Stackelberg竞争条件下的最佳福利关税与最大收入关税

文章考察Stackelberg竞争条件下的最佳福利关税与最大收入关税。分析表明,最佳福利关税与最大收入关税的相对大小主要取决于产品之间的相互关系和国内外企业的成本差异。当产品是互补品时,最佳福利关税总是小于最大收入关税;当产品是替代品时,最佳福利关税与最大收入关税的关系,既取决于产品间的替代程度又取决于国内外企业间的成本差异。产品的替代程度较弱时,最大收入关税总是大于最佳福利关税;产品的替代程度较强时,若国内外厂商间的成本差异越小,则最佳福利关税越有可能超过最大收入关税。     

Welfare‐ and Revenue‐Enhancing Tariff and Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition

We examine welfare and revenue effects of tariff and tax reform in a country importing final and intermediate goods, both of which are produced under imperfect competition. We consider two reform strategies. First, lower the sum of a consumption tax and a tariff on the intermediate good, and leave the sum of the consumption tax and a tariff on the final good unchanged. Second, lower the former and change the latter to leave government revenue unchanged. We specify conditions under which each reform strategy raises welfare without decreasing government revenue.     

On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas under a Revenue Constraint

This paper sets out a duopolistic model to examine the price and welfare equivalence of tariffs and quotas, given the quota rent is equal to the tariff revenue. It shows that the domestic welfare ranking of the two trade policies crucially depends on the relative costs of the domestic and foreign firms; when the domestic firm's relative costs are lower than those of the foreign firm, a quota regime generally leads to a higher welfare level than that of an equivalent tariff regime. This finding contrasts sharply with the conclusions of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1977 ), where it was found that a tariff regime always generates higher domestic welfare.     

OPTIMUM-WELFARE AND MAXIMUM-REVENUE TARIFFS UNDER BERTRAND DUOPOLY

This article derives the maximum‐revenue tariff and the optimum‐welfare tariff under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. It is shown that both tariffs are lower under Bertrand duopoly than under Cournot duopoly. Also, the optimum‐welfare tariff may exceed the maximum‐revenue tariff under both Bertrand duopoly and Cournot duopoly. This result is more likely the lower the costs of the home firm relative to the costs of the foreign firm, and the greater the degree of product substitutability. Also, it is shown that the optimum‐welfare tariff is less likely to exceed the maximum‐revenue tariff under Bertrand duopoly than under Cournot duopoly.     

最优关税和部分私有化战略-产品差异的混合寡头模型

本文通过构建一个双寡头垄断竞争的博弈模型,探讨了存在产品差异的混合寡头市场(mixed oligopoly)中,国内外企业的产品差异程度和公有企业私有化程度对最优关税的影响。研究结果表明:无论政府以收入极大化还是福利极大化为目标,其制定的关税税率都应随着私有化程度和产品差异程度的提高而提高,政府福利目标与关税收入目标都与产品差异程度成正比。与最近的其他研究发现不同,在不存在私有化或者当私有化程度相对较低而差异程度相对较高时,收入极大化关税税率总是高于福利极大化关税税率。同时本文还得出,福利极大化下的社会最优私有化比例总是大于关税收入极大化的社会最优私有化比例。因此,以社会福利极大化为目标的政府比以关税收入极大化为目标的政府更加倾向于私有化本国的公有企业。     

Capital Imports and Tariffs

This paper develops a three‐sector, three‐factor specific factor model with a tariff and presents conditions under which capital imports and tariffs can be welfare enhancing in a developing country. The impact on welfare depends on the tariff revenue effect and the repatriation effect. A capital import is welfare enhancing if it reduces the domestic output of imports. A tariff is welfare enhancing only if it reduces the return to foreign capital.     

Growth,revenue, and welfare effects of tariff and tax reform: Win–win–win strategies

We examine growth, revenue, and welfare effects of tariff and tax reform with a two-good, two-factor endogenous growth model. Learning-by-doing and intersectoral knowledge spillovers contribute to endogenous growth consistent with incomplete specialization. We obtain two main results. First, trade liberalization raises (or lowers) the growth rate if and only if the import sector is more effective-labor-intensive (or capital-intensive). Second, we can attain growth, revenue, and welfare gains by combining consumer–price–neutral tariff and tax reform for growth enhancement with an additional rise in the consumption tax on the less distorted good.     

