Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Corruption and the Political Economy of Resource-Based Development: A Comparison of Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa

We model how the “supply and demand” for bribes affects resource use by an economy, and the reinvestment of resource rents in other assets. This requires adjusting the World Bank’s measure adjusted net savings for any rent dissipation due to corruption. The impacts of corruption on long-run changes and periodic growth in the adjusted net savings rate are estimated across African and Asian economies from 1970 to 2003. Corruption rather than resource dependency per se affects negatively the ability of African countries to reinvest resource rents in the short term, but for Asian countries, corruption is less important than point resources. Corruption influences long-run growth in adjusted net savings rates in all countries, and is also the “pathway” through which this growth is affected by patterns of resource use, trade and abundance.     

Relationships between corruption,political orientation,and income inequality: evidence from Latin America

This research sheds light on the analysis of the impact of corruption and political orientation on income distribution in Latin America. Although it has been theoretically demonstrated that corruption worsens the income distribution, the empirical evidence has yielded ambiguous results based on biased estimates not considering a measurement error in the estimation of inequality. This article fills this gap by correcting the previous measurement error bias in the fixed-effects estimation. Additionally, political orientation and its relationship with income inequality are also investigated. The sample covers 18 Latin American countries between 1996 and 2012. Results reveal that corruption increases income inequality.     

Financial development,control of corruption and income inequality

This paper examines the effect of financial development and control of corruption on income inequality in 21 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over the period 1985–2011 using the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator. The empirical results show that financial development measures have positive impact on income inequality, which suggest that financial development increases income inequality. On the other hand, the coefficients of control of corruption are negative and significantly related to income inequality which implies that corruption control reduces income inequality. Further, the interaction of the financial development and the control of corruption is found to be negatively and significantly related to income inequality. Equally the interaction of the financial development and transparency index (an alternate measure of corruptibility) is found to be negatively and significantly related to income inequality. These findings suggest that the control of corruption and transparency in governance are crucial in reducing income inequality in SSA.     

Inequality, corruption and the informal sector

The marginal impact of corruption on income inequality is shown to be a linear function of the size of the informal sector. This implies that anti-corruption policies alone are unlikely to reduce inequality in countries with a large informal sector.     

Foreign direct investment,growth and income inequality in less developed countries

How does foreign direct investment (FDI) affect economic growth in less developed countries (LDCs)? What is its association with changes in the income distribution? This paper empirically examines these issues within a cross section of less developed countries between 1970 and 1989. FDI is positively associated with economic growth within this sample of countries. However, there is no strong association between FDI and changes in income inequality within these same countries and over this same time period. Hence, there is no evidence that FDI is increasing income inequality within this group of LDCs.     

Population increase,economic growth,educational inequality,and income distribution: some recent evidence

The relationship between population increase, economic growth, education and income inequality was examined in a cross-section study based on data from 26 developing and 2 developed countries. As other studies have noted, high population growth is associated with a less equal income distribution. A 1 percentage point reduction in the rate of population growth tends to raise the income share of the poorest 80% in the less developed world by almost 5 percentage points and is associated with a 1.7 percentage point increase in the income share of the poorest 40%. The relationship between short-run income growth and equality, on the other hand, is strong and positive. Estimates suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in the short-run rate of growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) increases the income share of the bottom 80% by about 2 percentage points and that of the poorest 40% by almost 1 percentage point. Although higher mean schooling appears to be a mild equalizer, educational inequality does not appear to have an adverse effect on income distribution. Overall, these results challenge the widely held belief that there must be a growth-equity trade-off. Moreover, they suggest that the impact of educational inequality on income distribution may be different from that observed in earlier studies, implying a need for caution in using these earlier results as a basis for educational policy development.     

WHAT MAKES INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH? AN INTERNATIONAL CROSS‐COUNTRY ANALYSIS

This paper re‐examines the relationship between international capital flows and economic growth within the context of various ‘conditional factors’ that possibly have the potential to influence such relationships. It achieves this by employing panel data for 80 countries that cover 1976–2007. International capital inflow is broken down into foreign direct investments (FDI) and foreign portfolio investments (FPI). We find interesting evidence that only FDI has a positive effect on growth and that FPI has an unfavorable, if not negative, effect on growth. The conditional variables of banking liberalization, high‐income level, twin crises, lower corruption, and human capital mitigate the positive impacts of FDI on growth. In contrast, the middle‐income level and good shareholder protection have a positive effect. As concerns FPI, the level of financial liberalization, being in a Latin American region, the wealth of countries, and market governance all influence the way that FPI affects growth, whereas the conditional variables of twin crises and human capital do not influence the effect of FPI on economic growth.     

