perfectly competitive capital and labor markets. Employees become entrenched under this contract and so face large human costs of bankruptcy. The firm's optimal capital structure therefore depends on the trade‐off between these human costs and the tax benefits of debt. Optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice emerge without relying on frictions such as moral hazard or asymmetric information. Consistent with empirical evidence, persistent idiosyncratic differences in leverage across firms also result. In addition, wages should have explanatory power for firm leverage. 相似文献
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We develop a firm-specific measure of the most important intangible asset—organization capital—and document that organization capital is associated with five years of future operating and stock return performance, after controlling for other factors. Thus, our organization capital measure captures firms' fundamental ability to generate abnormal performance. We also find that executive compensation is positively associated with our measure of organization capital, showing that the measure indeed reflects managerial ability. 相似文献
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印度的资本流动与资本账户开放 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
印度在上世纪90年代开始的资本账户开放,促进了印度资本流动的大发展,本文从五个方面介绍了资本账户开放的主要内容.印度的资本账户开放对印度意义重大,并取得了初步成功,其关键就在于渐进式改革的推进,这对包括中国在内的发展中国家都有借鉴意义. 相似文献
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正长期以来,我国民间金融一直没有得到官方认可,除极少数渠道外,均以"非法"的形式存在,民间资本没有获得应有的增值能力。2005年,国务院发布《关于鼓励支持和引导个体私营等非公有制经济发展的若干意见》,为民间资本进入银行业打开了一扇大门。经过多年发展,民间资本已是银行业资本金的重要组成部分。但研究发现,受传统观念、自身实力、外部环境等因素的影响,民间资本转化为银行资本仍存在一些困难,需进一步加以改进。 相似文献
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Bank Capital Requirements, Capital Structure and Regulation 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
John P. Harding Xiaozhong Liang Stephen L. Ross 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2013,43(2):127-148
This paper studies the impact of capital requirements, deposit insurance and franchise value on a bank’s capital structure. We find that properly regulated banks voluntarily choose to maintain capital in excess of the minimum required. Central to this decision is both firm franchise value and the ability of regulators to place banks in receivership stripping equity holders of firm value. These features of our model help explain both the capital structure of the large mortgage Government Sponsored Enterprises and the recent increase in risk taking through leverage by financial institutions. The insights gained from the model are useful in guiding the discussion of financial regulatory reforms. 相似文献