Tariffs,Quotas, and Forward Contracts under Asymmetric Information*

We consider optimal trade policy for a large country with private information. We show that the optimal tariff leads to a signaling equilibrium with higher tariffs and lower welfare than under complete information, whereas the optimal import quota replicates the complete information equilibrium and thus is superior to the tariff. We also show that, with the tariff, the country may be better off being uninformed. Finally, we show that if the importing nation cannot commit to its tariff, the use of futures contracts together with the dynamically consistent tariff leads to the same equilibrium as under complete information with commitment.     

Revenue‐enhancing Trade Liberalization in a Differentiated Duopoly

Existing studies suggest that in developing countries, tax reforms that increase consumption taxes can compensate for shortfalls in revenue from a tariff reduction. However, these revenue‐enhancing tariff–tax reforms have a critical shortcoming—they generally reduce welfare under imperfect competition. This paper shows that tax reforms such as consumption tax reforms do not necessarily have to be implemented to make up for revenue shortfalls from tariff reductions under imperfect competition, because trade liberalization through tariff cuts leads to an increase in government revenue when domestic and imported goods have a high substitutability. This revenue‐enhancing effect of a tariff reduction occurs for a wider degree of product substitutability when initial tariff and consumption tax rates are high. More importantly, we show that even if initial tariff and consumption tax rates are sufficiently low, a tariff reduction still increases government revenue for a low degree of product differentiation under Bertrand competition.     

Optimal Tariffs under a Revenue Constraint*

This paper examines the optimal tariff structure under a revenue constraint. When a fixed level of tax revenue has to be collected from the tariff alone, no adjustment in tariff rates can achieve an efficient resource allocation, even in a small open economy. Hence, the optimal tariff problem arises under a revenue constraint. We show that the revenue‐constrained optimal tariff structure is characterized by the following two rules: (i) the optimal tariff rate is lower for the import good that is a closer substitute for the export good, and (ii) the stronger the cross‐substitutability between imports, the closer the optimal tariff is to uniformity. This provides a theoretical explanation for the finding in empirical studies that the efficiency loss from a uniform tariff structure is negligible.     

Dynamic Interactions in Trade Policy in a Differential Game Model of Tariff Protection

This paper develops a two‐country dynamic game model of tariff protection to reconsider optimal trade policies and their implications for welfare. The authors show that an import subsidy is optimal in the feedback Nash equilibria, which results in a curious possibility that the domestic market is monopolized by the foreign firrm. However, welfare comparisons among Nash equilibria, free trade, and autarky reveal that feedback Nash equilibria involve higher welfare than both autarky and free trade, i.e. dynamic noncooperative choices of policy serve as tacit policy coordination and ensure larger trade gains relative to free trade.     

Foreign-Investment Tax and Tariff Policies in Developing Countries

In this paper we examine the welfare effects of tax on foreign capital and tariff policies for a small open economy with sectoral unemployment. The individually and jointly optimal tax and tariff rates in the absence or presence of international tax credits are derived. A subsidy on foreign capital coupled with a tariff can be jointly optimal when tax credits are absent in the source country. However, the capital subsidy policy may fail to hold when the foreign country follows a tax credit system.     

Mergers and Trade Policy under Oligopoly

For an oligopolistic industry, the effects of mergers on the domestic country's optimal trade policy are analyzed. If the domestic country pursues an optimal trade policy then it will always lose as a result of a foreign merger. The optimal domestic response to a foreign merger is to decrease (increase) the tariff if demand is concave (convex) and to increase the production subsidy. The foreign merger reduces foreign welfare when the domestic country pursues its optimal trade policy. The optimal domestic response to a domestic merger is to leave the tariff unchanged and to increase the production subsidy.     

Environmental Funds,Public Abatement,and Welfare

This paper addresses some features of environmental funds that the government uses to finance public abatement with pollution tax revenue or tariff revenue. I find that when the pollution tax rate and the tariff rate are jointly chosen optimally, then the optimal pollution tax rate is higher than the Pigouvian tax rate under public abatement financed by tariff revenue, and lower when public abatement is financed by pollution tax revenue. Furthermore, I show that the optimal tariff rate is positive regardless of which tax revenue is used to finance public abatement. These results are relevant for countries where the government seeks revenues earmarked for the financing of environmental funds.     