Corruption and growth: Historical evidence, 1790–2010

We use a newly assembled indicator of corruption from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) to examine the effects of corruption on economic growth. The V-Dem indicator is coded for almost all contemporary and historical polities since the year 1900 and, for some countries, since the French Revolution. This global dataset allows us to exploit long-run, slow-moving variation within countries for identification, circumventing many of the difficulties faced by previous studies based on cross-section data or short panels. We present robust evidence of a negative effect of corruption on steady-state growth. Yet, we find that corruption interacts with political regime type, giving rise to heterogeneous effects. In particular, corruption is found to be significantly more deleterious for growth in democracies than in autocracies. Since corruption tends to be decentralised in democracies and centralised in autocracies, these findings are in line with theories of the ‘industrial organisation’ of corruption. We find little to no evidence that institutional weaknesses along other dimensions (state capacity, regulatory quality, property rights protection) make corruption any less harmful for growth, casting doubt on the thesis that corruption may ‘grease the wheels’ of dysfunctional institutions. Our findings provide a rationale to target anti-corruption efforts to young democracies.     

Growth, income distribution, and democracy: What the data say

This paper investigates the relationship between income distribution, democratic institutions, and growth. It does so by addressing three main issues: the properties and reliability of the income distribution data, the robustness of the reduced form relationships between income distribution and growth estimated so far, and the specific channels through which income distribution affects growth. The main conclusion in this regard is that there is strong empirical support for two types of explanations, linking income distribution to sociopolitical instability and to the education/fertility decision. A third channel, based on the interplay of borrowing constraints and investment in human capital, also seems to receive some support by the data, although it is probably the hardest to test with the existing data. By contrast, there appears to be less empirical support for explanations based on the effects of income distribution on fiscal policy.     

Corruption and economic development nexus: Variations across income levels in a non-linear framework

This article investigates the relationship between income and corruption which provides an insight to the changes in the level of perceived corruption and economic development across countries. An existing shortcoming is that previous studies have focused only on detecting the linear effects of income on corruption. We therefore use the hierarchical polynomial regression to evaluate any existence of a non-linear relationship after controlling for socio-economic and institutional factors. Our results challenge some of the findings of a negative income–corruption association in the literature, and provide some new inferences. The findings indicate a quadratic function that best fits the data, and despite an upsurge of corruption among the low-to-medium income countries, the advanced stages of development eventually reduce corruption level substantially. The results persist when per capita income is instrumented for by latitude distance and life expectancy. The policy implications suggest a combination of economic, institutional and social policies that can effectively, in turn, reduce and lower the effects of corruption on the society, economy and development.     

Democracy, Governance, and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence

The paper examines how democracy affects long-run growth by influencing the quality of governance. Empirical evidence is first presented showing that measures of the quality of governance are substantially higher in more democratic countries. A general-equilibrium, endogenous growth model is then built to show how a governance-improving democracy raises growth. In this model, stronger democratic institutions influence governance by constraining the actions of corrupt officials. Reducing corruption, in turn, stimulates technological change and spurs economic growth. Empirical evidence is presented showing that democracy is in fact a significant determinant of total factor productivity (TFP) growth between 1960 and 1990 in a cross-section of countries. But this contribution occurs only insofar as stronger democratic institutions are associated with greater quality of governance.     

On poverty traps,thresholds and take-offs

Recent studies on economic growth focus on persistent inequality across countries. In this paper we study mechanisms that may give rise to such persistent inequality. We consider countries that accumulate capital in order to increase the per capita income in the long run. We show that the long-run growth dynamics of those countries can generate a twin-peak distribution of per capita income. The twin-peak distribution is caused by (1) locally increasing returns to scale and (2) capital market constraints. These two forces give rise to a twin-peaked distribution of per capita income in the long run. In our model investment decisions are separated from consumption decisions and we thus do not have to consider preferences. Empirical evidence in support of a twin-peak distribution of per capita income is provided.     

Which country uses public social expenditure efficiently among OECD countries?

In this study, we estimate the efficiency of public social expenditure and examine what exogenous factors affect the efficiency for OECD countries. In doing so, we use the Stochastic Frontier Model. Our findings suggest the following. First, public social expenditure related to unemployment and family as well as tax burden ratio significantly reduce income inequality. Second, corruption affects the efficiency of public social expenditure. This implies that even though two countries incur the same public social expenditure, a country with a low corruption index has higher efficiency of public social expenditure than that with a high corruption index.     

Corruption,remittances, and public goods: A unified framework

Remittances are an important source of income for the very countries afflicted by high levels of corruption. However, corruption undermines the development potential of remittances. With this in mind, we propose policy reforms that harness the potential of remittances while mitigating corruption. Unlike previous studies, we point to two channels: (1) the corrupt government's trade-off between its financial interests (corruption), the provision of a public good, and the gains from a higher inflow of remittances; and (2) the household's consumption of the public good relative to that of the privately obtained substitute of the public good.     

Why is corruption less harmful in some countries than in others?

Empirical evidence shows that not all countries with high levels of corruption have suffered poor growth performance. Bad quality governance has clearly been much less damaging (if at all) in some economies than in others. Why this is so is a question that has largely been ignored, and the intention of this paper is to provide an answer. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth occurs endogenously through the invention of new goods based on research and development activity. For such activity to be undertaken, firms must acquire complementary licenses from public officials who are able to exploit their monopoly power by demanding bribes in exchange for these (otherwise free) permits. We show that the effects of corruption depend on the extent to which bureaucrats coordinate their rent-seeking behaviour. Specifically, our analysis predicts that countries with organised corruption networks are likely to display lower levels of bribes, higher levels of research activity and higher rates of growth than countries with disorganised corruption arrangements.     

Is corruption in China “out of control”? A comparison with the US in historical perspective

This paper compares corruption in China over the past 15 years with corruption in the US between 1870 and 1930, periods that are roughly comparable in terms of real income per capita. Corruption indicators for both countries and both periods are constructed by tracking corruption news in prominent US newspapers. Several robustness checks confirm the reliability of the constructed corruption indices for both countries. The comparison indicates that corruption in the US in the early 1870s, when its real income per capita was about $2800 (in 2005 dollars), was 7–9 times higher than China’s corruption level in 1996, the corresponding year in terms of income per capita. By the time the US reached $7500 in 1928, approximately equivalent to China’s real income per capita in 2009, corruption was similar in both countries. The findings imply that, while corruption in China is an issue that merits attention, it is not at alarmingly high levels, compared to the US historical experience. In addition, the paper articulates a theoretical framework within which the relationship between corruption and economic development can be understood. The model is used to explain the “life-cycle” of corruption in the development process–rising at the early stages of development, and declining after modernization has taken place. Hence, as China continues its development process, corruption will likely decline.     

Education, corruption, and the distribution of income

We examine how the interaction between education and corruption affects institutional reform and economic development. While corruption reduces average income and education, education increases not only output and hence potential corruption rents, but also produces more informed electorates that better monitor government actions. We find that economies with intermediate levels of education remain in a poverty trap since the level of skills creates sufficient corruption rents but not enough monitoring. Economies with low or high levels of education can escape the poverty trap, and inequality plays a key role in determining whether this occurs through a change in institutions or an expansion of education.     

Social capital, innovation and growth: Evidence from Europe

This paper investigates the interplay between social capital, innovation and per capita income growth in the European Union. We model and identify innovation as an important mechanism that transforms social capital into higher income levels. In an empirical investigation of 102 European regions in the period 1990-2002, we show that higher innovation performance is conducive to per capita income growth and that social capital affects this growth indirectly by fostering innovation. Our estimates suggest that there is no direct role for social capital to foster per capita income growth in our sample of European Union countries.     

The Dynamic Relationship Between Corruption–Inflation: Evidence From Panel Vector Autoregression

This paper aims to explain the mixed causality nexus between corruption and inflation. For that, we apply a panel vector autoregression model on a large sample of 180 countries over the period 1996–2014. Using two corruption indexes and subsample estimations, results provide evidence that the inflation–corruption nexus is bidirectional. The causal effect is more important from corruption to inflation. Interactions remain significant but heterogeneous across subsamples with different income levels. The corruption effect is persistent only in low–middle income economies and its adverse effect on inflation is weaker in high‐income economies. The two‐way relationship between inflation and corruption reflects the inability to control inflation and the situation of the poverty trap in some countries.