Trade Liberalization in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment and Tax Credits: Estimates for Costa Rica

The paper uses a calibrated general-equilibrium model to quantify the welfare impact of trade liberalization—and compute the optimal tariff structure—for Costa Rica when trade-policy-induced foreign direct investment and international capital taxation with credits are present. It shows that complete trade liberalization reduces Costa Rica's welfare, as it leads to an outflow of capital and loss of tax revenue which more than offset the efficiency gains from an enhanced resource allocation. The optimal tariff structure for the Costa Rican economy turns out to be a mixture of relatively small import tariffs and subsidies.     

Manipulable behavior in international trade

In this paper, we present a Cournot duopoly model to analyze the manipulated behavior in international trade. The WTO is assumed as an arbitrator for the exchange in an oligopolistic industry and sets tariff rules according to the SDT principles; a firm's cost is private information both for the WTO and the foreign rivalries. Subsequent to our analysis of several cases we find that a firm may misreport to the WTO for more production revenue and the government may collude with a firm for higher welfare. It is shown that the misreporting and collusion incentives are related to the WTO tariff rule, the misreported cost and market size. Furthermore, a strategy proof tariff rule has been designed in which firms can never make his revenue better off by misreporting production cost.     

Revenue-Neutral Environmental Tariff Reform, Growth, and Welfare

This paper analyzes the growth and welfare effects of revenue‐neutral tariff reform in a small open endogenous growth model with environmental externalities. As is the case in countries that depend primarily on imported energy, the employment of a foreign intermediate good causes negative environmental externalities in production. This paper shows that substituting a tariff on the foreign intermediate good for a tariff on the foreign consumption good in a revenue‐neutral way raises the growth rate and the welfare, if the environmental externality is sufficiently strong and if the elasticity of substitution between inputs lies within a certain range.     

THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN CAPITAL INFLOW WITH TARIFF-RIDDEN AND QUOTA-RESTRICTED IMPORTS*

The welfare effects of foreign capital inflow and changes in the foreign price and tariff rate of a tariff-ridden imported good are considered for a small country for both 3 times 2 and 3 times 3 trade models with a quota-restricted imported good (whose special case is a nontraded good). For the 3 times 2 model, foreign capital inflow does not affect home welfare when there is no tariff on imports, but it harms the home country if a tariff is imposed on the imports to the extent that the tariff-ridden imported good is more capital intensive than the exported good. On the other hand, for the 3 times 3 model the foreign-capital inflow benefits the home country if the tariff rate is below a certain level under the analogous capital-intensity assumptions. The welfare effects of changes in the foreign price of the tariff-ridden good and its tariff rate remain the same for both models.     

Optimal Tariff Policy on Imports from Multinationals*

Using partial equilibrium analysis, it is shown that for small countries there is an optimal tariff on imports from a monopolistic multinational. There is also (under specified circumstances) a tariff at which the multinational finds subsidiary production more profitable than exports: the switchover tariff. The interaction between the optimal and switchover tariffs is analyzed from the small country's welfare standpoint. The conclusion is that there is not one, but a variety of possible optimal policies for the country: trade at the optimal tariff, with or without prohibition of subsidiary production, or tariff-protected subsidiary production.     

Uniform Versus Discriminatory Tariffs

We analyze the non‐cooperative interaction between two exporting countries producing differentiated products and one importing country when governments use optimal policies to maximize welfare. The analysis includes product differentiation, asymmetric costs, and Bertrand competition. For identical exporting countries we demonstrate that the importing country always prefers a uniform tariff regime while both exporting countries prefer a discriminatory tariff regime for any degree of product differentiation. If countries are asymmetric in terms of production cost then the higher‐cost exporter always prefers the discriminatory regime but the lower‐cost exporter prefers the uniform regime if there is a significant cost differential. With cost asymmetry the announcement of a uniform tariff regime by the importer is not a credible strategy since there is an incentive to deviate to discrimination. This implies an international body can play a role in ensuring that tariff agreements are respected.